George Georgiadis Kellogg

CV  |  Publications  |  Working Papers |  Teaching 

Associate Professor of Strategy
Kellogg School of Management
Northwestern University


Curriculum Vitae

Research Interests
Microeconomic Theory, Organization Economics, Industrial Organization

Contact Information
Kellogg School of Management
Office 4223
2211 Campus Drive
Evanston, IL 60208

E-mail: g-georgiadis@kellogg.northwestern.edu



Short Bio

    I am an applied microeconomic theorist with a focus on organizational economics and industrial organization. My recent research aims to understand how the design of incentives affects the behaviors of individuals in various settings, and develop insights that organizations can use to optimize their incentive systems.
     
    At Kellogg, I teach Strategy and Organizations (STRT 452), an elective MBA course on organizational economics, which aims to offer a micro-economic approach to both the internal organization of firms and its relationship with their rivals' overall strategies. Topics include incentive pay, decentralization (e.g., transfer pricing and coordination issues), horizontal mergers, and vertical integration.


Working Papers / Work in Progress

  • Optimal Feedback in Contests  [Slides]   [EC'21]  (Updated June 2021)
    with Jeffrey Ely, Sina Moghadas Khorasani, and Luis Rayo
    Review of Economic Studies, Revise & Resubmit
    Featured in: Kellogg Insight

    Abstract: We derive an optimal dynamic contest for environments where the principal monitors effort through a coarse, binary performance measure and chooses prize-allocation and termination rules together with a real-time feedback policy. The optimal contest takes a stark cyclical form: contestants are kept fully apprised of their own successes, and at the end of each fixed-length cycle, if at least one agent has succeeded, the contest ends and the prize is shared equally among all successful agents regardless of when they succeeded; otherwise, the designer informs all contestants that nobody has yet succeeded and the contest resets.

  • Optimal Technology Design  [Slides]  [Online Appendix]  (Updated October 2021)
    with Daniel Garrett, Alex Smolin, and Balazs Szentes

    Abstract: This paper considers a moral hazard model with agent limited liability. Prior to interacting with the principal, the agent designs the production technology, which is a specification of his cost of generating each output distribution. After observing the production technology, the principal offers a payment scheme and then the agent chooses a distribution over outputs. We show that there is an optimal design involving only binary distributions (i.e., the cost of any other distribution is prohibitively high), and we characterize the equilibrium technology defined on the binary distributions. Notably, the equilibrium payoff of both players is 1/e.


Publications

  1. A/B Contracts  [Slides]  [Zoom Talk]  [Online Appendix]  [Matlab Code]
    with Michael Powell
    American Economic Review, 2022, 112 (1), 267-303.
    Featured in: Kellogg Insight
  1. The Absence of Attrition in a War of Attrition under Complete Information
    with Youngsoo Kim and Dharma Kwon
    Games & Economic Behavior, 2022, 131, 171-185.
  1. Working to Learn  [Slides]
    with Drew Fudenberg and Luis Rayo
    Journal of Economic Theory, 2021, 197, 105347.
  1. Optimal Monitoring Design  [Slides]
    with Balazs Szentes
    Econometrica, 2020, 88 (5), 2075-2107.
    Featured in: Kellogg Insight
  1. Optimal Contracts with a Risk-Taking Agent   [Slides]  [Matlab Code]
    with Daniel Barron and Jeroen Swinkels
    Theoretical Economics, 2020, 15 (2), 715-761.
    Featured in: Kellogg Insight, Bloomberg, and SmartBrief
  1. Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision   [Slides]
    with Renee Bowen and Nicolas Lambert
    American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2019, 11 (1), 243-298.
  1. Deadlines and Infrequent Monitoring in the Dynamic Provision of Public Goods
    Journal of Public Economics, 2017, 152, 1-12.
  1. Achieving Efficiency in Dynamic Contribution Games    [Slides]
    with Jaksa Cvitanic
    American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2016, 8 (4), 309-342.
    Featured in: Kellogg Insight
  1. Projects and Team Dynamics   [Online Appendix]   [Slides]
    Review of Economic Studies, 2015, 82 (1), 187-218.
  1. Project Design with Limited Commitment and Teams   [Slides]
    with Steven Lippman and Christopher Tang
    RAND Journal of Economics, 2014, 45 (3), 598-623.
  1. Optimal Reservation Policies and Market Segmentation
    with Christopher Tang
    International Journal of Production Economics, 2014, 154, 81-99.

  1. The Retail Planning Problem Under Demand Uncertainty   [Slides]
    with Kumar Rajaram
    Production and Operations Management, 2013, 22 (5), 1200-1213.



Teaching & Lecture Notes