Take Action
Home | Faculty & Research Overview | Research
Research Details
Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions, Econometrica
Abstract
We consider discriminatory and uniform price auctions for multiple identical units of a good. Players have private values, possibly asymmetrically distributed and for multiple units. Our setting allows for aggregate uncertainty about demand and supply. In this setting, equilibria generally will be inefficient. Despite this, we show that such auctions become arbitrarily close to efficient if they are ‘‘large,’’ and use this to derive an asymptotic characterization of revenue and bidding behavior.
Type
Article
Author(s)
Date Published
2001
Citations
Swinkels, Jeroen. 2001. Efficiency of Large Private Value Auctions. Econometrica. 69(1): 37-68.
READKELLOGG INSIGHT
Explore leading research and ideas
Find articles, podcast episodes, and videos that spark ideas in lifelong learners, and inspire those looking to advance in their careers.
learn more
COURSE CATALOG
Review Courses & Schedules
Access information about specific courses and their schedules by viewing the interactive course scheduler tool.
LEARN MORE
DEGREE PROGRAMS
Discover the path to your goals
Whether you choose our Full-Time, Part-Time or Executive MBA program, you’ll enjoy the same unparalleled education, exceptional faculty and distinctive culture.
learn more