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Research Details
Power, Scrutiny, and Congressmen's Favoritism for Friends' Firms
Abstract
Does higher office always lead to more favoritism? The usual affirmative answer overlooks scrutiny's role in shaping the pattern of favoritism: It is possible that politicians who attain higher-powered positions under stricter scrutiny may reduce quid-pro-quo favors towards connected firms. Around close Congress elections, we nd RDD-based evidence of this adverse effect that a politician's win reduces his former classmates' firms stock value by 1.9% after a day and 3.2% after a week. As predicted, this effect varies by cross-state level of scrutiny, politician's power, firm size and governance, and connection strength. It diminishes as a politician's career concern fades over time.
Type
Working Paper
Author(s)
Quoc-Anh Do, Yen-Teik Lee, Bang D. Nguyen, Kieu-Trang Nguyen
Date Published
2023
Citations
Do, Quoc-Anh, Yen-Teik Lee, Bang D. Nguyen, and Kieu-Trang Nguyen. 2023. Power, Scrutiny, and Congressmen's Favoritism for Friends' Firms.
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