George Georgiadis Kellogg

CV  |  Publications  |  Working Papers |  Teaching 

Assistant Professor of Strategy
Kellogg School of Management
Northwestern University


Curriculum Vitae

Research Interests
Microeconomic Theory, Organization Economics, Industrial Organization

Contact Information
Kellogg School of Management
Office 4223
2211 Campus Drive
Evanston, IL 60208

E-mail: g-georgiadis@kellogg.northwestern.edu



Working Papers

  • Optimal Monitoring Design  [Slides]  
    with Balazs Szentes

    Abstract: This paper considers a Principal-Agent model with hidden action in which the Principal can monitor the Agent by acquiring independent signals conditional on effort at a constant marginal cost. The Principal aims to implement a target effort level at minimal cost. The main result of the paper is that the optimal information-acquisition strategy is a two-threshold policy and, consequently, the equilibrium contract specifies two possible wages for the Agent. This result provides a rationale for the frequently observed single-bonus wage-contracts.

  • Equilibrium Selection in the War of Attrition under Complete Information  
    with Youngsoo Kim and Dharma Kwon

    Abstract: We consider a two-player game of war of attrition under complete information. Our main result shows that if the players' payoffs whilst fighting for the prize vary stochastically, and their exit payoffs are heterogeneous, then the game admits Markov Perfect equilibria in pure strategies only. This result holds irrespective of the degree of randomness and heterogeneity, thus highlighting the fragility of mixed-strategy equilibria to a natural perturbation of the canonical model. In contrast, when the players' flow payoffs are deterministic or their exit payoffs are homogeneous, we show that the game admits equilibria in pure, as well as in mixed strategies.

  • Optimal Contracts with a Risk-Taking Agent   [Slides]
    with Daniel Barron and Jeroen Swinkels
    Featured in: Kellogg Insight, Bloomberg, and SmartBrief

    Abstract: Consider an agent who can costlessly add mean-preserving noise to his output. To deter such risk-taking, the principal optimally offers a contract that makes the agent's utility concave in output. If the agent is risk-neutral and protected by limited liability, this concavity constraint binds and so linear contracts maximize profit. If the agent is risk averse, the concavity constraint might bind for some outputs but not others. We characterize the unique profit-maximizing contract and show how deterring risk-taking affects the insurance-incentive tradeoff. Our logic extends to costly risk-taking and to dynamic settings where the agent can shift output over time.

  • Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision   [Slides]
    with Renee Bowen and Nicolas Lambert
    Accepted, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

    Abstract: Two heterogeneous agents contribute over time to a joint project, and collectively decide its scope. A larger scope requires greater cumulative effort and delivers higher benefits upon completion. We show that the efficient agent prefers a smaller scope, and preferences are time-inconsistent: as the project progresses, the efficient (inefficient) agent's preferred scope shrinks (expands). We characterize the equilibrium outcomes under dictatorship and unanimity, with and without commitment. We find that an agent's degree of efficiency is a key determinant of control over project scopes. From a welfare perspective, it may be desirable to allocate decision rights to the inefficient agent.


Publications



Teaching