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Research Details
Credible Deviations from Signaling Equilibria, International Journal of Game Theory
Abstract
In games with costly signaling, some equilibria are vulnerable to deviations which could be "unambiguously" interpreted as coming from a unique set of Sender-types. This occurs when these types are precisely the ones who gain from deviating for any beliefs the Receiver could form over that set. We show that this idea characterizes a unique equilibrium outcome in two classes of games. First, in monotonic signaling games, only the Riley outcome is immune to this sort of deviation. Our result therefore provides a plausible story behind the selection made by Cho and Kreps' (1987) D1 criterion on this class of games. Second, we examine a version of Crawford and Sobel's (1982) model with costly signaling, where standard refinements have no effect. We show that only a Riley-like separating equilibrium is immune to these deviations.
Type
Article
Author(s)
Peter Eso, James Schummer
Date Published
2009
Citations
Eso, Peter, and James Schummer. 2009. Credible Deviations from Signaling Equilibria. International Journal of Game Theory. 48(3): 411-430.
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