Nemanja Antic

Below is a collection of summaries of some sets of lectures from the economic theory sequence at Princeton.

Faruk Gul's Lectures on Classic Decision Theory

Eric Maskin's Lectures on Repeated Games (handwritten, pdf v1.7)

• Part 1: Folk Theorems with Overtaking and Dicounting (~1.8mb)
• Part 2: Renegotiation Proofness and Imperfect Monitoring (~1.7mb)
• Part 3: Reputation, Evolution and Private Monitoring (~2.0mb)

Stephen Morris' Lectures on Robust Mechanism Design

Wolfgang Pesendorfer's Lectures on Modern Decision Theory

Yuliy Sannikov's Lectures on Continuous-time Principal-Agent Models

The following notes summarize specific papers which I presented in courses on political economy and microeconomic theory. While these are mostly synopses, some include detailed proofs, comments on typos and expositional simplifications.

Madarász and Prat (2010) - Screening with an Approximate Type Space

Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) - A Theory of Political Transitions

Abreu and Gul (2000) - Bargaining and Reputation

Piketty (1995) - Social Mobility and Redistributive Politics

Fudenberg and Levine (1992) - Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed