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Research Details

Discretion in Reporting Managerial Performance, Economics Letters

Abstract

In a single period agency model in which the agent has some discretion regarding how to report his period's performance, we show when the agent's contract is increasing in his report regardless of the characteristics of his production technology, and how to rank changes in the agent's reporting technology according to the expected cost of compensating the agent.

Type

Article

Author(s)

Ronald A. Dye, Robert Magee

Date Published

1991

Citations

Dye, A. Ronald, and Robert Magee. 1991. Discretion in Reporting Managerial Performance. Economics Letters. 35(4): 359-363.

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