Research Details

Abstract

We analyze a canonical principal-agent problem with both moral hazard and adverse selection. We provide a method of solution, decoupling, which consists of first minimizing the principal's cost of implementing any given action at any given surplus for any given type in a relaxed moral-hazard problem, then using the resulting cost function as an input to a pure adverse-selection problem, and finally substituting back in the optimal compensation schemes from the moral-hazard problem. We show broad settings where the solution to this radically simplified and highly tractable program is optimal in the full problem. Decoupling has powerful implications for the structure of optimal menus. We illustrate our results in the context of an insurance market, and show how to extend our results to a social planner, and to a setting with common values.

Type

Working Paper

Author(s)

Jeroen Swinkels, Hector Chade

Date Published

2022

Citations

Swinkels, Jeroen, and Hector Chade. 2022. Disentangling Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection.

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