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Evolutionary Stability with Lexicographic Preferences, Evolutionary Stability with Lexicographic Preferences

Abstract

We explore the interaction between evolutionary stability and lexicographic preferences. To do so, we define a limit Nash equilibrium for a lexicographic game as the limit of Nash equilibria of nearby games with continuous preferences. Nash equilibria of lexicographic games are limit Nash equilibria, but not conversely. Modified evolutionarily stable strategies (Binmore and Samuelson, 1992. J. Econ. Theory 57, 278–305) are limit Nash equilibria. Modified evolutionary stability differs from “lexicographic evolutionarily stability” (defined by extending the common characterization of evolutionary stability to lexicographic preferences) in the order in which limits in the payoff space and the space of invasion barriers are taken.

Type

Article

Author(s)

Jeroen Swinkels, Larry Samuelson

Date Published

2003

Citations

Swinkels, Jeroen, and Larry Samuelson. 2003. Evolutionary Stability with Lexicographic Preferences. Evolutionary Stability with Lexicographic Preferences. 44(2): 332-342.

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