The Three Faces of Eve: An Examination of the Strategic Display of Positive, Negative and Neutral Emotions in Negotiations

In a series of laboratory experiments, we tested the inXuence of strategically displaying positive, negative, and neutral emotions on negotiation outcomes. In Experiment 1, a face-to-face dispute simulation, negotiators who displayed positive emotion, in contrast to negative or neutral emotions, were more likely to incorporate a future business relationship in the negotiated contract. In Experiment 2, an ultimatum setting, managers strategically displaying positive emotion were more likely to close a deal. This eVect was mediated by negotiators' willingness to pay more to a negotiator strategically displaying positive versus negative emotions. In Experiment 3, display of positive emotion was a more eVective strategy for gaining concessions from the other party in a distributive setting. Negotiators made more extreme demands when facing a negotiator strategically displaying negative, rather than positive or neutral, emotions. Implications for strategic display of emotion in negotiations are discussed.