An Approach to Bounded Rationality, Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems
A central question in game theory and artificial intelligence is how a rational agent should behave in a complex environment, given that it cannot perform unbounded computations. We study strategic aspects of this question by formulating a simple model of a game with additional costs, computational or otherwise, for each strategy. First we connect this to zero-sum games, proving a counter-intuitive generalization of the classic min-max theorem to zero-sum games with the addition of strategy costs. We then show that potential games with strategy costs remain potential games. Both zero-sum and potential games with strategy costs maintain a very appealing property: simple learning dynamics converge to equilibrium
Eli Ben-Sasson, Adam Kalai, Ehud Kalai
Ben-Sasson, Eli, Adam Kalai, and Ehud Kalai. 2007. An Approach to Bounded Rationality. Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems. 19: 145-152.