Math Center seminars, mini-courses + conferences
Alex Imas, University of Chicago - Booth
October 27, 2026
Daniel Martin, University of Southern California Santa Barbara
October 13, 2026
Andrew Hall, Stanford University
October 6, 2026
Joe Harrington, Cornell University
November 20, 2026
John Conlon, Ohio State University
October 30, 2026
Charlie Rafkin, University of British Columbia
October 9, 2026
Muriel Niederle, Stanford University
June 5, 2026
"Goal Harmony and Conflict"
Ayelet Fishbach, Professor, University of Chicago - Booth
May 15, 2026
"The Use of Natural Language Processing to Detect Collusive Content in Public Announcements"
Joe Harrington, Professor, University of Pennsylvania - Wharton
April 10, 2026
“Credible Threats” ( joint with Martin Dufwenberg, Flora Li & Alec Smith)
Martin Dufwenberg, Professor, Purdue University
November 21, 2025
Jason Abaluck, Yale University
November 14, 2025
"Why Language Models Hallucinate"
Adam Kalai, Open AI
Room 5301
October 10, 2025
"The Challenge of Algorithmic Pricing for Competition Policy"
Joseph Harrington, Professor, University of Pennsylvania
May 23, 2025
"Sophisticated Consumers with Inertia: Long-Term Implications from a Large-Scale Field Experiment"
Avner Strulov-Shlain, Assistant Professor, University of Chicago - Booth
May 16, 2025
"Assessing the Economic Rationality of Large Language Models"
Kevin Leyton-Brown, Professor, University of British Columbia
April 25, 2025
"How Real is Hypothetical? A High-Stakes Test of the Allais Paradox"
Uri Gneezy, Professor, UC San Diego
November 22, 2024
"Adjusting for Scale-Use Heterogeneity in Self-Reported Well-Being"
Dan Benjami, Professor, UCLA
Room 5101
October 25, 2024
"How to Build a Brain"
Christos Papadimitriou, Professor, Columbia University
Room 5101
October 4, 2024
"Robustness, Privacy, Fairness, and Credibility? Pushing the Boundaries of Economic Design with Deep Learning"
John Dickerson, Associate Professor, University of Maryland
Room 5101
May 3, 2024
"Incentive Complexity, Bounded Rationality and Effort Provision"
Collin Raymond, Associate Professor, Cornell SC Johnson College of Business
Room 2130
April 19, 2024
“Difficult Decisions” (with David Walker-Jones and Lanny Zrill)
Yoram Halevy, Professor of Economics, University of Toronto
Room 5301
April 5, 2024
"Aversion to Complexity, with Applications to Simple Contracts Simple Tax Systems and the Cost of Inflation"
Xavier Gabaix, Professor of Economics, Harvard University
Room 4101
November 17, 2023
"Simplicity Equivalents"
Ryan Oprea, Professor of Economics, UC Santa Barbara
Room 4101
October 27, 2023
"Exploring Incentive Designs: Evidence from Vaccination Experiments"
Devin Pope, Professor of Behavior Science and Economics
Room 4101
May 26, 2023
Shakar Kariv, Professor of Economics, Berkeley
Room 4101
Dec 2, 2022
"Uncovering Expert Views from Time to Decision"
Stefano DellaVigna, Distinguished Professor of Economics and Professor of Business Administration, Berkeley
Nov 14, 2022
"From Rivals to Partners: Capital, State Coercion, and the Rise of Modern Economic Growth" (with Lukas Leucht and Noam Yuchtman)
Ernesto Dal Bo, Associate Professor of Economics, Berkeley
Nov 7, 2022
"Incentives for Learning in Repeated Elections"
Andrew Mack, Professor of Economics, Princeton
Oct 24, 2022
"An Organizational Theory of State Capacity (with Mike Ting)"
Erik Snowberg, Marriner S. Eccles Presidential Chair and Professor of Finance, University of Utah
Oct 14, 2022
"Over and Underreaction to Information: A Unified Approach"
Alex Imas, Associate Professor of Behavioral Science and Economics, University of Chicago Booth School of Business
Oct 10, 2022
"Contract Enforcement in a Stateless Economy"
Sultan Mehmood, Professor of Economics, New Economic School in Moscow
May 27, 2021
Alex Imas, Assistant Professor of Behavioral Science and Economics, University of Chicago Booth School of Business
April 29, 2021
"Visual Attention and Simple Choice"
Antonio Rangel, Bing Professor of Neuroscience, Behavioral Biology, and Economics, California Institute of Technology
Feb 28, 2020
"Are High-Interest Loans Predatory? Theory and Evidence from Payday Lending"
Dmitry Taubinsky, Assistant Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley
December 2, 2026
Kareen Rozen, Brown University
November 18, 2026
Sergiu Hart, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
November 11, 2026
Yingni Guo, Duke University
November 4, 2026
Paul Milgrom, Stanford University
October 28, 2026
Ron Siegel, Penn State University
October 21, 2026
Doron Ravid, University of Michigan
October 14, 2026
Ivan Werning, MIT
October 7, 2026
Ryota Iijima, Princeton University
September 30, 2026
Marina Halac, Yale University
September 23, 2026
Ignacio Esponda, UCSB
June 3, 2026
"Whistleblowing" (joint with Aniko Oery and Anne-Katrin Roesler)
Ayca Kaya, Associate Professor, University of Miami
May 27, 2026
“Approximate Common Knowledge of Higher-Order Beliefs and Equilibrium Outcome Continuity” (joint with Dirk Bergemann and Rafael Veiel)
Stephen Morris, Professor, MIT
May 20, 2026
"Recommender Systems and Self-Preferencing"
Chiara Margaria, Assistant Professor, Boston University
May 13, 2026
"The Limits of Auctions under Ex-Ante Collusion" (joint with Ilya Segal and Alex Tordjman)
Ravi Jagadeesan, Assistant Professor, Stanford University
May 6, 2026
"Information Design, Partial Identification, Statistical Discrimination & the Kitchen Sink"
Rakesh Vohra, Professor, University of Pennsylvania
April 29, 2026
“Active Product Development”
Santiago Oliveros, Professor, University of Bristol
April 22, 2026
"Wasonian Persuasion" (joint with Ariel Rubinstein)
Kfir Eliaz, Professor, Tel Aviv University
April 15, 2026
"Self-Confirming Mechanisms"
Qingmin Liu, Professor, Columbia University
April 8, 2026
“Dual Reductions and the First-Order Approach for Informationally Robust Mechanism Design”
Ben Brooks, Professor, University of Chicago
April 1, 2026
"Distributional Analysis of Model Uncertainty"
Fabio Maccheroni, Professor, University of Bocconi
December 3, 2025
Tayfun Sonmez, Professor, Boston College
November 19, 2025
“Proper Robustness and the Efficiency of Monopoly Screening”
Ashwin Kambhampati, Assistant Professor, USNA
November 5, 2025
“Bargaining: A Mechanism Design Perspective” (with Simon Loertscher)
Leslie M. Marx, Professor, Duke - Fuqua
October 29, 2025
"Sharing Model Uncertainty" (with Chiaki Hara, Frank Riedel, and Jean-Marc Tallon)
Sujoy Mukerji, Professor, Queen Mary University of London
October 22, 2025
"On the Viability of Open-Source Financial Rails: The Economic Security of Permissionless Consensus" (with Elaine Shi and Rafael Pass)
Jacob Leshno, Associate Professor, University of Chicago - Booth
October 15, 2025
"Labor as Capital: AI and the Ownership of Expertise"
Shengwu Li, Professor, Harvard University
October 8, 2025
“Modeling information acquisition via f-divergence and duality”
Tommaso Denti, Assistant Professor, New York University - Stern
October 1, 2025
"Contextually Private Mechanisms"
Zoë Hitzig, Junior Fellow at the Harvard Society of Fellows, Harvard University
September 24, 2025
“Bundling against learning” (with Frank Yang)
Agathe Pernoud, Assistant Professor, University of Chicago - Booth
September 17, 2025
"Extreme Points in Multi-Dimensional Screening" (with Patrick Lahr)
Axel Niemeyer, Assistant Professor, CalTech
June 11, 2025
“Strategic Decentralized Matching: The Effects of Information Frictions” (Joint with Andrew Ferdowsian and Muriel Niederle)
Leeat Yariv, Professor, Princeton University
June 4, 2025
"Recombinant search" (joint with Steven Callander)
Arjada Bardhi, Assistant Professor, New York University
May 28, 2025
"Initiatives"
Hector Chade, Professor, Arizona State University
May 21, 2025
"Dynamic Imperfect Competition: A Non-Recursive Approach"
Marzena Rostek, Professor, University of Wisconsin-Madison
May 14, 2025
"Dynamic Threats to Credible Auctions"
Andrzej Skrzypacz, Professor, Stanford University
May 7, 2025
"Nonlinear Fixed Points and Stationarity: Economic Applications" (with Simone Cerreia-Vioglio and Roberto Corrao)
Giacomo Lanzani, Postdoctoral Fellow, Harvard University
April 30, 2025
"A Theory of Choice Overload" (joint with Yeon-Koo Che).
Sarah Auster, Associate Professor, University of Bonn
April 23, 2025
"Persuasion and Optimal Stopping"
Weijie Zhong, Assistant Professor, Stanford University
April 16, 2025
"Optimal Auction Design for Dynamic Stochastic Environments: Myerson Meets Naor" (joint with Andy B. Choi (Michigan))
Yeon-Koo Che, Professor, Columbia University
April 9, 2025
"News Media as Suppliers of Narratives (and Information)" (joint with Kfir Eliaz)
Ran Spiegler, Professor, Tel Aviv University
April 2, 2025
"Auctions with Frictions" (joint with Asher Wolinsky (Northwestern))
Stephan Lauermann, Professor, University of Bonn
December 11, 2024
Jonathan Libgober, Assistant Professor, University of Southern California
Room 5101
December 4, 2024
"Spreading Information via Social Networks: An Irrelevance Result"
Vijay Krishna, Professor, Penn State
Room 5101
November 20, 2024
"The Market for Attention"
Daniel Chen, Assistant Professor, Princeton University
Room 5101
November 13, 2024
Who gives, who cares?
Rahul Deb, Professor, University of Toronto
Room 5101
November 6, 2024
"Dynamic Evidence Disclosure: Delay the Good to Accelerate the Bad - joint work with Julia Salmi from Hanken School of Economics"
Jan Knoepfle, Lecturer, Queen Mary University of London
Room 5101
October 30, 2024
“Non-Discriminatory Personalized Pricing” (joint with Philipp Strack)
Kai Hao Yang, Assistant Professor, Yale University
Room 5101
October 23, 2024
"Robust Misspecified Models and Paradigm Shifts"
Cuimin Ba, Assistant Professor, University of Pittsburgh
Allen Center Room 223
October 16, 2024
"Coalitional Nash Bargaining"
Debraj Ray, Professor, NYU
Room 5101
October 9, 2024
"Robust Aggregation of Correlated Information." (joint with Henrique de Oliveira and Xiao Lin)
Yuhta Ishii, Associate Professor, Penn State
Room 5101
October 2, 2024
“When to Decide: Choice in Parallel Search” joint work with Pietro Ortoleva
Can Urgun, Assistant Professor, Princeton University
Room 5101
September 25, 2024
"Local priority mechanisms"
Joseph Root, Assistant Professor, University of Chicago
Room 5101
May 29, 2024
"Collective upkeep, joint with Erik Madsen"
Eran Shmaya, Professor, Stony Brook University
Room 5101
May 22, 2024
"Equal Pay for Similar Work" (joint with Diego Gentile and Fuhito Kojima)
Bobby Pakzad-Hurson, Assistant Professor of Economics and Entrepreneurship, Brown University
Room 2130
May 15, 2024
"Flow Trading"
Pete Kyle, Professor of Finance, University of Maryland
Room 5101
May 8, 2024
"Multidimensional Screening with Rich Consumer Data" (with Ryota Iijima and Yuhta Ishii)
Mira Frick, Associate Professor of Economics, Yale University
Room 5101
May 1, 2024
Dirk Bergemann, Professor of Economics, Yale University
Room 4101
April 24, 2024
"Equilibrium Selection in Participation Games, with Applications to Security Issuance"
David Frankel, Professor of Financial Economics, Melbourne Business School
Room 5101
April 17, 2024
"News media as suppliers of narratives (and information)", joint with Kfir Eliaz
Ran Spiegler, Professor of Economics, University College of London and Tel Aviv University
Room 5101
April 10, 2024
"Robust Predictions with Bounded Information"
Songzi Du, Associate Professor of Economics, University of California, San Diego
Room 4101
April 3, 2024
"Posterior-Mean Separable Costs of Information Acquisition."
Jeffrey Mensch, Senior Lecturer (with tenure), Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Room 5101
March 27, 2024
“Dynamic Trading and Inference: Non-Markovian Equilibria" (with Marzena Rostek and Xian Wu)
Ji Hee Yoon, Assistant Professor of Economics and Finance, University College London
Room 5101
November 29, 2023
“The Dynamics of Collective Action” by Marco Battaglini and Thomas Palfrey
Marco Battaglini, Professor of Economics, Cornell University
Room 5101
November 15, 2023
"#Change"
Joyee Deb, Professor of Economics, New York University
Room 5101
November 8, 2023
"Optimal Rating Design under Moral Hazard"
Maryam Saeedi, Assistant Professor of Economics, Carnegie Mellon University
Room 5101
November 1, 2023
"Outside options, reputations, and the partial success of the Coase conjecture"
Jack Fanning, Assistant Professor of Economics, Brown University
Room 4101
October 25, 2023
"Principled Mechanism Design with Evidence" Co-authored with Sebastian Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Humboldt Universität
Roland Strausz, Professor, Humboldt Universität Berlin
Room 5101
October 18, 2023
"Selective Memory Equilibrium," joint work with Giacomo Lanzani and Philipp Strack
Drew Fudenberg, Professor of Economics, MIT
Room 4101
October 11, 2023
"Two-dimensional information choice in committees"
Nina Bobkova, Assistant Professor of Economics, Rice University
Room 5101
October 4, 2023
"Contest Design under Strategic Risk Taking"
Teddy Kim, Associate Professor of Economics, Emory University
Room 5101
September 27, 2023
"Making Information More Valuable"
Mark Whitmeyer, Assistant Professor of Economics, Arizona State University
Room 5101
September 20, 2023
"Pricing and Perpetual Royalties with Repeated Resale”
Matt Mitchell, Professor of Economic Analysis and Policy, University of Toronto Rotman School
Room 5101
May 31, 2023
"A Theory of Stable Market Segmentations”
Ron Siegel, Professor of Economics, PennState
May 24, 2023
"Using Big Data and Machine Learning to Uncover How Players Choose Mixed Strategies" (with T. Hirasawa and A. Matsushita)
Michihiro Kandori, Professor of Economics, University of Tokyo
May 17, 2023
"Pricing for Coordination” (joint with Elliot Lipnowski and Daniel Rappoport)
Marina Halac, Professor of Economics, Yale University
May 10, 2023
"Strategic Ignorance and Information Design" joint with Tom Wiseman”
Ina Taneva, Associate Professor of Economics, University of Edinburgh
May 3, 2023
“Strategic Evidence Disclosure in Networks and Equilibrium Discrimination” (joint work with Rohan Dutta)
Leonie Baumann, Assistant Professor of Economics, McGill University
April 26, 2023
"Allocation Mechanisms with Mixture-Averse Preferences"
David Dillenberger, Professor of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
March 29, 2023
Anne-Katrin Roesler, Assistant Professor, University of Toronto, Department of Economics
April 5, 2023
Inga Deimen, Assistant Professor of Economics, Eller College of Management
April 12, 2023
Evan Sadler, Assistant Professor of Economics, Columbia
April 19, 2023
Kota Saito, Professor of Economics, California Institute of Technology
April 26, 2023
David Dillenberger, Professor of Economics, University of Pennsylvania
May 3, 2023
Leonie Baumann, Assistant Professor of Economics, McGill
May 10, 2023
Ina Taneva, Associate Professor / Reader at the School of Economics, University of Edinburgh
May 17, 2023
Marina Halac, Director of the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics and Professor of Economics, Yale
May 24, 2023
Michihiro Kandori, Professor, Faculty of Economics and University Professor, The University of Tokyo
May 31, 2023
Ron Siegel, Professor of Economics, PennState
June 7, 2023
Mallesh Pai, Lay Family Chair in Economics and Associate Professor of Economics, Rice
June 4, 2026
Yuval Salant, Professor, Managerial Economics & Decision Sciences, Northwestern University
May 28, 2026
“Space Exploration”
Suraj Malladi, Assistant Professor, Managerial Economics & Decision Sciences, Northwestern University
May 21, 2026
"Optimal Stopping and Reputation"
Sara Shahanaghi, Assistant Professor, Toulouse School of Economics
May 14, 2026
"Training in the Age of AI: A Theory of Career Viability" (with Luis Garicano)
Luis Rayo, Professor, Strategy Department, Northwestern University
May 7, 2026
"Searchable Menus" (joint with Frank Yang)
Piotr Dworczak, Associate Professor, Economics Department, Northwestern University
April 30, 2026
“The Empirical Content of Bayesian Updating under Misspecification”
Pooya Molavi, Assistant Professor, Managerial Economics & Decision Sciences, Northwestern University
April 23, 2026
"Multidimensional Signaling and the Rise of Cultural Politics" ( joint with Daron Acemoglu and Konstantin Sonin)
Georgy Egorov, Professor, Managerial Economics & Decision Sciences, Northwestern University
April 16, 2026
"Selective Disclosure in Overlapping Generations"
Harry Pei, Assistant Professor, Economics Department, Northwestern University
April 2, 2026
"UBI"
Jeff Ely, Professor, Economics Department
December 4, 2025
Xiaojie Liu, PhD Candidate, Managerial Economics and Strategy, Northwestern University
November 20, 2025
Nemanja Antic, Associate Professor, Managerial Economics & Decision Sciences, Northwestern University
November 13, 2025
"Outside options and risk attitude"
Ludvig Sinander, Associate Professor, Oxford & Nuffield College
November 6, 2025
"Causal Inference under Structural Misspecification"
Shallabh Tiwari, PhD Candidate, Managerial Economics and Strategy, Northwestern University
October 30, 2025
"Dynamic Health Insurance with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection"
Alex Boche, PhD Candidate, Managerial Economics and Strategy, Northwestern University
October 23, 2025
“Adversarial Elicitation.”
Andrei Iakovlev, PhD Candidate, Economics, Northwestern University
October 16, 2025
“Barriers to AI Adoption: Image Concerns at Work”
David Almog, PhD Candidate, Managerial Economics and Strategy, Northwestern University
October 9, 2025
“Price Impact of Insurance” (with Andrea Di Giovan Paolo)
Jose Corona, PhD Candidate, Economics, Northwestern University
October 2, 2025
“Scoring Rules for a Theory of AI”
Jason Hartline, Professor, Computer Science, Northwestern University
September 25, 2025
"Employer Competition and Certification"
Hersh Singh Chopra, PhD Candidate, Economics, Northwestern University
September 18, 2025
Nina Fluegel, PhD Candidate, Economics, Northwestern University
June 5, 2025
“Incentive Contracts and Peer Effects in the Workplace”
Pau Milan, Associate Professor, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB)
May 29, 2025
"Optimal Redistribution via Income Taxation and Market Design"
Piotr Dworczak, Associate Professor, Economics, Northwestern University
May 22, 2025
"Task Clarity in Relationships" with Ameet Morjaria and Miguel Talamas Marcos
Nemanja Antic, Associate Professor, Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Northwestern University
May 15, 2025
"Rational Disagreement" (with Harald Uhlig, University of Chicago)
Nabil Al-Najjar, Professor, Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Northwestern University
May 8, 2025
"Sharing with Frictions: Limited Transfers and Costly Inspections"
Federico Bobbio, Postdoctoral Researcher, Northwestern University
May 1, 2025
"Bounding High Dimensional Comparative Statics"
Jordan Norris, Assistant Professor, NYU Abu Dhabi
April 24, 2025
"Replacement" (with Navin Kartik and Elliot Lipnowski)
Harry Pei, Assistant Professor, Northwestern University
April 17, 2025
"Artificial Intelligence Clones"
Annie Liang, Associate Professor, Northwestern University
April 10, 2025
"Robust Procurement Design" joint with Debasis Mishra and Sanket Patil
Alessandro Pavan, Professor, Northwestern University
April 3, 2025
"Incentive-Compatible Information Design" joint with Hershdeep Chopra
Jeff Ely, Professor, Northwestern University
December 5, 2024
"Regulation of Algorithmic Collusion"
Jason Hartline, Professor, Northwestern University
November 21, 2024
"Proportionality in participatory budgeting”
Edith Elkind, Professor, Northwestern University
November 14, 2024
"Robust Dynamic Contracts"
Tomer Yehoshua-Sandak, PhD Candidate, Economics, Northwestern University
November 7, 2024
"Guarantees in Price Experimentation"
Suraj Malladi, Assistant Professor, Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Northwestern University
October 31, 2024
"Multi-dimensional Test Design"
Xiaoyun Qiu, PhD Candidate, Economics, Northwestern University
October 24, 2024
"Strategic Interactions Along the Energy Transition"
Guillaume Gex, PhD Candidate, Economics, Northwestern University
October 17, 2024
"The Evolutionary success of Moral Universalism vs Moral Particularism"
Michelle Avataneo, PhD Candidate, Managerial Economics and Strategy, Northwestern University
October 10, 2024
"Mixology: Order flow segmentation design"
Joshua Mollner, Associate Professor, Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Northwestern University
October 3, 2024
"Dynamic Reward Design"
Yijun Liu, PhD Candidate, Economics, Northwestern University
September 26, 2024
"Buyer-Optimal Algorithmic Consumption"
Alex Smolin, Assistant Professor, Toulouse School of Economics
May 30, 2024
"Optimal Linear Contracts"
Wojciech Olszewski, Professor, Economics, Northwestern University
Room 4101
May 23, 2024
"Stochastic Reputational Bargaining"
Marcos Campos, PhD Candidate, Economics, Northwestern University
Room 4101
May 16, 2024
"Labor Demand in Relational Contracts"
Luciano Fabio Busatto Venturim, PhD Candidate, Managerial Economics and Strategy, Northwestern University
Room 4101
May 9, 2024
"Auctions with Dynamic Scoring"
Martino Banchio, Research Scientist, Google Research
Room 4101
May 2, 2024
"Search and Rediscovery"
Suraj Malladi, Assistant Professor, Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Northwestern University
Room 5301
April 25, 2024
"Belief-dependent motivations and belief updating"
Enrico Salonia, PhD Candidate, Toulouse School of Economics
Room 4101
April 18, 2024
"Test Optional"
Jeff Ely, Professor, Economics, Northwestern University
Room 4101
April 11, 2024
"Natural Language Equilibrium: Signaling Games"
Phil Reny, Professor, University of Chicago
Room 5301
April 4, 2024
"Contagious Implementation in Prisoner’s Dilemma and Beyond"
Ehud Kalai, Professor Emeritus, Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Northwestern University
Room 4101
March 28, 2024
"Incentive Compatibility and Belief Restrictions"
Mariann Ollar, Assistant Professor, NYU Shanghai
Room 4101
November 30, 2023
“Information acquisition from extremely biased agents in a dynamic setting”
Yijun Liu, PhD Candidate, Economics, Northwestern University
Room 4101
November 16, 2023
"Linking Mechanisms: Limits and Robustness"
Ian Ball, Assistant Professor, MIT
Room 4101
November 9, 2023
“The Macroeconomics of Supply Chain Disruptions”
Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi, Professor, Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Northwestern University
Room 4101
November 2, 2023
"Supply and Demand of Medical Knowledge”
Megumi Murakami, PhD Candidate, Economics, Northwestern University
Room L070
October 26, 2023
"Cognition in Preferences and Choice"
Maria Betto, PhD Candidate, Economics, Northwestern University
Room 4101
October 19, 2023
"Information Intermediaries in Monopolistic Screening"
Panagiotis Kyriazis, PhD Candidate, Economics, Northwestern University
Room 4101
October 12, 2023
"Robust Optimal Income Taxation"
Maren Vairo, PhD Candidate, Economics, Northwestern University
Room 4101
October 5, 2023
"Incentive Separability"
Piotr Dworczak, Associate Professor, Economics, Northwestern University
Room 4101
September 28, 2023
"Resales, preference shocks and monopoly pricing"
Zhichong Lu, PhD Candidate, Managerial Economics and Strategy, Northwestern University
Room 4101
September 21, 2023
"Black Boxes"
Jeff Ely, Professor, Economics, Northwestern University
Room 4101
June 1, 2023
Maria Betto, PhD Candidate, Economics, Northwestern
Room 5101
May 25, 2023
Nemanja Antic, Assistant Professor, Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Northwestern
Room 4101
May 18, 2023
Shallabh Tiwari, PhD Candidate, Managerial Economics and Strategy, Northwestern
Room 4101
May 11, 2023
"Persuasion with Ambiguous Communication" (joint work with Xiaoyu Cheng, Sujoy Mukerji and Ludovic Renou)
Peter Klibanoff, Professor, Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Northwestern
Room 4101
May 4, 2023
“Beyond Dominance and Nash: Ranking Equilibria by Critical Mass” (with Adam T Kalai)
Ehud Kalai, Professor Emeritus, Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Northwestern
Room 2420AB
April 27, 2023
"Local Version Tarski Theorem and Monotone Comparative Statics"
Wojciech Olszewski, Professor, Economics, Northwestern
Room L110
Dec 1, 2022
Yuval Salant, Professor, Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Northwestern
Nov 17, 2022
Maren Vairo, PhD Candidate, Economics, Northwestern
Nov 10, 2022
“Contests as Optimal Mechanisms under Signal Manipulation”
Xiaoyun Qiu, PhD Candidate, Economics, Northwestern
Nov 3, 2022
“Expectation Conformity in Strategic Cognition”
Alessandro Pavan, Professor, Economics, Northwestern
Oct 27, 2022
“Algorithm Design: Fairness and Accuracy”
Annie Liang, Assistant Professor, Economics, Northwestern
Oct 20, 2022
Boli Xu, PhD Candidate, Financial Economics, Northwestern
Oct 13, 2022
Maria Betto, PhD Candidate, Economics, Northwestern
Oct 6, 2022
Matthew Thomas, PhD Candidate, Economics, Northwestern
Sept 29, 2022
Udayan Vaidya, PhD Candidate, Economics, Northwestern
Sept 22, 2022
Theo Durandard, PhD Candidate, Managerial Economics and Strategy, Northwestern
2019-2020
Feb 17–20, 2020
“Learning and Equilibrium under Misspecification”
Ignacio Esponda, Associate Professor and Walter J. Mead Chair of Economics at the University of California, Santa Barbara
The mini-course will take place over three sessions (all in the Kellogg Global Hub Crown Family Boardroom, room 5101):
- Mon, Feb 17, 3:30-5 p.m.
- Tues, Feb 18, 3:30-5 p.m.
- Thurs, Feb 20, 3:30-5 p.m.
The lecture will be divided into six chapters. For each chapter, references are included and the recommended readings are highlighted with a (*).
Chapter 1. Fictitious play
Reading:
(*) Fudenberg and Levine (1998), The theory of learning in games, Chapter 2.
Chapter 2. Stochastic fictitious play
Readings:
(*) Fudenberg and Levine (1998), The theory of learning in games, Chapter 4. Fudenberg and Kreps (1993), “Learning to play Bayesian games,” Games and Economic Behavior. Benaim and Hirsch (1999), “Mixed equilibria and dynamical systems arising from fictitious play in perturbed games,” Games and Economic Behavior. Borkar (2008), Stochastic approximation: A dynamical systems viewpoint.
Chapter 3. Self-confirming equilibrium
Readings:
(*) Fudenberg and Levine (1998), The theory of learning in games, Chapters 6 & 7. Fudenberg and Levine (1993), “Self-confirming equilibrium,” Econometrica. Dekel, Fudenberg and Levine (2003), “Learning to Play Bayesian Games,” in Games and Economic Behavior. Esponda (2008), “Information Feedback in First-Price Auctions,” RAND Journal of Economics.
Chapter 4. Cursed and behavioral equilibrium
(*) Esponda (2008), “Behavioral equilibrium in economies with adverse selection,” American Economic Review. Eyster and Rabin (2005), “Cursed equilibrium,” Econometrica. Jehiel (2005), “Analogy-based expectation equilibrium,” Journal of Economic Theory. Jehiel and Koessler (2008), “Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations,” Games and Economic Behavior. Spiegler (2011), Bounded rationality in industrial organization.
Chapter 5. Berk-Nash equilibrium
(*) Esponda and Pouzo (2016), “Berk-Nash equilibrium: A framework for modeling agents with misspecified models,” Econometrica. Heidhues, Koszegi, and Strack (2018), “Unrealistic expectations and misguided learning,” Econometrica. Spiegler (2016) “Bayesian networks and boundedly rational expectations,” Quarterly Journal of Economics. Esponda and Pouzo (2019), “Equilibrium in misspecified Markov decision processes,” working paper.
Chapter 6. Dynamics
(*) Esponda, Pouzo, and Yamamoto (2019), “Asymptotic behavior of Bayesian learners with misspecified models,” working paper. Heidhues, Koszegi, and Strack (2019), “Convergence in misspecified learning models with endogenous actions,” working paper. Frick, Iijima, and Ishii (2019), “Stability and robustness in misspecified learning models,” working paper.
2018-2019
Charles Sprenger, Associate Professor of Economics and Strategic Management at the Rady School of Management, UC San Diego, will present a mini-course on "Behavioral Foundations and Experimental Evidence in Time and Risk" during his visit to Northwestern in May.
Description: The mini-course will cover two core topics in behavioral analysis of individual decision-making: intertemporal and risky choice. In these two domains we will present standard neoclassical theories, examine plausible deviations therefrom, establish behavioral alternatives, and discuss experimental evidence for behavioral models. In decisions over time, focus will be placed on behavioral models of present-biased preferences. In decisions under uncertainty, focus will be placed on models such as prospect theory and rank-dependent utility. The empirical work discussed in this mini-course will come primarily from laboratory experiments, with discussion of field evidence and assessment of external validity where appropriate.
The mini-course will have three sessions as follows:
Lecture 1: "Behavioral Foundations in Intertemporal Choice: Laboratory and Field Elicitation of Time Preference" (Part 1)
Monday, May 13th, 3:30-5:00pm in the Kellogg Global Hub, Room 4101
Lecture 2: "Behavioral Foundations in Intertemporal Choice: Laboratory and Field Elicitation of Time Preferences" (Part 2)
Tuesday, May 14th, 3:30-5:00pm in the Kellogg Global Hub, Room 4101
Lecture 3: "Decisions Under Uncertainty: Behavioral Models and Recent Developments"
Thursday, May 16th, 3:30-5:00pm in the Kellogg Global Hub, Room 4101
Readings for the first and second sessions:
"Estimating Time Preferences from Convex Budgets" (James Andreoni and Charles Sprenger), American Economic Review, 2012, 102(7), 3333-3356.
"Working Over Time: Dynamic Inconsistency in Real Effort Tasks" (Ned Augenblick and Muriel Niederle and Charles Sprenger), Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2015, 130(3), 1067-1115.
Reading for the third session:
"Direct Tests of Cumulative Prospect Theory" (Doug Bernheim and Charles Sprenger)
Additional relevant readings:
Intertemporal Choice:
“Doing it Now or Later” (O’Donoghue, Ted and Matthew Rabin), American Economic Review, 1999, 89 (1), 103–124.
“Choice and Procrastination” (O’Donoghue, Ted and Matthew Rabin), The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2001, 116 (1), 121–160.
“Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review” (Frederick, Shane, George Loewenstein, and Ted O’Donoghue), Journal of Economic Literature, 2002, 40 (2), 351–401.
Decisions Under Uncertainty:
“Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk" (Kahneman, Daniel and Amos Tversky), Econometrica, 1979, 47 (2), 263–291.
“Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty” (Tversky, Amos and Daniel Kahneman), Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 1992, 5 (4), 297–323.
Benjamin Golub, Assistant Professor of Economics at Harvard University, will present a mini-course on "Learning and Influence in Networks" during his visit to Northwestern in October. The mini-course will include three lectures during the week of October 15-19, 2018:
Lecture 1: Monday, October 15th, 3:30-5:00pm in Global Hub 2130
Lecture 2: Tuesday, October 16th, 3:30-5:00pm in Global Hub 2130
Lecture 3: Thursday, October 18th, 3:30-5:00pm in Global Hub 2130
Talk details, including a list of references, can be found here.
Background reading can be found here.
2017-2018
Tomasz Strzalecki, Professor of Economics at Harvard University, will present a mini-course on "Static and Dynamic Models of Stochastic Choice" during his visit to Northwestern in May. The mini-course will include three lectures on May 7th, 8th, and 10th.
Detailed course description and suggested readings can be found here.
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We periodically invite to campus distinguished scholars to give mini-courses on a topic of current interest. These mini-courses are open to all members of the Northwestern community as well as visitors from other Colleges and Unviersities.
Fuhito Kojima, Associate Professor of Economics at Stanford University, will present a mini-course on "Matching theory and market design: Theory and Applications" during his visit to Northwestern in October-November.
Abstract: How to match people to other people or goods is an important problem in society. Just think of some examples such as (1) student placement in schools, (2) labor markets where workers and firms are matched, and (3) organ donation, in which patients are matched to potential donors.The economics of “matching and market design” has analyzed these problems and improved real-life institutions in recent years. In this lecture series, Kojima will briefly cover the basics of matching theory and then discuss some of the recent advances in matching theory and applications, partly based on his own research.
The first lecture will be Tuesday, October 31st, 2017.
11:00am-12:00pm in Global Hub #2410A&B
In the first lecture, Kojima will begin by giving a brief introduction to the theory of two-sided matching. We will see that there are mechanisms to find a desirable outcome in the sense of “stability,” but we will also find that there are a lot of impossibility theorems, rendering an off-the-shelf application of standard models to real world impossible. Partly to remedy this problem, Kojima will spend the remaining time by discussing the issue of “large matching markets.” It is also intended to provide some methodological point departing from classical matching theory in economics.
The second lecture will be Thursday, November 2nd, 2017.
11:00am-12:00pm in Global Hub #2410A&B
The second lecture continues the discussion of two-sided matching. Kojima will talk about a class of problems which he calls “matching with constraints.” Motivated by a number of market-design issues found in applications, we will study both existing mechanisms to cope with constraints as well as suggestions by researchers including Kojima. This part of the lecture is closely related to his theory seminar topic.
The third lecture will be Friday, November 3rd, 2017.
9:30am-11:00am in Global Hub #2410A&B
The last lecture will turn to another class of problems, which one could call “one-sided matching.” That’s a setting in which only one side of the problem are real players and the other side of the market are objects to be allocated. We will discuss theoretical and practical issues in this problem, drawing a lot on applications to school choice. Also, theoretical issues covered in the first two lectures, such as impossibility theorems, large markets, and constraints, present themselves in this setting as well.
Reading: A classical textbook is “Two-Sided Matching” by Roth and Sotomayor (1990) from Cambridge University Press, and that will cover the basic theory. Kojima's recent survey paper, “Recent Developments in Matching Theory and its Practical Applications” to appear in "Advances in Economics and Econometrics: 11th World Congress", will cover much of the topics discussed in the rest of the lectures.
2016-2017
We periodically invite to campus distinguished scholars to give mini-courses on a topic of current interest. These mini-courses are open to all members of the Northwestern community as well as visitors from other Colleges and Universities.
Vincent Crawford, Drummond Professor of Political Economy at the University of Oxford,will present a mini-course on “Level-k Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications” during his visit to Northwestern in April.
The first lecture will be Tuesday, April 18, 2017.
11:00am-12:30pm - Global Hub #2130.
In the first lecture, Vince will review his work on mechanism design with k-level thinking in this lecture (reading 1 below).
In the second lecture, Friday, April 21, 11:00am-12:30pm, Global Hub #5101, Vince will review various kinds of evidence on k-level thinking in games (readings 2-6 below).
Reading:
1. Vincent P. Crawford. “Efficient Mechanisms for Level-k Bilateral Trading”
2. Vincent P. Crawford, Miguel A. Costa-Gomes, and Nagore Iriberri. 2013. “Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications,” Journal of Economic Literature, 51(1): 5–62
3. Costa-Gomes, Miguel A., Vincent P. Crawford, and Bruno Broseta. 2001. “Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study.” Econometrica 69 (5): 1193–1235.
4. Costa-Gomes, Miguel A., and Vincent P. Crawford. 2006. “Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study.” American Economic Review 96 (5): 1737–1768.
5. Brocas, Isabelle, Juan D. Carrillo, Stephanie W. Wang, Colin F. Camerer. 2014. “Imperfect Choice or Imperfect Attention? Understanding Strategic Thinking in Private Information Games.” Review of Economic Studies 81 (3): 944-970.
6. Wang, Joseph, Michael Spezio, and Colin F. Camerer. 2010. “Pinocchio's Pupil: Using Eyetracking and Pupil Dilation to Understand Truth Telling and Deception in Sender-Receiver Games” American Economic Review 100 (3): 984-1007.
Slides for the mini-course are available here.
There are four slide decks for the mini-course:
1. Efficient mechanisms for level-k bilateral trading
2. A level-k model for games with asymmetric information
3. Measuring cognition in economic decisions: How and why? II: Studying cognition via information search in game experiments
4. Structural and nonparametric econometrics
Vince plans to discuss deck (1) on Tuesday, April 18, and decks (2)-(4) on Friday, April 21.
2014-2015
There are two "teachers" in the 2014-15 series: Alessandro Arlotto, Professor of Economics at Duke University, and Matthew Rabin, Professor of Behavioral Economics at Harvard.
Alessandro Arlotto's mini-course in bandit models
Click here for the syllabus.
Three lectures starting January 12
Time: 10:00-12:00
Classroom: Jacobs G43
Monday, January 12
Wednesday, January 14
Friday, January 16
Matthew Rabin's course on "Errors in Statistical Reasoning: Evidence, Models, Implications."
Please click here for the reading list.
Monday, May 18
12:30-2:00
Jacobs 1246
Wednesday, May 20
12:30-2:00
Jacobs 160
Friday, May 22
12:30-2:00
Jacobs 1246
2012-2013
There are two "teachers" in the Spring 2013 series: John List, Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago, and Álvaro José Riascos Villegas, Professor of Economics at Universidad de los Andes and Executive, Quantil.
Álvaro J.R. Villegas's mini-course: Logic and Game Theory
3 lectures starting May 20
Description:
There is a long tradition in mathematical logic (at least since Hintikka in the 1950s) of using games as a way of defining truth of mathematical sentences. This is an alternative approach to the classical compositional semantics definition of truth due to Tarski. Besides a few very preliminary research topics in which the author has been working we shall discuss informally the main ideas of this literature: the semantic game, the separation game and the model existence game in propositional, first order and IF logic. The idea is that by learning how logicians have used game theory for the advancement of mathematical logic, we can gain insights and learn some basic tools that may be useful for studying the logic and language of game theory.
Monday, May 20
12:00-1:15
Jacobs G43
Introduction to games in logic: (1) The semantic game in predicative, first order and IF logic. (2) The separation game in first order logic. (3). The model existence game in first order logic.
Tuesday, May 21
12:00-1:15
Jacobs G43
On falsiability and empirical content: a discussion based on Chambers, Echenique and Shmaya (2013): The Axiomatic Structure of Empirical Content.
Wednesday, May 22
12:00-1:15
Jacobs 101
Research topics: (1) A formalization of the problem of identification in General Equilibrium (2) The logic of rational play.
References
Lecture Notes on Games and Logic. Tulemheimo, T (2007). Department of Philosophy, University of Helsinki.
Models and Games. Vaananen, J (2011). Cambridge University Press.
Independence Friendly Logic: A Game Theoretic Approach. Mann, A., Sandu, G., Sevenster, M. 2011. Cambridge University Press.
Equilibrium semantics of languages of imperfect information. Sandu, G., Sevenster, M. 2010. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic.
Chambers, Echenique and Shmaya (2013): The Axiomatic Structure of Empirical Content.
John List's Mini-Course: "Field Experiments in Economics"
May 13, 14 and 15
Content: The course presents lectures on how to use field experiments in economics and summarizes recent research. It will consist of three lectures over three days.
The Syllabus contains the reading lists for each of the lectures.
Outline of the course
Monday, May 13
12:00-1:15
Jacobs G42
Introduction to field experiments in economics, randomization, and simple rules of thumb for design
Tuesday, May 14
12:00-1:15
Jacobs G42
The Economics of Charitable Giving
Wednesday, May 15
1:30-2:45
Accounting Dept. seminar room (6234 Jacobs)
Audience Choice:
1. Field Experiments in education
2. On why men are paid more than women
3. On using field experiments in firms
4. Using field experiments to understand the economics of crime
2011-2012
The 'teacher' in the spring 2012 series will be Professor Tayfun Sönmez, Professor of Economics at Boston College. His mini-course will be on market design.
TayfunSönmez' Mini-Course: "Matching Markets: Theory and Practice"
The Syllabus contains the course description, lecture topics, and reading lists
The Survey contains background reading for 3 of the 4 lectures.
Most of Prof. Sönmez' papers for the course can be downloaded from his webpage
4 lectures starting May 14
Monday, May 14
12:00-1:30
Jacobs G43
OVERVIEW OF LECTURES
House Allocation & Housing Markets
Slides
Tuesday, May 15
12:00-1:30
Jacobs G43
Kidney Exchange
Slides
Wednesday, May 16
12:00-1:30
Jacobs G43
School Matching
Slides
Thursday, May 17
3:30-5:00
Jacobs G43
Cadet-Branch Matching
Slides
2010-2011
The 'teacher' in the spring 2011 series will be Professor Andrew Caplin, Co-Director, Center for Experimental Social Science, New York University. His mini-course will be on economics and psychology.
Andrew Caplin's Mini-Course: "Decision Theory, Psychology, and Enriched Choice Data"
3 lectures starting May 17
Tuesday, May 17
12:00-1:15
Jacobs G43
"Anxiety or Surprise? The Need for Data Enrichment "
Reading List
Wednesday, May 18
12:00-1:15
Jacobs G43
"The Axiomatic Approach to Enriched Choice Data: Two Examples"
Reading List
Thursday, May 19
9:30-10:45
Jacobs 166
"Mis-perception and Stochastic Choice: Theory and Tests"
Supplementary Material: Part One and Part Two
2009-2010
There are two "teachers" in the Fall 2009 series: Benny Moldovanu, Chair of Economic Theory II, University of Bonn, who is visiting the CET and Math Center, and Matthew Jackson, Eberle Professor of Economics, Stanford University.
Benny Moldovanu's Mini-Course: "Dynamic Mechanism Design"
6 lectures starting Sept. 30
Mon & Weds 12:00-1:30
Mon in Jacobs G44; Weds in Jacobs G43
Reading List
The mini-course will survey several recent developments in dynamic mechanism design. Topics included: sequential assignment models and order statistics, queueing models, continuous-time revenue management models, dynamic Clarke-Groves-Vickrey mechanisms, Bayesian learning and implementation, and mechanism design with interdependent values.
Matthew Jackson's Mini-Course: "Network Formation and Patterns of Behavior"
3 lectures starting Nov. 16
Mon, Tues & Weds 12:10-1:10
Mon & Weds in Jacobs G42; Tues in Jacobs G27
Reading List
SLIDES
The mini-course will provide an overview of some recent research on social network formation as well as how network patterns of interactions affect behavior. This includes discussion of recent models of network formation combining random and strategic approaches, as well as studies of how network structure affects learning, both Bayesian and non-Bayesian, and theoretical and empirical studies of other behavioral contagions and diffusion.
2008-2009
Paul Milgrom's Mini-Course: "Auction Consulting: Practical Uses of Economics and Game Theory"
Tuesday, Oct. 7
"Advising bidders: how economic and game theoretic analysis has led to superior bidder performance"
Time: 4:00-5:00pm
Jacobs Center Room G42
Tuesday, Oct. 14
"Advising designers: how economic and game theoretic analysis continues to influence government auctioneers"
Time: 4:00-5:00pm
Jacobs Center Room G42
Yuliy Sannikov's Mini-Course: "Dynamic Games in Continuous Time"
Monday, Oct. 27
Time: 1:00-3:00pm
Jacobs Center Room 2245
Notes
Wednesday, Oct. 29
Time:1:00-3:00pm
Jacobs Center Room G43
Notes
2007-2008
The inaugural 'teacher' in the series is Professor Arthur Robson of Simon Fraser University. Robson is the Canada Research Chair in Economic Theory and Evolution and Fellow of the Econometric Society. His mini-course will be on economics and evolution.
Course Schedule:
Monday March 10
12:10-1:10pm
Jacobs Center Room G45
Tuesday March 11
12:10-1:10pm
Jacobs Center Room G45
Wednesday March 12
3:30 to 5:00pm
Jacobs Center Room G36
Thursday March 13
12:10-1:10pm
Jacobs Center Room G45
Friday March 14
12:10-1:10pm
Jacobs Center Room G43
Topics will be based on these readings:
INTRODUCTION
Robson, A.J. "The Biological Basis of Economic Behavior," J. Econ. Lit. 29 (2001), 11-33.
Robson, A.J. "Evolution and Human Nature," J. Econ. Perspectives 16 (2002), 89-106.
UTILITY
Robson, A.J. "Why Would Nature Give Individuals Utility Functions?," J. Polit. Econ. 109 (2001), 900-914.
Rayo, L., and Becker, G. "Evolutionary Efficiency and Happiness," University of Chicago WP (2005).
RISK
Bergstrom, T.C "Storage for Good Times and Bad: Of Rats and Men," UCSB WP (2005).
Cooper W. S., R. H. Kaplan. 1982. Adaptive "coin-flipping": a decision-theoretic examination of natural selection for random individual variation. Journal of Theoretical Biology. 94:135--151.
Grafen, A. "Formal Darwinism, the individual-as-maximizing-agent analogy and bet-hedging," Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 266, 799-803.
Karni, E. and Schmeidler, D. "Self-Preservation as a Foundation of Rational Behavior Under Risk," J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 1986, 7, 71-82.
Robson, A.J. "A Biological Basis for Expected and Non-Expected Utility," J. Econ. Theory, 1996, 68, 397-424.
Robson, A.J. "The Evolution of Attitudes to Risk: Lottery Tickets and Relative Wealth," Games Econ. Behav. 1996, 14, 190-207.
ALTRUISM TO KIN
Bergstrom, T.C. "On the Evolution of Altruistic Rules for Siblings," Amer. Econ. Rev. 1995, 85, 58-81.
Bergstrom, T.C. "Economics in a Family Way," J. Econ. Lit. 1996, 34, 1903-1934.
TIME PREFERENCE
Dasgupta, P. and Maskin, E. "Uncertainty and Hyperbolic Discounting," Amer. Econ. Rev. 1995, 95, 1290-1299.
Hansson, I. and Stuart, C. "Malthusian Selection of Preferences," Amer. Econ. Rev. 1990, 80, 529-544.
Robson, A and Samuelson L "The Evolution of Intertemporal Preferences", American Economic Review 97 (2007), 496-500.
"The Evolution of Impatience with Aggregate Uncertainty" WP, Yale and SFU
Robson, A.J. and Szentes, B. "Evolution of Time Preference by Natural Selection: Comment'' American Economic Review forthcoming.
Robson, A.J., Szentes, B., and Iantchev, E. "On the Evolution of Time Preference," Chicago WP (2006)
Rogers, A. "Evolution of Time Preference by Natural Selection," Amer. Econ. Rev. 1994, 84, 460-481.
Sozou, P. "On Hyperbolic Discounting and Uncertain Hazard Rates," Proceedings of the Royal Society of London: Series B 265 (1998), 2015-2020.
September 9 - 10, 2026
Eighteenth Transatlantic Theory Workshop
Kellogg School of Management, Evanston, IL
August 25 - 27, 2026
Northwestern-Kellogg Summer School in Economic Theory
Kellogg School of Management, Evanston, IL
June 5 - 6, 2026
Learning and Bounded Rationality Conference
Kellogg School of Management, Evanston, IL
September 1 - 2, 2025
Seventeenth Transatlantic Theory Workshop
Bocconi University, Milan, Italy
May 9 - 10, 2025
Games of Communication, Persuasion and Disclosure Conference
Kellogg School of Management, Evanston, IL
September 2 - 4, 2024
Sixteenth Transatlantic Theory Workshop
HEC Paris
August 19 – 21, 2024
Northwestern-Kellogg Summer School in Economic Theory
Kellogg School of Management, Evanston, IL
June 24 – 26, 2024
RUD (Risk, Uncertainty, & Decision) Conference
Kellogg School of Management, Evanston, IL
September 6 - 8, 2023
Fifteenth Transatlantic Theory Workshop
Oxford
June 3 - 4, 2023
Bounded Rationality in Choice Conference
Kellogg School of Management, Evanston, IL
May 12, 2023
Nancy L. Schwartz Lecture
“Bargaining and Cooperation in Dynamic Games”
Dilip Abreu, Professor of Economics, NYE
May 12, 2023
An Afternoon Honoring Dilip Abreu
Kellogg School of Management, Evanston, IL
August 31– September 2, 2022
Fourteenth Transatlantic Theory Workshop
Kellogg School of Management, Evanston, IL
September 1 - 3, 2021
Thirteenth Transatlantic Theory Workshop
Zoom (Virtual), Ecole Polytechnique, Paris
September 4 - 6, 2019
Twelfth Transatlantic Theory Workshop
Nuffield College, Oxford
September 4 - 5, 2018
Eleventh Transatlantic Theory Workshop
Kellogg School of Management, Evanston, IL
September 6 - 8, 2017
Tenth Transatlantic Theory Workshop
Ecole Polytechnique, Paris
September 7 - 9, 2016
Ninth Transatlantic Theory Workshop
Nuffield College, Oxford
June 10–11, 2016
The Fourth Bounded Rationality in Choice Conference
Kellogg School of Management, Evanston, IL
September 3–4, 2015
Eighth Transatlantic Theory Workshop
Kellogg School of Management, Evanston, IL
June 20–25, 2015
Petralia Sottana 2015 Applied Economics Workshop
Petralia Sottana, Italy
March 20-22, 2015
Reimagining Decentralization: A Conference in Honor of Stanley Reiter
Kellogg School of Management, Evanston, IL
September 10-12, 2014
Seventh Transatlantic Theory Workshop
Paris School of Economics
July 24-30, 2014
Petralia Sottana 2014 Applied Economics Workshop
Petralia Sottana, Italy
April 24–25, 2014
Heartland Electricity Dialog
September 9–10, 2013
Sixth Transatlantic Theory Workshop
Magdalen College, University of Oxford
May 7–8, 2013
Workshop on Privacy
January 29 - 30, 2013
Wholesale Electricity Markets - Hurdles to Overcome
November 2 - 3, 2012
Security Market Auctions and IPOs
Kellogg School of Management, Evanston, IL
September 7 - 9, 2012
Fifth Transatlantic Theory Workshop
Kellogg School of Management, Evanston, IL
June 26 - 28, 2012
Risk Uncertainty and Decision Conference
Kellogg School of Management, Evanston, IL
May 4 - 5, 2012
Challenges for Electricity Markets
Kellogg School of Management, Evanston, IL
September 7 - 9, 2011
Fourth Transatlantic Theory Workshop
Paris School of Economics
December 2 - 3, 2011
Problem of Prediction
Kellogg School of Management, Evanston, IL
September 14 - 16, 2010
Third Transatlantic Theory Workshop
Trinity College, Oxford
September 11 - 13, 2009
Second Transatlantic Theory Workshop
Kellogg School of Management, Evanston, IL
April 30 - May 1, 2009
Decision Theory and its Discontents
Kellogg School of Management, Evanston, IL
October 24 - 25, 2008
Conference in Honor of Ehud Kalai's 66th
Kellogg School of Management, Evanston, IL
October 3 - 4, 2008
Workshop on Advances in the Theory of Networks and Strategic Interactions
September 8 - 10, 2008
First Transatlantic Theory Workshop
Paris School of Economics
July 13 - 17, 2008
GAMES 2008
July 8 - 12, 2008
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Chicago, IL
May 2 - 3, 2008
Workshop on Dynamic Mechanism Design
Kellogg School of Management, Evanston, IL
September 7 - 8, 2007
Workshop on Communication, Game Theory, and Language
Kellogg School of Management, Evanston, IL