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Journal Article
Relational Contracts: Recent Empirical Advancements and Open Questions
journal of institutional and theoretical economics
Author(s)
Relational contracts – informal self-enforcing agreements sustained by repeated
interactions – are ubiquitous both within and across organizational boundaries.
This review highlights recent empirical contributions in selected areas.We begin
by reviewing some recent work that explicitly takes the dynamic enforcement
constraints that underpin relational contract theory to the data. We then discuss
the relationship between relational contracting and firms’ performance. We conclude
by pointing in directions that we consider to be particularly ripe for future
work.
Date Published:
2023
Citations:
Morjaria, Ameet, Rocco Macchiavello. 2023. Relational Contracts: Recent Empirical Advancements and Open Questions. journal of institutional and theoretical economics. (3-4)673-700.