Seminars
Theory Workshops Archive Go to Current Theory Workshops
Chris Chambers Cal Tech Bayesian Consistent Prior Selection (with Takashi Hayash) Research Page
Uzi Segal Boston College Calibration results for non expected utility theories Research Page
Hector Chade Arizona State University Repeated Games with Present-Biased Preferences NEW ROOM FOR RECEPTION AFTERWARDS: 547 Jacobs (Staff Lounge) (due to Kellogg photo shoot in Jacobs) Research Page
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Jean-Francois Mertens Université Catholique de Louvain Intergenerational Equity and the discount rate for Cost-Benefit analysis (with Anna Rubinchik)
Ilya Segal Stanford University Communication and Prices in Economic Mechanisms Research Page
Sjaak Hurkens Institute for Economic Analysis (Barcelona) Dynamic Matching and Bargaining: The Role of Deadlines Research Page
Luca Anderlini Georgetown University A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated (with Dino Gerardi and Roger Lagunoff) Research Page
Dirk Bergemann Yale University Robust Monopoly Pricing (joint with Karl Schlag (European University Institute)) Research Page
Wolfgang Pesendorfer Princeton University Partison Politics and Aggregation Failure with Ignorant Voters Research Page
Daijiro Okada Rutgers University Growth of Strategy Sets, Entropy, and Nonstationary Bounded Recall
Sergiu Hart The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium Research Page
Nicola Persico University of Pennsylvania "A Rational Theory of Random Crackdowns" Research Page
Che-Lin Su Stanford University Title of Talk: Equilibrium Programming and Leader-Follower Games, refers to:
Computation of Moral-Hazard Problems (with Kenneth L. Judd, Jan. 2005) Analysis on Forward Market Equilibrium Model (Nov. 2004) A Sequential NCP Algorithm for Solving Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints (Revised Nov. 2004)
Yeon-Koo Che University of Wisconsin-Madison Revenue Comparisons for Auctions When Bidders Have Arbitrary Types
Go to Current Theory Workshops