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CHOOSING VERSUS REJECTING: THE IMPACT OF GOAL-TASK COMPATIBILITY ON DECISION CONFIDENCE

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This research posits that goal orientation influences the impact of the type of decision task (selection vs. rejection) on decision confidence. The data reported in a series of three experiments show that promotion-focused individuals tend to be more confident in their decisions in the context of a selection rather than a rejection task, whereas for prevention-focused individuals this effect is reversed. This research suggests that goal-task compatibility underlies the observed effects and shows that the impact of goal orientation can transfer the value of the process onto the judgment of the outcomes, as suggested by prior research, and have a significant impact on individuals' decision confidence. The empirical data support these propositions across different decision contexts, offering new insights into the role of goal-task compatibility in individual decision processes.

Individuals frequently are confronted with two types of decisions: decisions in which they must select an alternative from a given set, and decisions in which they must give up one or more of the available alternatives. To illustrate, an individual might consider buying an item (selection decision) and later consider returning the item (rejection decision). Although choosing one of two options is normatively equivalent to rejecting the other option, it has been shown that there are systematic differences in how individuals decide to select and to give up choice alternatives.

Prior research has shown that evaluations of a given object are asymmetric depending on whether the object is being acquired or forfeited, such that individuals are generally willing to pay less for a given product than they are willing to accept for giving up the same product (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). It has further been demonstrated that more extreme options (e.g., options having more positive and more negative dimensions) have a higher probability of being chosen as well as rejected relative to less extreme options (Dunning & Parpal, 1989; Shafir, 1993, see also Dhar & Wertenbroch, 2000). Prior research has also examined the impact of the nature of the decision task on indi-

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vidual decision processes, documenting that elimination-based evaluation tasks are likely to produce larger choice sets than selection-based tasks (Levin, Jasper, & Forbes, 1998).

Most prior research has focused on the asymmetric impact of choosing and rejecting decision tasks on choice. An important yet often overlooked aspect of the asymmetric nature of the choosing and rejecting tasks involves their impact on decision confidence. Indeed, whereas choice reflects the direction of individuals' preferences for the available alternatives (e.g., option A is preferred to option B), individuals' confidence in their decision reflects the strength of their preference for the chosen option and often determines whether these preferences are translated into actions (Gill, Swann, & Silvera, 1998). Thus, individuals' confidence in their choice determines the amount of additional information they seek, the extent to which they commit to the chosen alternative, and how willing they are to hedge their bets (Geller & Pitz, 1968; Hoge, 1970; Klayman, Soll, Gonzalez-Vallejo, & Barlas, 1999; Simmons & Nelson, 2006). Decision confidence is also likely to influence factors such as consumption patterns, the probability of returning the purchased item, as well as the nature and the intensity of post-purchase word-of-mouth communications.

This research examines the impact of the decision task (choosing vs. rejecting) on individuals' confidence in their decisions as a function of their goals. The theory advanced in this research builds on the notion that individuals derive value not only from the outcomes of their choices but also from the means with which these outcomes are pursued, and in particular, from the consistency of these means with individuals' self-regulatory orientation (Cesario, Grant, & Higgins, 2004; Higgins, 2000; Higgins, Idson, Freitas, Spiegel, & Molden, 2003; Lee & Aaker, 2004).

The regulatory focus theory identifies two distinct self-regulatory systems: a promotion-focused system and a prevention-focused system (Freitas & Higgins, 2002; Higgins, 1997). Promotion and prevention orientation differ in three key aspects: the needs that individuals seek to satisfy, the standards with which individuals aim to align themselves, and the salient outcomes. Thus, with respect to an individual's needs, promotion focus is associated with growth, development, and nurturance, whereas prevention is associated with safety, protection, and security (Higgins, 1998). With respect to standards that a person is trying to achieve, promotion orientation is associated with a focus on an ideal self, reflected in an individual's hopes, ideals, and aspirations; in contrast, prevention focus is associated with ought selves, reflected in duties, obligations, and responsibilities (Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994). Finally, with respect to behavioral outcomes, promotion focus makes salient the presence or absence of positive outcomes, whereas prevention focus makes salient the presence or absence of negative outcomes (Crowe & Higgins, 1997).

The regulatory fit principle implies that individual decisions are contingent on the degree to which the means used to pursue a certain goal are compatible with their regulatory focus. A promotion orientation is concerned with advancement and accomplishment, and with the presence and absence of positive outcomes, which are compatible with approach means. In contrast, prevention focus is concerned with safety, and the presence and absence of negative outcomes, which are more compatible with avoidance means. In this context, the regulatory fit hypothesis asserts that individuals derive additional value from the degree to which the means used to pursue the goal are compatible with their regulatory focus, such that promotion-oriented individuals are likely to receive higher utility from ap-

proach means, whereas prevention-focused individuals derive greater utility from avoidance means.

Building on the notion of regulatory fit, this research argues that goal orientation moderates the impact of the nature of the decision task (selection vs. rejection) on individuals' confidence in their decisions. In particular, it is proposed that promotion orientation is more compatible with selection tasks and that prevention orientation is more compatible with forfeiture tasks. This prediction follows from the notion that promotion focus, with its emphasis on positive outcomes, is more likely to be characterized by an inclination to approach matches with the desired end-state, which is more typical for selection than for forfeiture tasks. In contrast, prevention focus, which emphasizes avoiding negative outcomes, is likely to be characterized by an inclination to avoid mismatches with the desired end-state—a strategy more typical for forfeiture than for selection tasks.

This research further argues that this goal-task compatibility influences individuals' decision confidence. In particular, it is proposed that promotion-focused individuals are likely to display greater confidence in their decisions in the context of a selection-based rather than a forfeiture-based task, while prevention-focused individuals are likely to be more confident of decisions made in the context of a forfeiture-based rather than a selection-based task. These predictions are tested in a series of three studies presented in more detail in the following sections.

STUDY 1

The goal of this study was to test the hypothesis that goal orientation moderates the impact of the decision task on confidence.

METHOD

One hundred and twenty-seven Northwestern University undergraduates were presented with a series of binary choice sets and asked to select one of the available alternatives. Respondents were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (goal orientation: promotion focus vs. prevention focus) X 2 (choice task: select vs. reject), between-subjects factorial design. Each individual was presented with the goal-orientation manipulation, shown four choice sets in different product categories, and asked to make a choice from each of these four choice sets.

Goal orientation was manipulated by asking respondents to write essays about their hopes/aspirations and duties/obligations (e.g., Higgins et al., 1994). Respondents in the promotion-focus condition were given the following instruction: "Think about what you want to achieve a few years from now. Please write down some of the aspirations and ambitions that you hope to achieve." In contrast, respondents in the prevention-focus condition were told: "Think about your responsibilities for the next few years. Please write down some of the duties and obligations that you have to fulfill over the next years." This manipulation was based on the notion that an individual's self-regulation with respect to hopes and aspirations is linked to promotion goals, whereas self-regulation in relation to duties and obligations is linked to prevention goals (Higgins, 1997; Higgins et al., 1994).

Choice sets consisted of two options, each described on two attributes. The stimuli were designed so that choice alternatives were similar in their overall attractiveness: One of the options was superior on the first attribute and the other option was superior on the second attribute. Four categories were used: restaurant (attributes: dessert menu and walking distance); team member (attributes: fun to work with and reliable); TV set (attributes: picture clarity and reliability), and computer monitor (attributes: display resolution and warranty).

The decision frame was manipulated as follows. Respondents in the selection condition were given the following instruction: "Imagine that you are buying [a computer monitor] and have to choose from the following two reasonably priced options. Which one would you prefer?" In contrast, respondents in the forfeiture condition were told: "Imagine that you have purchased the following two reasonably priced [computer monitors] but had to return one. Which one would you prefer to give up?"[1] Each respondent had to answer four choice questions: one per product category. Conceptually, this procedure is consistent with the manipulations used in prior research (e.g., Chernev, 2001; Shafir, 1993).

Upon making a choice, respondents were asked to indicate their decision confidence on a 10-point scale (1 = not confident at all; 10 = very confident). At the end of the study respondents were debriefed and compensated for participating.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This research argues that the impact of goal orientation on decision confidence is moderated by the nature of the choice task. Specifically, it proposes that promotion-focused individuals are likely to be more confident in their decisions in the context of a selection rather than an elimination task, whereas prevention-focused individuals are likely to be more confident in their decisions in the context of an elimination rather than a selection task. The data were consistent with these propositions. Respondents in the promotion condition were more confident in the context of a selection than a rejection task ($M = 7.69$, $SD = 1.64$, $N = 128$ vs. $M = 7.26$), $SD = 2.01$, $N = 128$), whereas respondents in the prevention condition were more confident in the context of a rejection than a selection task ($M = 8.25$, $SD = 1.67$, $N = 128$ vs. $M = 7.66$), $SD = 1.69$, $N = 124$). The category-specific decision confidence data are reported in Table 1.

The significance of the data was examined by testing a model in which an individual's decision confidence was a function of goal orientation, choice task, and product category. Analysis of the data shows that goal orientation does indeed moderate the impact of the decision task on decision confidence, as indicated by the significance of the (goal orientation) X (decision task) interaction, $F(1, 123) = 6.17$, $p < .05$. Furthermore, consistent with the experimental predictions, the simple effect of a decision task for prevention-focused individuals was significant ($M = 8.25$ vs.

1. This manipulation does not exclude the possibility that some of the respondents will not "reframe" the decision task, such that those in the selection condition make a choice using an "avoid mismatches" strategy, whereas those in the forfeiture condition make a choice using an "approach matches" strategy (Higgins, 1997). Should such "re-framing" occur, however, it is likely to be symmetric across the two selection and forfeiture tasks and, hence, not likely to have a significant impact on the experimental results.

TABLE 1. Decision Confidence as a Function of Goal Orientation, Choice Task, and Product Category (Study 1)

	Goal Orientation			
	Promotion		Prevention	
Product Category	Select Task (N = 32)	Reject Task (N = 32)	Select Task (N = 31)	Reject Task (N = 32)
Team	7.69 (1.65)	7.56 (1.54)	7.39 (1.93)	8.25 (1.74)
Restaurant	8.56 (1.48)	7.50 (2.42)	8.42 (1.50)	8.44 (1.29)
Monitor	7.41 (1.64)	6.88 (2.21)	7.71 (1.57)	8.63 (1.58)
TV	7.09 (1.47)	7.13 (1.77)	7.13 (1.50)	7.69 (1.94)

Note. N is the number of observations. Standard deviations are given in parentheses.

$M = 7.66$, $F(1, 123) = 4.15$, $p < .05$. For promotion-focused individuals, the effect was directionally consistent with the predictions, although non-significant ($M = 7.69$ vs. $M = 7.26$), $F(1, 123) = 2.17$, $p > .10$. For respondents presented with the rejection task, goal orientation had a significant impact on decision confidence ($M = 8.25$ vs. $M = 7.26$), $F(1, 123) = 11.8$, $p < .001$. Finally, there was a significant main effect of goal orientation, indicating that respondents in the prevention condition were more confident in their decisions than those in the promotion condition ($M = 7.96$, SD = 1.70 vs. $M = 7.47$, SD = 1.84), $F(1, 123) = 5.55$, $p < .05$. Overall, these data are consistent with the notion that regulatory focus moderates the impact of the nature of the choice task on decision confidence, such that prevention-focused individuals are likely to have stronger decision confidence in the context of a rejection than a selection task, whereas for promotion-focused individuals this effect was reversed.

Study 1 examined how goal orientation moderates the impact of the decision task on confidence by presenting respondents with choice problems in which they were forced to choose one of the available alternatives. When making actual decisions, however, individuals do not always have to choose from the particular set presented to them, and they have the option of deferring the purchase or not purchasing at all. In this context, prior research has argued that the inclusion of a no-choice option may influence consumer decision processes and, hence, have a significant impact on choice outcome (Dhar, 1997; Dhar & Simonson, 2003). Therefore, an alternative strategy to test the experimental predictions is to examine the impact of goal orientation on decision confidence in a scenario in which respondents are not constrained by the forced-choice nature of the decision task. Providing individuals with the opportunity of not choosing a particular option can offer an alternative measure of decision confidence, such that individuals who are not confident in their decision are also more likely to select the no-choice option.

STUDY 2

Study 2 was designed to provide further support for the research hypotheses and extend the validity of the findings reported in Study 1. Unlike Study 1, in which respondents were forced to select one of the available alternatives, Study 2 used a set of problems in which respondents were given a non-forced choice task. A straightforward manipulation of a non-forced choice would have been to offer respondents a no-choice option—a manipulation successfully used in prior research

(Dhar, 1997; Dhar & Simonson, 2003). Given that the no-choice option is meaningless in the context of a rejection task, this study employed a manipulation in which the decision maker was given the option to defer the decision to a random selection such as the toss of a coin. The option of randomly selecting one of the alternatives also offered the possibility of collecting additional choice-related data by measuring the number of respondents making random selections and comparing them across the experimental conditions.

METHOD

One hundred and sixty-two Northwestern University undergraduates were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (goal orientation: promotion vs. prevention) X 2 (choice task: select vs. reject), between-subjects design. The goal orientation and choice task manipulations were identical to those used in Study 1. Choice sets consisted of two options, each described on two attributes. Two product categories were used as stimuli (TV and computer monitor); the attributes and attribute values describing these products were identical to the ones used in the first study.

Each individual was presented with two choice sets and was asked to choose one of the options in each set. Unlike the first study, in which respondents were forced to choose one of the options, in this study they were given a third option—that of randomly selecting one of the alternatives by tossing a coin ("will toss a coin to choose"). Next, respondents were asked to indicate their confidence in the decision using the same 10-point scale as in the first study (1 = not confident at all; 10 = very confident). Upon completing the study, respondents were debriefed and paid for participating in the study.

The dependent variable—decision confidence—was operationalized by comparing the number of respondents who opted to choose by toss of a coin (random selection) across the experimental conditions, as well as by directly measuring respondents' decision confidence.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The 162 respondents each made two choice decisions, yielding 324 observations in total (one subject who did not complete the goal orientation manipulation was eliminated from the sample). Because respondents were given the option to randomly select one of the alternatives by tossing a coin, confidence analysis included responses that specifically selected one of the available options. Using only the respondents who were confident enough in their decision to select a particular option instead of using a random-selection process (toss of a coin) provides a more stringent test of the research hypothesis since it likely excludes individuals who truly were indifferent to the options. Thus, the analysis of respondents' decision confidence ratings was based on 308 observations.

The data show that respondents in the promotion condition were more confident in the context of a selection than a rejection task ($M = 7.52$, $SD = 1.54$, $N = 82$ vs. $M = 7.00$, $SD = 1.31$, $N = 77$), whereas respondents in the prevention condition were more confident in the context of a rejection than a selection task ($M = 7.93$, $SD = 1.29$, $N =$

79 vs. $M = 7.45$, $SD = 1.25$, $N = 70$). This data pattern was consistent for both product categories. Analysis of the data shows that goal orientation indeed moderates the impact of the decision task on decision confidence, and that the (goal orientation) X (decision task) interaction was significant, $F(1, 158) = 7.93$, $p < .01$. For both promotion-focused and prevention-focused individuals, the effect of the decision task was significant ($M = 7.52$ vs. $M = 7.00$), $F(1, 158) = 3.96$, $p < .05$ and ($M = 7.45$ vs. $M = 7.93$), $F(1, 158) = 3.98$, $p < .05$. Furthermore, for respondents presented with the rejection task, goal orientation had a significant impact on decision confidence ($M = 7.93$ vs. $M = 7.00$), $F(1, 158) = 13.44$, $p < .001$.

The choice data offers further evidence of the moderating impact of goal orientation and choice task on decision confidence. In this context, the number of respondents electing to toss a coin to make a choice across the experimental conditions was used as an indication of their decision confidence. The data show that promotion-focused individuals were more likely to select the random-choice option in the context of a rejection than a selection task. In particular, 10.5% of the observations in the promotion-focus condition indicated a preference for the no-choice option in the context of a forfeiture task, compared to only 2.4% of those in the selection task. In contrast, for respondents in the prevention condition, this effect was reversed, with 1.4% of the responses favoring the random-choice option in the forfeiture context, and 5.4% favoring the random-choice option in the selection context. Analysis of these data shows that goal orientation moderates the impact of the decision task on the likelihood of selecting the random-choice option, $\chi^2(1) = 4.94$; $p < .05$. For promotion-focused respondents, the impact of choice task was significant, $\chi^2(1) = 3.86$; $p < .05$), lending further support for the experimental predictions. For prevention-focused respondents, the effect was directionally consistent with the experimental predictions, although it did not reach statistical significance, $\chi^2(1) = 1.78$; $p < .20$.

Overall, the data support the proposition that prevention-focused individuals are likely to be more confident in the context of a rejection than a selection task, whereas the corresponding effect for promotion-focused individuals was in the opposite direction. More important, the data show that the impact of the decision task on confidence is moderated by respondents' goal orientation—a finding consistent with the experimental predictions.

In addition to providing an indication of respondents' decision confidence, the use of random selection can also be viewed as a measure of respondents' willingness to undertake the very action of making a choice. In this context, respondents' preferences for action versus inaction can be viewed as a separate dimension in which goal orientation moderates the impact of the decision task on decision confidence (Chernev, 2004c). Individuals' general preference for inaction (omission) to action (commission) is captured by the concept of omission bias (Spranca, Minsk, & Baron, 1991), which has been attributed to the inclination to place more blame on actions (relative to inactions) leading to bad outcomes (Baron & Ritov, 1994; Ritov & Baron, 1995; see also Schweitzer, 1994). Preference for inaction can also be attributed to the fact that actions have been associated with greater regret relative to inactions (Landman, 1987; Spranca et al., 1991). Thus, individuals' preference for the no-choice option can also be interpreted as an inclination toward omission-based rather than commission-based decisions.

In general, this research argued that the observed effects are caused by the compatibility of respondents' goal orientation and the nature of the decision task. One

could argue, however, that the observed data pattern is caused by the shift in the reference point resulting from object ownership, whereby obtaining an object (selection task) is perceived as a gain; on the other hand, giving it up (forfeiture task) is perceived as a loss (Kahneman et al., 1991; Shafir, 1993). Indeed, because prevention-oriented individuals are likely to be more averse to losses than promotion-focused individuals (Liberman, Idson, Camacho, & Higgins, 1999), one can argue that the endowment effect should be stronger for prevention-oriented individuals. In this context, controlling for potential endowment effects associated with ownership of the object being acquired or forfeited can provide further support for the goal-task compatibility hypothesis.

STUDY 3

The primary goal of Study 3 was to examine whether goal orientation moderates the impact of the choice task (selection vs. rejection) on decision confidence independent of the endowment effect. To control for potential ownership-related loss aversion effects, in this study the decision task was held constant and the decision strategy used to make a choice was varied. In particular, this study compared two decision strategies: a selection-driven strategy in which the focus was on selecting one of the available options, and an elimination-driven strategy in which the focus was on rejecting one (or more) of the available alternatives. Thus, all respondents were asked to choose a product (acquisition task) but were asked to adopt different decision strategies (selection vs. elimination) to achieve that task. More detail on the experimental design, procedure, and results is offered in the following sections.

METHOD

One hundred eighty-six Northwestern University undergraduates were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (goal orientation: promotion vs. prevention) X 2 (decision strategy: select vs. reject), between-subjects factorial design. The goal orientation manipulation was identical to the one used in Studies 1 and 2. The decision strategy was manipulated as follows: Respondents in the selection condition were asked to evaluate all six options and to circle the option they found most attractive. In contrast, respondents in the elimination strategy condition were asked to cross out the less attractive alternatives, starting with the least attractive one, so that the only option left was their most preferred option. Conceptually, the latter strategy is similar to the elimination-by-aspects strategy in which individuals select the most attractive alternative by eliminating the less attractive ones (Tversky, 1972; see also Avnet & Higgins, 2003; Park, Jun, & Macinnis, 2000).

The stimuli were different computer carrying cases described on four attributes: brand name (Kenneth Cole, Targus, Belkin, Kensington), bag style (saddle bag, backpack, briefcase), material (leather, nylon, fabric), and color (black, blue, red, platinum). These attributes were randomly combined to yield six different choice options.

At the beginning of the study, respondents were given the goal orientation manipulation, followed by a choice task in which each respondent was given a set of

six alternatives and asked to select one of the options. The dependent variable, decision confidence, was measured using a scale identical to the one used in the first two studies (1 = not confident at all; 10 = very confident). Upon completing the study, respondents were debriefed and compensated for participating.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The 186 respondents each made one decision, providing 186 observations in total. The data show that respondents in the promotion condition were more confident in the context of a selection than an elimination task ($M = 6.98$, $SD = 1.64$, $N = 46$ vs. $M = 6.38$, $SD = 1.79$, $N = 46$), whereas respondents in the prevention condition were more confident in the context of a rejection than a selection task ($M = 7.42$, $SD = 1.52$, $N = 46$ vs. $M = 7.04$, $SD = 1.81$, $N = 48$). Analysis of the data shows that goal orientation has a significant moderating effect on the impact of the decision task on respondents' decision confidence, $F(1, 185) = 4.14$, $p < .05$. These findings are consistent with the experimental predictions.

The data presented in Study 3 support the proposition that the impact of goal orientation on decision confidence is moderated by the nature of the choice task and that prevention-focused individuals are likely to display greater confidence in their decisions in the context of a rejection than a selection task. Consistent with the experimental predictions, promotion-focused individuals were likely to be more confident in their decisions in the context of a selection-based task, whereas prevention-focused individuals were likely to be more confident in their decisions in the context of an elimination-based task. The fact that this effect was observed even without varying the nature of the decision task (selection vs. rejection) suggests that goal orientation moderates the impact of the decision task on decision confidence independent of the endowment effect.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The key premise of this research is that goal orientation influences how individuals approach selection and elimination tasks. The data reported in a series of three experiments show that promotion-focused individuals tend to be more confident in their decisions in the context of a selection than a forfeiture task, whereas prevention-focused individuals are more confident in decisions involving a forfeiture task rather than a selection task. The data further document that these effects can occur in both forced-choice (Study 1) and non-forced-choice tasks (Study 2). The data also show that the impact of goal orientation on decision confidence is independent of the endowment effect (Study 3).

These findings help to delineate the psychological experience of regulatory fit, whereby individuals derive additional utility from the fit between their goals and the strategies used to achieve these goals (Higgins, 2000; Kruglanski et al., 2000). In this context, this research demonstrates not only that individuals transfer process value to their perceptions of outcomes, but also that they are likely to be more confident in decisions that are reached in the presence of greater regulatory fit. Thus, promotion-oriented individuals are more confident in their decisions (1) in the context of a selection task rather than a forfeiture task and (2) when using a selection-

based rather than an elimination-based strategy to make a choice. These effects were reversed for prevention-oriented individuals. These findings support the notion that the impact of goal orientation can lead not only to a transfer of the value of the process ("value from fit") onto their judgments of the outcomes but can also have a significant impact on individuals' decision confidence.

This research contributes to the literature on decision compatibility (Chernev, 2004b, 2006; Fischer, Carmon, Ariely, & Zauberman, 1999; Fischer & Hawkins, 1993; Nowlis & Simonson, 1997; Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 1988) by demonstrating compatibility effects in the context of selection versus rejection tasks as a function of individuals' goal orientation. Unlike most of the compatibility studies that investigate the impact of compatibility on option evaluations and choice, the research presented in this article documents how goal compatibility moderates the impact of the nature of the decision task on people's confidence in their decisions. It extends the notion of compatibility to the area of self-regulation, and in this context underscores the role of goal-strategy compatibility. Building on prior decision research on compatibility effects, in which goals are often determined by the specifics of the choice task, this research examines individual goals in a more global, meta-cognitive context that goes beyond the specifics of the choice task at hand. In this broader context, it demonstrates that decision confidence is a function of the compatibility of the choice strategy with the active goal orientation.

In addition to documenting the impact of goal orientation on decision confidence, this research offers an opportunity for further investigation in this area. An interesting issue not explicitly addressed in this research concerns the effect of goal orientation on extremeness aversion. Prior studies have shown that individuals often prefer alternatives that can be construed as a compromise between options with more extreme values (Chernev, 2004a; Simonson, 1989; Simonson & Tversky, 1992). Building on the notion that prevention-oriented individuals focus on avoiding errors and minimizing negative choice outcomes, it can be argued that they are also more likely to display extremeness aversion than promotion-oriented individuals, who focus on maximizing positive choice outcomes. Investigating the effect of goal orientation on individual preferences for extreme alternatives will offer further insights into the role of motivational and self-regulatory factors in individual decision processes.

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