Electoral Systems, Taxation and Immigration Policies

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Abstract

When exposed to similar migration flows, countries with different institutional systems may respond with different levels of openness. We study in particular the different responses determined by different electoral systems. We find that Winner Take All countries would tend to be more open than countries with PR when all other policies are kept constant, but, crucially, if we consider the endogenous differences in redistribution levels across systems, then the openness ranking may switch.

Keywords: Proportional representation, Median voter, Taxation, Occupational Choice, Migration, Walls.

JEL Classification codes: D72, F22.

1 Introduction

Migration has of course always been an important phenomenon, with causes and consequences related to sociology, demography, relative economic opportunities, conflicts and cultural clashes. However, either due to a real increase of migration pressures or because of misperceptions, the topic of immigration policy has risen to the top in most countries’ issue rankings in terms of the political campaigns, rhetoric, debates and actions.1

The political response to the increase (real or perceived) threat of immigration has varied over time and across countries, with some going towards a close border policy faster than others, and

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1 To see evidence of the global increase of migration pressures see e.g. the UN international migration report of 2017. As an example, In the US the percentage of foreign born went from 4.7 percent in 1970 to 13 percent in 2015.

2 See e.g. Alesina, Miano and Stantcheva (2018).

3 In the 2015 edition of the Pew Research Center’s annual policy priorities survey, 52 percent of Americans rated immigration a “top priority for the president and Congress.” (Pew Research Center, 2015).
with also large variation in terms of willingness to host refugees. The explanations for why countries like the US and Germany are showing different political reactions to immigration flows could of course be many, ranging from economic, geographic, cultural, and reasons of political opportunism, or different institutions. This paper focuses on the role that different institutions could play in the determination of political decisions on immigration policies in destination countries.

What role do institutions play for the interpretation of the different responses that different countries have to the threat of increasing migration flows? When there is a perception that migrants could be a threat for employment or income levels, politicians’ electoral incentives may push them to display increasing hostility to open borders, but such electoral concerns could have different intensities and/or implications depending on the electoral system. We analyze this question using a political economy model previously used to study the implications of electoral systems for the level of redistribution, with the additional goal of studying the interplay between immigration and redistribution policies.

We use a model of policy making with endogenous occupational choice, an extension of Austen-Smith (2000). In that paper the population size is fixed, while in this paper we assume that entry of immigrants is a constant flow as long as the institutional system is such that leaving the doors open is preferred to building a wall by the majority of members of parliament. The main insight of the paper is that the predictions about immigration policies chosen in countries with different electoral systems may be completely reversed when redistribution levels are endogenous as well. We show that openness would be more likely in winner take all systems than in PR systems for any given same level of redistribution of income, but, once one takes into account the endogenous redistribution levels, the relative openness result switches.

As an intuition, in the absence of endogenous taxation differences, PR is weakly more closed because the average worker’s preferences are the ones that matter (especially in a capital intensive and productive country), while in a WTA system the decisive agent is the median voter in the distribution of preferences over immigration policies, which happens to be an agent with lower talent, deriving relative greater utility from the increased aggregate income from migration. Endogenous taxation is crucial, and can reverse the prediction: PR induces higher taxes, and this can induce the set of native agents who self-select into an employee occupation to be less than 1/2 of the total native population, which implies that the decisive agent is no longer the average worker, but rather an unemployed or pensioner, whose primary concern are the redistributive benefits. Given that total benefits increase in aggregate income under reasonable conditions, especially at the beginning of the migration flow, PR countries can be more open than WTA countries.

On the wide variation of policies even in terms of asylum see Dustmann et al (2017). While Alesina et al (2018) displays survey results suggesting that greater fear of immigrants determines lower preferences for redistribution, the political economy model we introduce in this paper shows that the greater is redistribution the more likely it is that a country will display open borders majority preferences, especially when the country has an electoral system with proportional representation and the class of employees does not constitute an absolute majority in the population.
Let us briefly discuss the relationship of this paper to the empirical literature. In our model, immigration affects the native population both through wages and through welfare transfers. The report produced by the National Academy of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2017) contains an extensive review of theoretical and empirical results of the effect of immigration on employment and wages as well as on its fiscal impact. The empirical evidence about the impact of immigration on natives’s wages is mixed. Some papers found that immigration decreases wages in the receiving country (among others, Altonji and Card (1991), Monras (2015), Borjas (2003, 2016)), others that the effect is negligible (among others Card (2001, 2009)) and some others that the effect is positive (Ottaviano and Peri (2012)). Dustman, Frattini, and Preston (2013) estimate the effect of immigration along the distribution of wages and show that the effect is negative for lower parts of the distribution and positive at the top. Important factors affecting the outcome of the analysis are the degree of substitutability between natives and immigrants, the degree of substitutability among different groups of workers and whether the analysis takes a short-run or long run perspective (i.e. whether capital is allowed to adjust to the inflow of migrants or not).\(^6\) Our model assumes perfect substitutability between natives and immigrants, it considers only one labour market and disregards the adjustment of capital. Given these assumptions, the negative effect of immigration on equilibrium wage that our model displays seems in line with empirical findings.

Immigration impacts welfare transfers to natives in two ways. On the one hand, when working, immigrants increase tax revenues and therefore transfers. On the other hand, they increase the number of people among which tax revenues must be redistributed. Whether immigrants are net contributors or receivers depends on the share of resources they are entitled to receive. This is a key parameter in our analysis (the parameter \(\alpha\)) and is a key determinant of natives’ attitudes towards immigrants (see e.g. Facchini and Mayda, 2009, and Preston, 2014).

Given that in our model migration is described as a flow that keeps modifying endogenous variables as it continues, the paper offers a stylized dynamics also of natives’ preferences. The economic consequences of immigration can indeed affect the natives’ preference over immigration (see e.g. Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). Barone et al (2016) show that these effects can also affect voting decisions by the native population: immigration leads natives to vote more for center-right parties. Halla et al (2017) show that an increase in the number of immigrants increases nationalist responses in Austria, and Dehdari (2018) finds the same result for Sweden.\(^7\)

As far as the political economy literature is concerned, to our knowledge we are the first to compare winner take all and proportional representation electoral systems in terms of endogenous

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\(^6\) The different results are also due to different estimation techniques and possible misallocation of migrants in the relevant experience and skills groups (downgrading). See Dustmann et al (2016).

\(^7\) In terms of the model presented in this paper this would simply correspond to a negative change in perceived benefits by natives when more migrants arrive, which is explainable in the model with either a distribution of immigrants’ skills skewed towards low skills or by an \(\alpha\) parameter too generous, or by things outside the model like compositional amenities or misperceptions.
immigration policies. We have chosen to use mainly the modeling insights of Austen-Smith (2000) because endogenous occupational choice seems to be an important part of the dynamic phenomenon we wanted to describe. Morelli (2004) displays other important contrasts between winner take all and proportional systems, in terms of party formation and policy outcomes, and hence some future results could be obtained also from that framework.

The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model of political and economic choices, namely occupational choice by citizens and the consequent class and party formation that determines, through the political institutions, the taxation and immigration policies. Section 3 describes the equilibrium results when the tax rate is kept equal across countries with different electoral systems. Section 4 displays the results when redistribution levels differ endogenously across systems. Section 5 concludes.

2 Model

We consider two countries that are identical in every aspect, except for the electoral system they use (see description below). Both countries have a mass one of native individuals. Moreover, there is a mass one of potential entrants in each country. At the beginning of the game all potential migrants are out, and, if a country leaves the borders open, they enter at a constant rate. Formally, let $Q_t \in [0, 1)$ be the share of immigrants that have already entered in a country at time $t$, with $Q_0 = 0$. The assumption of constant flow if borders are kept open implies that $Q_{t+1} = Q_t + \delta$, $\delta > 0$, until either $Q_t = 1$ is reached at some $t$ or until the country’s government decides to build a wall to stop the flow, whichever comes first.

Each individual (native or immigrant) is characterised by a type $\theta \in (0, \bar{\theta})$. The distribution of types in the population of natives is assumed to be uniform on the support. The set of immigrants entering each of the two countries in each period is sampled from a distribution $h(\theta)$. For the moment, we only impose that $\theta h(\theta)$ is non-decreasing in $\theta$. We will be more precise about its characteristics later in the paper.

Individuals can select one of three possible occupations: becoming an employer ($e$), becoming an employee ($l$) or being unemployed ($d$). An employer of type $\theta$ can employ $L$ units of labor to produce an amount $F(L, \theta)$ of consumption good, which is assumed to be the only good consumed in the economy and whose price is normalized to one. The function $F(\cdot, \cdot)$ is at least twice differentiable, strictly increasing in both arguments, strictly concave in $L$ and strictly convex in $\theta$. Furthermore, we also assume that $\partial^2 F / \partial \theta \partial L > 0$ for all $\theta > 0$.

Letting $w$ be the wage paid for each unit of labor, an employer’s gross income is

$$y_e(L, w, \theta) = F(L, \theta) - wL.$$  

If an individual chooses to become an employee, she inelastically provides $\theta$ units of labor and
receives a gross income

\[ y_t(w, \theta) = \theta w. \]

Both employers and employees pay a cost of working \( c > 0 \) and their income is taxed at a rate \( \tau \in [0, 1] \). Taxes are redistributed to the whole population in the form of lump-sum transfers. For any stock \( Q_t \) of immigrants having entered a country at a given date \( t \), and for any tax level \( \tau \) and wage \( w \), let \( \lambda_j(\tau, w, Q_t) \) be the set of types choosing occupation \( j \in \{e, l, d\} \). The total aggregate income in the country is

\[
Y(\tau, w, Q_t) = \int_{\lambda_e(\tau, w, Q_t)} y_e(L, w, \theta) \left[ \frac{1}{\theta} + Q_t h(\theta) \right] d\theta + \int_{\lambda_l(\tau, w, Q_t)} y_l(L, w, \theta) \left[ \frac{1}{\theta} + Q_t h(\theta) \right] d\theta \tag{1}
\]

so that tax revenues are \( \tau Y(\tau, w, Q_t) \). We assume that no debt can be accumulated and that each immigrant obtains a fraction \( \alpha \in (0, 1) \) of the tax revenues. The remaining amount is redistributed equally among natives. Let \( b_t(\tau, w, Q_t, \alpha) = \alpha \tau Y(\tau, w, Q_t) \) be the benefits received by each immigrant and \( b(\tau, w, Q_t, \alpha) = (1 - \alpha Q_t) \tau Y(\tau, w, Q_t) \) be those received by each native. The net income \( x_j(\cdot, \theta) \) of a native individual of type \( \theta \) in occupation \( j \in \{e, l, d\} \) is

\[
x_e(L, \tau, w, Q_t, \alpha, \theta) = (1 - \tau) y_e(L, w, \theta) + b(\tau, w, Q_t, \alpha) - c
\]

\[
x_l(\tau, w, Q_t, \alpha, \theta) = (1 - \tau) y_l(L, w, \theta) + b(\tau, w, Q_t, \alpha) - c
\]

\[
x_d(\tau, w, Q_t, \alpha, \theta) = b(\tau, w, Q_t, \alpha)
\]

The corresponding net incomes for immigrants are obtained by replacing \( b(\tau, w, Q_t, \alpha) \) with \( b_t(\tau, w, Q_t, \alpha) \) in the expressions above.

For any wage level \( w \) and any type \( \theta \), let \( L(w, \theta) \) denote the amount of labour that maximizes an employer’s net income. Given the assumptions on the production function, \( L(w, \theta) \) is strictly decreasing in \( w \) and strictly increasing in \( \theta \). Since from now on we will only consider the optimal amount of labour demanded by employers, we will sometimes simplify notation by using \( L \) instead of \( L(w, \theta) \). Definition 1 extends the concept of sorting equilibrium contained in Austen-Smith (2000) (AS henceforth) to our framework.

**Definition 1.** At any fixed tax rate \( \tau \in [0, 1] \) and immigration level \( Q_t \in [0, 1] \), a sorting equilibrium is a wage rate \( w_t = w(\tau, Q_t) \) such that

\[
\int_{\lambda_e(\tau, w_t, Q_t)} L(w_t, \theta) \left[ \frac{1}{\theta} + Q_t h(\theta) \right] d\theta = \int_{\lambda_l(\tau, w_t, Q_t)} \theta \left[ \frac{1}{\theta} + Q_t h(\theta) \right] d\theta
\]

and for all \( \theta \in (0, \bar{\theta}) \), for all \( j, j' \in \{e, l, d\} \), \( \theta \in \lambda_j(\tau, w_t, Q_t) \) implies \( x_j(\cdot, \theta) \geq x_{j'}(\cdot, \theta) \).

By Proposition 1 in AS, a sorting equilibrium always exists and is characterised by pairs of
types $\theta_1^t = \theta^1(\tau, w_t, Q_t)$ and $\theta_2^t = \theta^2(\tau, w_t, Q_t)$, with $\theta_1^t < \theta_2^t$, such that

$$
\lambda_d(\tau, w_t, Q_t) = (0, \theta_1^t) \quad \lambda_l(\tau, w_t, Q_t) = [\theta_1^t, \theta_2^t] \quad \lambda_e(\tau, w_t, Q_t) = (\theta_2^t, \bar{\theta})
$$

Type $\theta_1^t$ is the type who is indifferent between becoming unemployed and working as an employee. Given the definition of net income for the two types,

$$
\theta_1^t = \frac{c}{(1 - \tau)w_t} \quad (2)
$$

Type $\theta_2^t$ is the type who is indifferent between becoming an employee or an employer and is implicitly defined by

$$
F(L(w_t, \theta_2^t), \theta_2^t) - w_t L(w_t, \theta_2^t) = w_t \theta_2^t \quad (3)
$$

In order to avoid trivial cases, in what follows we will make the following assumption:

**Assumption 1.** Let $\bar{w} \equiv w(\tau, 1)$. We assume that $\theta_2^t(\tau, \bar{w}, 1) < 1/2$.

In words, we simply assume that even in the extreme situation of full openness, where all potential migrants enter, the set of endogenous employers can never be an absolute majority of the population.

From Definition 1, then, the wage rate $w_t$ satisfies

$$
\int_{\theta_2^t}^{\theta_1^t} L(w_t, \theta) \left[ \frac{1}{\theta} + Q_t h(\theta) \right] d\theta = \int_{\theta_1^t}^{\theta_2^t} \theta \left[ \frac{1}{\theta} + Q_t h(\theta) \right] d\theta \quad (4)
$$

We can now specify the main characteristic of $h(\theta)$.

**Assumption 2.** The distribution of immigrant types $h(\theta)$ is such that

$$
\int_{\theta_1^t(\tau, \bar{w}, 1)}^{\theta_2^t(\tau, \bar{w}, 1)} \theta h(\theta) d\theta - \int_{\theta_1^t}^{\theta_2^t} L(\bar{w}, \theta) h(\theta) d\theta \geq 0
$$

In words, Assumption 2 states that if all the immigrants were to enter the country, they would contribute relatively more to the supply side of the labour market.

In each period, each country can decide to stop the inflow of migrants. We will sometimes refer to this decision as building a wall against immigration. We assume that if in period $t$ the option of building the wall can win the majority in parliament, a party that supports it will propose a wall bill. With this assumption the analysis simply needs to focus on the time when the possibility of building a wall becomes a winning option.

In one of the two countries, the composition of parliament is determined by a winner take all system. In this country, the wall will be built at time $t$ if and only if a majority of individuals in the country is in favour of it at that time.
The other country uses a proportional representation system. We assume that there exist three parties, each representing a different occupation. We denote by $E$ the party of employers, by $L$ the party of employees and by $D$ the one of unemployed individuals. Each party wants to maximise the average utility of the native individuals in the occupation it represents. That is,

$$u_E(\tau, Q_t) = b(\tau, w_t, Q_t, \alpha) + (1 - \tau)\hat{y}_e(L, w_t, Q_t) - c$$

$$u_L(\tau, Q_t) = b(\tau, w_t, Q_t, \alpha) + (1 - \tau)\hat{\theta}_l(\tau, Q_t)w_t - c$$

$$u_D(\tau, Q_t) = b(\tau, w_t, Q_t, \alpha)$$

where

$$\hat{y}_e(L, w_t, Q_t) = \frac{\int_{\theta_1^2}^{\theta_2} y_e(\theta) d\theta}{\theta - \theta_2^2}$$

and

$$\hat{\theta}_l(\tau, Q_t) = \frac{\theta_1^2 + \theta_2^2}{2}$$

Each party’s share of parliament seats corresponds to the share of native individuals in the occupation it represents. When a party has the majority of parliament seats, it unilaterally decides about the construction of the wall. If no party has the majority in parliament, coalition governments will be formed and the wall will be built when at least two parties agree about it.

In what follows, we will refer to the country using the winner take all system as country $W$ and to the one using PR as country $P$.

3 Results for a fixed tax rate

We begin by assuming that the tax rate $\tau$ does not differ across the two countries. Our first goal is to establish the effect of immigration on wages and occupational choices for a fixed tax rate. Under Assumption 2, immigrants contribute more to the supply side of the labour market. Then,

Lemma 1. The equilibrium wage rate $w_t$ is differentiable, strictly decreasing and nonlinear in $Q$.

For any level of immigration $Q_t$, then, $w_t > w_{t+1}$. When wages decrease, being an employee becomes less attractive. Employees’ gross income is strictly increasing in $w$, while the envelope theorem implies

$$\frac{\partial y_e(L, w, \theta)}{\partial w} = -L(w, \theta) < 0. \quad (5)$$

For both occupations, the magnitude of the effect increases with $\theta$. Since benefits are equally distributed across the population, then, the entrance of migrants modifies optimal labour decisions. More formally, from (2) and (3), one gets $\partial \theta_1^1/\partial w < 0$ and $\partial \theta_1^2/\partial w > 0^8$. Then, $\theta_1^1 < \theta_1^{t+1} < \theta_1^{t+1} < \ldots$
\( \theta_i^2 \). Notice that Lemma 1 and Assumption 1 imply that employers are never the absolute majority in the country.

### 3.1 Immigration under winner take all

Immigration affects the native population through three channels. First, by decreasing wages, it reduces employees’ gross income and increases employers’ profits. Secondly, it might increase or decrease all natives’ net income by changing the amount of benefits they receive. This second effect can be positive or negative, depending on whether migrants’ contribution to aggregate income is higher or lower than the share of resources they divert from natives through their participation to the welfare system. The third, indirect, effect arises through occupational choice. The interplay between changes in gross income and benefits modifies the attractiveness of different occupations after immigration has occurred.

The third effect allows to partition the population of natives into five different sets, depending on the occupation chosen before and after immigration. All individuals with a type \( \theta \in (0, \theta_1^t) \) are unemployed at time \( t \) and remain unemployed at time \( t + 1 \), after immigration has taken place. Their preferences over the construction of the wall only depend on the effect of immigration on benefits. More precisely, these individuals will prefer to keep the borders open only if

\[
x_d(\tau, Q_{t+1}, \alpha, \theta) - x_d(\tau, Q_t, \alpha, \theta) = b(\tau, Q_{t+1}, \alpha) - b(\tau, Q_t, \alpha) \geq 0
\]

where, to keep notation lighter, we dropped the dependence of net income and benefits on the equilibrium wage.

Individuals of type \( \theta \in [\theta_1^t, \theta_1^{t+1}) \) are employees at time \( t \) but prefer to switch to unemployment at time \( t + 1 \). These individuals will be in favor of keeping the borders open only if immigration increases benefits by an amount that is large enough to compensate for the loss of labor income. That is,

\[
x_d(\tau, Q_{t+1}, \alpha, \theta) - x_l(\tau, Q_t, \alpha, \theta) = b(\tau, Q_{t+1}, \alpha) - b(\tau, Q_t, \alpha) - [(1 - \tau)\theta w_t - c] \geq 0
\]

The last term in square brackets is non-negative for all \( \theta \geq \theta_1^t \). Then, for all \( \theta \in [\theta_1^t, \theta_{t+1}) \) the change in net income due to immigration linearly decreases in type at a rate \((1 - \tau)w_t\). Notice that if unemployed individuals are in favor of building the wall, these individuals will be in favor too.

The types \( \theta \in [\theta_1^{t+1}, \theta_2^{t+1}] \) are employees in both periods \( t \) and \( t + 1 \). For these individuals to be in favor of keeping the borders open, the (positive) effect of immigration on benefits must be

\[(A5)\) in the proof of Proposition 1 in AS (p. 1258).
large enough to compensate for the decrease in wage. That is

\[ x_l(\tau, Q_{t+1}, \alpha, \theta) - x_l(\tau, Q_t, \alpha, \theta) = b(\tau, Q_{t+1}, \alpha) - b(\tau, Q_t, \alpha) - (1 - \tau)(w_t - w_{t+1})\theta \geq 0 \]

Clearly, when \( \theta = \theta^1_{t+1} \)

\[ x_l(\tau, Q_{t+1}, \alpha, \theta^1_{t+1}) - x_l(\tau, Q_t, \alpha, \theta^1_{t+1}) = x_d(\tau, Q_{t+1}, \alpha, \theta^1_{t+1}) - x_l(\tau, Q_t, \alpha, \theta^1_{t+1}) \]

The change in net income due to immigration for types \( \theta \in [\theta^1_{t+1}, \theta^2_{t+1}] \) is also linearly decreasing in type, at a rate \((1 - \tau)(w_t - w_{t+1})\). As for the previous subset of types, these individuals will prefer to build the wall whenever unemployed individuals are in favor too.

All individuals with type \( \theta \in (\theta^2_{t+1}, \bar{\theta}) \) are employees in period \( t \) and become employers in period \( t + 1 \). They will support open borders only if

\[ x_e(L, \tau, Q_{t+1}, \alpha, \theta) - x_l(\tau, Q_t, \alpha, \theta) = b(\tau, Q_{t+1}, \alpha) - b(\tau, Q_t, \alpha) + (1 - \tau)[y_e(L, w_{t+1}, \theta) - \theta w_t] \geq 0 \]

The last term measures the change in gross (and net) income for this type of individuals and is increasing and convex in type because of the properties of the production function. However, it is not necessarily positive. For all these types \( y_e(L, w_t, \theta) \leq \theta w_t \). Then, the change in gross income is positive only if the immigration-driven increase in profits is large enough. As a matter of fact, notice that by the definition of \( \theta^2_t \) and \( \theta^2_{t+1} \)

\[ y_e(L, w_{t+1}, \theta^2_t) - \theta^2_t w_t = y_e(L, w_{t+1}, \theta^2_t) - y_e(L, w_t, \theta^2_t) > 0 \]

and

\[ y_e(L, w_{t+1}, \theta^2_{t+1}) - \theta^2_{t+1} w_t = w_{t+1} \theta^2_{t+1} - w_t \theta^2_{t+1} < 0 \]

Finally, all types \( \theta \in (\theta^2_t, \bar{\theta}) \) are and remain employers after immigration occurs. These are the individuals that are most likely to oppose the construction of the wall. Indeed, given the decrease in wage generated by migrants, they always experience an increase in gross income. If this increase is larger than a potential decrease in benefits, they will always be in favor of keeping the borders open. More precisely, a type \( \theta \in (\theta^2_t, \bar{\theta}) \) will support open borders only if

\[ x_e(L, \tau, Q_{t+1}, \alpha, \theta) - x_e(L, \tau, Q_t, \alpha, \theta) = b(\tau, Q_{t+1}, \alpha) - b(\tau, Q_t, \alpha) + (1 - \tau)[y_e(L, w_{t+1}, \theta) - y_e(L, w_t, \theta)] \geq 0 \]

Notice that the last term is always positive. Using (5) and the properties of the production
function, we get
\[
\frac{\partial^2 y_e(L, w, \theta)}{\partial w \partial \theta} = -\frac{\partial L(w, \theta)}{\partial \theta} < 0
\]

Then, the change in profits due to immigration is increasing in type.

Figure 1 shows the change in net income from period \( t \) to period \( t + 1 \) as a function of types. Given our discussion above, the function is flat for all types \( \theta \in (0, \theta_1^t) \), it decreases at a rate \((1 - \tau)w_t \) in between \( \theta_1^t \) and \( \theta_{1+1}^t \) and at a rate \((1 - \tau)(w_t - w_{t+1}) \) in between \( 0 \) and \( \theta_{1+1}^t + \theta_{2+1}^t \). From \( \theta_{2+1}^t \) on, the function starts increasing again. Different changes in benefits due to immigration shift the curve upwards or downwards. The three cases shown in Figure 1 correspond to a positive increase in benefits (+), no change in benefits (=) and negative change in benefits (−).

Under the assumption that some individuals in the native population must be opposed to immigration, then, we can identify two types \( \tilde{\theta}_1^t = \tilde{\theta}_1^1(\tau, w_t, Q_t) \) and \( \tilde{\theta}_2^t = \tilde{\theta}_2^2(\tau, w_t, Q_t) \) such that all types \( \theta \in (\tilde{\theta}_1^t, \tilde{\theta}_2^t) \) strictly prefer to build the wall and all types \( \theta \in (0, \tilde{\theta}_1^t] \cup [\tilde{\theta}_2^t, \tilde{\theta}_2^t] \) are either indifferent or strictly prefer to keep the borders open. Type \( \tilde{\theta}_1^t = 0 \) if \( b(\tau, w_{t+1}, Q_{t+1}, \alpha) - b(\tau, w_t, Q_t, \alpha) < 0 \). It is equal to \( \theta_1^t \) if \( b(\tau, w_{t+1}, Q_{t+1}, \alpha) - b(\tau, w_t, Q_t, \alpha) = 0 \), since the change in income for type \( \theta_1^t \) coincides with the change in benefits. When \( b(\tau, w_{t+1}, Q_{t+1}, \alpha) - b(\tau, w_t, Q_t, \alpha) > 0 \), then \( \tilde{\theta}_1^t > \theta_1^t \).

Moreover, \( \tilde{\theta}_1^t < \theta_{1+1}^t \), because otherwise no native would support the construction of the wall. When the increase in benefits due to immigration is not too large type \( \tilde{\theta}_1^t \) will be an employee at time \( t \) who switches to unemployment at time \( t + 1 \), i.e. \( \tilde{\theta}_1^t \leq \theta_{1+1}^t \). In this case, all individuals that are employees at time \( t \) and remain employees at time \( t + 1 \) are strictly harmed by immigration. If instead immigration has a strong positive effect on benefits, \( \tilde{\theta}_1^t \) will be an employee in both periods (i.e. \( \tilde{\theta}_1^t > \theta_{1+1}^t \)). Formally,

\[
\tilde{\theta}_1^t = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if } b(\tau, w_{t+1}, Q_{t+1}, \alpha) - b(\tau, w_t, Q_t, \alpha) < 0 \\
\frac{b(\tau, w_{t+1}, Q_{t+1}, \alpha) - b(\tau, w_t, Q_t, \alpha) + c}{(1 - \tau)w_t} & \text{if } 0 \leq b(\tau, Q_{t+1}, \alpha) - b(\tau, Q_t, \alpha) \leq \frac{w_t - w_{t+1}}{w_{t+1}}c \\
\frac{b(\tau, w_{t+1}, Q_{t+1}, \alpha) - b(\tau, w_t, Q_t, \alpha)}{(1 - \tau)(w_t - w_{t+1})} & \text{if } b(\tau, Q_{t+1}, \alpha) - b(\tau, Q_t, \alpha) > \frac{w_t - w_{t+1}}{w_{t+1}}c 
\end{cases}
\]

where the second row is the solution of \( x_d(\tau, w_{t+1}, Q_{t+1}, \alpha, \tilde{\theta}_1^t) - x_i(\tau, w_t, Q_t, \alpha, \tilde{\theta}_1^t) = 0 \) and the last one is the solution to \( x_i(\tau, w_{t+1}, Q_{t+1}, \alpha, \tilde{\theta}_1^t) - x_i(\tau, w_t, Q_t, \alpha, \tilde{\theta}_1^t) = 0 \).

Let us turn to type \( \tilde{\theta}_2^t \) now. Clearly, \( \tilde{\theta}_2^t > \theta_{1+1}^t \), because otherwise the entire native population would be in favor of open borders. If benefits are non-decreasing in immigration, then \( \tilde{\theta}_2^t < \theta_2^t \) since

\[
x_e(L, \tau, Q_{t+1}, \alpha, \tilde{\theta}_2^t) - x_i(\tau, Q_t, \alpha, \tilde{\theta}_2^t) = x_e(L, \tau, Q_{t+1}, \alpha, \theta_2^t) - x_e(L, \tau, Q_t, \alpha, \theta_2^t) \\
= b(\tau, Q_{t+1}, \alpha) - b(\tau, Q_t, \alpha) + (1 - \tau)[y_e(L, w_{t+1}, \theta_2^t) - y_e(L, w_t, \theta_2^t)] > 0
\]
Figure 1: Change in net income from period $t$ to period $t+1$ as a function of types, for the case of $b(\tau, Q_{t+1}, \alpha) - b(\tau, Q_t, \alpha) > 0$ (+), $b(\tau, Q_{t+1}, \alpha) - b(\tau, Q_t, \alpha) = 0$ (=) and $b(\tau, Q_{t+1}, \alpha) - b(\tau, Q_t, \alpha) < 0$ (−).

In this case, type $\tilde{\theta}_2^t$ is implicitly defined by

$$b(\tau, Q_{t+1}, \alpha) - b(\tau, Q_t, \alpha) + (1 - \tau)[y_e(L, w_{t+1}, \tilde{\theta}_2) - \tilde{\theta}_2 w_t] = 0$$

(7)

When benefits are decreasing in immigration, $\tilde{\theta}_2^t > \theta_2^t$ if and only if

$$b(\tau, Q_{t+1}, \alpha) - b(\tau, Q_t, \alpha) + (1 - \tau)[y_e(L, w_{t+1}, \theta_2^t) - y_e(L, w_t, \theta_2^t)] < 0$$

when this holds, type $\tilde{\theta}_2^t$ is implicitly defined by

$$b(\tau, Q_{t+1}, \alpha) - b(\tau, Q_t, \alpha) + (1 - \tau)[y_e(L, w_{t+1}, \tilde{\theta}_2) - y_e(L, w_t, \tilde{\theta}_2)] = 0$$

(8)
The following proposition follows immediately from our discussion.

**Proposition 1.** A necessary and sufficient condition for country $W$ to build the wall is

$$\frac{\tilde{\theta}_2^t - \tilde{\theta}_1^t}{\tilde{\theta}} > \frac{1}{2}$$

where $\tilde{\theta}_1^t$ is as defined in (6) and $\tilde{\theta}_2^t$ is as defined in (7) and (8).

We assumed that the share of resources transferred to migrants is fixed to some value $\alpha$. One could instead assume that natives’ benefits are fixed and migrants only receive a fraction of the resources left after redistribution to natives has occurred. With a fixed and exogenous supply of migrants, this is just a particular case of our model and corresponds to the situation where natives’ benefits do not change with immigration (the line marked by the $=$ sign in Figure 1). Our conclusions are therefore robust to this alternative assumption.

### 3.2 Immigration under PR

Under PR, the decision to build the wall will be taken by one party if this party has the majority of votes in parliament. Given Assumption 1, this party can only be $\mathcal{L}$ or $\mathcal{D}$. Then, if at a given time $t$,

$$\frac{\theta_2^t - \theta_1^t}{\tilde{\theta}} \geq \frac{1}{2}$$

employees constitute the majority in the population, and borders will be kept open only if $u_\mathcal{L}(\tau, Q_{t+1}) \geq u_\mathcal{L}(\tau, Q_t)$, or equivalently only if

$$x_l(\tau, Q_{t+1}, \alpha, \hat{\theta}_l(\tau, Q_{t+1})) \geq x_l(\tau, Q_t, \alpha, \hat{\theta}_l(\tau, Q_t))$$

If instead

$$\frac{\theta_1^t}{\tilde{\theta}} \geq \frac{1}{2}$$

then unemployed individuals will be the majority and borders will be kept open only if $u_\mathcal{D}(\tau, Q_{t+1}) \geq u_\mathcal{D}(\tau, Q_t)$, or equivalently only if

$$b(\tau, Q_{t+1}, \alpha) - b(\tau, Q_t, \alpha) \geq 0$$

Now suppose that no party has the majority in Parliament, so that (10) and (11) do not hold. In this case, borders will be closed if the decision is supported by a coalition of at least two parties. Our next lemma focuses on this scenario.

**Lemma 2.** If

$$\frac{d\hat{y}_w(L, w_t, Q_t)}{dw} < 0$$

(12)
and no party has the majority in parliament in period \( t \), country \( P \) will pass a wall bill if and only if the bill has the support of party \( D \).

If party \( D \) prefers to build the wall, then benefits must decrease with the new wave of immigration. In the proof of the lemma, we show that employees’ average gross income \( \hat{\theta}_t(\tau, Q_t)w_t \) decreases with \( Q \). Then, if party \( D \) wants to close the border, it can form a coalition with party \( L \). If instead \( D \) prefers to keep the borders open, benefits must be increasing in immigration. If employers average gross income is increasing in immigration (i.e., (12) holds),\(^9\) then \( D \) can form a coalition with \( E \).

Lemma 2 and the discussion above directly imply the following proposition.

**Proposition 2.** A sufficient condition for the wall to be build in country \( P \) is

\[
\begin{align*}
&u_L(\tau, Q_{t+1}) < u_L(\tau, Q_t) \\
&u_D(\tau, Q_{t+1}) < u_D(\tau, Q_t)
\end{align*}
\]

if \((10)\) holds, \( u_L(\tau, Q_{t+1}) < u_L(\tau, Q_t) \) otherwise.

### 3.3 Comparison between the two systems

In this section, we compare the degree of openness of the two countries. Proposition 3 is one of the two main result of the paper. Let \( t^W \) denote the smallest \( t \) at which country \( W \) decides to build the wall and denote by \( t^P \) the equivalent date for country \( P \). Then

**Proposition 3.** Let the common level of taxation in the two countries be exogenously fixed. If

\[
\begin{align*}
b(\tau, Q_{t+1}, \alpha) - b(\tau, Q_t, \alpha) &\leq \frac{w_t - w_{t+1}}{w_{t+1}}c \\
\left| \frac{\partial \theta_t^2}{\partial w_t} \right| &\geq \left| \frac{\partial \theta_t^1}{\partial w_t} \right|
\end{align*}
\]

then \( t^W \geq t^P \).

Notice that when benefits are decreasing in immigration, both countries will decide to close their borders. Indeed, when \( b(\tau, Q_{t+1}, \alpha) - b(\tau, Q_t, \alpha) < 0 \), all types in between 0 and \( \hat{\theta}_t^2 \) will be negatively affected by immigration. By Assumption 1, these types are the majority in the population, and the wall bill will be passed in country \( W \). Furthermore, \( u_D(\tau, Q_{t+1}) < u_D(\tau, Q_t) \) and \( u_L(\tau, Q_{t+1}) < u_L(\tau, Q_t) \). Then, the wall bill must be passed in country \( P \) too.

\(^9\)Using the definition of \( \hat{y}_e(L, w_t, Q_t) \), we get

\[
\frac{d\hat{y}_e(L, w_t, Q_t)}{dQ} = \frac{1}{\theta - \hat{\theta}_t^2} \left[ -\frac{\partial w_t}{\partial Q} \int_{\theta_2}^\theta L(w_t, \theta) d\theta + (\hat{y}_e(L, w_t, \theta_2^2) - \hat{y}_e(L, w_t, Q_t)) \frac{\partial \theta_t^2}{\partial w_t} \right]
\]

The first term represents the increase in average gross income due to an increase in income for all the individuals that are employers at time \( t \). The second component measures the indirect effect of immigration through occupational choice. A decrease in wage induces more individuals to become employers. Furthermore, these individuals have an income that is lower than the average employers’ income at time \( t \). This second component therefore reduces the average.
Now suppose \( b(\tau, Q_{t+1}, \alpha) - b(\tau, Q_t, \alpha) > 0 \) and \( \tilde{\theta}_t^1 < \theta_{t+1}^1 \), which is implied by (13). Suppose in addition that country \( W \) wants to build the wall. Proposition 1 implies

\[
\frac{\tilde{\theta}_t^2 - \tilde{\theta}_t^1}{\theta} > \frac{1}{2}
\]

with \( \tilde{\theta}_t^1 \in [\theta^1_t, \theta^1_{t+1}] \) and \( \tilde{\theta}_t^2 \in [\theta^2_{t+1}, \theta^2_t] \). Then, employees must be the majority in the population and, by Proposition 2, country \( P \) will close the borders if \( u_L(\tau, Q_{t+1}) < u_L(\tau, Q_t) \). In the appendix, we show that (14), is a sufficient condition for \( L \) to be willing to close the borders whenever \( \tilde{\theta}_t^1 \leq \theta_{t+1}^1 \).

As noted before, the effect of immigration on employees’ average net income can be decomposed into a direct effect on the income of the individuals who remain employees and an indirect effect due to occupational choice. All individuals of type \( \theta \in [\theta^1_t, \theta^2_{t+1}] \) suffer a decrease in net income, which decreases the average. At the same time, all types \( \theta \in [\theta^1_t, \theta^1_{t+1}] \) become unemployed and all types \( \theta \in [\theta^2_{t+1}, \theta^2_t] \) become employers. The change in occupation by the first set of types reduces the average net income, while the change in occupation by the second increases it. Condition (14) ensures that the mass of high types individuals leaving employment is not lower than the mass of low types individuals becoming unemployed.

Although we are unable to prove that condition (14) always holds, we believe it is a plausible assumption. A decrease in wages makes unemployment relatively more attractive only because it reduces gross income from employment. The attractiveness of becoming an employer instead arises both from a reduced labour income and from increased profits. When (13) does not hold, (14) is not sufficient anymore to guarantee that \( u_L(\tau, Q_{t+1}) < u_L(\tau, Q_t) \). Indeed, if \( \tilde{\theta}_t^1 > \theta_{t+1}^1 \), part of the types who were employees at time \( t \) and remain employees at time \( t + 1 \) are now positively affected by immigration.

Finally, consider the case of \( b(\tau, Q_{t+1}, \alpha) - b(\tau, Q_t, \alpha) = 0 \). If the types in between \( \tilde{\theta}_t^1 \) and \( \tilde{\theta}_t^2 \) are the majority in the population, this case is identical to the one we just analyzed. If instead these types are not the majority in the population, then the construction of the wall depends on non-economic factors that might affect the opinion of unemployed individuals. If these individuals decide to close the borders in country \( W \), so will party \( D \) in country \( P \).

### 4 Results with different endogenous tax levels

We now introduce the possibility that electoral systems affect the tax rate implemented by a country.\(^{10}\) We assume that each country chooses a tax rate at time \( t = 0 \) and does not change it

\(^{10}\)Empirically, as shown among others in Milesi-Ferretti et al (2002) and Persson and Tabellini (2005), the higher taxes in PR systems go hand in hand with different levels of spending and welfare entitlements. This immediately yields a preliminary intuition for why the endogenous taxation levels can affect the impact of immigration from the point of view of voters.
during the immigration process.\textsuperscript{11}

The next two sections discuss the tax level implemented by each country for any generic (fixed) immigration level \( Q_t \). This makes our analysis more general and allows us to extend the conclusions found by AS.\textsuperscript{12} The tax rates chosen by the two countries in period \( t \) are denoted by \( \tau^W_t \) and \( \tau^{PR}_t \). In Section 4.3, where we examine the effects of different tax rates on the decision to build the wall, we will fix the tax rates to \( \tau^W_0 \) and \( \tau^{PR}_0 \).

The implemented tax rate under winner take all is the one preferred by the majority of the population of natives. For PR, we consider a legislative bargaining process as follows. Denote by \( \tau^0 \) the given status quo level of taxation. After elections, if a party \( \mathcal{P} \in \{ \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{L}, \mathcal{D} \} \) obtains the majority of the votes, it will implement the tax level maximizing \( u_\mathcal{P}(\tau, Q_t) \). If no party obtains the majority, one party will be selected randomly to propose a tax rate. We assume each party is selected as a proposer with a probability equal to the share of native individuals in the occupation it represents. The proposed tax rate is then put to a vote against the status quo \( \tau^0 \). If at least another party agrees with the proposal, the new tax rate is implemented. The tax rate remains \( \tau^0 \) otherwise. Denote by \( p(\tau|\tau^0) \) the probability that tax rate \( \tau \) is chosen by the legislative bargaining process when \( \tau^0 \) is the status quo. Our focus is on stable tax rates.\textsuperscript{13}

**Definition 2.** A tax rate \( \tau \) is stable if \( p(\tau|\tau) = 1 \).

A stable tax rate is a status quo tax rate that is never changed by the legislative bargaining process and could be interpreted as a long-run tax rate. Focusing on stable tax rates allows to not make the comparison between winner take all and PR dependent on the status quo tax rate.

Before introducing the results for the two systems, notice that

**Lemma 3** (Lemma 1 in AS). For a fixed level of immigration \( Q_t \), the equilibrium wage rate \( w_t \) is differentiable, strictly increasing and nonlinear in \( \tau \).

We refer to AS for the proof of the lemma and simply note that

\[
\frac{\partial w_t}{\partial \tau} = \frac{w_t(\theta^1_t)^2[1/\bar{\theta} + Q_t h(\theta^1_t)]}{(1 - \tau)A(\tau, w_t, Q_t)}
\]

with \( A(\tau, w_t, Q_t) \) as defined in (18). Let \( \epsilon(\tau) \) and \( \tilde{\epsilon}(\tau) \) denote the tax elasticity of the equilibrium wage rate and the tax elasticity of the marginal equilibrium wage rate,

\[
\epsilon(\tau) = \frac{\partial w_t}{\partial \tau} \frac{\tau}{w_t}
\]

\textsuperscript{11}Ideally, one would want to allow the tax rate to vary in each period, making it endogenous to the immigration level. Unfortunately, the model becomes intractable under this assumption. The main results would depend on specific assumptions about the cross-derivatives of the main variables with respect to \( \tau \) and \( Q_t \).

\textsuperscript{12}The results in AS rely on single-peakedness of individuals’ preferences over taxation. However, as noted by Morelli and Negri (2019), the argument proving single-peakedness contains a mistake and the property cannot be established. Morelli and Negri (2019) provide an alternative proof of the results, based on the property of single-crossing preferences (Gans and Smart (1996)).

\textsuperscript{13}Our definition of stable tax rate is a simplified version of the PRPE-stable equilibrium in AS (p.1251).
\[ \bar{\epsilon}(\tau) = \frac{\partial^2 w_t}{\partial \tau^2} \frac{\tau}{\partial w_t} \frac{\partial w_t}{\partial \tau} \]

In what follows, we assume

**Assumption 3.**

\[(1 - \tau)\bar{\epsilon}(\tau) \leq (1 - \tau)\epsilon(\tau) + \tau\]

Assumption 3 is identical to condition (5) in AS\(^{14}\) and allows us to use some of the results contained in the paper.

### 4.1 Taxation under winner take all

For any given immigration level \(Q_t\), let \(\xi(\tau, Q_t, \theta)\) denote a type \(\theta\)'s maximum consumption level at a given tax rate \(\tau\) and sorting equilibrium \(w_t = w(\tau, Q_t)\). That is

\[ \xi(\tau, Q_t, \theta) = \max_{j \in \{e, l, d\}} x_j(\cdot, \theta) \]

Suppose the median type in the distribution, \(\tilde{\theta} = \bar{\theta}/2\), is an employee, i.e. \(\theta^1_t < \tilde{\theta} < \theta^2_t\).

**Lemma 4.** For any two tax levels \(\tau, \tau'\) such that \(\tau < \tau'\),

1. \(\xi(\tau, Q_t, \tilde{\theta}) \geq \xi(\tau', Q_t, \tilde{\theta}) \Rightarrow \xi(\tau, Q_t, \theta) \geq \xi(\tau', Q_t, \theta)\) for all \(\theta > \tilde{\theta}\)

2. \(\xi(\tau', Q_t, \tilde{\theta}) \geq \xi(\tau, Q_t, \tilde{\theta}) \Rightarrow \xi(\tau', Q_t, \theta) \geq \xi(\tau, Q_t, \theta)\) for all \(\theta < \tilde{\theta}\)

Lemma 4 proves that individuals’ preferences over taxation satisfy a weak version of the single-crossing condition (Gans Smart (1996)). The result was proven by Morelli and Negri (2019) and the proof we provide in the appendix is just an adaptation of that proof to our framework. A direct implication of the lemma is that \(\tilde{\theta}\) is the median type in the distribution of preferences over taxation. Then

\[ \tau^W_t = \arg\max_{\tau} (1 - \tau)\tilde{\theta}w_t + b(\tau, Q_t, \alpha) - c \]

### 4.2 Taxation under PR

In order to identify the stable tax rate, we first need to understand parties’ behavior in the legislative bargaining process. In the following lemma, we show that parties’ preferences over taxation also satisfy a weak version of the single-crossing condition. More precisely, the lemma shows that party \(L\) is the median party. The first part of the lemma is a direct consequence of

\(^{14}\)Condition (5) in AS also includes a lower bound for \((1 - \tau)\bar{\epsilon}(\tau)\). As shown in Morelli and Negri (2019), this lower bound is not necessary.
Lemma 2 and Lemma 5 in AS. Lemma 2 states that, under Assumption 3, benefits (and therefore $u_D(\tau, Q_t)$) are strictly concave in $\tau$, with interior arg max. Define

$$V(\tau) \equiv 1 - \frac{(1 - \tau) \partial w_t}{w_t}$$

(15)

AS shows that $V(\tau) > 0$.\(^{15}\) Lemma 5 in AS states that, when

$$\frac{\partial \hat{\theta}_l(\tau, Q_t)}{\partial \tau} \geq \frac{\partial^2 \hat{\theta}_l(\tau, Q_t)}{\partial \tau^2} \left[ \frac{1 - \tau}{1 + V(\tau)} \right]$$

(16)

party $L$'s utility is strictly quasiconcave in $\tau$. Furthermore, denoting by $\tau^P_L$ the maximizer of $u_P(\tau, Q_t)$, $P \in \{E, L, D\}$, the lemma proves that $\tau^C_L < \tau^P_L$. This immediately implies that for all $\tau' > \tau$, if party $L$ prefers $\tau'$ to $\tau$, then party $D$ also prefers $\tau'$, which is the first statement in our Lemma 5. The second statement in our lemma states that, when party $L$ prefers a lower tax rate, party $E$ must prefer lower taxes too. A sufficient condition for this to hold is that average employers’ income is decreasing in $\tau$. Given that wage is increasing in $\tau$, (12) is a sufficient condition for this.

**Lemma 5.** If (12) and (16) hold,

1. $u_L(\tau, Q_t) \leq u_L(\tau', Q_t) \Rightarrow u_D(\tau, Q_t) \leq u_D(\tau', Q_t)$
2. $u_L(\tau, Q_t) \geq u_L(\tau', Q_t) \Rightarrow u_E(\tau, Q_t) \geq u_E(\tau', Q_t)$

for all $\tau < \tau'$.

Lemma 5 directly implies the following proposition.

**Proposition 4.** If no party has the absolute majority of seats in parliament and (12) and (16) hold, the unique stable tax rate in a PR country is

$$\tau^P_t = \tau^C_L = \arg \max_\tau u_L(\tau, Q_t)$$

The most important result in AS, which holds in our model too, is the following conclusion about the tax rates in the two countries:

**Proposition 5** (Proposition 6 in AS). Assume (12) and (16) hold. For any immigration level $Q_t$, there exists a cost of working $\bar{c}_t = \bar{c}(Q_t)$ such that, for all $c \leq \bar{c}_t$, $\tau^P_t > \tau^W_t$.

We refer to AS for the proof.\(^{15}\)

\(^{15}\)This is shown in the proof of Lemma 2 in AS. Using the formula for $\partial w_t/\partial \tau$, one gets

$$V(\tau) = 1 - \frac{(\theta^1_t)^2[1/\theta + Q_t h(\theta^1_t)]}{A(\tau, w_t, Q_t)}$$

and since $A(\tau, w_t, Q_t) > (\theta^1_t)^2[1/\theta + Q_t h(\theta^1_t)]$, $V(\tau) > 0$. 

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4.3 Immigration decisions under different endogenous tax rates

From now on, we assume that conditions (12) and (16) in Proposition 4 are satisfied. Furthermore, we set \( c \leq \bar{c}_0 \), so that Proposition 5 holds at time \( t = 0 \) and hence \( \tau_0^P > \tau_0^W \).

For any tax rate \( \tau \) and level of immigration \( Q_t \), let
\[
\eta(\tau, Q_t) \equiv \frac{dY(\tau, w_t, Q_t)}{d\tau} \frac{\tau}{Y(\tau, w_t, Q_t)}
\]
denote the tax elasticity of aggregate income.

**Lemma 6.** If
\[
\frac{d\eta(\tau, Q_t)}{dQ} \geq 0 \tag{17}
\]
then the function
\[
u_D(\tau, Q_{t+1}) - u_D(\tau, Q_t) = b(\tau, Q_{t+1}, \alpha) - b(\tau, Q_t, \alpha)
\]
is increasing in \( \tau \).

Lemma 6 plays a key role in the proof of the following proposition.

**Proposition 6.** Let the level of taxation in the two countries be endogenous. If (17) holds and
\[
\frac{\theta^2(\tau_0^P, w_t, Q_t) - \theta^1(\tau_0^P, w_t, Q_t)}{\theta} < \frac{1}{2}
\]
then \( t^W \leq t^P \).

The proof of Proposition 6 is straightforward. When the share of employees in country \( P \) is lower than one-half, the decision about the wall is taken by party \( D \). Suppose the party supports the construction of the wall. Then, benefits in country \( P \) must be decreasing in immigration. If (17) holds, then benefits must be decreasing in immigration in country \( W \) too, and the country will close its borders. Whenever
\[
b(\tau_0^W, Q_{t+1}, \alpha) - b(\tau_0^W, Q_t, \alpha) < 0 < b(\tau_0^P, Q_{t+1}, \alpha) - b(\tau_0^P, Q_t, \alpha)
\]
country \( W \) will build the wall, while country \( P \) will keep its borders open.

Clearly, Proposition 6 does not imply that countries using a PR system are always more open than those using winner take all. Whenever the share of employees in country \( P \) is larger than one-half, it is not clear which country will close the borders first. Proposition 6, however, has an important implication on the analysis of migration policies. The main conclusion of Section 3 (Proposition 3) was that, *ceteris paribus*, winner take all systems are relatively more open than PR. The results in this section show that the *ceteris paribus* assumption is not innocuous. When
the tax levels are determined endogenously, countries using PR systems can be strictly more open to immigration than countries using winner take all systems.

Before concluding, consider the following straightforward extension of the model that accounts for retirement. Assume that, in every period $t$, a fraction $\rho$ of the native population retires. The set of types that retire is randomly sampled from the uniform distribution of types. For simplicity, assume that these people die in the next period and are replaced by new individuals to keep the population size equal to one. Retired individuals only care about benefits and therefore respond to immigration exactly as unemployed. This simple adaptation of the model allows to obtain insights on the relationship between retirement policies and support for immigration. A reform that lowers retirement age is equivalent to an increase in $\rho$ and, when benefits increase in immigration, an increased support for open borders. Parties supporting the construction of the wall then should normally oppose such reforms. A second important remark is that the current trend of ageing population (as before, equivalent to an increase in $\rho$) could force the share of employees in PR countries to be permanently below 50%. Our model would then unequivocally predict that PR countries are more open to immigration than winner take all ones.

5 Conclusions and Future Research

We have shown that different electoral systems may induce countries to choose different immigration policies, and that the predictions depend crucially on the implications that electoral systems have also for the determination of redistribution policies. Considering that pensioners’ preferences on the two dimensions are aligned with the unemployed and considering the increasing life expectancy, the relative size of the class of employees could be expected to diminish over time. This shrinking of the relative size of the class of employees is also made further likely by the automation technological change.\textsuperscript{16} Thus, if already now the percentage of employees in western democracies is around fifty percent,\textsuperscript{17} the overall prediction of our model is that PR countries should be more open than WTA countries.

We have conducted the analysis keeping constant and equal the supply of migrants across countries, because our focus was exclusively on the demand side. In future research we plan to complement these results with a supply or selection analysis, and we plan to answer a number of important questions:

\textsuperscript{16}Early research estimated the share of jobs at high risk of automation to be between 45% and 60% (see [23] and references therein). More recent research has consistently decreased these estimates, but the percentages are still high. Across OECD countries, the share of jobs at high risk of automation is estimated to be around 9% by [3] and around 14% by [22].

\textsuperscript{17}Interestingly, out of the 35 advanced countries in OECD with such data readily available in 2017, 20 have already a number of workers below fifty percent of the voting population, but among the 15 where employees are the majority of the voting population we have US, Canada, Australia and the UK, where the electoral system is arguably closer to a WTA system.
- first, it is intuitive that the support for open borders should be more likely when the composition of economic immigrants is more towards high-skills,\(^\text{18}\) but it can be also shown that borders remaining open is the more politically feasible the more selection is possible in terms of enfranchisement. I.e., giving the right to vote to agents with \(\theta\) above a certain threshold actually helps the possibility of endogenous open borders, especially in WTA systems.

- Second, an interesting question could be the attractiveness of different immigration policies across systems, in the sense that one system could favor changes in welfare extensions or enfranchisement rules whereas the other could be more likely to build the wall or choose selection policies at the entry point.

- Third, we plan to address endogenous selection of types on the supply side: for similar economic structure and perspectives in two countries, migrants would prefer one to the other if the conditions on institutional insurance or expectations of integration (or even voting) differ substantially. PR, having higher wages and taxes, could induce negative selection, in the sense that the most talented individuals could prefer to supply themselves to WTA countries. The conjecture is that such selection effects may make it comparatively more likely that borders would be closed first in PR systems.

Can a destination ranking be sustainable and under what conditions? In a world of equal growth rate across destination countries, it seems likely that the expected payoffs of migrants should equalize across destinations, and hence there should be a frontier of immigration policies. For example two countries offer the same expected utility to migrants of a given type if either all variables are the same or one has higher \(\alpha\) but the other has more generous enfranchisement.

Answering all these questions will further increase the heuristic power of the model we have chosen to propose for the study of immigration policies, which is an increasingly important topic in political economy.

Finally, we remark that a variant of our model could also be employed to study the effect of different electoral institutions on the political support for protectionism on the goods market, hence the studies of the political feasibility of open borders and free trade can be done in a very similar framework.

\(^{18}\)For empirical evidence about this, see Morriconi et al (2018).
References


Appendix

Proof of Lemma 1. By Proposition 1 in AS, \( w(\tau, Q_t) \) is unique and implicitly defined by (4). Differentiating the condition with respect to \( Q \), we get

\[
\frac{\partial w_t}{\partial Q} = -\frac{w_t X(\tau, w_t, Q_t)}{A(\tau, w_t, Q_t)} < 0.
\]

with

\[
X(\tau, w_t, Q_t) = \int_{\theta_t^1}^{\theta_t^2} \theta h(\theta) d\theta - \int_{\theta_t^2}^\theta L(w_t, \theta) h(\theta) d\theta
\]

and

\[
A(\tau, w_t, Q_t) = F(L(w_t, \theta_t^2), \theta_t^2) \left[ \frac{1}{\theta} + Q_t h(\theta_t^2) \right] \frac{\partial \theta_t^2}{\partial w} + (\theta_t^1)^2 \left[ \frac{1}{\theta} + Q_t h(\theta_t^2) \right] - w_t \int_{\theta_t^2}^\theta L(w_t, \theta) \left[ \frac{1}{\theta} + Q_t h(\theta) \right] d\theta
\]

By (2), \( \partial \theta_t^1 / \partial w \) and, by (3), \( \partial \theta_t^2 / \partial w > 0 \) (the proof can be found in AS). Then, since labour demand is decreasing in \( w \), \( X(\tau, w_t, Q_t) \) must be increasing in \( w \). By Assumption 2, this implies \( X(\tau, w_t, Q_t) > 0 \).

The first term in \( A(\tau, w_t, Q_t) \) was obtained by using (3), the second term by substituting for \( \partial \theta_t^1 / \partial w \). By the same reasoning used for \( X(\tau, w_t, Q_t) \), \( A(\tau, w_t, Q_t) > 0 \).

Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose that party \( D \) prefers to build the wall. Party \( L \) will support the wall bill if employees’ average net income is decreasing in immigration. Given the non-positive effect on benefits, a sufficient condition for this to hold is that employees’ average gross income \( \hat{\theta}_l(\tau, Q_t) w_t \) decreases with \( Q_t \). Using the definition of \( \hat{\theta}_l(\tau, Q_t) \) and (2), we can write

\[
\frac{d\hat{\theta}_l(\tau, Q_t) w_t}{dQ} = \left[ \frac{\hat{\theta}_l(\tau, Q_t) + w_t}{2} \left( \frac{\partial \theta_t^2}{\partial w} + \frac{\partial \theta_t^1}{\partial w} \right) \right] \frac{\partial w_t}{\partial Q} = \left[ \frac{\theta_t^2 - \theta_t^1}{2} + w_t \frac{\partial \theta_t^2}{\partial w} \right] \frac{\partial w_t}{\partial Q} < 0
\]

Then, if party \( D \) wants to close the borders, it can pass the wall bill by forming a coalition with party \( L \).

Now suppose party \( D \) wants to keep the borders open. This happens only if benefits are non-decreasing in immigration. In this case, party \( D \) can form a coalition with party \( E \) if employers’ average net income is increasing in \( Q \). This is always the case when

\[
\frac{dy_e(L, w_t, Q_t)}{dQ} = \frac{\partial y_e(L, w_t, Q_t)}{\partial w} \frac{\partial w_t}{\partial Q} > 0
\]

Since wage is decreasing in immigration, (12) is sufficient to prove the result.
Proof of Proposition 3. In order to prove Proposition 3, we only need to show that (14) is a sufficient condition for \( u_L(\tau, Q_{t+1}) < u_L(\tau, Q_t) \) when

\[
\frac{\bar{\theta}_t^2 - \bar{\theta}_t^1}{\bar{\theta}} > \frac{1}{2}
\]

Since all types \( \theta \in [\theta_{t+1}^1, \theta_{t+1}^2] \) are strictly harmed by immigration, it is straightforward to see that

\[
u_L(\tau, Q_{t+1}) < (1 - \tau)w_t\left(\frac{\theta_{t+1}^1 + \theta_{t+1}^2}{2}\right) + b(\tau, Q_t, \alpha)
\]

Now notice that

\[
(1 - \tau)w_t\left(\frac{\theta_{t+1}^1 + \theta_{t+1}^2}{2}\right) + b(\tau, Q_t, \alpha) < u_L(\tau, Q_t)
\]

if and only if

\[
\theta_{t+1}^2 - \theta_{t+1}^1 > \theta_{t+1}^1 - \theta_{t+1}^1
\]

\(\square\)

Proof of Lemma 4 (from [18]). Let \( \theta > \bar{\theta} \) first. A sufficient condition for 1. to hold is

\[
\xi(\tau, Q_t, \theta) - \xi(\tau', Q_t, \theta) \geq \xi(\tau, Q_t, \bar{\theta}) - \xi(\tau', Q_t, \bar{\theta})
\]

for all \( \tau < \tau' \). Rearranging terms, we get

\[
\xi(\tau, Q_t, \theta) - \xi(\tau, Q_t, \bar{\theta}) \geq \xi(\tau', Q_t, \theta) - \xi(\tau', Q_t, \bar{\theta})
\]

Thus, 1. holds if the function \( \Delta \xi(\tau) \equiv \xi(\tau, Q_t, \theta) - \xi(\tau, Q_t, \bar{\theta}) \) is decreasing in \( \tau \). By assumption, the median type is an employee, so that \( \xi(\tau, Q_t, \bar{\theta}) = x_t(\tau Q_t, \alpha, \bar{\theta}) \). For all \( \theta \in (\bar{\theta}, \theta_2^t) \), \( \xi(\tau, Q_t, \theta) = x_t(\tau, Q_t, \alpha, \theta) \). Then, \( \Delta \xi(\tau) = (1 - \tau)(\theta - \bar{\theta})w_t \). Deriving it with respect to \( \tau \) and rearranging terms, we get

\[
\frac{d\Delta \xi(\tau)}{d\tau} = -(\theta - \bar{\theta})w_t V(\tau)
\]

where \( V(\tau) > 0 \) is as defined in (15). For all \( \theta \in [\bar{\theta}^2, \bar{\theta}] \), \( \xi(\tau, Q_t, \theta) = x_e(L, \tau, Q_t, \alpha, \theta) \). Then, \( \Delta \xi(\tau) = (1 - \tau)[y_e(L, w_t, \theta) - w_t \bar{\theta}] \) and

\[
\frac{d\Delta \xi(\tau)}{d\tau} = -[y_e(L, w_t, \theta) - w_t \bar{\theta}] + (1 - \tau) \left[ \frac{\partial y_e(L, w_t, \theta)}{\partial \tau} - \bar{\theta} \frac{\partial w_t}{\partial \tau} \right]
\]

By the envelope theorem,

\[
\frac{\partial y_e(L, w_t, \theta)}{\partial \tau} = -L(w_t, \theta) \frac{\partial w_t}{\partial \tau}
\]

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Then,
\[
\frac{d\Delta \xi(\tau)}{d\tau} = -[y_e(L, w_t, \theta) - w_t \hat{\theta}] - (1 - \tau) \left[ L(w_t, \theta) + \hat{\theta} \right] \frac{\partial w_t}{\partial \tau} < 0
\]
as gross income is increasing in \(\theta\) and wage is increasing in \(\tau\).

By a similar reasoning, a sufficient condition for 2. to hold is \(d\Delta \xi(\tau)/d\tau > 0\), whenever \(\theta < \hat{\theta}\). For all \(\theta \in [\theta_1, \hat{\theta}]\), \(\xi(\tau, Q_t, \hat{\theta}) = x_1(\tau, Q_t, \alpha, \hat{\theta})\) and \(\Delta \xi(\tau) = (1 - \tau)(\theta - \hat{\theta})w_t\). For all types \(\theta \in (0, \theta_1]\), \(\xi(\tau, \theta) = x_d(\tau, Q_t, \alpha, \theta)\) and \(\Delta \xi(\tau) = -(1 - \tau)\hat{\theta}w_t + c\). In both cases, \(V(\tau) > 0\) implies \(d\Delta \xi(\tau)/d\tau > 0\).

**Proof of Lemma 5, point 2.** Consider the second item in the statement of the lemma. A sufficient condition for it to hold is that
\[
u_e(\tau, Q_t) - u_e(\tau, Q_t) \geq u_e(\tau, Q_t) - u_e(\tau', Q_t)
\]
or, rearranging terms,
\[
u_e(\tau, Q_t) - u_e(\tau, Q_t) \geq u_e(\tau', Q_t) - u_e(\tau', Q_t).
\]
Substituting for \(u_e(\tau, Q_t)\) and \(u_e(\tau, Q_t)\), (19) becomes
\[
(1 - \tau)[\hat{y}_e(L, w_t, Q_t) - \hat{\theta}_l(\tau, Q_t)w_t] \geq (1 - \tau')[\hat{y}_e(L, w_t, Q_t) - \hat{\theta}_l(\tau', Q_t)w_t]
\]
where \(w_t' \equiv w(\tau', Q_t)\). Define the function \(\Delta(\tau) \equiv (1 - \tau)[\hat{y}_e(L, w_t, Q_t) - \hat{\theta}_l(\tau, Q_t)w_t]\). Then
\[
\frac{\partial \Delta(\tau)}{\partial \tau} = -[\hat{y}_e(L, w_t, Q_t) - \hat{\theta}_l(\tau, Q_t)w_t] + (1 - \tau) \left[ \frac{\partial \hat{y}_e(L, w_t, Q_t)}{\partial \tau} - \frac{\partial \hat{\theta}_l(\tau, Q_t)w_t}{\partial \tau} \right]
\]
The first term in \(\partial \Delta(\tau)/\partial \tau\) is always negative since
\[
\hat{y}_e(L, w_t, Q_t) > y_e(L, w_t, \theta_t^2) = \theta_t^2 w_t > \hat{\theta}_l(\tau, Q_t)w_t
\]
Furthermore,
\[
\frac{d\hat{y}_e(L, w_t, Q_t)}{d\tau} = \frac{\partial \hat{y}_e(L, w_t, Q_t)}{\partial w} \frac{\partial w_t}{\partial \tau} < 0
\]
when (12) holds. Finally,
\[
\frac{\partial \hat{\theta}_l(\tau, Q_t)w_t}{\partial \tau} = w_t \frac{\partial \hat{\theta}_l(\tau, Q_t)}{\partial \tau} + \hat{\theta}_l(\tau, Q_t) \frac{\partial w_t}{\partial \tau} > 0
\]
since
\[
\frac{\partial \hat{\theta}_l(\tau, Q_t)}{\partial \tau} = \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{\theta_t^1}{1 - \tau} V(\tau) + \frac{\partial \theta_t^2}{\partial w} \frac{\partial w_t}{\partial \tau} \right) > 0
\]
with \( V(\tau) \) as defined in (15). Combining everything, we get \( \partial \Delta(\tau) / \partial \tau < 0 \), implying that (19) holds.

Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose \( \tau^c \) is the status quo tax rate. By Lemma 5, a coalition of two parties always prefers \( \tau^c \) to any other proposed tax rate \( \tau \): when \( \tau < \tau^c \), the coalition includes parties \( \mathcal{L} \) and \( \mathcal{D} \); when \( \tau > \tau^c \), it includes parties \( \mathcal{L} \) and \( \mathcal{E} \). This proves that \( \tau^c \) is stable.

Now consider any other status quo tax rate \( \tau^0 \neq \tau^c \). With some positive probability

\[
\pi_{\mathcal{L}} = \frac{\theta_2^t - \theta_1^t}{\theta}
\]

party \( \mathcal{L} \) will be the proposer and will always be able to form a coalition to replace \( \tau^0 \) with \( \tau^c \). Then, for any \( \tau^0 \neq \tau^c \), \( p(\tau^0|\tau^0) < 1 \).

Proof of Lemma 6. Differentiating \( u_D(\tau, Q_{t+1}) - u_D(\tau, Q_t) \) with respect to \( \tau \) we find

\[
\frac{\partial}{\partial \tau} [u_D(\tau, Q_{t+1}) - u_D(\tau, Q_t)] = Y(\tau, w_{t+1}, Q_{t+1}) - Y(\tau, w_t, Q_t) + \tau \left( \frac{\partial Y(\tau, w_{t+1}, Q_{t+1})}{\partial \tau} - \frac{\partial Y(\tau, w_t, Q_t)}{\partial \tau} \right)
\]

Since aggregate income is increasing in immigration, the derivative is positive if and only if

\[
\frac{\partial Y(\tau, w_{t+1}, Q_{t+1})}{\partial \tau} - \frac{\partial Y(\tau, w_t, Q_t)}{\partial \tau} \geq 0
\]

Condition (17) is a sufficient condition for this to hold.