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Research Details
Discretion in Reporting Managerial Performance, Economics Letters
Abstract
In a single period agency model in which the agent has some discretion regarding how to report his period's performance, we show when the agent's contract is increasing in his report regardless of the characteristics of his production technology, and how to rank changes in the agent's reporting technology according to the expected cost of compensating the agent.
Type
Article
Author(s)
Date Published
1991
Citations
Dye, Ronald A., and Robert Magee. 1991. Discretion in Reporting Managerial Performance. Economics Letters.(4): 359-363.
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