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Research Details

A Commitment Folk Theorem, Games and Economic Behavior

Abstract

Conditional commitments are used by players who wish to strengthen their strategic positions. We propose a model of conditional commitments that unifies earlier models and avoids the pitfalls and circularities of such commitments. A commitment folk theorem shows that the potential of conditional commitment is essentially unlimited. All feasible and individually-rational payoffs of a two-person strategic game can be attained at the equilibria of one (universal) voluntary commitment game that uses simple commitment devices.

Type

Article

Author(s)

Adam Kalai, Ehud Kalai, Ehud Lehrer, Dov Samet

Date Published

2010

Citations

Kalai, Adam, Ehud Kalai, Ehud Lehrer, and Dov Samet. 2010. A Commitment Folk Theorem. Games and Economic Behavior. 69(1): 127-137.

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