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Theory Workshops Archive
Go to Current Theory Workshops

2006-2007 2006-2007 Coordinator: Alp Atakan
09/20/06	Chris Chambers Cal Tech Bayesian Consistent Prior Selection (with Takashi Hayash) Research Page
09/27/06	Uzi Segal Boston College Calibration results for non expected utility theories Research Page
10/04/06	David Martimort Universite des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse Research Page Mechanism Design Under Private Communication
10/11/06	Joe Halpern Cornell University, CS Dept Distributed Computing Meets Game Theory: Robust Mechanisms for Secret Sharing and Implementations With Cheap Talk
10/18/06	Federico Echenique Caltech Supermodularity is not Falsifiable
10/25/06	Bernard Caillaud Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques Consensus Building: How to persuade a group
11/01/06	Pino Lopomo Duke University Efficient Mechanisms for Mergers and Acquisitions Research Page
11/08/06	Andreas Blume Pittsburgh University Noisy Talk Research Page
11/15/06	Jan Eeckhout University of Pennsylvania Local supermodularity and unique assortative matching Research Page
11/22/06	Thanksgiving - No Seminar
11/29/06 Jacobs G44	Haluk Ergin MIT A Unique Costly Contemplation Representation (with Todd Sarver, NU) Research Page
12/06/06	Salvatore Piccolo University of Salerno The Strategic Value of Incomplete Contracts for Competing Hierarchies (with D. Martimort) Research Page
03/28/07	Navin Kartik University of California- San Diego A Theory of Momentum in Sequential Voting Research Page
04/04/07	Douglas Gale New York University Trading Networks Research Page
04/11/07	Peyton Young The Brookings Institution Innovation Diffusion in Heterogeneous Populations Research Page
04/18/07	Fabio Maccheroni Università Bocconi - Milan Preliminary Title: Social Decision Theory: choosing in and between groups Research Page
04/25/07	Efe Ok New York University Reference-Dependent Rational Choice Theory and the Attraction Effect Research Page TIME CHANGE (due to Nancy Schwartz Memorial Lecture): New Time- 3:00-4:30 ROOM CHANGE: New Room: Jacobs G03
05/02/07	Larry Samuelson University of Wisconsin- Madison Pricing in Matching Markets Research Page
05/09/07	Hector Chade Arizona State University Repeated Games with Present-Biased Preferences NEW ROOM FOR RECEPTION AFTERWARDS: 547 Jacobs (Staff Lounge) (due to Kellogg photo shoot in Jacobs) Research Page
05/16/07	Tristan Tomala University Paris-Dauphine Correlation and authentication in repeated games with monitoring network Research Page
05/23/07	Max Amarante Columbia University Toward a Rational-Choice Foundation for Non-Additive Models Papers Talk Is Based On: Paper 1, Paper 2 ROOM CHANGE: New Room- Jacobs G27
05/30/07	Adam Brandenburger New York University How Much Coordination is Possible via Correlation? Research Page

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2005-2006
May 31	Vasiliki Skreta UCLA The Role of Outside Options in Auction Design Research Page
May 24	Ignacio Palacios-Huerta Brown University Experientia Docet: Professionals Play Minimax in Laboratory Experiments Research Page
May 17	Jean-Francois Mertens Université Catholique de Louvain Intergenerational Equity and the discount rate for Cost-Benefit analysis (with Anna Rubinchik)
May 10	Bill Zame UCLA Incentives Contracts and Markets: A General Equilibrium Theory of Firms
May 3	Ilya Segal Stanford University Communication and Prices in Economic Mechanisms Research Page
April 26	Sjaak Hurkens Institute for Economic Analysis (Barcelona) Dynamic Matching and Bargaining: The Role of Deadlines Research Page
April 19	David Levine UCLA The Paradox of Voter Participation: A Laboratory Study (with T. R. Palfrey ) Research Page
April 12	Luca Anderlini Georgetown University A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated (with Dino Gerardi and Roger Lagunoff) Research Page
April 5	David Ahn University of California at Berkeley Unawareness and Framing
March 29	Dirk Bergemann Yale University Robust Monopoly Pricing (joint with Karl Schlag (European University Institute)) Research Page
March 8	Stephen Morris Princeton University Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms Research Page
Dec. 7	Wolfgang Pesendorfer Princeton University Partison Politics and Aggregation Failure with Ignorant Voters Research Page
Nov. 16	Patrick Bolton Columbia University Economics Department-Wide Speaker: Sovereign debt restructuring and the role of the IMF
Nov. 9	Tymon Tatur Princeton University On an Evolutionary Model, an Equilibrium Concept, and Applications
Nov. 2	Daijiro Okada Rutgers University Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy, and Nonstationary Bounded Recall
Oct. 26	Luca Rigotti Duke University "Uncertainty in Mechanism Design" Research Page
Oct. 19	Sergiu Hart The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium Research Page
Oct. 12	Aldo Rustichini University of Minnesota Dynamic Variational Preferences Home Page
Oct. 5	Vincent Crawford University of California, San Diego "Fatal Attraction: Focality, Naivete, and Sophistication in Experimental 'Hide-and-Seek' Games"
Sept. 28	Itzhak Gilboa Tel-Aviv University, "Empirical Similarity and Objective Probabilities"
Sept. 21	Nicola Persico University of Pennsylvania "A Rational Theory of Random Crackdowns" Research Page

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2004-2005
March 2	Paolo Ghirardato University of Torino Ambiguity and Asset Prices

March 9	Che-Lin Su Stanford University Title of Talk: Equilibrium Programming and Leader-Follower Games, refers to: Computation of Moral-Hazard Problems (with Kenneth L. Judd, Jan. 2005) Analysis on Forward Market Equilibrium Model (Nov. 2004) A Sequential NCP Algorithm for Solving Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints (Revised Nov. 2004)

March 16	Tadashi Sekiguchi Kobe University, Japan The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Observation Costs

March 30	Yeon-Koo Che University of Wisconsin-Madison Revenue Comparisons for Auctions When Bidders Have Arbitrary Types

April 6	Faruk Gul Princeton University The Canonical Type Space for Interdependent Preferences

April 13	Ian Jewitt Nuffield College, Oxford Information in Auctions: Disclosure

April 20	Olivier Compte ENPC, Paris Bargaining over Randomly Generated Offers

April 27	Sanjeev Goyal University of Essex Structural Holes in Social Networks

May 4	Jing Li University of Pennsylvania Unawareness Appendix

May 11	Ariel Rubinstein Tel-Aviv University A Model of Persuasion

May 18	Drew Fudenberg Harvard University Steady State Learning and the Code of Hammurab i

May 25	Andreas Park University of Toronto Caller Number Five: Timing Games that Morph from One Form to Another (with Lones Smith)

June 1	Daron Acemoglu MIT Competition and Efficiency in Congested Markets (with Asu Pzdaglar)

Go to Current Theory Workshops

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