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Research Details
Correlated Equilibrium in Evolutionary Models with Subpopulations, Games and Economic Behavior
Abstract
We study a version of the multipopulation replicator dynamics, where each population is comprised of multiple subpopulations. We establish that correlated equilibrium is a natural solution concept in this setting. Specifically, we show that every correlated equilibrium is equivalent to a stationary state in the replicator dynamics of some subpopulation model. We also show that every interior stationary state, Lyapunov stable state, or limit of an interior solution is equivalent to a correlated equilibrium. We provide an example with a Lyapunov stable limit state whose equivalent correlated equilibrium lies outside the convex hull of the set of Nash equilibria. Finally, we prove that if the matching distribution is a product measure, a state satisfying any of the three conditions listed above is equivalent to a Nash equilibrium.
Type
Article
Author(s)
Justin Lenzo, Todd Sarver
Date Published
2006
Citations
Lenzo, Justin, and Todd Sarver. 2006. Correlated Equilibrium in Evolutionary Models with Subpopulations. Games and Economic Behavior. 56(2): 271-284.