Take Action

Home | Faculty & Research Overview | Research

Research Details

The Use and Misuse of Coordinated Punishments

Abstract

Communication facilitates cooperation by ensuring that deviators are collectively punished. We explore how players might misuse equilibrium messages to threaten one another, and we identify conditions under which communication improves cooperation despite such threats. In our model, a principal plays trust games with a sequence of short-run agents who communicate with each other. A shirking agent can demand pay by threatening to report that the principal deviated. We show how these threats can destroy cooperation. However, some cooperation is restored if players observe public signals of efforts or transfers, or if the principal has a bilateral relationship with each agent.

Type

Working Paper

Author(s)

Daniel Barron, yingni guo

Date Published

2019

Citations

Barron, Daniel, and yingni guo. 2019. The Use and Misuse of Coordinated Punishments.

KELLOGG INSIGHT

Explore leading research and ideas

Find articles, podcast episodes, and videos that spark ideas in lifelong learners, and inspire those looking to advance in their careers.
learn more

COURSE CATALOG

Review Courses & Schedules

Access information about specific courses and their schedules by viewing the interactive course scheduler tool.
LEARN MORE

DEGREE PROGRAMS

Discover the path to your goals

Whether you choose our Full-Time, Part-Time or Executive MBA program, you’ll enjoy the same unparalleled education, exceptional faculty and distinctive culture.
learn more

Take Action