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Journal Article
Compulsory Licensing and Innovation. Historical Evidence From German Patents After WWI
Journal of Development Economics
Author(s)
This paper investigates whether compulsory licensing – which allows governments to license patents without the consent of patent-owners – discourages invention. Our analysis exploits new historical data on German patents to examine the effects of compulsory licensing under the US Trading-with-the-Enemy Act on invention in Germany. We find that compulsory licensing was associated with a 28 percent increase in invention. Historical evidence indicates that, as a result of war-related demands, fields with licensing were negatively selected, so OLS estimates may underestimate the positive effects of compulsory licensing on future inventions.
Date Published:
2017
Citations:
Baten, Joerg, Nicola Bianchi, Petra Moser. 2017. Compulsory Licensing and Innovation. Historical Evidence From German Patents After WWI. Journal of Development Economics. 231-242.