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Working Paper
The Assassination Paradox: Why Violent Attacks against Elected Leaders Do Not Uniformly Increase Political Conflict
Author(s)
Political violence poses a serious threat to democratic stability, yet its psychological consequences remain underexplored. The present research examines how a high-profile political assassination attempt influences intergroup openness—citizens’ willingness to engage with opposing political perspectives. Using a unique dataset (N = 2,798) spanning longitudinal and experimental approaches, we uncover the assassination paradox: while assassination attempts can reduce intergroup openness for one political group, they simultaneously increase openness for the opposing group. We propose that this paradox arises from how people attribute the assailant’s motives. When an attack is perceived as politically motivated, members of the targeted group (i.e., those aligned with the victimized politician) experience political threat, reducing intergroup openness. Conversely, members of the non-targeted group perceive an intragroup moral identity threat, increasing openness as a form of reputational repair. Importantly, even when an assassination attempt lacks a clear partisan motive, it asymmetrically affects intergroup openness depending on which side was attacked. These findings challenge prevailing assumptions about political violence and intergroup conflict, offering a novel framework for understanding how violent political events shape polarization. By elucidating the conditions under which violence deepens versus alleviates political divides, this research provides critical insights for fostering democratic resilience.
Date Published:
2025
Citations:
Siev, Joseph, Jacob Teeny. 2025. The Assassination Paradox: Why Violent Attacks against Elected Leaders Do Not Uniformly Increase Political Conflict.