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Research Details
Partially-Specified Large Games, Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Abstract
The sensitivity of Nash equilibrium to strategic and informational details presents a difficulty in applying it to games which are not fully specified. Structurally-robust Nash equilibria are less sensitive to such details. Moreover, they arise naturally in important classes of games that have many semi-anonymous players. The paper describes this condition and its implications.
Type
Article
Author(s)
Date Published
2005
Citations
Kalai, Ehud. 2005. Partially-Specified Large Games. Lecture Notes in Computer Science.: 3-13.
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