Jeroen Swinkels is the Paget Professor of Management Policy in the Strategy Department at the Kellogg School of Management. He joined Kellogg in 2009, after previous positions at Stanford, Kellogg, and the Olin School at Washington University in St. Louis. He received his PhD in 1990 from Princeton, and his undergraduate degree from Queen's University in Canada.
Swinkels' work has looked, among other things, at the question of how much of the value of an MBA can be traced to signaling versus education, how information is aggregated in auction and other market settings, the efficiency of auctions with many players, the design of incentive contracts with minimum wages, the design of procurement auctions when one vendor is preferred to another, and the evolutionary foundations for self control problems. His current work examines models with both adverse selection and moral hazard, and competition between principals who faces agents of unknown type. He has been published in journals including Econometrica, the American Economic Review, the Review of Economic Studies, and the Review of Financial Studies. He is a fellow of the Econometric Society, a past associate editor for Econometrica, and has served on boards including the Journal of Economic Theory and Games and Economic Behavior. He was chair of the economics group at the Olin School for 11 years, and received 16 teaching awards while there. At Kellogg, he has served as department chair, and is currectly the chair of the personnel committee. His primary teaching is of the core strategy course Business Strategy.
Game theory; auctions and other models of price formation; evolution and learning; job-market signaling; corporate compensation; principal-agent models; procurement.
Working Papers may be found beneath Articles.