We periodically invite to campus distinguished
scholars to give mini-courses on a topic of current interest.
These mini-courses are open to all members of the Northwestern
community as well as visitors from other Colleges and Universities.
Vincent Crawford, Drummond Professor of Political Economy at the University of Oxford,will present a mini-course on �Level-k Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications� during his visit to Northwestern in April.
The first lecture will be Tuesday, April 18, 2017.
11:00am-12:30pm - Global Hub #2130.
In the first lecture, Vince will review his work on mechanism design with k-level thinking in this lecture (reading 1 below).
In the second lecture, Friday, April 21, 11:00am-12:30pm, Global Hub #5101, Vince will review various kinds of evidence on k-level thinking in games (readings 2-6 below).
1. Vincent P. Crawford. �Efficient Mechanisms for Level-k Bilateral Trading�
2. Vincent P. Crawford, Miguel A. Costa-Gomes, and Nagore Iriberri. 2013. �Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications,� Journal of Economic Literature, 51(1): 5�62
3. Costa-Gomes, Miguel A., Vincent P. Crawford, and Bruno Broseta. 2001. �Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study.� Econometrica 69 (5): 1193�1235.
4. Costa-Gomes, Miguel A., and Vincent P. Crawford. 2006. �Cognition and Behavior in Two-Person Guessing Games: An Experimental Study.� American Economic Review 96 (5): 1737�1768.
5. Brocas, Isabelle, Juan D. Carrillo, Stephanie W. Wang, Colin F. Camerer. 2014. �Imperfect Choice or Imperfect Attention? Understanding Strategic Thinking in Private Information Games.� Review of Economic Studies 81 (3): 944-970.
6. Wang, Joseph, Michael Spezio, and Colin F. Camerer. 2010. �Pinocchio's Pupil: Using Eyetracking and Pupil Dilation to Understand Truth Telling and Deception in Sender-Receiver Games� American Economic Review 100 (3): 984-1007.
Slides for the mini-course are available here.
There are four slide decks for the mini-course:
1. Efficient mechanisms for level-k bilateral trading
2. A level-k model for games with asymmetric information
3. Measuring cognition in economic decisions: How and why? II: Studying cognition via information search in game experiments
4. Structural and nonparametric econometrics
Vince plans to discuss deck (1) on Tuesday, April 18, and decks (2)-(4) on Friday, April 21.
There are two "teachers" in the 2014-15 series: Alessandro Arlotto, Professor of Economics at Duke University, and Matthew Rabin, Professor of Behavioral Economics at Harvard.
Alessandro Arlotto's mini-course in bandit models
Click here for the syllabus.
Three lectures starting January 12
Classroom: Jacobs G43
Monday, January 12
Wednesday, January 14
Friday, January 16
Matthew Rabin's course on "Errors in Statistical Reasoning: Evidence, Models, Implications."
Please click here for the reading list.
Monday, May 18
Wednesday, May 20
Friday, May 22
There are two "teachers" in the Spring 2013 series: John List, Professor of Economics at the University of Chicago, and Álvaro José Riascos Villegas, Professor of Economics at Universidad de los Andes and Executive, Quantil.
Álvaro J.R. Villegas's mini-course: Logic and Game Theory
3 lectures starting May 20
There is a long tradition in mathematical logic (at least since Hintikka in the 1950s) of using games as a way of defining truth of mathematical sentences. This is an alternative approach to the classical compositional semantics definition of truth due to Tarski. Besides a few very preliminary research topics in which the author has been working we shall discuss informally the main ideas of this literature: the semantic game, the separation game and the model existence game in propositional, first order and IF logic. The idea is that by learning how logicians have used game theory for the advancement of mathematical logic, we can gain insights and learn some basic tools that may be useful for studying the logic and language of game theory.
Monday, May 20
Introduction to games in logic: (1) The semantic game in predicative, first order and IF logic. (2) The separation game in first order logic. (3). The model existence game in first order logic.
Tuesday, May 21
On falsiability and empirical content: a discussion based on Chambers, Echenique and Shmaya (2013): The Axiomatic Structure of Empirical Content.
Wednesday, May 22
Research topics: (1) A formalization of the problem of identification in General Equilibrium (2) The logic of rational play.
Lecture Notes on Games and Logic. Tulemheimo, T (2007). Department of Philosophy, University of Helsinki.
Models and Games. Vaananen, J (2011). Cambridge University Press.
Independence Friendly Logic: A Game Theoretic Approach. Mann, A., Sandu, G., Sevenster, M. 2011. Cambridge University Press.
Equilibrium semantics of languages of imperfect information. Sandu, G., Sevenster, M. 2010. Annals of Pure and Applied Logic.
Chambers, Echenique and Shmaya (2013): The Axiomatic Structure of Empirical Content.
John List's Mini-Course: "Field Experiments in Economics"
May 13, 14 and 15
Content: The course presents lectures on how to use field experiments in economics and summarizes recent research. It will consist of three lectures over three days.
The Syllabus contains the reading lists for each of the lectures.
Outline of the course
Monday, May 13
Introduction to field experiments in economics, randomization, and simple rules of thumb for design
Tuesday, May 14
The Economics of Charitable Giving
Wednesday, May 15
Accounting Dept. seminar room (6234 Jacobs)
1. Field Experiments in education
On why men are paid more than women
3. On using field experiments in firms
4. Using field experiments to understand the economics of crime
'teacher' in the spring 2012 series will be Professor Tayfun Sönmez, Professor of Economics at Boston College. His mini-course will be on market design.
TayfunSönmez' Mini-Course: "Matching Markets: Theory and Practice"
The Syllabus contains the course description, lecture topics, and reading lists
The Survey contains background reading for 3 of the 4 lectures.
Most of Prof. Sönmez' papers for the course can be downloaded from his webpage
4 lectures starting May 14
Monday, May 14
OVERVIEW OF LECTURES
House Allocation & Housing Markets
Tuesday, May 15
Wednesday, May 16
Thursday, May 17
'teacher' in the spring 2011 series will be Professor Andrew Caplin, Co-Director, Center for Experimental Social Science, New York University. His mini-course will be on economics
Andrew Caplin's Mini-Course: "Decision Theory, Psychology, and Enriched Choice Data"
3 lectures starting May 17
Tuesday, May 17
"Anxiety or Surprise? The Need for Data Enrichment "
Wednesday, May 18
"The Axiomatic Approach to Enriched Choice Data: Two Examples"
Thursday, May 19
"Mis-perception and Stochastic Choice: Theory and Tests"
Supplementary Material: Part One and Part Two
There are two "teachers" in the Fall 2009 series: Benny Moldovanu, Chair of Economic Theory II,
University of Bonn, who is visiting the CET and Math Center, and Matthew Jackson, Eberle Professor of Economics, Stanford University.
Benny Moldovanu's Mini-Course: "Dynamic Mechanism Design"
6 lectures starting Sept. 30
Mon & Weds 12:00-1:30
Mon in Jacobs G44; Weds in Jacobs G43
The mini-course will survey several
recent developments in dynamic
mechanism design. Topics included:
sequential assignment models and order statistics,
continuous-time revenue management
models, dynamic Clarke-Groves-Vickrey
mechanisms, Bayesian learning and
implementation, and mechanism design
with interdependent values.
Matthew Jackson's Mini-Course: "Network Formation and Patterns of Behavior"
3 lectures starting Nov. 16
Mon, Tues & Weds 12:10-1:10
Mon & Weds in Jacobs G42; Tues in Jacobs G27
The mini-course will provide an overview of some recent research on social network formation as well as how network patterns of interactions affect behavior. This includes discussion of recent models of network formation combining random and strategic approaches, as well as studies of how network structure affects learning, both Bayesian and non-Bayesian, and theoretical and empirical studies of other behavioral contagions and diffusion.
Milgrom's Mini-Course: "Auction
Consulting: Practical Uses of Economics and Game Theory"
bidders: how economic and game theoretic analysis has
led to superior bidder performance"
Jacobs Center Room G42
"Advising designers: how economic and game theoretic analysis continues to influence
Jacobs Center Room G42
Sannikov's Mini-Course: "Dynamic Games
in Continuous Time"
Jacobs Center Room
Jacobs Center Room G43
'teacher' in the series is Professor Arthur
Robson of Simon Fraser University. Robson is the Canada
Research Chair in Economic Theory and Evolution and Fellow
of the Econometric Society. His mini-course will be on economics
Jacobs Center Room G45
Jacobs Center Room G45
3:30 to 5:00pm
Jacobs Center Room G36
Jacobs Center Room G45
Jacobs Center Room G43
will be based on these readings:
Robson, A.J. "The
Biological Basis of Economic Behavior," J. Econ. Lit. 29
Robson, A.J. "Evolution
and Human Nature," J. Econ. Perspectives 16 (2002), 89-106.
Robson, A.J. "Why
Would Nature Give Individuals Utility Functions?," J. Polit.
Econ. 109 (2001), 900-914.
Rayo, L., and
Becker, G. "Evolutionary Efficiency and Happiness," University
of Chicago WP (2005).
T.C "Storage for Good Times and Bad: Of Rats and Men," UCSB
Cooper W. S.,
R. H. Kaplan. 1982. Adaptive "coin-flipping": a decision-theoretic
examination of natural selection for random individual
variation. Journal of Theoretical Biology. 94:135--151.
Grafen, A. "Formal
Darwinism, the individual-as-maximizing-agent analogy and
bet-hedging," Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological
Sciences 266, 799-803.
Karni, E. and
Schmeidler, D. "Self-Preservation as a Foundation of Rational
Behavior Under Risk," J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 1986, 7, 71-82.
Robson, A.J. "A
Biological Basis for Expected and Non-Expected Utility," J.
Econ. Theory, 1996, 68, 397-424.
Robson, A.J. "The
Evolution of Attitudes to Risk: Lottery Tickets and Relative
Wealth," Games Econ. Behav. 1996, 14, 190-207.
ALTRUISM TO KIN
T.C. "On the Evolution of Altruistic Rules for Siblings," Amer.
Econ. Rev. 1995, 85, 58-81.
T.C. "Economics in a Family Way," J. Econ. Lit. 1996, 34,
and Maskin, E. "Uncertainty and Hyperbolic Discounting," Amer.
Econ. Rev. 1995, 95, 1290-1299.
and Stuart, C. "Malthusian Selection of Preferences," Amer.
Econ. Rev. 1990, 80, 529-544.
Robson, A and
Samuelson L "The Evolution of Intertemporal Preferences",
American Economic Review 97 (2007), 496-500.
Evolution of Impatience with Aggregate Uncertainty" WP, Yale
and Szentes, B. "Evolution of Time Preference by Natural
Selection: Comment'' American Economic Review forthcoming.
Szentes, B., and Iantchev, E. "On the Evolution of Time Preference," Chicago
Rogers, A. "Evolution
of Time Preference by Natural Selection," Amer. Econ. Rev.
1994, 84, 460-481.
Sozou, P. "On
Hyperbolic Discounting and Uncertain Hazard Rates," Proceedings
of the Royal Society of London: Series B 265 (1998), 2015-2020.
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