Sequential Preference Revelation in Incomplete Information Settings
An agent's preference revelation obviously acts as input to a direct revelation mechanism. When such revelations are sequential, however, one agent’s revelation may also act as a signal (to agents who have not yet reported) about his private information on all agents’ types. Under certain conditions, an agent could even have a strict disincentive to truthfully report preferences even though outcomes are computed using a strategy-proof social choice function. We show that, under an independent-priors assumption, when a strategy-proof scf is non-bossy in welfare, its sequential-mechanism counterpart preserves the robustness properties of strategy-proof direct revelation mechanisms that motivate their use in various market design settings. On the other hand, we show by example that these properties can fail to hold when preferences are correlated.
James Schummer, R. Velez
Schummer, James, and R. Velez. 2019. Sequential Preference Revelation in Incomplete Information Settings.