MARKETING
Hartmarx Research Professor of Marketing
New Product Development
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Advertising Age: Package-Goods Brands Lose Loyalists in Recession - 6/22/2009
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In non-vertically integrated channels manufacturers rely on incentives to influence the prices offered by channel partners such as wholesalers and retailers. One of the most common channel incentives is a trade promotion. Packaged goods manufacturers spend in excess of $75 billion annually on trade promotions with the goal of offering temporary discounts to end-consumers (Cannondale 2001). A common metric used by practitioners and academics to evaluate trade promotion effectiveness is pass-through. Although the effectiveness of trade promotions has been debated for decades, empirical research on the topic is scarce. Extant research has relied on data from one or two supermarket chains in a single market and managerial surveys. For this study we assemble a unique dataset containing information on prices, quantities, and promotions throughout the entire channel in a category. The data enable us to extend the empirical literature on pass-through in two important ways. First, we investigate how it varies across more than 1000 retailers in over 30 states. Second, we study pass-through at multiple levels of the distribution channel, allowing us to assess how channel intermediaries -- such as wholesalers and brokers -- influence pass-through. We find that the median pass-through elasticities are 0.75, 0.58, and 0.39, for the wholesaler, retailer, and total channel respectively. Thus, a 10% reduction in manufacturer price results in a 3.9% reduction in consumer price. At each of the levels in the channel large variances in the estimates of pass-through elasticities are observed. We therefore argue that average pass-through elasticities are only of limited tactical value to manufacturers. For example, the pass-through for a specific chain in California may be 0.98 while it is equal to 0.42 for the same chain in Nevada. The average of these values holds little meaning for a firm trying to evaluate and improve trade-promotion effectiveness. We investigate the sources of pass-through variation using various measures of cost and competition.
Extant promotion models predict that a leading brand should either offer infrequent, deep discounts or frequent, shallow discounts. However, in some markets, the leading brand offers the deepest and most frequent discounts. In this paper, we develop a dynamic model of two competing firms that can explain why leading brands may use this pricing strategy. Our model considers a duopoly in which each firm differs in their ability to convert consumers who are initially indifferent into repeat, loyal buyers. We show that it is optimal for a leading firm who attracts more repeat, loyal buyers to sustain its market position via deep, frequent discounts. The unique aspect of our paper is that we analyze how firms’ relative ability to attract repeat, loyal consumers affects their pricing strategies. Our analysis highlights three additional results. First, there is an inverted-U relationship between a weak firm’s ability to attract repeat, loyal consumers and strong firm profits. Second, the relative ability of firms to attract repeat buyers affects whether serial and contemporaneous price correlations are positive or negative. Third, a comparison of myopic and dynamic pricing strategies shows that myopia only benefits both firms when each attracts a sufficient number of repeat buyers.
There is now an extensive theoretical literature investigating optimal inventory policies for retailers. Yet several recent reviewers have recognized that these models are rarely applied in practice. One explanation for the paucity of practical applications is the difficulty of measuring how stockouts affect both current and future demand. In this paper we report the findings of a large-scale field test that measures the immediate cost of a stockout and the impact on future demand. The findings confirm that the impact of stockouts extends well beyond the current order. Firms cannot hope to implement optimal inventory policies without measuring these long-run effects. The study also investigates the effectiveness of different responses that firms can offer in order to mitigate these costs. There is considerable variation in the effectiveness of these responses. Offering discounts to encourage customers to backorder rather than cancel their orders is widely used in practice but were the least profitable of the responses that we evaluated.
Behavioral decision researchers have documented number of anomalies that seem to run counter to established theories of consumer behavior from microeconomics that are often at the core of analytical models in marketing. A natural question therefore is how equilibrium behavior and strategies would change if models were to incorporate these anomalies in a consistent way. In this paper we identify several important and generalizable anomalies that modelers may want to incorporate in their models. We briefly discuss each phenomenon, identify a key unresolved issue and outline a research agenda to be pursued.
In this note, we prove that the equilibrium proposed by Padilla [1, Theorem 1] is not an equilibrium for c < c*. We then characterize a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) for all values of c and show that findings on the sustainability of tacit collusion [1, Theorem 3] are unchanged for this MPE. We further show that neither the equilibrium proposed by Padilla nor our MPE is an equilibrium if consumers are forward looking.
In this article, the authors use an economic model to show that it may be optimal to lower the retail price during a coupon event when marginal consumers have moderate hassle costs of coupon redemption. Results from the model offer predictions on the relationships among coupon redemptions, shelf price, and coupon face value. The authors test these predictions on a large data set of hundreds of coupon events across six packaged goods categories. The data show that when a small coupon face value is offered, the shelf price is likely to be reduced. They also find that coupon efficiency increases when there is a lower retail price. The results are of interest to managers planning a promotion calendar and deciding whether to coordinate price promotions with coupon events, and they contribute to economic theory. When a firm moves from uniform pricing (e.g., no coupons) to second-degree price discrimination (e.g., coupons), all consumers may face a lower price. This finding has public policy implications because second-degree price discrimination may increase the welfare of every consumer.
We use the results of three large-scale field experiments to investigate how the depth of a current price promotion affects future purchasing of first-time and established customers. While most previous studies have focused on packaged goods sold in grocery stores, we consider durable goods sold through a direct mail catalog. The findings reveal different effects for first-time and established customers. Deeper price discounts in the current period increased future purchases by first-time customers (a positive long-run effect) but reduced future purchases by established customers (a negative long-run effect). We investigate alternative explanations for these findings including purchase acceleration, selection, customer learning and increased deal sensitivity.
In this paper, we use an economic model to show that it may be optimal to lower the retail price during a coupon event when consumers have moderate hassle costs of coupon redemption. Results from the model offer predictions on the relationships between coupon redemptions, the shelf price and the coupon face value. We test these predictions on a large dataset of hundreds of coupon events across six packaged goods categories. The data show that when a small coupon face value is offered the shelf price is likely to be reduced. We also find that coupon efficiency increases when there is a lower retail price and higher coupon face value. These empirical results are consistent with model predictions. Our results are of interest to managers who are planning the promotion calendar and deciding whether to coordinate price promotions with coupon events. Our results contribute to economic theory as we show that when a firm moves from uniform pricing (e.g., no coupons) to second-degree price discrimination (e.g., coupons) it is possible for all consumers to face a lower price. This finding has public policy implications as it shows that 2nd degree price discrimination may increase the welfare of every consumer.
Although the use of $9 price endings is widespread amongst U.S. retailers there is little evidence of their effectiveness. In this paper, we present a series of three field-studies in which price endings were experimentally manipulated. The data yield two conclusions. First, use of a $9 price ending increased demand in all three experiments. Second, the increase in demand was stronger for new items than for items that the retailer had sold in previous years. These results suggest that $9-endings maybe more effective when customers have limited information, which may in turn help to explain why retailers do not use $9-ending prices on every item.
For most items that they buy, consumers don't have an accurate sense of what the price should be. This article reviews several common pricing cues that retailers use - "sale" signs, prices that end in 9, signpost items, and price matching guarantees. The authors also offers some findings about how - and how well - these cues work.
Despite many advances in marketing models, the Guadagni-Little (1983) model is still in widespread use by both practitioners and academics. For many new marketing models, the Guadagni-Little model serves as a benchmark. The key variable that allows the Guadagni-Little model to accurately fit data is the loyalty variable, which is an exponential smoothing of past purchases. In this paper, I show that inclusion of this variable in the logit model may result in a likelihood function that can have multiple maxima. I am able to demonstrate this using simulated data and actual household scanner panel data. In addition, I document a systematic relationship between the loyalty coefficient and the loyalty smoothing parameter. Insight for this systematic relationship and the multiple maxima is obtained by recognizing a trade-off between capturing household heterogeneity and state dependence. Finally, in the Guadagni-Little model extreme parameter values capture two different idealized forms of consumer behavior. However, reported studies rarely find these extreme parameter values. I show that procedures commonly used to initialize loyalty biases against these extreme parameter values. This bias offers some explanation for the observed empirical regularity in Guadagni-Little parameter estimates and suggests that researchers should be cautious concluding these parameters capture regularity in consumer behavior.
Marketers often stress the importance of treating customers as partners. A fundamental premise of this perspective is that all parties can be weakly better off if they work together to increase joint surplus and reach pareto efficient agreements. For marketing managers, this implies organizing marketing activities in a manner that maximizes total surplus. This logic is theoretically sound when agreements between partners are limitless and costless. In most consumer marketing contexts (business-to-consumer), this is typically not true. The question I ask is should one still expect firms to partner with consumers and reach pareto efficient agreements? In this paper, I use the example of a firm’s choice of product configuration to demonstrate two effects. First, I show that a firm may configure a product in a manner that reduces total surplus but increases firm profits. Second, one might conjecture that increased competition would eliminate this effect, but I show in a duopoly that firm profits may be increasing in the cost of product completion. This second result suggests that firms may prefer to remain inefficient and/or stifle innovations. Both results violate a fundamental premise of partnering - that firms and consumers should work together to increase total surplus and reach pareto efficient agreements. The model illustrates that pareto efficient agreements are less likely to occur if negotiation with individual partners is infeasible or costly, such as in business to consumer contexts. Consumer marketers in one-to-many marketing environments should be wary of treating customers as partners because pareto efficient agreements may not be optimal for their firm.
Anderson and Simester (1998) recently presented an equilibrium model predicting that customers who lack knowledge of market prices rely upon point of purchase sale signs to help evaluate posted prices. Their model predicts that sale signs increase demand but that the increase is smaller when more products have them. This moderating effect is critical to their argument. It regulates how many sale signs stores use and makes customer reliance on these cues an equilibrium strategy. We analyze data from a variety of sources, including historical data from a women’s clothing catalog, a field study in that catalog, survey responses to catalog stimuli, and grocery store data for frozen juice, toothpaste and tuna. The analysis yields three conclusions. First, sale signs are less effective at increasing demand when more items have them. Second, total category sales are maximized when some but not all products have sale signs. Third, placing a sale sign on a product reduces the perceived likelihood that the product will be available at a lower price in the future, but the effect is smaller when more products have sale signs. By ruling out alternative hypotheses, the second and third conclusions suggest that moderation of the sale sign effect is in part due to Anderson and Simester’s (1998) prediction that sale signs lose credibility when used on more products. The consistency of these findings is particularly reassuring given that limitations in the data do not extend across all of the data sources. Together the findings offer evidence supporting Anderson and Simester’s equilibrium justification for customer reliance upon sale signs. The results are also of considerable practical importance to retailers. The demand effects that we observe are large, in some cases exceeding 50%.
We offer an explanation for why firms may forgo an opportunity to price discriminate. By revealing that a product is being sold to a broad range of segments the retailer implicitly claims that the product is suitable for each segment. However, this may yield an adverse quality signal. The prediction is illustrated in the paper using a formal model and tested empirically by investigating how the introduction of installment billing affects demand in a mail-order catalog that targets customers who purchase premium quality products. Installment billing plans offer retailers the opportunity to discriminate between customers who face a high cost of capital and other customers who are less credit constrained and less price sensitive. We predict that the introduction of installment billing may prompt an unfavorable quality inference and reduce demand amongst the catalog’s quality sensitive customers. The results from a large-scale field test are both consistent with this prediction and managerially important. Significantly fewer customers order when the option of installment billing is introduced, even though customers are at least weakly better off when given this option. Offering installment billing in the field test resulted in approximately $15,000 in lost revenue. The only plausible explanation for this counter-intuitive finding appears to be the signaling theory. Further support is provided by survey data and a second test in a catalog that targets more price sensitive customers.
The author shows how firms' pricing and communications strategies may be affected by the size of the Internet: Firms have incentives to facilitate consumer search on the Internet, but only as long as the Internet's reach is limited. As the Internet is used by more consumers, firms' pricing and communications strategies on the Internet will mirror the strategies they pursue in a conventional channel. Firms can increase their market power by strategically using information on multiple channels to achieve finer consumer segmentation. The author suggests directions the Internet might take and derives managerial implications. The findings generalize to other channels that enable firms to segment consumers and inform them at low cost.
Sale signs increase demand. The apparent effectiveness of this simple strategy is surprising; sale signs are inexpensive to produce and stores generally make no commitment when using them. As a result, they can be placed on any products, and as many products, as stores prefer. If stores can place sale signs on any or all of their products, why are they effective? We offer an explanation for the effectiveness of sale signs by arguing that they inform customers about which products have relatively low prices, thus helping customers decide whether to purchase now, visit another store, or perhaps return to the same store in the future. This explanation raises two additional issues. First, why do stores prefer to place sale signs on products that are truly low priced - stores could use sale signs to increase demand for any of their products? Second, how many sale signs should a store use - should they limit sale signs to just their relatively low priced products or should they also place them on some of their higher priced products? The paper addresses each of these questions and in doing so investigates how much information sale signs reveal.
We analyze a large-scale field test conducted with a mail-order catalog firm to investigate how customers react to premium prices for larger sizes of women’s apparel. In the field test we randomly assigned customers to four experimental conditions and then mailed different versions of a catalog to customers in each condition. We exogenously varied the prices of small and large sizes of a sample of items across the four versions of the catalog. The design made it possible to disentangle the effects of introducing a price difference across sizes from the own-price elasticity. The findings reveal that customers who demand large sizes react unfavorably to paying higher prices than customers for small sizes. This adverse reaction is strongest amongst customers purchasing the smallest of the large sizes. We interpret the findings as evidence that consumers perceive the price premium for large sizes as unfair. Overall, the price contrast effect was approximately twice as large as the own price-elasticity effect, and led to a 6% to 8% decrease in gross profits.
When a firm allows the return of previously purchased merchandise, it provides customers with an option that has measurable value. While the option to return merchandise leads to an increase in gross revenue it also creates additional costs. Selecting an optimal returns policy requires balancing both demand and cost implications. In this paper, we develop a structural model that incorporates a consumer’s decision to purchase and return an item. The model enables a firm both to measure the value to consumers of the return option, and to balance the costs and benefits of different return policies. We apply the model to a sample of data provided by a mail order catalog company. We find considerable variation in the value of returns across customers and categories. When the option value is large there are large increases in demand. For example, the option to return women’s footwear is worth an average of more than $15 per purchase to customers and increases average purchase rates by more than 50%. We illustrate how the model can be used by a retailer to optimize its return policies across categories and customers.
Asking managers about prices reveals that they are often reluctant to vary prices for fear of antagonizing customers. We use two randomized field experiments to investigate whether customer antagonism could lead to price stickiness. The experiments reveal how customers react if they buy a product and later observe the same retailer selling it for less. We find that lowering prices diminishes demand from customers who previously purchased the discounted items. The loss of demand persists for up to two years and extends beyond the category in which the discounts occurred. This outcome is aggravated if the customer’s previous purchase was more recent, or the customer paid a higher price for that earlier purchase. The key findings replicate in two different product categories and cannot be attributed to mere changes in customers’ price expectations or temporal demand substitution (forward-buying). The effects are large enough to suppress price variation.
"Many firms employ an array of price cues, such as sale signs, to convince customers that their prices are low. While there is an extensive literature studying how to set prices, use of price cues has received relatively little attention. In this paper, we study how firms should use price discounts and price cues. We develop theoretical predictions regarding both demand and profits, and then test these predictions in a large-scale empirical study that combines survey metrics and a field experiment. We show that customer price knowledge moderates the impact of both price discounts and price cues. However, the profitability of price discounts and price cues are both determined by a different force. This common force makes it profitable to use price discounts and price cues on the same products, which in turn explains why consumers can rely on price cues as a credible source of price information."
The marketing, economics, and operations management literatures have recognized many ways in which a firm can price discriminate. The question of how to price discriminate (e.g. how to price a product line)has received considerable attention but most of this work has assumed that price discrimination is optimal. However, the question of whether to price discriminate is also important as firms often forgo this option. For example, a firm may offer only a single product or version, not engage in intertemporal pricing, offer a single customer service queue, not offer advance purchase discounts, or not offer coupons. In this paper, we develop a very general model of monopoly price discrimination that yields two important contributions. First, we derive a single intuitive condition that determines whether price discrimination is profitable. The condition relates to changes in the social surplus, which is the difference between consumer benefits and firm costs, when a consumer upgrades from a low quality product to a high quality product. We show that price discrimination is profitable if and only if the percentage change in social surplus from product upgrades is increasing in consumers’ willingness to pay. We refer to this as an increasing percentage differences condition. Second, while applications of second-degree price discrimination have much in common, few papers attempt to unify them in a single model. Using our framework, we both recover and generalize many results from applications of price discrimination in the marketing, economics, and operations management literatures. Our paper unifies these seemingly disparate applications of price discrimination by explicitly recognizing their common elements.
In February 2003, President and CEO Nick Lazaris faces critical decisions on Keurig’s launch of a new consumer coffee brewing system. Keurig has successfully sold single cup brewing systems through commercial distribution channels and is now expanding to the lucrative consumer segment. However, a meeting with key strategic partners six months prior to launch raised questions about the product design. This prompted the Keurig management team to revisit their decisions on product design, pricing, and the marketing plan. With six months to launch, what should they do?
This course counts toward the following majors: Marketing, Marketing Management
Marketing channels are analyzed as systems of interrelated and interdependent organizations engaged in making goods and services available for consumption by industrial, institutional and household consumers. This course emphasizes the means by which effective and efficient distribution networks (comprising manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, transportation firms and other actors in the distribution process) can be constructed. Particular attention is given to examining the behavioral dimensions of channel relations, the roles of channel members, their use of power, the conflicts that arise among them and their communication procedures. Government and other constraints on channel activities are also examined. Cases are used for illustrative and analytical purposes.
Prerequisite: MKTG-430.
Sales Promotion and Retailer Behavior (MKTG-462-0)
This course counts toward the following majors: Marketing, Marketing Management
Why is a dress priced at $39 rather than $40? How does a "Sale" sign change customer behavior? Does it matter what other customers pay for an item? Can price changes antagonize customers and reduce demand? How has the Internet changed customer price sensitivity? Are retail loyalty programs effective? How has expansion of retail stores, factory stores and the Internet changed customer behavior? This course seeks to answer these types of questions. Approximately two-thirds of the course covers topics in sales promotion and pricing; the remainder focuses on emerging issues in retailing, such as retail loyalty programs, category management and multi-channel consumer behavior. This empirical, data-driven course provides an integrated framework for studying consumer behavior, which we then take to data. Most of the data is from real-world managerial problems, and students will often study data from field experiments to gain a deeper understanding of consumer and firm behavior. Students will learn how to make informed pricing and retailing decisions using data. Prerequisite: MKTG-430.
This seminar confronts students with significant problems, issues and theories at the leading edge of the marketing field. Presentations and discussions are designed to stimulate thinking on important areas of research and the development of new theoretical viewpoints.
Why is a dress priced at $39 rather than $40? How does a “Sale” sign change customer behavior? Does it matter what other customers pay for an item? Does price fairness really matter? In this course, we seek to answer these types of questions. We begin the course by developing a theoretical, normative framework of customer value. We then illustrate how to apply this framework to both business and consumer markets.
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