Professor of Managerial Economics & Decision Sciences
Kellogg School of Management
Northwestern University
2211 Campus Drive, Evanston, IL 60208

Curriculum vitae
Kellogg bio

 Blog: Cheap Talk

Selected Published Papers and Current Projects:

Topic: International Relations | Bounded Rationality and Economoc Decision-Making | Theory of the Firm/Organization Design | Mechanism Design and Implementation | Cheap Talk | Repeated Games

International Relations

Doctoral course: Conflict and Cooperation (Political Economy II: MECS 540)

Discussion of Roger Myerson’s “Game Theory and First World War”

Long Wars with Tomas Sjostrom (December 2021) (NEW)

Optimal Coercion , with Tomas Sjostrom (September 2022) (NEW)

Deterrence with Imperfect Attribution, with Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Alexander Wolitzky, American Political Science Review

An article in The National Interest, The Case for a Cyber Deterrence Plan that Works based on APSR paper.

The Strategy and Technology of Conflict, with Tomas Sjostrom (March 2018), forthcoming, Journal of Political Economy

Bargaining and War: A Review of Some Formal Models, with Tomas Sjostrom, Korean Economic Review

The Strategy of Manipulating Conflict, with Tomas Sjostrom, American Economic Review.

The Hobbesian Trap, Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict, eds. Michelle Garfinkel and Stergios Skaperdas, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2010.

Conflict and Cooperation, book project in progress with Tomas Sjostrom.

Arms Races and Negotiations, with Tomas Sjostrom, Review of Economic Studies, 71, 351-369, 2004 (Also check out Ted Bergstrom’s review in Vol 2 of NAJ Economics at

Strategic Ambiguity and Arms Proliferation, with Tomas Sjostrom, Journal of Political Economy, 116 (6), 1023-1058 (Short presentation)

Domestic Political Survival and International Conflict: Is Democracy Good for Peace, with David O. Lucca and Tomas Sjostrom, Review of Economic Studies 78, 458-486, 2011 (Online Appendix) (Short presentation)

Dangers of a Weak Dictator, an opinion piece in New York Times loosely based on this paper.

Martial Democracies, Wall Street Journal article based on this paper

Conflict Games with Payoff Uncertainty, with Tomas Sjostrom (old title: "The Logic of Mutual Fear")

Reputation and Conflict, with Tomas Sjostrom (slides)

Torture and the Commitment Problem  (former title “Torture”), with Jeff Ely, Review of Economic Studies, October 2016

Conflict Games with Payoff Uncertainty, with Tomas Sjostrom (old title: "The Logic of Mutual Fear")

Reputation and Conflict, with Tomas Sjostrom (slides)

Schedule for related conferences

Bounded Rationality and Economic Decision-Making

Market Forces and Behavioral Biases: Cost-Misallocation and Irrational Pricing, with Nabil Al-Najjar and David Besanko, April 2006 (former title: "The Sunk Cost Bias and Managerial Pricing Practices") RAND Journal of Economics.

Mnemonomics: The Sunk Cost Fallacy as a Memory Kludge, November 2011 American Economic Journal: Microeconomics with Jeff Ely

Polarization and Ambiguity, with Eran Hanany and Peter Klibanoff, forthcoming American Economic Review. (Working Paper version with results for multiple signals.)

Theory of the Firm/Organization Design

A Theory of the Firm based on Haggling, Coordination and Rent-Seeking, with Tomas Sjostrom,(November 2018)

Liquidity and Manipulation of Executive Compensation Schemes, with Ulf Axelson, Review of Financial Studies, January 2008

Contracting with Third Parties, with Tomas Sjostrom, February 2009, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics

Optimal Design of Peer Review and Self-Assessment Schemes, (former title: "Not Invented Here") with Tomas Sjostrom, RAND Journal of Economics, pp 27-51, Spring 2001.

Decentralization and Collusion, with Tomas Sjostrom, Journal of Economic Theory, 83(2), pp 196-232, December 1998.

Monitoring and Collusion with ‘Soft’ Information, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 15(2), pp 434-440, July 1999.

The Emergence and Persistence of the Anglo-Saxon and German Financial Systems, with Ben Polak, Review of Financial Studies., Spring 2004, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp 129-163.

Mechanism Design and Implementation

Doctoral course: Contract Theory and Mechanism Design

On this topic:


Contracting with Third Parties, with Tomas Sjostrom, February 2009, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (new journal of American Economic Association)

Mechanism Design for the Environment, with Eric Maskin (2003), Handbook of Environmental Economics, series editors K. Arrow and M. Intriligator, volume editors K Maler and J. Vincent. Elsevier Science: Amsterdam.

Mechanism Design: Recent Developments, with Tomas Sjostrom for the New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition (editors Steven Durlauf and Larry Blume).

Market Research and Market Design, with Rakesh Vohra, Advances in Theoretical Economics, Vol. 3, Issue 1, Article 5, 2003

The Not-So-Secret-Agent: Professional Monitors, Hierarchies and Implementation, Review of Economic Design, 7, pp 17-26, 2002.

Collusion, Renegotiation and Implementation, with Sandro Brusco, Social Choice and Welfare, 17, pp 69-83, January 2000.

Implementation In Incomplete Information Environments: the Use of Multi-Stage Games, Games and Economic Behavior, 27, 173-183, May 1999.

Interactive Implementation, with Tomas Sjostrom, Games and Economic Behavior, 27, pp 38-63, April 1999.

The Theory of Implementation when the Planner is a Player, with Luis Corchon and Tomas Sjostrom, Journal of Economic Theory, 77(1), pp 15-33, November 1997.

Cheap Talk

Durable Cheap Talk Equilibria, with Tomas Sjostrom, forthcoming in Advances in Applied Economics: Communication Games, Rick Harbaugh editor, Emerald, 2009.

Coordination, Spillovers and Cheap-Talk, with Stephen Morris, Journal of Economic Theory, 105(2), pp 450-468, August 2002.

Repeated Games

Renegotiation in Repeated Games with Side-Payments, with Robert Evans, Games and Economic Behavior, 33, 159-176, November 2000.


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