Research Details

Abstract

Management earnings forecasts (MEF) are a form of voluntary disclosure. MEF are distinct from "ordinary" voluntary disclosures because MEF have spillover effects on both managers' subsequent operating decisions and their earnings reporting choices. Managers who do (resp., don't) forecast choose greater (resp., less) than first-best operating actions. Managers who do forecast engage in more earnings management than managers who don't. We explain which managers issue MEF. Managers who issue MEF tend to issue biased forecasts, with the extent of their bias depending on whether the bias is measured with respected to their firms' expected economic earnings or expected reported earnings.

Type

Article

Author(s)

Ronald A. Dye, Swaminathan Sridharan

Date Published

2024

Citations

Dye, Ronald A., and Swaminathan Sridharan. 2024. To Forecast or Not: Biases and Spillover Effects of Management Forecasts on Firms' Operating Actions and Earnings Reports. The Rand Journal of Economics.