MANAGEMENT & ORGANIZATIONS
J. Jay Gerber Professor of Dispute Resolution & Organizations
In 1991, Dr. Thompson received a the multi-year Presidential Young Investigator award from the National Science Foundation for her research on negotiation and conflict resolution. In 1999, Thompson received a grant from Citicorp for research on negotiation. In 1994-1995, Dr. Thompson was a Fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in Stanford, California.
Leigh Thompson’s research focuses on negotiation, team creativity, and learning. Her most recent research projects include investigations of: (1) whether managers and executives actually use knowledge gained in the classroom in real business situations; (2) how reorganizations facilitate team creativity; (3) the type of analogical reasoning that Fortune 100 CEOs use in their communications; (4) the social impact of information technology, and (5) emotional tuning in relationships and teams.
Leigh Thompson has published more than 95 research articles and chapters in edited books. She has authored 9 books: The Mind and Heart of the Negotiator (Fourth Edition) (Prentice Hall, 2009), Shared Knowledge in Organizations (with David Messick and John Levine, 1999), Making the Team (Third edition) (Prentice Hall, 2008), Organizational Behavior Today (Prentice Hall, 2008), The Truth About Negotiations (Pearson Education, 2008), The Social Psychology of Organizational Behavior: Essential Reading (2003), Creativity and Innovation in Organizations (2006), Negotiation: Theory and Research (2006), and Conflict in Organizational Groups (2007).
Leigh Thompson is a member of the editorial boards of Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, International Journal of Conflict Management, and Group Decision and Negotiation. She has served on the selection panel of the Decision, Risk, and Management Program at the National Science Foundation and its program review committee. She was named a fellow of the American Psychological Society and is a member of the Academy of Management, American Psychological Association, Judgment and Decision Making Society, and Society for Experimental Social Psychologists.
Cross-cultural Negotiations
Group Decision-Making
Group Dynamics
Innovation
Leading High-Impact Teams
Negotiations
Psychology
Teams
- Recent Media Coverage
Chicago Tribune: Negotiate or fall behind, businesswomen told - 10/16/2009
Forbes (ForbesWoman): Negotiation 101: Gender War Or Gender Peace And Prosperity? - 9/18/2009
San Francisco Chronicle: How to Say No Without Saying No - 7/16/2009
The Mint (Dow Jones publication in India): 53 truths about negotiations - 3/9/2008
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- Recent Kellogg News
Research by Kellogg Professors Adam Galinsky and Leigh Thompson named ‘Most Influential’ - 9/12/2008
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Teaching and research are frequently described as opposing forces within academia, with tradeoffs required between the two domains. A new research paradigm - classroom research - bridges the divide between pedagogy and research methodology. An exploratory review spanning 25 years of micro-OB research identified the classroom as an increasingly popular site for research. The classroom presents an opportunity for conducting research, but also presents unique methodological considerations distinct from those discussed in the laboratory or field research traditions. We define the classroom research paradigm, discuss its advantages for both researcher and student, and outline the major methodological, educational, and ethical considerations of classroom research.
Negotiators often have different expectations about the future. A contingent agreement, or a bet that makes the ultimate outcome dependent on some future event, builds on negotiators’ differences. The authors argue that a problem-solving approach, in which negotiators thorougly explore options to build on their differences, is most likely to construct contingent agreements. The authors explore two factors expected to influence this problem-solving approach, namely, negotiators’ relational and accountability concerns. The authors argue when these considerations are imbalanced, negotiators are less likely to adopt a problem-solving style and construct a contingent agreement. To test this hypothesis, negotiators’ relationships and accountability pressures were manipulated in two experiments. In Experiment 1, participants engaged in an integrative negotiation, allowing the authors to examine whether a contingent agreement was constructed and joint gain. Experiment 2 sought to replicate and extend the findings of Experiment 1 using a scenario study. Results across the two experiments support the authors’ hypotheses.
Negotiation scholars and practitioners have long noted the impact of face, or social image, concerns on negotiation outcomes. When face is threatened, negotiators are less likely to reach agreement and to create joint gain. In this paper, we explore individual differences in face threat sensitivity (FTS), and how a negotiator's role moderates the relationship of his or her FTS to negotiation outcomes. Study 1 describes a measure of FTS. Study 2 finds that buyers and sellers are less likely to reach an agreement that is in both parties' interests when the seller has high FTS. Study 3 finds that job candidates and recruiters negotiate an employment contract with less joint gain when the candidate has high FTS, and that this relationship is mediated by increased competitiveness on the part of the high FTS candidates. The results support Deutsch's (1961) application of face theory ( Goffman, 1967) to negotiation.
Two experiments explored the hypothesis that the impact of activating gender stereotypes on negotiated agreements in mixed-gender negotiations depends on the manner in which the stereo-type is activated (explicitly vs. implicitly) and the content of the stereotype (linking negotiation performance to stereotypically male vs. stereotypically female traits). Specifically, two experiments investigated the generality and limits of stereotype reactance. The results of Experiment 1 suggest that negotiated outcomes become more one-sided in favor of the high power negotiator when masculine traits are explicitly linked to negotiator effectiveness. In contrast, the results of Experiment 2 suggest that negotiated outcomes are more integrative (win-win) when feminine traits are explicitly linked to negotiator effectiveness. In total, performance in mixed-gender negotiations is strongly affected by the cognitions and motivations that negotiators bring to the bargaining table.
The article presents a commentary on the book "Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In," by Roger Fisher and William Ury. The authors note that the book outlined three landmark events in the scholarly study of negotiation. They are relationships, emotions, and subjective perceptions. The authors discuss the principle outlined in the book known as the "Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement" (BATNA). They acknowledge that this principle has become a gold standard for negotiation researchers. They contend that negotiators with more attractive BATNA capture a greater share of the bargaining zone.
Negotiation can be conceptualized as a problem-solving enterprise in which mental models guide behavior. We examined the association between negotiation outcomes and mental models, as measured by negotiators’ associative networks. Four hypotheses were supported. First, negotiators who reached optimal settlements had mental models that reflected greater understanding of the negotiation’s payoff structure, and of the processes of trading and exchanging information, compared to negotiators who did not reach optimal settlements. Second, negotiators who reached optimal settlements exhibited greater within-dyad mental model similarity. Third, experience-based training was more likely than instruction-based training to produce mental models similar to the mental models of negotiators who actually reached optimal settlements. Finally, negotiators who received 10 weeks of experience-based training had mental models that were similar to novice negotiators who reached optimal settlements, except that the mental models of the experienced negotiators were more abstract.
We used structure-mapping theory (Gentner, 1983) to study learning in negotiation teams. We instructed some teams to compare two training cases and identify a key negotiation principle; other teams were given the same two cases to study and analyze separately. Teams who compared the two cases during the training period were more likely to transfer a key value-added strategy to a novel face-to-face, two-party negotiation situation than were teams who analyzed the same two cases separately. In fact, analyzing cases separately was no better than no training at all. Teams of negotiators showed comparable levels of knowledge transfer to solo negotiators.
We offer a study revealing the mechanisms through which communication helps actual bargaining behavior outperform economic predictions. The possibility of individually strategic behavior in the presence of private information leads to game-theoretic predictions of less than full efficiency. We present a one-stage, simultaneous offers bargaining game in which buyers and sellers have independent, privately held valuations for the item being sold (i.e. a bilateral auction with two-sided private information). In three communication treatments, parties are: (a) allowed face-to-face communication prior to submitting offers; (b) allowed written communication prior to submitting offers; or (c) allowed no-communication prior to submitting offers. When parties are allowed pre-play communication, we find nearly full efficiency (98%). We examine two systematically predictable aspects of dyadic interaction - disclosure and reciprocity - to explain how negotiators achieve this efficiency.
In the rapidly changing, more competitive new economy, teams need to engage in divergent thinking in which they put aside typical assumptions. However, the deck seems to be stacked against teams as the agents of creativity. Indeed, teams excel at convergent thinking, but it is individuals who excel at divergent thinking. In this article, the four key shortcomings of teamwork are identified and described. Then, 10 techniques for enhancing creative teamwork are outlined that most teams or workgroups can put into place. These techniques have all been proven to be effective in enhancing creativity and are extremely cost-effective.
Teaching by examples and cases is widely used to promote learning, but it varies widely in its effectiveness. The authors test an adaptation to case-based learning that facilitates abstracting problem-solving schemas from examples and using them to solve further problems: analogical encoding, or learning by drawing a comparison across examples. In 3 studies, the authors examined schema abstraction and transfer among novices learning negotiation strategies. Experiment 1 showed a benefit for analogical learning relative to no case study. Experiment 2 showed a marked advantage for comparing two cases over studying the 2 cases separately. Experiment 3 showed that increasing the degree of comparison support increased the rate of transfer in a face-to-face dynamic negotiation exercise.
Our review of the learning and training literature revealed four common methods for training people to be more effective negotiators: didactic learning, learning via information revelation, analogical learning, and observational learning. We tested each of these methods experimentally in an experiential context and found that observational learning and analogical learning led to negotiated outcomes that were more favorable for both parties, compared to a baseline condition of learning through experience alone. Information revelation and didactic learning were not significantly different from any other condition. Process measures revealed that negotiators' schemas about the task (reflected in open-ended essays) were strong predictors of performance in the analogical learning condition, but were poor predictors of performance in the remaining conditions. Interestingly, negotiators in the observation group showed the largest increase in performance, but the least ability to articulate the learning principles that helped them improve, suggesting that they had acquired tacit knowledge that they were unable to articulate.
While traditional behavioral decision theory as applied to negotiation sheds light on some of the barriers encountered in negotiations, it does not fully account for many of the difficulties and failures to reach settlement in ideologically-based disputes. In this paper, we identify a number of factors that differentiate ideologically-based negotiations from other types of negotiation, and advance a perspective that takes into account the value-laden and institutional contexts in which they occur. We illustrate our ideas by applying them to the organizationally relevant example of environmental disputes.
We study a double auction with two-sided private information and preplay communication, for which Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983, J. Econ. Theory 28, 265-281) showed that all equilibria are inefficient and the Chatterjee-Samuleson linear equilibrium is most efficient. Like several others, we find that players use communication to surpass equilibrium levels of efficiency, especially when the communication is face-to-face. Our main contribution is an analysis of how communication helps the parties achieve such high levels of efficiency. We find that when preplay communication is allowed, efficiency above equilibrium levels is a result of what we call "dyadic" strategies that allow the parties to coordinate on a single price that reflects both parties' valuations.
In this review paper, we examine how people negotiate via e-mail and in particular, how the process and outcomes of e-negotiations differ from traditional face-to-face bargaining. We review the key tasks of negotiation and then undertake a review of the research literature that has examined e-negotiations. We outline four theories of interaction that provide insights about social behavior in e-media: rapport building, social contagion, coordination, and information-exchange. Our research program has focused on the interpersonal factors and social-identity factors that can enhance the quality of e-negotiations. E-negotiators often succumb to the temporal synchrony bias, the burned bridge bias, the squeaky wheel bias, and the sinister attribution bias. We discuss social-psychological factors that can reduce these biases and the future of research on e-negotiations.
We examine how gender stereotypes affect performance in mixed-gender negotiations. We extend recent work demonstrating that stereotype activation leads to a male advantage and a complementary female disadvantage at the bargaining table (Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, in press). In the present investigation, we regenerate the stereotype of effective negotiators by associating stereotypically feminine skills with negotiation success. In Experiment 1, women performed better in mixed-gender negotiations when stereotypically feminine traits were linked to successful negotiating, but not when gender-neutral traits were linked to negotiation success. Gender differences were mediated by the performance expectations and goals set by negotiators. In Experiment 2, we regenerated the stereotype of effective negotiators by linking stereotypically masculine or feminine traits with negotiation ineffectiveness. Women outperformed men in mixed-gender negotiations when stereotypically masculine traits were linked to poor negotiation performance, but men outperformed women when stereotypically feminine traits were linked to poor negotiation performance. Implications for stereotype threat theory and negotiations are discussed.
Past research indicates that rapport helps negotiators overcome interpersonal friction and find cooperative agreements. Study 1 explored differences in the behavioral dynamics evoked by e-mail versus face-to-face negotiation. Although some behavioral content categories differed in ways pointing to strengths of e-mail, the strongest pattern was that e-mail inhibited the process of exchanging personal information through which negotiators establish rapport. We hypothesized that the liabilities of e-mail might minimized by a pre-negotiation intervention of social lubrication. To test this in Study 2, half of dyads had a brief personal telephone conversation (“schmoozed”) before commencing e-mail negotiations, and half did not. Schmoozers felt more rapport; their plans were more trusting—though no less ambitious; and their economic and social outcomes were better.
We examine how gender stereotypes affect negotiation performance. Men outperformed women when the negotiation was perceived as diagnostic of ability (Experiment 1) or the negotiation was linked to gender-specific traits (Experiment 2), suggesting the threat of negative stereotype confirmation hurt wome s performance relative to men. We hypothesized that men and women confirm gender stereotypes when they are activated implicitly, but when stereotypes are explicitly activated, people exhibit stereotype reactance, or the tendency to behave in a manner inconsistent with a stereotype. Experiment 3 confirmed this hypothesis. Experiment 4 examined the cognitive processes involved in stereotype reactance and the conditions under which cooperative behaviors between men and women can be promoted at the bargaining table (by activating a shared identity that transcends gender).
In light of the increasing presence of teams and work groups in organizations and their role in negotiations, we outline a framework for understanding the dynamics of negotiating teams. The traditional context of dyadic negotiations (i.e., one-on-one) is used as a point of departure for our analysis. We bring together research on negotiation, small group dynamics and individual social cognition into a coherent framework to analyze negotiating teams. At the heart of our framework are three categories of psychological processes, corresponding to different levels of analysis, which highlight the contributions of individual, intragroup, and intergroup processes. These processes are discussed in terms of traditional negotiation concepts such as integrative and distributive bargaining. Finally, we provide guidance for future research.
We tested predictions from fairness heuristic theory that justice judgments are more sensitive to early fairness-relevant information than to later fairness-relevant information and that this primacy effect is more evident when group identification is higher. Participants working on a series of three tasks experienced resource failures that interfered with their productivity. In a manipulation of fairness-relevant experiences, a supervisor denied the participant the opportunity to explain his or her problems on the first, second, or third of three work trials (but participants were given an opportunity to explain on the other two trials), or the supervisor never denied the participant the opportunity to explain. Prior to the work periods, the participants either had or had not undergone a manipulation designed to induce greater identification with the work group. As predicted, there was a primacy effect on fairness judgments and acceptance of authority in the high identification conditions and no evidence of such an effect in the low identification conditions. The implications of the findings for understanding the psychology of justice and for real-world justice phenomena are discussed.
We examined the ability of master of business administration students to transfer knowledge gained from case studies to a face-to-face negotiation task. During a study phase, students either read two cases and gave advice to the protagonist in each case ("Advice" condition) or derived an overall principle by comparing two cases ("Comparison" condition). Management students in the Comparison condition were nearly three times as likely to transfer the principle in their actual, face-to-face bargaining situation as those in the Advice condition. Further, content analysis of students' open-ended responses revealed that the quality of the advice given in the Advice condition did not predict subsequent behavior, whereas the quality of the principles given in the Comparison condition did predict successful transfer to the negotiation situation. Perhaps most striking is the fact that not a single person in the Advice condition seemed to draw a parallel between the two cases presented to them, even though they were printed on the same page. We conclude that the value of examples is far greater if analogical comparisons among examples are encouraged. We propose that this simple and cost-effective method can substantially improve the benefits of professional training and education.
We assessed collective efficacy (a group's judgment of their ability to perform a particular task) and some dimensions of shared mental models (models of the group structure, process, and the task, that members hold in common) in student groups working on semester-long research projects. In particular, we assessed the extent to which group members had agreement and accuracy about members' past and future contributions to the group project, and agreement about the importance of various task aspects. Groups with higher efficacy early in the semester had more agreement and accuracy later in the semester. However, the reverse was not true: the extent to which agreement and accuracy developed early in the semester was not correlated with collective efficacy later in the semester. Also, groups with higher collective efficacy (as measured early and late in the semester) and more shared mental models (as measured late in the semester) received higher grades on their projects. A number of task process and social process variables were tested as possible mediators of these relationships; however, no significant mediators were found.
The pharmaceutical industry is changing at a hurried pace, thanks to the growth of information technology, greater competition, globalization, and an increasing number of mergers and acquisitions. Product managers who have learned the necessary skills to become adept at negotiating with their clients will have the advantage in the new workplace; those who do not possess negotiating skills may find themselves unable to make much progress in as dynamic a playing field as pharmaceuticals. Product managers must be able to negotiate effectively and efficiently with people of diverse backgrounds. After all, they spend the major portion of their workday in discussions with sales personnel, advertising agencies, PR agencies, product developers, and financial analysts. The successful integration of ideas and decisions necessitates good negotiating skills on the part of the effective product manager. Product management requires the ability to be comfortable with the negotiating process and the resulting decisions. Furthermore, the ability to recognize opportunities and to assemble deals that do not waste resources and leave potential gains unexplored (a phenomenon known as “leaving money on the table”) are essential to building solid relationships in the field. Successful negotiating skills, then, are a core management competency for product managers in the pharmaceutical industry. This article provides product managers with tools to improve their negotiating skills, using a systematic approach. First, the variety of reasons why negotiations are a challenging prospect for most people are examined within the context of four myths and four sins of negotiations. Second, strategies and methods that can aid the product manager in improving negotiating skills are identified.
Observers watched videotapes of people negotiating. In half of the videotapes, the negotiators had a negative relationship; in the other half, the negotiators had a positive relationship. Some observers believed that the relationship was a genuine reflection of how the parties felt about one another; others were told that the behavior of negotiators was strategic- i.e., used by parties to gain advantage. Following the tape, observers recommended a settlement. Observers' suggestions were most efficient when the negotiators' relationship was positive and genuine; observers proposed significantly worse solutions when negotiators' relationships were negative and genuine. We advise mediators to focus on the issues rather than the emotional tone, and avoid the correspondence bias when observing conflicts among parties with negative relationships.
This essay offers one attempt to apply insights from educational psychology to the teaching and learning of negotiation skills. First, we suggest a key reason why becoming an expert is challenging, namely, peopl s naïve theories about negotiation need to be challenged and largely put to rest. Second, we examine how professional schools typically teach negotiation. Third and finally, we offer suggestions for improving our negotiation pedagogy. To this end, we describe and review our research on analogical learning and how it can be used in classrooms to enhance learning.
What is the relationship between economic development and environmental protection? Mirroring the negotiations field of fifteen years ago, the debate over this question has polarized into the opposing perspectives of win-lose (distributive bargaining) or win-win (integrative bargaining) outcomes. We argue that such polarization is both unnecessary and inaccurate. Conflict between economics and the environment is, at its core, what we will describe as a mixed-motive situation. In presenting this argument, we will draw from the negotiations and managerial decision-making literature to offer a mixed-motive perspective on the economics versus environment debate. Further, we will consider existing individual and institutional barriers to realizing the mixed-motive perspective and conclude with some strategies for overcoming them.
Information learned in academic settings has a distressing tendency to be left behind in the classroom. Learning in one situation often fails to transfer to a similarly structured situation (e.g., Gentner, Rattermann, & Forbus, 1993; Gick & Holyoak, 1980). However, comparing two or more instances that embody the same principle promotes abstraction of a schema that can be transferred to new situations. In two lines of research, we examined analogical encoding on knowledge transfer in negotiation situations. In Experiment 1, undergraduates were more likely to propose optimal negotiation strategies, and less likely to propose compromises (a sub-optimal strategy), when they received analogy training. In Experiment 2, business school students who drew an analogy from two cases were nearly three times more likely to incorporate the strategy in the training cases into their negotiations than students given the same cases separately. For novices and experienced participants, the comparison process can be an efficient means of abstracting principles for later application.
This report summarizes cutting-edge research thinking on how negotiators learn. A person's ability to access knowledge is highly dependent on how it is learned, and memory failures often result from accessibility difficulties rather than from capacity limitation or information deficit. Furthermore, there is often a disassociation between what is most accessible in memory and what is most useful in tackling the particular problem being confronted. Counter to intuitive expectations, the ability to take full advantage of our prior experiences is highly limited because it relies primarily upon superficial similarities among what was learned in the classroom and in the real world. Instead, we propose that negotiators utilize analogical encoding, which allows for comparison of multiple, structurally similar examples, and provides a cost effective and conceptually straightforward mechanism for improving negotiating skills.
To understand why e-mail negotiations break down, we investigated two distinct elements of negotiators' relationships with each other: shared membership in a social group, and mutual self-disclosure. In an experiment, some participants negotiated with a member of an outgroup (a student at a competitor university), whereas others negotiated with a member of an ingroup (a student at the same university). In addition, some negotiators exchanged personal information with their counterpart, whereas others did not. When neither common ingroup status nor a personalized relationship existed between negotiators, negotiations were more likely to end in impasse. These results are attributable to the positive influence of mutual self-disclosure and common group membership on negotiation processes and rapport between negotiators.
In this article, we review four classes of models of socially-shared cognition and behavior: supra-individual models, information-processing models, communication models, and social interaction models. Our review draws upon research and theory in social psychology, sociology, and organization behavior. We conclude that these innovative perspectives on socially-shared behavior represent a new approach to the study of groups and are distinct from traditional models of the group mind and crowd behavior. The key processes implicated in these models focus on the potency of immediate interaction, reciprocal influence processes between individuals and groups, goal-directed behavior, negotiated processing of information and ideas, and the maintenance and enhancement of social identity. This approach to socially-shared understanding is not antagonistic toward the analysis of individual-level processes but rather maintains that individual-level processes are necessary, but not sufficient, to build a social psychology of shared understanding.
This paper investigates the information dilemma in negotiations: if negotiators reveal information about their priorities and preferences, more efficient agreements may be reached but the shared information may be used strategically by the other negotiator, to the revealers' disadvantage. We present a theoretical model that focuses on the characteristics of the negotiators, the structure of the negotiation, and the available incentives; it predicts that experienced negotiators will outperform naive negotiators on distributive (competitive) tasks, especially when they have information about their counterpart's preferences and the incentives are high--unless the task is primarily integrative, in which case information will contribute to the negotiators maximizing joint gain. Two experiments (one small, one large) showed that tire revelation of one's preferences was costly and that experienced negotiators outperformed their naive counterparts by a wide margin, particularly when the task and issues were distributive and incentives were large. Our results help to identify the underlying dynamics of the information dilemma and lead to a discussion of the connections between information and social dilemmas and the potential for avoiding inefficiencies.
Our experiment analyzes situations in which a group engages in two dilemmas, a social dilemma and an escalation dilemma, in one of two orders. Some of the groups were composed of long-time friends (high cohesion); other groups were composed of unacquainted individuals (low cohesion). Further, some were accorded high respect from relevant authorities; in contrast, others were not treated with respect. Groups of friends were more likely to cooperate by contributing to a greater degree in the social dilemma task than were groups of nonfriends. Groups high in cohesion but low in respect were more likely to escalate their commitment to a losing course of action in an escalation dilemma compared to other groups. There appear to be two distinct types of group identity: one based on cohesion and the other based on respect. Cohesion-based identity remained high and relatively constant across the two tasks among groups of friends, but declined over time among groups of nonfriends. Both cohesion-based identity and respect-based identity dropped precipitously following social dilemma tasks, but increased consistently following escalation dilemmas.
We examined how relationships' perceived goal incompatibility and communal orientation affected the expectations people bring to negotiation, their actual performance, and retrospective judgments of the situation. Pairs of friends who perceived the task as a problem-solving situation and who were similar in communal orientation were most likely to capitalize on joint interests; however, when friends were dissimilar in communal orientation, their ability to identify compatible issues declined precipitously. Friends who were high in communal orientation were more likely to allocate resources equally among each other than were friends low in communal orientation. When friends negotiated car deals, they judged themselves to be less cooperative and as making fewer concessions when they were high in communal orientation than when they were low in communal orientation. We conclude that the impact of relationships on negotiation performance and judgment depends upon perceived goal incompatibility as well as participants' chronic attitudes toward relationships.
The research literature in organizational justice has examined in some detail the dynamics and consequences of justice judgments based on direct experiences with fair and unfair authorities, but little is known about how people form justice judgments on the basis of reports of injustice by others or how group discussion changes justice judgments. The present study examined the consequences of distributed injustice, in which all members of a group experience some denial of voice, and concentrated injustice, in which one member experiences repeated denial of voice and others do not. It was predicted and found that mild personal experiences of injustice are a more potent source of group impressions of injustice than are reports of more severe injustice experienced by others. In both conditions, group ratings of unfairness were more extreme than were the mean of individual ratings either before or after discussion.
We examined how the distribution of information among team members and accountability pressures affected the quality of negotiated settlements reached among teams of friends negotiating against teams of strangers. The main conclusions of the experiment may be summarized by the following findings: (1) Teams of strangers reaped a greater share of the joint profit than did teams of friends when teammates were accountable to a supervisor as opposed to negotiating strictly on their own behalf. (2) Teams of strangers also reaped a marginally greater share of the joint profit than did teams of friends when teammates possessed unique, as opposed to common, information about their own team's preferences. (3) Not surprisingly, teams of friends were more cohesive than were teams of strangers; however, teams of friends were also more concerned about maintaining their relationship than were teams of strangers. (4) Teams of friends felt least cohesive when they were accountable to a supervisor, whereas teams of strangers felt most cohesive when they were accountable. Similarly, friends indicated greater relationship concerns when having to deal with distributed information, whereas information distribution had no effect on the relationship concerns of strangers. (5) For teams of strangers, greater team cohesiveness was positively correlated with better performance. (6) Moreover, when teams of strangers felt more cohesive than their opponents, they earned more than teams of strangers who felt less cohesive.
In a series of three investigations we examined people's anticipation of, actual experiences in, and subsequent recollection of meaningful life events: a trip to Europe, a Thanksgiving vacation, and a 3-week bicycle trip in California. The results of all three studies supported the hypothesis that people's expectations of personal events are more positive than their actual experience during the event itself, and their subsequent recollection of that event is more positive than the actual experience. The ''rosy view'' phenomenon is associated with an increase in the number of negative thoughts during the event which seem to be caused by distractions, disappointment, and a less positive view of the self. However, these effects are short-lived; within days after the event, people have much more positive evaluations of the event. We discuss alternative interpretations for our findings and implications for group and organizational settings.
Two people in an interdependent decision-making situation may have compatible interests; however, they often fail to realize this and settle on an outcome less favorable to both parties than another readily available solution. People sometimes settle for less favorable outcomes even when they realize they have compatible interests. The authors refer to this failure to identify and optimize compatible interests as the lose-lose effect, which means a faulty belief or judgment about another person's interests and an outcome or agreement that fails to capitalize on shared interests. Whether the people involved are individuals or organizations, lose-lose agreements result in reduced prosperity and satisfaction for both parties. The authors present a meta-analytic review of 32 experiments that document the pervasiveness of lose-lose agreements. They examine the relationship between the judgments people make about others' interests and lose-lose agreements and the effects of practice on both. They review theoretical explanations of lose-lose agreements.
The authors argue that much of the conventional wisdom about mediation is based on the concept of neutrality—a concept difficult to operationalize. They replace this approach with the goal of providing Symmetric Prescriptive Advice (SPA). SPA is based on Raiffa's decision theoretic approach to negotiation and mediation, coupled with an analysis of common cognitive errors that occur in mediation. SPA requires mediators to: (1) only push for agreements when a positive bargaining zone exists; (2) search for fully efficient agreements; and (3) help the parties think through the issue of fairness.
Two experiments compared the effectiveness of team and solo negotiators in integrative and distributive bargaining. When at least 1 party to a negotiation was a team, joint profit increased. Teams, more than solos, developed mutually beneficial trade-offs among issues and discovered compatible interests. The presence of at least 1 team increased information exchange and accuracy in judgments about the other party’s interests in comparison with solo negotiations. The belief by both teams and solos that teams have a relative advantage over solo opponents was not supported by actual outcomes. Unexpectedly, neither private meetings nor friendships among team members improved the team’s advantage. Teams of friends made less accurate judgments and reached fewer integrative agreements compared to teams of nonfriends.
Researchers examined the impact of communication constraints and tradeoff structures on negotiations within 3-member groups in a simulated architectural firm. Groups were faced with the task of designing a house to meet a client's needs and budget constraints. Groups restricted to dyadic-only communication (between 2 members at any given time) perceived other group members and themselves to be more competitive than groups that engaged in full-group communication (3 members present). When groups were allowed to communicate in full, they were more likely to discover circular tradeoffs than reciprocal tradeoffs; however, when communication was restricted to dyadic interactions, reciprocal tradeoffs were more likely than circular tradeoffs. Joint profit was greater for tasks requiring reciprocal rather than circular tradeoffs. Furthermore, reciprocal tradeoff structures led to a more equal division of profits among group members than did circular tradeoffs.
A social preparation framework was used to examine how social cues and intergroup relations affect social judgment and behavior in negotiation. In Experiment 1, subjects negotiated and then learned that their opponent felt happy/disappointed/neutral. Negotiators felt less successful when their opponent was happy than when the opponent was disappointed. This effect occurred independent of negotiators′ actual performance on the task. The feeling of success was "bittersweet", however, in that individuals who felt successful also regarded themselves as less honest, less sincere, less generous, and less fair - in short, less honourable in the negotiations. Experiment 2 tested the prediction that intergroup relationships govern the inverse affect and bittersweet effects. Individuals who negotiated with a disappointed opponent felt successful when the opponent was an out-group member, but not when the opponent was an in-group member. Negotiators allocated substantially more resources to in-group members who expressed disappointment with a previous outcome than to out-group members who expressed disappointment.
Experiment 1 examined the impact of minimum goals and aspiration values on feelings of success. Negotiators with low minimum goals felt more successful than did those with higher minimum goals, even though their final settlements were identical. Furthermore, negotiators with low aspirations felt more successful than did negotiators with higher aspirations, even though the final settlement was identical. Experiment 2 examined the relative impact of minimum goals and aspirations and found that aspirations influenced negotiators' perceptions of success more than did minimum goals. Experiment 3 examined how goals affected the demands negotiators made to their opponents. Negotiators with low minimum goals and high aspirations demanded more from their opponents than did negotiators with high minimum goals and low aspirations. In general, aspirations, as compared to minimum goals, exerted a more powerful influence on the demands people made to others in negotiations and how successful they felt about negotiated outcomes.
The incompatibility error is the belief that the other party's interests are completely opposed to one's own in a negotiation situation, when in fact, the other party's interests are completely compatible with one's own. In Experiment 1, partisan and nonpartisan observers viewed a negotiation. Nonpartisan observers were more likely to detect compatible interests than the actual negotiators. In Experiment 2, high involvement worsened judgment accuracy among partisan observers but improved judgment accuracy among nonpartisan observers. Experiment 3 replicated the findings of Experiment 2: Nonpartisan observers made more accurate judgments when they were accountable than when they were not accountable; however, partisan observers made less accurate judgments when they were accountable than when they were not accountable. Partisans who were not accountable expressed the most confidence in their judgments. Partisans tended to judge their party to be more friendly than the other party; nonpartisans were more evenhanded in their judgments. There were no differences in recall of the videotaped interaction.
We examined the impact of feedback on the accuracy of people′s judgments of their opponents′ interests and on the quality of negotiated outcomes. Pairs of subjects engaged in four bargaining tasks. Following each task, some subjects received a complete diagnosis of their opponent′s interests in the preceding task (full feedback); others learned only about their opponents final outcomes (outcome feedback); some did not receive any information about their opponent (control). We predicted that subjects who received a complete diagnosis would make more accurate judgments about their opponent′s interests and reach more integrative agreements in subsequent negotiation situations. Results supported the hypothesis. However, outcome-only feedback did not improve judgment accuracy and performance. We interpret the results as supporting a judgment-action-outcome model of feedback.
Three studies examined the impact of interpersonal conflict on intergroup relations. It was hypothesized that whereas all subjects were expected to show in-group bias merely as a consequence of social categorization, in-group favoritism would be greatly reduced among those who negotiated with an out-group member, but not for those who negotiated with an in-group member. The results supported the predictions: People who negotiated with a member of an out-group developed more favorable evaluations of the out-group whereas people who negotiated with a member of their own group were more likely to show in-group favoritism (Experiments 1 and 2). However, when the negotiation situation was such that negotiators could not reach a mutually beneficial agreement, the positive effects of interpersonal negotiation with members of out-groups on intergroup relations was not observed (Experiment 3). Thus, negotiation with members of out-groups improves intergroup relations when the negotiation situation is one in which both persons′ goals may be achieved. Whereas individuals who expected to negotiate with out-group members thought they would obtain significantly lower outcomes, there were no differences in terms of the value of the actual outcomes achieved for those who negotiated with an in-group member and those who negotiated with an out-group member.
Two experiments tested the hypothesis that egocentric interpretations of fairness are an important cause of unnecessary and costly settlement delays in bargaining. Subjects engaged in an interactive, dynamic bargaining task in which their objective was to reach an agreement with an opponent. If negotiators failed to settle, a strike ensued which was costly for both parties. The results of Experiment 1 indicated that negotiators' judgments of fair outcomes were biased in an egocentric direction. Further, the magnitude of the parties' biases strongly predicted the length of strikes. Experiment 2 examined the role of situational complexity as a cause of egocentric interpretations of fairness. Two forms of complexity were examined: complexity created by background information concerning the dispute and complexity associated with asymmetries in negotiators' strike costs. Background information concerning the dispute and asymmetric costs exacerbated egocentric interpretations of fairness. Egocentric interpretations of fairness were greatest when measured before negotiation and were mitigated following bargaining. Negotiators showed biased recall of information concerning the dispute, remembering more information that favored their own position. The magnitude of bias was positively related to egocentric interpretations of fairness. We conclude that egocentric interpretations of fairness hinder conflict resolution because people are reluctant to agree to what they perceive to be an inequitable settlement.
The research question addressed an apparent lack of supportive empirical evidence for theoretical arguments predicting a relationship between information exchange and successful negotiation outcomes. I examined the effects of two methods of information exchange, providing and seeking information about interests, on the accuracy of negotiators' perceptions of their opponent and negotiation outcomes. The first experiment examined the effects of mutual information exchange: both negotiators were provided with information or both sought information about the other party's interests. The second experiment examined the effects of asymmetric information exchange: one member of the bargaining pair was instructed to either provide or seek information; the other party was not given explicit communication instructions. Both mechanisms, providing information and seeking information, improved the accuracy of negotiators' judgments about the other party and led to more mutually beneficial, integrative negotiation agreements. It was not necessary that both negotiators provide (or seek) information: joint outcomes improved significantly even when only one member of the bargaining pair provided (or sought) information. Negotiators who provided information to the other party did not place themselves at a disadvantage vis a vis their opponent in terms of individual profit. Finally, the accuracy of negotiators' judgments was strongly related to their performance, suggesting that judgment accuracy is a key ingredient for reaching integrative negotiation agreements. I discuss the implications of these results for theories of information exchange in negotiation.
A total of 20 Ss engaged in 7 different, 2-party negotiation tasks to examine the effects of experience on judgment accuracy, behavior, and outcomes in negotiation. Negotiators bargained with naive negotiators who had either no experience or just a single previous experience; the total amount of experience in each bargaining pair was controlled for. Joint outcomes could be increased by trading off pairs of issues (logrolling) and by identifying issues for which both people had compatible interests. Logrolling improved as negotiators gained experience, but negotiators' ability to identify compatible issues did not. Negotiators were more successful in logrolling issues when the naive person had a single previous bargaining experience as opposed to no experience. Highly experienced bargainers claimed a larger share of the joint resources at the expense of their naive opponents. High aspirations, small concessions, and proposing several different offers predicted superior performance. The accuracy of negotiators' judgments about their opponent paralleled their performance, suggesting judgment accuracy is a key ingredient for reaching integrative agreement.
We tested some implications of Wills' (1981) downward comparison interpretation of ingroup bias in the minimal intergroup paradigm. Based on a self-enhancement interpretation of ingroup bias, we predicted that subjects who expected to succeed on a task for dispositional reasons and subsequently failed would be most threatened by the feedback and hence, would engage in downward social comparison strategies. The results did not support the self-enhancement interpretation, but a number of interesting findings emerged. First, downward social comparison involving favorable comparisons of the ingroup relative to the outgroup was pervasive and not mediated by self-esteem. Second, ingroup bias was greatest when individuals' outcomes were consistent with their expectations; ingroup bias was mitigated when subjects received feedback that was inconsistent with their expectations. Third, although low self-esteem subjects rated members of the outgroup more negatively than did high self-esteem subjects, high self-esteem subjects engaged in more downward social comparison by enhancing the self relative to both members of the outgroup and their own ingroup. Finally, self-enhancement strategies were affected by performance expectations, attributions, and chronic self-esteem: People who expected to perform well because of stable, dispositional reasons and who were high in self-esteem showed the greatest tendency to engage in self-enhancing comparisons with others. This was true regardless of whether subjects ultimately succeeded or failed on the important task and regardless of whether the comparison others were members of the outgroup or the ingroup.
This article examines the ability of the individual differences, motivational, and cognitive approaches of negotiation to account for empirical research on dyadic negotiation. Investigators have typically focused on objective, economic measures of performance. However, social-psychological measures are important because negotiators often do not have the information necessary to make accurate judgments of the bargaining situation. Negotiators' judgments are biased, and biases are associated with inefficient performance. Personality and individual differences appear to play a minimal role in determining bargaining behavior; their impact may be dampened by several factors, such as homogeneity of S samples, situational constraints, and self-selection processes. Motivational and cognitive models provide compelling accounts of negotiation behavior. A psychological theory of negotiation should begin at the level of the individual negotiator and should integrate features of motivational and cognitive models.
Many negotiations provide opportunities for integrative agreements in which parties can maximize joint gains without competing for resources in a direct win-lose fashion. However, negotiators often settle for suboptimal compromise agreements rather than search for mutually beneficial, or integrative, agreements. We hypothesized that misperceptions of the other party's interests are a primary cause of suboptimal outcomes. Two studies examined the role of social perception in negotiation and the relationship between judgment accuracy and negotiation performance. Results indicated that: most negotiators enter negotiation expecting the other party's interests to be completely opposed to their own; negotiators learn about the potential for joint gain during negotiation; most learning occurs within the first few minutes of interaction; accurate perception of the other party's interests leads to better negotiation performance; negotiators who learn about the other party's interests in the early stages of negotiation earn higher payoffs than do those who learn during the later stages of negotiation; a substantial number of negotiators fail to realize when they have interests that are completely compatible with those of the other party and settle for suboptimal agreements; and the two types of judgment error, Fixed Sum Error and Incompatibility Error, appear to be unrelated, distinct judgment errors. We discuss the role of social judgment in negotiation and the generalizability of the results to real world negotiations.
This paper examined negotiator behavior in a variable-sum two-party negotiation task and its impact on individual and joint negotiator out-come. Specifically, we examined the role of negotiator opening offer, reciprocity and complementarity of the use of tactics, systematic progression of offers, and information sharing in a negotiation with integrative potential. Results indicated that initial offers affect final outcome differently across buyers and sellers. The buyer's initial offer was curvilinearly related to his or her final outcome in the form of an inverted-U. The seller's initial offer was positive-linearly related to seller's outcome. Second, negotiators reciprocated and complemented both distributive and integrative tactics. In addition, highly integrative dyads differed from less efficient dyads in their reciprocation of integrative behaviors and complementarity of distributive behaviors. Third, approximately forty percent of offers made represented systematic concessions, but the proportion of offers reflecting systematic concessions was not related to the efficiency of the joint outcome. Finally, while information sharing did appear to have a positive effect on the efficiency of agreements, differences in the amount of information provided did not affect the proportion of outcome claimed by each party.
The purpose of the study was to explore whether experience improves or possibly debilitates people's ability to reach mutually beneficial negotiation outcomes. The impact of different kinds of experience on performance was examined, including negotiators' experience with the bargaining task, their bargaining opponent, and the type of skill required to reach mutually beneficial outcomes. The major research findings were that negotiators were able to apply the integrative skills learned in one task to different negotiation situations. Whereas this was true for logrolling skills (negotiators' ability to make mutually beneficial tradeoffs between issues), bargainers' ability to use compatible skills (recognize similar interests) was markedly limited. Improvements in performance over time occurred when negotiators had experience with tasks involving integrative potential, specifically, logrolling potential; otherwise, experience did not lead to better performance. Negotiation performance was not affected by the bargainer's familiarity with the other party. Finally, improvements in performance were associated with greater judgment accuracy about the other party and higher bargaining aspirations. The research findings suggest that judgment accuracy and aspirations are key ingredients for successful negotiation outcomes.
The impact of issue agendas, decision rule, and power balance on the quality of negotiated agreements in small groups was examined. Three-person groups negotiated an agreement on three issues, with each issue having five alternative levels. Groups using sequential agendas were less likely to achieve mutually beneficial agreements than groups using package agendas. Groups following sequential agendas under majority rule achieved significantly less beneficial agreements than did groups following sequential agendas/unanimous rule, package agendas/majority rule, or package agendas/unanimous rule. As the predetermined alternatives to a negotiated agreement increased, so did individual profit. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for the quality of decision making in mixed-motive small groups.
Three studies examined preferences for outcomes to self and a codisputant. Studies 1 and 2 estimated social utility functions from judgments of satisfaction with alternative outcomes. Comparing functional forms, we found that a utility function, including terms for own payoff and for positive and negative discrepancies between the parties' payoffs (advantageous and disadvantageous inequality), provides a close fit to the data. The typical utility function is steeply increasing and convex for disadvantageous inequality and weakly declining and convex for advantageous inequality. We manipulated dispute type (personal, business) and disputant relationship (positive, neutral, or negative) and found that both strongly influence preferences for advantageous but not disadvantageous inequality. A third study contrasted implications of the social utility functions with predictions of individual utility theories.
In this study we characterized small group negotiation as a mixed motive task that involved both cooperation and competition. We examined the impact of two group decision-making processes (decision rule and agenda) and one cognitive-motivational frame (aspiration level) on the quality of negotiated outcomes in small groups. Negotiation groups that used a unanimous decision rule were more likely to integrate their interests to achieve higher group outcomes than were groups that used a majority rule. Negotiation groups that followed an explicit agenda and used a majority decision rule distributed resources more unequally, and were more likely to form coalitions against a remaining party than were groups with no agenda/majority rule, explicit agenda/unanimity rule, and no agenda/unanimity rule. There was no support for the hypotheses that group members who held high aspirations and followed a majority decision rule would distribute resources more unequally than would groups with high aspirations/unanimity rule, low aspirations/majority rule, and low aspirations/unanimity rule; that adherence to explicit agendas would lead to lower group profits; and that the absence of high aspirations would lead to lower group profit. We discuss the results in terms of a mixed motive analysis of group decision making. We examine the implications of methods designed to increase the effectiveness of small group decision making.
In two studies, we explored the effects of trait self-esteem and threats to the self-concept on evaluations of others. In Study 1, subjects high, moderate, and low in self-esteem received either success, failure, or no feedback on a test and later evaluated three pairs of targets: in-groups and out-groups based on a minimal intergroup manipulation, those who scored above average and those who scored below average on the test, and themselves and the average college student. Study 2 explored the effects of self-esteem and threat on in-group favoritism in a real-world setting, campus sororities. Together, the results of these studies indicate that individuals high in self-esteem, but not those low in self-esteem, respond to threats to the self-concept by derogating out-groups relative to the in-group when the group boundaries have evaluative implications.
A common fallacy held by negotiators and dispute resolution professionals is that conflict escalation, negotiation impasses, and unsatisfactory agreements are driven by intransigence and self-interested motivations. Whereas self-interest and opposing motivations do interfere with the productive resolution of conflict, there are a host of seemingly benign beliefs and cognitions that also interfere with effective conflict resolution but often go undetected. Unfortunately, these beliefs are not easily corrected during the process of conflict resolution itself because they are difficult for negotiators to monitor. Furthermore, third party intervention is no guarantee that erroneous beliefs and cognitions will be adequately identified and eliminated. In fact, the mere presence of a third party may exaggerate the tendency of these faulty and erroneous beliefs to disturb the otherwise effective resolution of conflict. Further, third parties, and other self-proclaimed "neutrals" often fall prey to similar cognitive biases. We argue in this chapter that identifying and challenging these biases can do much to effectively resolve disputes and conflicts of interest. Unfortunately, most negotiators are not aware of the existence of cognitive biases and their deleterious effects. In the first section, we lay out our basic framework and key assumptions. In the second section, we provide illustrative examples of the effects of cognitive bias on conflict management. Finally, we examine methods by which to eliminate or reduce cognitive bias at the bargaining table.
In many organizational settings, status hierarchies result in the conferral of privileges that are based on achievement. However, in the same settings, status may result in the bestowal of privileges that are unearned. We argue that these unearned privileges are often awarded based on ascribed characteristics, but are perceived to be achieved. We further argue that these misattributions occur because acknowledging that one has benefited from unearned advantages that are awarded in a meritocracy can be threatening to a person's self-identity. We propose that by studying unearned privileges in organizational settings, a more accurate assessment of status hierarchies may result.
Whether gender differences exist at the negotiation table is a timeless question. To address this question, we identify five major theoretical perspectives attempting to account for gender differences at the bargaining table. We distinguish these theoretical perspectives on the basis of the origin of gender differences and the research questions they address. A common thread that runs through each perspective is the gender stereotype, which presumes masculine skills are more valuable at the bargaining table than feminine skills. We then consider the empirical support for this basic assumption as approached by each theoretical perspective. Our review includes the two dominant bargaining paradigms identified by Nash (1950) – cooperative and non-cooperative (e.g. prisoner’s dilemmas) negotiations – and non-interactive and group-level tasks. We then look forward by identifying a research agenda on this timely question for the new millennium.
Freud argued that analogy is the weakest form of reasoning. In this paper, we take the extreme counterview, not only arguing that analogy is a powerful form of reasoning, but that it is a key tool by which leaders motivate others, solve problems, and learn from experience. We base our assertion on scientific investigations of how human thought and behavior is influenced by analogies, all the way from the classroom to the boardroom. Behavioral scientists have long recognized the importance of analogical reasoning. Psychologist William James (1890) noted that “a native talent for perceiving analogies is… the leading fact in genius of every order” (p. 530) and Spearman (1923) claimed that all intellectual acts involve analogical reasoning. In this paper, we argue that leaders use analogies to lead and influence people. Some leaders use analogy deliberately and consciously; but many are unaware of their use of analogy. We discuss the effects that analogies have on reasoning and decision-making. We provide scientific evidence of how managers and leaders reason analogically (and where the stumbling blocks are). We also provide our own analysis of Fortune 100 leaders’ use of analogies.
The research literature on negotiation has advanced greatly by identifying the key shortcomings of negotiators. These shortcomings have been broadly construed as systematic biases held by negotiators that affect the processes and outcomes of negotiation (Neale & Bazerman, 1991; Thompson & Nadler, 2000). The key questions that negotiation researchers have examined in the area of bias have centered on three key issues: (1) the biases that affect judgment and behavior in negotiation; (2) their psychological underpinnings, such as motivation, cognition, emotion, etc.; and (3) the conditions or situations that augment or reduce bias. Accordingly, this chapter examines the nature of bias in negotiation and the conditions under which bias is intensified or ameliorated. We distinguish four types of biases: cognitive biases, social perception biases, motivational biases, and emotional biases. We examine current conceptualizations of bias and the implications for theory and practice.
We review research and theory on negotiation by identifying five approaches that operate as mental models for descriptive, prescriptive, and paradigmatic research. Mental models are cognitive representations of external systems that specify the cause-effect relationships governing those systems. The five mental models that have guided theory and research in negotiations are: negotiation as power and persuasion, negotiation as decision making, negotiation as a game, negotiation as a relationship, and negotiation as problem solving. We review and describe the basic theoretical principles that characterize each model and identify key areas for research.
Micro organizational behavior (micro OB) and social psychology have shared a strong and fruitful relationship that has been gaining in strength for many years. There are many reasons for social psychologists and micro OB researchers to better understand this blossoming bond between the two fields. First, micro OB is a close theoretical and empirical cousin to social psychology. Micro OB methods rely on many principles of social psychology while exhibiting some important differences. Second, micro OB research has been dramatically on the rise. The behavioral side of management has taken center stage as businesses look beyond the numbers to issues such as leadership and motivation to understand successful organizations. Finally, social psychologists and micro OB researchers inform one another’s research. There is ample room for fruitful collaboration between social psychologists and micro OB researchers, and a better understanding of micro OB helps make this collaboration easier. The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with a top-down tour of the key theoretical, empirical, and methodological questions in micro OB research and how they are addressed from a design standpoint. We begin by conceptualizing where micro OB falls within the general field of organizational behavior (OB). We follow with a brief comparison of micro OB to social psychology. Next, we trace the development of a micro OB research project employing an experimental methodology. We then discuss the three most common types of methodologies in micro OB research focusing on two primary considerations: the research site (classroom, field, or laboratory) and the nature of the research design (correlational, experimental, or qualitative). In this section, we also identify some of the most important methodological challenges faced by researchers in the field. Finally, we conclude by attempting to dispel some of the more common myths held about micro OB research.
This book has two purposes. First, it is fundamentally about groups at work, both as they attempt to accomplish their goals and as they operate in organizational settings. Second, it draws together group researchers from social psychological and organizational studies. Each chapter focuses on a central issue regarding groups as they work and examines that issue by drawing from both social psychological and organizational research. Thus, this book centers on the convergence and divergence of these two fields.
There is a mix of advice concerning the role of emotion in negotiation. Both the prescriptive and descriptive negotiation literatures toil with the questions of whether it is advisable to be emotional in a negotiation, whether one should play on other's emotions, and whether it is better to display positive or negative emotions throughout a negotiation. Our review of the research literature identifies three distinct perspectives on the role of emotion at the bargaining table. These perspectives, which we label the rational negotiator, the positive negotiator, and the irrational negotiator, give rise to very different prescriptive advice. First, we review these three perspectives on emotion and critically examine the prescriptive advice that flows from each of these perspectives. Subsequently, we expose the assumptions and biases that underlie this advice. Finally, we suggest directions for future research.
The classic analysis of the organization is based upon the information-processing agent whose decisions result from rational analysis (March, 1988). Similar analyses have been applied to virtually all micro-organizational activity, including individual decision making and interpersonal decision making, or negotiation. It is not too surprising that the study of negotiation has been "mentalized" given the cognitive revolution that preceded its development. With cognition as the dominant model of negotiation, the descriptive and prescriptive analysis of negotiation is largely divorced from considerations of affect and emotion. The negotiator is commonly depicted as a faulty information processor who uses judgmental heuristics that often lead to inefficient bargaining outcomes (cf. Neale & Bazerman, 1991; Thompson & Hastie, 1990). When the negotiator falls short, it is attributed to the fallibility of his or her information processing system. Affect, when it is examined, is viewed as a nuisance, obstacle, ploy, or byproduct of negotiation. Prescriptive analyses of negotiation behavior uniformly argue that negotiators should take the "high road" and focus on cognitive, decision-making principles as a way out of the information-processing quagmire. In contrast, we argue that the negotiator who behaves in a purely cognitive fashion will not be as effective in achieving his or her goals as the emotional negotiator. In this chapter, we challenge the view that emotion is a nuisance or hindrance in negotiation and argue that the effective negotiator is an emotional negotiator.
OB as the study of how people affect their organizations; understanding ourselves and others as the most important aspect of management, distinguishing leadership from management, ethical issues and challenges pervading every layer of the organization, examining power as a personal characteristic of people, the importance of relationships in organizations, decision making at the intrapersonal, interpersonal, group, and organizational levels, conflict as a natural part of organizational life, four major types of teams, attitude and behavior change, and major branches of justice theory, diversity, the place-time model of social interaction, and the personal side of organizational behavior. Three core themes: Immediacy, Self-knowledge and self-development, Actionable Theory.
A perfect marriage of theory and practice, Making the Team unites cutting-edge research on groups with practical management principles. The text is organized into 3 primary tasks for the leader/manager: 1) Accurately assessing and improving team performance; 2) Managing the internal dynamics of teams (diversity, conflict, and creativity); and 3) Optimally leveraging the team within the larger organization.
OB as the study of how people affect their organizations; understanding ourselves and others as the most important aspect of management, distinguishing leadership from management, ethical issues and challenges pervading every layer of the organization, examining power as a personal characteristic of people, the importance of relationships in organizations, decision making at the intrapersonal, interpersonal, group, and organizational levels, conflict as a natural part of organizational life, four major types of teams, attitude and behavior change, and major branches of justice theory, diversity, the place-time model of social interaction, and the personal side of organizational behavior. Three core themes: Immediacy, Self-knowledge and self-development, Actionable Theory.
The chapters of this book were presented at a conference held at the Kellogg School of Management in June 2005.
A perfect marriage of theory and practice, Making the Team unites cutting-edge research on groups with practical management principles. The text is organized into 3 primary tasks for the leader/manager: 1) Accurately assessing and improving team performance; 2) Managing the internal dynamics of teams (diversity, conflict, and creativity); and 3) Optimally leveraging the team within the larger organization.
This text provides an integrated, big-picture view of what to do and what to avoid at the bargaining table, based on the latest research findings. Combining a strong applied flavor with straightforward and lively writing, it presents a unified, and comprehensive overview of the insights, strategies, and practices inherent in successful negotiations, and addresses the most common myths and pitfalls that plague negotiators. It weaves together a wide range of disciplines in its study of negotiation, including economics, psychology, sociology, and organizational behavior.
Making the Team unites cutting-edge research on groups with practical management principles. Making the Team organizes the art and science of teamwork in 3 primary tasks for the leader/manager: (1) Accurately assessing and improving team performance: (2) Managing the internal dynamics of teams (diversity, conflict, creativity within the team): and (3) Optimally leveraging the team within the larger organization. Making the Team is a great core book for a course or a supplement book for the course. The instructor's manual contains exercises for challenging in-class exercises and experimental learning. Managers-in-training as well as the seasoned executive will find the clear, step-by-step approaches offered in this book useful, provocative, and refreshing. This book is a perfect marriage of theory and practice.
Written for those interested in the topic of "shared knowledge" in organizations, this edited volume brings together a variety of themes and perspectives that emerge when multidisciplinary scholars examine this important subject. The papers were presented at a conference designed to bring together behavioral scientists who were interested in the creation, conversation, distribution, and protection of knowledge in organizations. The editors bring together a distinguished group of social psychologists who have made important contributions to social cognition and group processes. They cast a wide net in terms of the topics covered and challenged the authors to think about how their research applies to the management or mismanagement of knowledge in organizations. The volume is divided into three sections: knowledge systems, emotional-motivational systems, and communication and behavioral systems. A final conclusion chapter discusses and integrates the various contributions.
This course focuses on individual behavior in organizational settings. Topics for analysis include social cognition, decision making, negotiation groups, social influence, norms, fairness and equity theory. Recent empirical research will be evaluated in each of these areas, and implications will be studied in terms of theoretical advancement, empirical study and practical applications.
Advanced Negoitations (MORS-426-1)
Advanced Negotiations (PhD Course)
This course counts toward the following majors: Human Resource Management, Management & Organizations.
This is a course about teams: How to lead a team, encourage creativity, ensure coordination, deal with difficult team members, improve teams' decision making and performance, get the most out of a team, and manage the boundaries between the team and other parts of the organization from which the team draws resources and authority. Students are assigned to a team at the beginning of the quarter. Teams analyze cases of outstanding and poor teamwork, then complete a group project and analyze their own teamwork and outcomes.
Prerequisite: MORS-430.
Negotiations (MORS-470-0)
This course counts toward the following majors: Entrepreneurship & Innovation, Management & Organizations.
This course is designed to improve students' skills in all phases of negotiation: understanding prescriptive and descriptive negotiation theory as it applies to dyadic and multiparty negotiations, to buyer-seller transactions and the resolution of disputes, to the development of negotiation strategy and to the management of integrative and distributive aspects of the negotiation process. The course is based on a series of simulated negotiations in a variety of contexts including one-on-one, multi-party, cross-cultural, third-party and team negotiations. There is an attendance policy.
Prerequisite: MORS-430.
Negotiation Strategies teaches the art and science of achieving objectives in interdependent relationships, both inside and outside the company. Students practice cross-cultural negotiation, dispute resolution, coalition formation and multiparty negotiations, extremely competitive negotiations, and negotiating via information technology.
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