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Research Details

Mechanism Design without Money

Abstract

Despite impossibility results on general domains, there are some classes of situations in which there exist interesting dominant-strategy mechanisms. While some of these situations (and the resulting mechanisms) involve the transfer of money, we examine some that do not. Specifically, we analyze: problems where agents have single-peaked preferences over a 1-dimensional "public" policy space; problems where agents can trade/consume a single, indivisible "private" good; and problems where agents must match with each other.

Type

Book Chapter

Author(s)

James Schummer, Rakesh Vohra

Date Published

2007

Citations

Schummer, James, and Rakesh Vohra. 2007. Mechanism Design without Money.

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