The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict, American Economic Review
Two players choose hawkish or dovish actions in a conflict game with incomplete information. An extremist, who can either be a hawk or a dove, attempts to manipulate decision making. If actions are strategic complements, a hawkish extremist increases the likelihood of conflict, and reduces welfare, by sending a public message which triggers hawkish behavior from both players. If actions are strategic substitutes, a dovish extremist instead sends a public message which causes one player to become more dovish and the other more hawkish. A hawkish (dovish) extremist is unable to manipulate decision making if actions are strategic substitutes (complements).
Sandeep Baliga, Tomas Sjostrom
Baliga, Sandeep, and Tomas Sjostrom. 2012. The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict. American Economic Review. 106(2)