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Research Details
Delegated Law Enforcement and Noncooperative Behavior, Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization
Abstract
This article addresses two significant problems arising from the delegation of law enforcement. First, the policymaker's problem of designing incentives to induce efficient performance by the enforcement agency is examined. Second, the effect of delegation on the enforcer's strategic interaction with potential offenders is specified.
Type
Article
Author(s)
Date Published
1989
Citations
Besanko, David, and Daniel Spulber. 1989. Delegated Law Enforcement and Noncooperative Behavior. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization.(1): 25-52.
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