Research Details

Abstract

Communication facilitates cooperation by ensuring that deviators are collectively punished. We explore how players might misuse messages to threaten one another, and we identify ways in which organizations can deter misuse and restore cooperation. In our model, a principal plays trust games with a sequence of short-run agents who communicate with one another. An agent can shirk and then extort pay by threatening to report that the principal deviated. We show that these threats can completely undermine cooperation. Investigations of the agents' efforts, or dyadic relationships between the principal and each agent, can deter extortion and restore some cooperation. Investigations of the principal's action, on the other hand, typically do not help. Our analysis suggests that collective punishments are vulnerable to misuse unless they are designed with an eye towards discouraging it.

Type

Article

Author(s)

Daniel Barron, yingni guo

Date Published

2020

Citations

Barron, Daniel, and yingni guo. 2020. The Use and Misuse of Coordinated Punishments. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 136(1): 471-504.

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