George Georgiadis
George Georgiadis

STRATEGY
Assistant Professor of Strategy

Print Overview

George Georgiadis is an Assistant Professor in the Strategy department. At a broad level, the goal of his research is to understand how incentives affect the behaviors of individuals in various organizational settings, and to develop insights regarding the optimal design of incentives. His work has been published in various journals including the Review of Economic Studies, the American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, the RAND Journal of Economics, and the Journal of Public Economics.

Professor Georgiadis teaches Strategy and Organization (STRT 452). Prior to joining Kellogg, he taught at the California Institute of Technology and Boston University. He received a B.S. in Electrical and Computer Engineering from the Aristotle University in Greece, a M.S. in Electrical Engineering and a M.A. in Economics from UCLA, and a Ph.D in Management from the UCLA Anderson School of Management.



Print Vita
Education
Ph.D., 2013, Management, University of California, Los Angeles
C. Phil (M.S. equivalent), 2011, Management, University of California, Los Angeles
M.A., 2010, Economics, University of California, Los Angeles
M.S., 2010, Electrical Engineering, University of California, Los Angeles
B.S., 2007, Electrical and Computer Engineering, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki

Academic Positions
Assistant Professor, Strategy, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2015-present
Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Boston University, 2014-2015
Postdoctoral Instructor of Business, Economics, and Management, Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, 2013-2014

Print Research
Research Interests

Microeconomic Theory, Organization Economics, Industrial Organization



Articles
Georgiadis, George. 2017. Deadlines and Infrequent Monitoring in the Dynamic Provision of Public Goods. Journal of Public Economics. 152: 1-12.
Cvitanic, Jaksa and George Georgiadis. 2016. Achieving Efficiency in Dynamic Contribution Games. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 8(4): 309-342.
Georgiadis, George. 2015. Projects and Team Dynamics. Review of Economic Studies. 82(1): 187-218.
Georgiadis, George, Steven Lippman and Christopher S. Tang. 2014. Project Design with Limited Commitment and Teams. RAND Journal of Economics. 45(3): 59-623.
Georgiadis, George and Christopher S. Tang. 2014. Optimal Reservation Policies and Market Segmentation. International Journal of Production Economics. 154: 81-99.
Georgiadis, George and Kumar Rajaram. 2013. The Retail Planning Problem Under Demand Uncertainty. Production and Operations Mangement. 22(5): 1200-1213.
Working Papers
Kim, Youngsoo, George Georgiadis and H. Dharma Kwon. 2017. Equilibrium Selection in the War of Attrition under Complete Information.
Bowen, Renee, George Georgiadis and Nicolas S Lambert. 2016. Collective Choice in Dynamic Public Good Provision.
Barron, DanielGeorge Georgiadis and Jeroen Swinkels. 2017. Optimal Contracts with a Risk-Taking Agent.
Book Chapters
Georgiadis, George and Christopher S. Tang. 2016. "Project Contracting Strategies for Managing Team Dynamics." In Information Exchange in Supply Chain Management, edited by Albert Ha and Christopher S. Tang, Springer.

 
Print Teaching
Full-Time / Evening & Weekend MBA
Strategy and Organization (STRT-452-0)
This course was formerly known as MGMT 452
This course focuses on the link between organizational structure and strategy, making heavy use of the microeconomic tools taught in MECN-430. The core question students address is how firms should be organized to achieve their performance objectives. The first part of the course takes the firm's activities as given and studies the problem of organizational design; topics may include incentive pay, decentralization, transfer pricing, and complementarities. The second part examines the determinants of a firm's boundaries and may cover such topics as outsourcing, horizontal mergers, and strategic commitment.