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We periodically invite to campus distinguished scholars to give mini-courses on a topic of current interest. These mini-courses are open to all members of the Northwestern community as well as visitors from other Colleges and Unviersities.

Last updated: 10/27/2017

Fuhito Kojima, Associate Professor of Economics at Stanford University, will present a mini-course on "Matching theory and market design: Theory and Applications" during his visit to Northwestern in October-November.

Abstract: How to match people to other people or goods is an important problem in society. Just think of some examples such as (1) student placement in schools, (2) labor markets where workers and firms are matched, and (3) organ donation, in which patients are matched to potential donors.The economics of �matching and market design� has analyzed these problems and improved real-life institutions in recent years. In this lecture series, Kojima will briefly cover the basics of matching theory and then discuss some of the recent advances in matching theory and applications, partly based on his own research.

The first lecture will be Tuesday, October 31st, 2017.
11:00am-12:00pm in Global Hub #2410A&B

In the first lecture, Kojima will begin by giving a brief introduction to the theory of two-sided matching. We will see that there are mechanisms to find a desirable outcome in the sense of �stability,� but we will also find that there are a lot of impossibility theorems, rendering an off-the-shelf application of standard models to real world impossible. Partly to remedy this problem, Kojima will spend the remaining time by discussing the issue of �large matching markets.� It is also intended to provide some methodological point departing from classical matching theory in economics.

The second lecture will be Thursday, November 2nd, 2017.
11:00am-12:00pm in Global Hub #2410A&B

The second lecture continues the discussion of two-sided matching. Kojima will talk about a class of problems which he calls �matching with constraints.� Motivated by a number of market-design issues found in applications, we will study both existing mechanisms to cope with constraints as well as suggestions by researchers including Kojima. This part of the lecture is closely related to his theory seminar topic.

The third lecture will be Friday, November 3rd, 2017.
9:30am-11:00am in Global Hub #2410A&B

The last lecture will turn to another class of problems, which one could call �one-sided matching.� That�s a setting in which only one side of the problem are real players and the other side of the market are objects to be allocated. We will discuss theoretical and practical issues in this problem, drawing a lot on applications to school choice. Also, theoretical issues covered in the first two lectures, such as impossibility theorems, large markets, and constraints, present themselves in this setting as well.

Reading: A classical textbook is �Two-Sided Matching� by Roth and Sotomayor (1990) from Cambridge University Press, and that will cover the basic theory. Kojima's recent survey paper, �Recent Developments in Matching Theory and its Practical Applications� to appear in "Advances in Economics and Econometrics: 11th World Congress", will cover much of the topics discussed in the rest of the lectures.

For information on past mini-courses,


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