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Selected Published Papers and Current
Projects:
Topic:
International Relations | Bounded Rationality
and Economoc Decision-Making | Theory of the
Firm/Organization Design | Mechanism Design and
Implementation | Cheap Talk | Repeated
Games International Relations
Doctoral course: Conflict and
Cooperation (Political Economy II: MECS 540) Masterclass
on Mutual Fear and Conflict Discussion
of Roger Myerson’s “Game Theory and First World War” The Causes of War, with Tomas
Sjöström, forthcoming, Handbook of the Economics of Conflict. Edited
by Oeindrila Dube, Massimo Morelli, Debraj Ray and Tomas Sjöström. North
Holland. (NEW) Long Wars with Tomas Sjostrom (NEW) Optimal Compellence, with Tomas Sjostrom (NEW) Deterrence with Imperfect Attribution, with Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Alexander
Wolitzky, American Political Science Review An article in The
National Interest, The Case for a Cyber Deterrence Plan that Works
based on APSR paper. The Strategy and Technology of
Conflict, with Tomas Sjostrom, Journal of
Political Economy Bargaining and War: A Review of Some
Formal Models, with Tomas Sjostrom, Korean Economic Review The Strategy of
Manipulating Conflict, with Tomas Sjostrom, American Economic
Review. The Hobbesian Trap,
Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict, eds. Michelle
Garfinkel and Stergios Skaperdas, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2010. Conflict and Cooperation, book project in progress with Tomas Sjostrom. Arms Races and
Negotiations, with Tomas Sjostrom, Review of Economic Studies,
71, 351-369, 2004 (Also check out Ted Bergstrom’s review in Vol 2 of NAJ
Economics at www.najecon.org).
Strategic Ambiguity and
Arms Proliferation, with Tomas Sjostrom, Journal of Political
Economy, 116 (6), 1023-1058 (Short
presentation) Domestic Political
Survival and International Conflict: Is Democracy Good for Peace,
with David O. Lucca and Tomas Sjostrom, Review of Economic Studies 78,
458-486, 2011 (Online Appendix)
(Short presentation) Dangers of a Weak Dictator, an opinion piece in New
York Times loosely based on this paper. Martial Democracies, Wall Street Journal
article based on this paper Conflict
Games with Payoff Uncertainty, with Tomas Sjostrom (old title:
"The Logic of Mutual Fear") Reputation and
Conflict, with Tomas Sjostrom (slides) Torture and the Commitment
Problem (former title
“Torture”), with Jeff Ely, Review of
Economic Studies, October 2016 Conflict
Games with Payoff Uncertainty, with Tomas Sjostrom (old title:
"The Logic of Mutual Fear") Reputation
and Conflict, with Tomas Sjostrom (slides) Schedule for related conferences
Bounded Rationality and Economic Decision-Making
Market Forces
and Behavioral Biases: Cost-Misallocation and Irrational Pricing,
with Nabil Al-Najjar and David Besanko, April 2006 (former title: "The
Sunk Cost Bias and Managerial Pricing Practices") RAND Journal of
Economics. Mnemonomics:
The Sunk Cost Fallacy as a Memory Kludge, November 2011 American
Economic Journal: Microeconomics with Jeff Ely Polarization and
Ambiguity, with Eran Hanany and Peter Klibanoff, forthcoming American Economic
Review. (Working
Paper version with results for multiple signals.) Theory of the Firm/Organization Design
A Theory of the
Firm based on Haggling, Coordination and Rent-Seeking, with Tomas
Sjostrom,(November 2018) Liquidity
and Manipulation of Executive Compensation Schemes, with Ulf Axelson,
Review of Financial Studies, January 2008 Contracting with
Third Parties, with Tomas Sjostrom, February 2009, American Economic
Journal: Microeconomics Optimal Design
of Peer Review and Self-Assessment Schemes, (former title: "Not
Invented Here") with Tomas Sjostrom, RAND Journal of Economics, pp
27-51, Spring 2001. Decentralization
and Collusion, with Tomas Sjostrom, Journal of Economic Theory,
83(2), pp 196-232, December 1998. Monitoring and
Collusion with ‘Soft’ Information, Journal of Law, Economics and
Organization, 15(2), pp 434-440, July 1999. The Emergence
and Persistence of the Anglo-Saxon and German Financial Systems, with
Ben Polak, Review of Financial Studies.,
Spring 2004, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp 129-163. Mechanism Design and Implementation
Doctoral course: Contract Theory and Mechanism
Design On this topic: Contracting
with Third Parties, with Tomas Sjostrom, February 2009, American
Economic Journal: Microeconomics (new journal of American
Economic Association) Mechanism
Design for the Environment, with Eric Maskin (2003), Handbook of
Environmental Economics, series editors K. Arrow and M. Intriligator, volume
editors K Maler and J. Vincent. Elsevier Science: Amsterdam. Mechanism
Design: Recent Developments, with Tomas Sjostrom for the New Palgrave
Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition (editors Steven Durlauf and Larry
Blume). Market
Research and Market Design, with Rakesh Vohra, Advances in
Theoretical Economics, Vol. 3, Issue 1, Article 5, 2003 The
Not-So-Secret-Agent: Professional Monitors, Hierarchies and Implementation,
Review of Economic Design, 7, pp 17-26, 2002. Collusion,
Renegotiation and Implementation, with Sandro Brusco, Social Choice
and Welfare, 17, pp 69-83, January 2000. Implementation
In Incomplete Information Environments: the Use of Multi-Stage Games,
Games and Economic Behavior, 27, 173-183, May 1999. Interactive
Implementation, with Tomas Sjostrom, Games and Economic Behavior, 27,
pp 38-63, April 1999. The Theory of
Implementation when the Planner is a Player, with Luis Corchon and
Tomas Sjostrom, Journal of Economic Theory, 77(1), pp 15-33, November 1997. Cheap Talk
Durable Cheap
Talk Equilibria, with Tomas Sjostrom, forthcoming in Advances in
Applied Economics: Communication Games, Rick Harbaugh editor, Emerald, 2009. Coordination,
Spillovers and Cheap-Talk, with Stephen Morris, Journal of Economic
Theory, 105(2), pp 450-468, August 2002. Repeated Games
Renegotiation in
Repeated Games with Side-Payments, with Robert Evans, Games and
Economic Behavior, 33, 159-176, November 2000. |
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