Selected Published Papers and Current Projects:
Doctoral course: Conflict and Cooperation (Political Economy II: MECS 540)
Torture and the Commitment Problem (former title “Torture”), with Jeff Ely, Review of Economic Studies, October 2016
Bargaining and War: A Review of Some Formal Models, with Tomas Sjöström, Korean Economic Review
The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict, with Tomas Sjöström, American Economic Review.
The Hobbesian Trap, Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict, eds. Michelle Garfinkel and Stergios Skaperdas, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2010.
Conflict and Cooperation, book project in progress with Tomas Sjöström.
Domestic Political Survival and International Conflict: Is Democracy Good for Peace, with David O. Lucca and Tomas Sjöström, Review of Economic Studies 78, 458-486, 2011 (Online Appendix) (Short presentation)
Conflict Games with Payoff Uncertainty, with Tomas Sjöström (old title: "The Logic of Mutual Fear")
Reputation and Conflict, with Tomas Sjöström (slides)
Schedule for related conferences
Market Forces and Behavioral Biases: Cost-Misallocation and Irrational Pricing, with Nabil Al-Najjar and David Besanko, April 2006 (former title: "The Sunk Cost Bias and Managerial Pricing Practices") RAND Journal of Economics.
Mnemonomics: The Sunk Cost Fallacy as a Memory Kludge, November 2011 American Economic Journal: Microeconomics with Jeff Ely
A Theory of the Firm based on Haggling, Coordination and Rent-Seeking, with Tomas Sjöström. (NEW VERSION August 2016)
Liquidity and Manipulation of Executive Compensation Schemes, with Ulf Axelson, Review of Financial Studies, January 2008
Contracting with Third Parties, with Tomas Sjöström, February 2009, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Optimal Design of Peer Review and Self-Assessment Schemes, (former title: "Not Invented Here") with Tomas Sjöström, RAND Journal of Economics, pp 27-51, Spring 2001.
Decentralization and Collusion, with Tomas Sjöström, Journal of Economic Theory, 83(2), pp 196-232, December 1998.
Monitoring and Collusion with ‘Soft’ Information, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 15(2), pp 434-440, July 1999.
The Emergence and Persistence of the Anglo-Saxon and German Financial Systems, with Ben Polak, Review of Financial Studies., Spring 2004, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp 129-163.
Doctoral course: Contract Theory and Mechanism Design
On this topic:
Mechanism Design for the Environment, with Eric Maskin (2003), Handbook of Environmental Economics, series editors K. Arrow and M. Intriligator, volume editors K Maler and J. Vincent. Elsevier Science: Amsterdam.
Mechanism Design: Recent Developments, with Tomas Sjöström for the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition (editors Steven Durlauf and Larry Blume).
Market Research and Market Design, with Rakesh Vohra, Advances in Theoretical Economics, Vol. 3, Issue 1, Article 5, 2003
The Not-So-Secret-Agent: Professional Monitors, Hierarchies and Implementation, Review of Economic Design, 7, pp 17-26, 2002.
Collusion, Renegotiation and Implementation, with Sandro Brusco, Social Choice and Welfare, 17, pp 69-83, January 2000.
Implementation In Incomplete Information Environments: the Use of Multi-Stage Games, Games and Economic Behavior, 27, 173-183, May 1999.
Interactive Implementation, with Tomas Sjostrom, Games and Economic Behavior, 27, pp 38-63, April 1999.
The Theory of Implementation when the Planner is a Player, with Luis Corchon and Tomas Sjöström, Journal of Economic Theory, 77(1), pp 15-33, November 1997.
Durable Cheap Talk Equilibria, with Tomas Sjöström, forthcoming in Advances in Applied Economics: Communication Games, Rick Harbaugh editor, Emerald, 2009.
Coordination, Spillovers and Cheap-Talk, with Stephen Morris, Journal of Economic Theory, 105(2), pp 450-468, August 2002.
Renegotiation in Repeated Games with Side-Payments, with Robert Evans, Games and Economic Behavior, 33, 159-176, November 2000.