|
|||
Selected Published Papers and Current Projects:
Topic: International Relations
| Bounded Rationality and Economoc
Decision-Making | Theory of the Firm/Organization Design
| Mechanism Design and Implementation | Cheap
Talk | Repeated Games International
Relations
Doctoral
course: Conflict and Cooperation
(Political Economy II: MECS 540) Masterclass on Mutual Fear and Conflict Discussion of Roger Myerson’s “Game Theory and
First World War” The Causes of War, with Tomas Sjöström,
forthcoming, Handbook of the Economics of Conflict. Edited by Oeindrila Dube, Massimo Morelli, Debraj Ray and Tomas
Sjöström. North Holland. Long Wars with Tomas Sjöström,
forthcoming, American Economic Review: Insights Optimal Compellence, with Tomas Sjöström (NEW) Deterrence
with Imperfect Attribution, with Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and
Alexander Wolitzky, American Political Science Review An article in The National Interest, The Case for a Cyber Deterrence Plan that Works
based on APSR paper. The Strategy and Technology of
Conflict, with Tomas Sjostrom, Journal of Political Economy Bargaining and War: A Review of Some
Formal Models, with Tomas Sjostrom, Korean Economic Review The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict, with
Tomas Sjostrom, American Economic Review. The Hobbesian Trap, Oxford Handbook of
the Economics of Peace and Conflict, eds. Michelle Garfinkel and Stergios
Skaperdas, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2010. Conflict
and Cooperation, book project in progress with Tomas Sjostrom. Arms Races and Negotiations, with Tomas
Sjostrom, Review of Economic Studies, 71, 351-369, 2004 (Also check
out Ted Bergstrom’s review in Vol 2 of NAJ Economics at www.najecon.org). Strategic Ambiguity and Arms Proliferation,
with Tomas Sjostrom, Journal of Political Economy, 116 (6), 1023-1058
(Short presentation) Domestic Political Survival and International
Conflict: Is Democracy Good for Peace, with David O. Lucca and Tomas
Sjostrom, Review of Economic Studies 78, 458-486, 2011 (Online Appendix) (Short presentation) Dangers of a Weak Dictator, an opinion piece in New
York Times loosely based on this paper. Martial Democracies, Wall Street Journal
article based on this paper Conflict
Games with Payoff Uncertainty, with Tomas Sjostrom (old title:
"The Logic of Mutual Fear") Reputation and
Conflict, with Tomas Sjostrom (slides) Torture and the Commitment Problem (former title “Torture”), with Jeff Ely, Review of Economic Studies, October
2016 Conflict
Games with Payoff Uncertainty, with Tomas Sjostrom (old title:
"The Logic of Mutual Fear") Reputation
and Conflict, with Tomas Sjostrom (slides) Schedule
for related conferences
Bounded
Rationality and Economic Decision-Making
Market Forces and Behavioral Biases:
Cost-Misallocation and Irrational Pricing, with Nabil Al-Najjar and
David Besanko, April 2006 (former title: "The Sunk Cost Bias and
Managerial Pricing Practices") RAND Journal of Economics. Mnemonomics: The Sunk Cost Fallacy as a Memory
Kludge, November 2011 American Economic Journal: Microeconomics with
Jeff Ely Polarization and
Ambiguity, with Eran Hanany and Peter
Klibanoff, forthcoming American
Economic Review. (Working
Paper version with results for multiple signals.) Theory
of the Firm/Organization Design
A Theory of the Firm based on Haggling, Coordination and
Rent-Seeking, with Tomas Sjostrom,(November
2018) Liquidity and Manipulation of Executive
Compensation Schemes, with Ulf Axelson, Review of Financial Studies,
January 2008 Contracting with Third Parties, with Tomas
Sjostrom, February 2009, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics Optimal Design of Peer Review and Self-Assessment Schemes,
(former title: "Not Invented Here") with Tomas Sjostrom, RAND
Journal of Economics, pp 27-51, Spring 2001. Decentralization and Collusion, with Tomas
Sjostrom, Journal of Economic Theory, 83(2), pp 196-232, December 1998. Monitoring and Collusion with ‘Soft’ Information,
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 15(2), pp 434-440, July 1999. The Emergence
and Persistence of the Anglo-Saxon and German Financial Systems, with
Ben Polak, Review of Financial Studies., Spring 2004, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp
129-163. Mechanism
Design and Implementation
Doctoral
course: Contract Theory and
Mechanism Design On
this topic: Contracting with Third
Parties, with Tomas Sjostrom, February 2009, American Economic
Journal: Microeconomics (new journal of American
Economic Association) Mechanism Design for the Environment,
with Eric Maskin (2003), Handbook of Environmental Economics, series editors
K. Arrow and M. Intriligator, volume editors K
Maler and J. Vincent. Elsevier Science: Amsterdam. Mechanism Design: Recent Developments, with
Tomas Sjostrom for the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition
(editors Steven Durlauf and Larry Blume). Market Research and Market Design, with Rakesh
Vohra, Advances in Theoretical Economics, Vol. 3, Issue 1, Article 5, 2003 The Not-So-Secret-Agent:
Professional Monitors, Hierarchies and Implementation, Review of
Economic Design, 7, pp 17-26, 2002. Collusion, Renegotiation and Implementation,
with Sandro Brusco, Social Choice and Welfare, 17, pp 69-83, January 2000. Implementation In Incomplete Information Environments: the Use of Multi-Stage Games, Games and Economic
Behavior, 27, 173-183, May 1999. Interactive Implementation, with Tomas
Sjostrom, Games and Economic Behavior, 27, pp 38-63, April 1999. The Theory of Implementation when the Planner is a Player,
with Luis Corchon and Tomas Sjostrom, Journal of
Economic Theory, 77(1), pp 15-33, November 1997. Cheap
Talk
Durable Cheap Talk Equilibria, with Tomas
Sjostrom, forthcoming in Advances in Applied Economics: Communication Games,
Rick Harbaugh editor, Emerald, 2009. Coordination, Spillovers and Cheap-Talk, with
Stephen Morris, Journal of Economic Theory, 105(2), pp 450-468, August 2002. Repeated
Games
Renegotiation in Repeated Games with Side-Payments,
with Robert Evans, Games and Economic Behavior, 33, 159-176, November 2000. |
|||
|