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Research Details

Rationalizable Trade, Games and Economic Behavior

Abstract

We formulate necessary and sufficient conditions for the impossibility of interim rationalizable trade between two agents, without assuming common priors or common ex-post values. Since equilibrium trade is always interim rationalizable, the conditions are also sufficient for no equilibrium trade.

Type

Article

Author(s)

Stephen Morris, Constantinos Skiadas

Date Published

2000

Citations

Morris, Stephen, and Constantinos Skiadas. 2000. Rationalizable Trade. Games and Economic Behavior. 31(2): 311-323.

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