Jeroen Swinkels
Jeroen Swinkels

Richard M. Paget Professor of Management Policy
Professor of Strategy

Print Overview

Jeroen Swinkels is the Paget Professor of Management Policy in the Strategy department at the Kellogg School of Management. He joined Kellogg in 2009, after previous positions at Stanford, Kellogg, and the Olin School at Washington University in St. Louis. He received his PhD in 1990 from Princeton, and his undergraduate degree from Queen’s University in Canada.

Swinkels work has looked, among other things, at the question of how much of the value of an MBA can be traced to signaling versus education, how information is aggregated in auction and other market settings, the efficiency of auctions with many players, the design of incentive contracts with minimum wages, the design of procurement auctions when one vendor is preferred to another, and the evolutionary foundations for self control problems. He has been published in journals including Econometrica, the American Economic Review, the Review of Economic Studies, and the Review of Financial Studies. He is a fellow of the Econometric Society, an associate editor for Econometrica, and has served on boards including the Journal of Economic Theory and Games and Economic Behavior. He was chair of the economics group at the Olin School for 11 years, and received 16 teaching awards while there. His primary teaching is of the core strategy course Business Strategy.

Areas of Expertise
Contract Theory
Economic Theory
Economics of Organizations
Game Theory
Information Economics

Print Vita
PhD, 1990, Economics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ
BA (hon.), 1986, Economics, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada

Academic Positions
Richard M. Paget Chair in Management Policy, Department of Management and Strategy, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, 2009-present
August A. Busch, Jr., Distinguished Professor of Managerial Economics and Strategy, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis MO, (Also, by courtesy to the Department of Economics after 2006), 1998-2009
Professor of Managerial Economics and Strategy, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis MO, 1997-1998
Associate Professor of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences (tenured), J.L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, 1995-1997
Assistant Professor of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, J.L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, 1992-1994
Assistant Professor of Economics, Stanford University, Stanford CA, 1990-1992

Honors and Awards
Chairs' Core Course Teaching Award, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2010-2011
Economic Theory Fellow, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory, 2011
Sidney J. Levy Teaching Award, Kellogg School of Management, 1995-1996

Editorial Positions
Editorial Board, Theoretical Economics, 2005-Present
Associate Editor, Econometrica, 2005-Present
Associate Editor, Journal of Economic Theory, 2003-2009
Editorial Board Member, Econometrica

Print Research
Research Interests
Game theory; auctions and other models of price formation; evolution and learning; job-market signaling; corporate compensation; principal-agent models; procurement.

Swinkels, Jeroen and Vladimir N Mares. 2014. On the Analysis of Asymmetric First Price Auctions. Journal of Economic Theory. 152: 1-40.
Swinkels, Jeroen and Sofia Moroni. 2014. Existence and Non-Existence in the Moral Hazard Problem. Journal of Economic Theory. 150: 668-682.
Swinkels, Jeroen and Vladimir N Mares. 2014. Comparing First and Second Price Auctions with Multiple Insiders and Outsiders. International Journal of Game Theory. 43: 487-514.
Swinkels, Jeroen and Ohad Kadan. 2014. On the Moral Hazard Problem without the First-Order Approach. Journal of Economic Theory.
Swinkels, Jeroen and Ohad Kadan. 2014. Minimum Payments and Induced Effort in Moral Hazard Problems. Games and Economic Behavior. 72: 218-241.
Swinkels, Jeroen and Vladimir N Mares. 2011. On the Near-Optimality of Second Price Mechanisms for a Class of Asymmetric Auctions. Games and Economic Behavior. 72(1): 218-241.
Swinkels, Jeroen, Ohad Kadan and Ian Jewitt. 2008. Moral Hazard with Bounded Payments. Journal of Economic Theory. 143(1): 36-58.
Swinkels, Jeroen and Ohad Kadan. 2007. Stocks or Options? Moral Hazard, Firm Viability and the Design of Compensation Contracts. Review of Financial Studies.
Swinkels, Jeroen and Larry Samuelson. 2006. Information, Evolution and Utility. Theoretical Economics. 1(1): 47-92.
Swinkels, Jeroen and Martin Cripps. 2006. Depth and Efficiency of Large Double Auctions. Econometrica. 74(1): 47-92.
Swinkels, Jeroen and Matthew O. Jackson. 2005. Existence of Equilibrium in Single and Double Private Value Options. Econometrica. 73(1): 93-140.
Swinkels, Jeroen, Klaus Ritzberger and Stefano Demichelis. 2004. The Simple Geometry of Perfect Information Games. International Journal of Game Theory.
Swinkels, Jeroen and Larry Samuelson. 2003. Evolutionary Stability with Lexicographic Preferences. Evolutionary Stability with Lexicographic Preferences. 44(2): 332-342.
Swinkels, Jeroen, Leo Simon and William Zame. 2002. Communication and Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games of Incomplete Information. Econometrica. 70(5): 1711-1740.
Swinkels, Jeroen. 2001. Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions. Econometrica. 69(1): 37-68.
Swinkels, Jeroen and Leslie M. Marx. 2000. Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance: Corrigendum. Games and Economic Behavior. 31(2): 324-329.
Swinkels, Jeroen, George Mailath and Larry Samuelson. 1997. How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium?. Games and Economic Behavior. 18: 193-218.
Swinkels, Jeroen and Wolfgang Pesendorfer. 1997. The Loser's Curse and Information Aggregation in Common Value Auctions. Econometrica. 65: 1247-1282.
Swinkels, Jeroen, George Mailath and Larry Samuelson. 1994. Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games. Journal of Economic Theory. 64: 325-371.
Swinkels, Jeroen. 1993. Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games. Games and Economic Behavior. 5: 455-484.
Swinkels, Jeroen, George Mailath and Larry Samuelson. 1993. Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games. Econometrica. 6: 273-302.
Swinkels, Jeroen. 1992. Evolution and Strategic Stability: from Maynard Smith to Kohlberg and Mertens. Journal of Economic Theory. 57: 333-342.
Swinkels, Jeroen. 1992. Evolutionary Stability with Equilibrium Entrants. Journal of Economic Theory. 57: 306-332.
Swinkels, Jeroen, Roger Myerson and Gregory B. Pollock. 1991. Viscous Population Equilibria. Games and Economic Behavior. 3: 101-109.
Working Papers
Swinkels, Jeroen and Hector Chade. 2016. The No-Upward-Crossing Condition and the Moral Hazard Problem.
Swinkels, Jeroen and Ohad Kadan. 2013. Moral Hazard, Incentives and Markets.
Swinkels, Jeroen, Ohad Kadan and Phil Reny. 2010. Existence of Optimal Mechanisms in Principal-Agent Problems.
Busse, MeghanJeroen Swinkels and Greg Merkley. 2011. Enterprise Rent-A-Car. Case 5-311-508 (KEL612).

Print Teaching
Full-Time / Part-Time MBA
Business Strategy (STRT-431-0)
This course was formerly known as MGMT 431
Strategy is the set of objectives, policies and resource commitments that collectively determine how a business positions itself to create wealth for its owners. This course introduces students to principles and conceptual frameworks for evaluating and formulating business strategy. Topics include the boundaries of the firm, the analysis of industry economics, strategic positioning and competitive advantage, and the role of resources and capabilities in shaping and sustaining competitive advantages.

Executive MBA
Frameworks for Strategic Analysis (STRTX-430-A)

Foundations for Strategy Formulation (STRTX-431-0)

Executive Education
Competitive Strategy
Gain the insights you need to secure and maintain your organization’s competitive strategy long-term through this interactive learning experience. With a blend of modern theory, strategic analysis and practical application, this program readies you for sustainable strategic success based on time-tested economic principles for profitability and growth.
View Program