Take Action

Home | Faculty & Research Overview | Research

Research Details

The Use and Misuse of Coordinated Punishments

Abstract

Communication facilitates cooperation by ensuring that deviators are collectively punished. We explore how players might misuse messages to threaten one another, and we identify ways in which organizations can deter misuse and restore cooperation. In our model, a principal plays trust games with a sequence of short-run agents who communicate with one another. An agent can shirk and then extort pay by threatening to report that the principal deviated. We show that these threats can completely destroy cooperation. Investigations of the agents' efforts, or dyadic relationships between the principal and each agent, can deter extortion and restore some cooperation. Investigations of the principal's action, on the other hand, typically don't help. Our analysis suggests that collective punishments improve cooperation only if they are designed with an eye towards discouraging misuse.

Type

Working Paper

Author(s)

Daniel Barron, yingni guo

Date Published

2019

Citations

Barron, Daniel, and yingni guo. 2019. The Use and Misuse of Coordinated Punishments.

LINK READ
KELLOGG INSIGHT

Explore leading research and ideas

Find articles, podcast episodes, and videos that spark ideas in lifelong learners, and inspire those looking to advance in their careers.
learn more

COURSE CATALOG

Review Courses & Schedules

Access information about specific courses and their schedules by viewing the interactive course scheduler tool.
LEARN MORE

DEGREE PROGRAMS

Discover the path to your goals

Whether you choose our Full-Time, Part-Time or Executive MBA program, you’ll enjoy the same unparalleled education, exceptional faculty and distinctive culture.
learn more

Take Action