Research Details

Abstract

The impact of issue agendas, decision rule, and power balance on the quality of negotiated agreements in small groups was examined. Three-person groups negotiated an agreement on three issues, with each issue having five alternative levels. Groups using sequential agendas were less likely to achieve mutually beneficial agreements than groups using package agendas. Groups following sequential agendas under majority rule achieved significantly less beneficial agreements than did groups following sequential agendas/unanimous rule, package agendas/majority rule, or package agendas/unanimous rule. As the predetermined alternatives to a negotiated agreement increased, so did individual profit. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for the quality of decision making in mixed-motive small groups.

Type

Article

Author(s)

Elizabeth A. Mannix, Leigh Thompson, Max H Bazerman

Date Published

1989

Citations

Mannix, Elizabeth A., Leigh Thompson, and Max H Bazerman. 1989. Negotiation in small groups. Journal of Applied Psychology.(3): 508-517.