EQUILIBRIUM WAGE DIFFERENTIALS AND EMPLOYER SIZE

by

Kenneth Burdett
Cornell University

and

Dale T. Mortensen
Northwestern University

October, 1989

ABSTRACT

The presence of matching frictions in the form of lags in the arrival of information about the availability and terms of job offers unifies the labor market models analyzed in this study. Each model presented is related to a perfectly competitive counterpart in a natural way in the sense that its solution converges to the competitive equilibrium as frictions vanish. However, the characteristics of equilibrium when frictions are significant suggest novel theoretical insights and new empirical predictions:

First, important phenomena that cannot be explained by traditional equilibrium market analysis, such as unemployment and wage dispersion, naturally arise as characteristics of equilibrium in these models. Second, monotone cross-employer associations of the wage offered, the provision of non-wage attributes, and turnover with size of labor force are predicted. Third, the framework's implications for policy intervention, specifically the imposition of a minimum wage, are strikingly different from those of traditional competitive market analysis.
1. Introduction

Empirical research has documented that both inter-industry and cross-employer wage differentials exist, are stable, and cannot be fully explained by observable differences in worker ability or job characteristics that might require compensation. The current controversy over why workers of apparently equal ability are paid differently on similar jobs has two sides. On one, proponents argue that workers sort on non-observable ability in ways that explain the data without contradicting first principles of competitive market analysis, e.g., Murphy and Topel [1987]. On the other, adherents appeal to alternative wage determination theories, 'efficiency' and 'fair' wage arguments seem to be in particular vogue, e.g., Krueger and Summers [1987a]. In contrast, we argue that persistent wage differentials are consistent with atomistic wage formation and employment determination, at least in the non-union sector, once the effects of matching frictions are appropriately recognized. Furthermore, the argument also provides a direct explanation for the mysterious fact that large positive wage differentials are associated with employer size, especially in the non-union sector. (See Brown and Medoff [1989] for a review of the evidence.)

The framework used is based on Mortensen's [1988] generalization of Diamond's [1971] and Albrecht and Axell's [1984] equilibrium formulations of wage and employment determination as a non-co-operative wage-search and wage-posting game played by self-interested workers and employers. Relative to these earlier papers, the model's principal innovation is that workers obtain and respond to information about alternative job offers while employed. Although the equilibrium wage and employment levels limit to their perfectly
competitive counterparts as frictions vanish in the sense that offer arrival rates become instantaneous, the model has numerous empirical implications that are very different from those of the standard competitive equilibrium when frictions are non-trivial.

We begin by analyzing a simple equilibrium labor market model with matching frictions where all workers are equally productive on all jobs and have the same opportunity cost of employment. It is shown that wage dispersion characterizes the equilibrium if workers obtain offers when employed. Several testable predictions of interest follow: (a) a positive association between wage paid and job tenure, (b) a positive association between wage paid and experience, (c) a positive cross-firm association between wage paid and size of the labor force, and (d) a negative cross-firm association between the size of a firm's labor force and quits. That these implications are generally consistent with data on wage differentials drawn from many different sources is documented by Brown and Medoff [1989]. In particular, simple tabulations from the Quality of Employment Survey found in Idson (1986) are consistent with all of these predictions for worker not covered under union contracts but are not consistent with them for the subset of workers whose wage is determined via a union-employer negotiation. Since our theory of wage and employment determination is not intended to apply to the union sector, we view the evidence for both subsets as supportive.

The prototype model, analyzed in Section II, is too simple to address all of the framework's interesting empirical and policy implications. For this purpose, the analysis is subsequently extended in three separate directions. Although the principal objective is to derive empirical implications that flow from the general framework in each case, the extensions also represent
innovations in the theory of equilibrium wage differentials, compensating differentials, and employment.

In the first two extensions, introduced and analyzed in Section III, employer heterogeneity of two forms is considered separately: first a model with differences in productivity, and second a model with differences in the costs of providing job attributes is studied. The first generalization implies that more productive firms offer relative higher wages as a means of acquiring a relatively larger labor force because it is profit maximizing for them to do so. Hence, an equilibrium matching explanation exists for the persistence of inter-industry wage differentials reported by Dickens and Katz [1987a,b], Krueger and Summers [1987a,b], Gibbons and Katz [1987], by Murphy and Topel [1987]. Furthermore, the implication that equilibrium wage offers increases with labor force size is reinforced. The second extension, a search theoretic generalization of existing theories of compensating differentials, also implies a positive relationship between the provision of desirable job attributes and labor force size for similar reasons. Namely, employers with a cost advantage in supplying a desired attribute profit more by acquiring a larger labor force.

In the third extension, introduced and studied in Section IV, all jobs are equally productive but workers differ with respect to the opportunity cost of employment. In this case, equilibrium unemployment exceeds that associated with the operation of an efficient job-worker matching process in the sense that some matches that offer gains from trade fail to form. The unemployment inefficiency that arises in this case is attributable to the monopsony power that accrues to wage setting employers when frictions are present.
The model's implications for policy intervention are strikingly different from those of its perfectly competitive counterpart. For example, a mandated minimum wage increases wages paid with no employment effect in the simplest model. As shown in Section V, an increase in the minimum wage increases both equilibrium wage offers and equilibrium employment when workers differ with respect to the opportunity cost of employment if either offer arrival rates are independent of employment status or if offer arrival rates are large enough relative to the job separation rate. In each case, the effect of an increase in the minimum wage is to reduce the employers' dynamic monopsony power. A redistribution of trading surplus from employers to workers and a reduction in inefficiency associated with a monopsony wage determination result as a consequence of any increase in the minimum wage in these two cases.

II Pure Wage Dispersion

Suppose a large fixed number of both firms and workers participate in a labor market (formally a continuum of each). The measure of workers is indicated by \( n \), whereas the given measure of firms is normalized to equal the number one. In the initial model considered, all workers and all firms are identical.

Each worker receives information about job openings at random time intervals. The information arrival rate may well depend on the worker's employment status. Let \( \lambda_i \) denote the offer arrival rate faced by any worker while currently occupying state \( i \), where \( i = 0 \) represents unemployment and \( i = 1 \) indicates employment. Workers must respond to offers as soon they arrive; there is no recall.
As jobs are otherwise identical, employed workers move from lower to higher pay as opportunities arise. Workers also move from employment to unemployment from time to time as well as from job to job. In particular, exiting job-worker matches are assumed to breakup at an exogenous positive rate $\delta$.

Let $b$ indicate the opportunity cost of employment at any instant to an unemployed worker, i.e., $b$ represents the flow of unemployment insurance payment plus the dollar equivalent of the flow of leisure forgone when employed. As is well known in the situation envisaged, a rational unemployed worker accepts the first offer greater than some optimally chosen reservation wage. In this case, the expected wealth maximizing reservation wage, $r$, satisfies

\begin{equation}
(1) \quad r + k_1 \int_0^\infty \frac{1-F(x)}{1+k_1[1-F(x)]} dx - b + k_0 \int_0^\infty \frac{1-F(x)}{1+k_1[1-F(x)]} dx
\end{equation}

where $F(.)$ is the wage offer distribution and

\begin{equation}
(2) \quad k_0 = \frac{\lambda_0}{\delta} \text{ and } k_1 = \frac{\lambda_1}{\delta}
\end{equation}

represents the ratios of state dependent arrival rates to the job separation rate.2

The number of workers unemployed at time $t$ is indicated by $u(t)$. The flow of workers into employment is $\lambda_0 (1-F(t)) u(t)$, whereas the flow from employment to unemployment is $\delta (u(t))$. Thus, the time derivative of the number unemployed at time $t$ can be written as $du(t)/dt = \delta (u(t)) - \lambda_0 (1-F(t)) u(t)$. Hence, the unique steady-state number of unemployed, $u$, is

\begin{equation}
(3) \quad u = \frac{m}{1 + k_0 (1-F(r))}
\end{equation}
Given an initial allocation of workers to firms, the number of employed workers receiving a wage no greater than \( w \) at time \( t \), \( G(w,t)(u-u(t)) \), can be calculated, where \( G(w,t) \) is the proportion of employed workers receiving a wage no greater than \( w \) at \( t \). The time derivative of this stock is

(4) \[ \frac{d[G(w,t)(u-u(t))]}{dt} = \lambda_0 \max(F(w)-F(r),0)u(t) - \lambda_1 [1-F(w)]G(w,t)(u-u(t)) - \delta G(w,t)(u-u(t)). \]

The first term on the right-hand side of (4) describes the flow at time \( t \) of unemployment workers into firms offering a wage no greater than \( w \) and the second and third terms represent the flows out, those into higher paying jobs and into unemployment respectively.

The unique steady-state distribution across workers of wages earned can be written as

(5) \[ G(w) = \frac{\max(F(w)-F(r),0)[1-F(r)]}{1 + \lambda_1 (1-F(w))} \]

by virtue of (3) and (4). Note that (5) represents the distribution of earning across workers given any arbitrary wage offer distribution, \( F \), across employers.

In the sequel, the focus of attention is on steady-state behavior. The steady state measure (number) of workers earning a wage in the interval \([w-\varepsilon,w]\) is represented by \([G(w-\varepsilon)-G(w)](u-u)\), while \( F(w-\varepsilon)-F(w) \) is the measure of firms offering a wage in the same interval. Thus, the measure of workers per firm earning a wage \( w \) can be expressed as

(6a) \[ \lambda(w;F) = \lim_{\varepsilon \to 0} \frac{[G(w-\varepsilon)-G(w)](u-u)}{F(w-\varepsilon)-F(w)} \]
\[ \frac{nk_0[1+k_1(1-F(r))]}{[1+k_1(1-F(w))]^{1+k_1(1-F(w'))}} \], \text{if } w \geq r, \]

and

\[(6b) \quad \lambda(w; r, F) = 0, \text{if } w < r \]

where

\[(7) \quad F(w) = F(w') + \nu(w),\]

\(\nu(w)\) is the fraction, or mass, of firms offering wage \(w\) and \(F(w')\) is the fraction of all firms offering a wage strictly less than \(w\). From (6a) it follows immediately that \(\lambda(.; r, F)\) is (a) increasing in \(w\), (b) continuous except where \(F\) has a mass point, and (c) strictly increasing on the support of \(F\) and (d) a constant on any connected interval off the support of \(F\).

The equations of (6) specify the steady-state number of workers available to a firm offering any particular wage, given the wages offered by other firms are represented by the distribution function \(F\). To determine an equilibrium offer distribution, firm behavior has to be considered. Let \(p\) denote the constant flow of marginal revenue generated by employing any worker. The steady-state profit flow to a firm offering wage \(w\) equals \((p - w)\lambda(w; r, F)\) given the strategies of workers, characterized by the common reservation wage, and the behavior of other firms, summarized by the wage offer distribution. Given \(r\) and \(F\), each employer is assumed to seek a wage that maximizes steady-state profit flow, i.e., an optimal wage offer solves the following problem:

\[ (8) \quad \tau = \max_w ((p - w)\lambda(w; r, F)). \]
A non-cooperative equilibrium solution to the wage-search and wage-posting game sketched above can be described by a triple \((F,r,\pi)\) such that \(r\), the common reservation wage of unemployed workers, satisfies (1), the common profit flow, \(\pi\), satisfies (8), and \(F\), the wage offer distribution, is such that

\[
(p-w)I(w;r,F) = \pi \text{ for all } w \text{ in the support of } F
\]

\[
(p-w)I(w;r,F) \leq \pi \text{ otherwise.}
\]

Before establishing existence, non-continuous wage offer distributions are ruled out as possible equilibria. As stated previously, \(I(w^*;r,F)\) is discontinuous at \(w^*\) if, and only if, \(w^*\) is a mass point of \(F\). Thus, a firm offering any wage slightly greater than a mass point \(w^*\) increases its labor force significantly but suffer only a second order loss of profit per worker, as \((p-w)\) is continuous. Hence, any sufficiently small increase yields a greater profit if \(p > w^*\). If there were a mass of \(F\) at \(w^* \geq p\), all firms offering such a wage make non-positive profit. Hence, any firm offering a wage slightly lower than \(p\) in this case will make a strictly positive profit because it will still attract a strictly positive steady-state labor force.

In short, offering a wage equal to a mass point \(w^*\) cannot be profit-maximizing in the sense of (8). Note that this conclusion rules out a single market wage as an equilibrium possibility.

That the only equilibrium is characterized by a unique continuous wage offer distribution and an unique reservation wage is the principal claim to be established below. To rule out the trivial case, the inequalities \(\gamma > p > b \geq 0\) is assumed, i.e., gains from trade exist in the sense that the productivity of any worker exceeds the common opportunity cost of employment. Further, and this is the more critical restriction, job separation takes place and offers
do not arrive instantaneously, i.e., \( w > k_i > 0, i = 0,1 \). The role this restriction plays is discussed later.

Let \( w \) and \( \bar{w} \) represent the lowest and highest wage offers (formally, \( w \) and \( \bar{w} \) are the infimum and supremum of the support of \( F \) respectively). As non-continuous offer distributions have been ruled out (6a) implies that \( f(w; r, F) = \frac{mk_0}{(1+k_0)(1+k_1)} \) independent of the wage offered, as long as it is at least as great as \( r \). Hence, the employer offering the lowest wage in the market will maximize its profit flow if and only if

\[
\tag{10} \quad \bar{w} = r.
\]

In any equilibrium every offer must yield the same steady-state profit which equals

\[
\tag{11} \quad \pi = (p-w)f(w; r, F) = \frac{(p-w)mk_0}{(1+k_0)(1+k_1)} - \frac{(p-w)f(w; r, F)}{mk_0(1+k_1)/(1+k_0)(1-k_1[1-F(w)])^2}
\]

for all \( w \) in the support of \( F \). Obviously, the unique candidate for \( F \) is

\[
\tag{12} \quad F(w) = \left(\frac{1+k_1}{k_1}\right)\left[1 - \frac{(p-w)/(p-r)}{1/2}\right]
\]

by virtue of (10) and (11).

The equilibrium can now be constructed from (1), (10), (11), and (12). In particular, substituting (12) into (1) yields

\[
\tag{13} \quad r = b + \left[\frac{k_0-k_1}{k_1}\right] \int_{k_1}^{k_1[1-F(x)]} \frac{dx}{1+k_1[1-F(x)]}
\]

Recognizing that \( F(\bar{w}) = 1 \), manipulation of (12) yields
\[ \hat{w} = \left( k_1 / (1 + k_1) \right)^2 p + \left[ 1 - (k_1 / (1 + k_1)) \right] w. \]

Hence, substituting (14) into (13), and noting that \( r = w \) from (10), one obtains
\[ r = b + \frac{[k_0 - k_1]}{[1 + k_1]^2} \times [p - r] \]
or, equivalently, the unique equilibrium reservation wage is
\[ r = \frac{[1 + k_1]^2 b + [k_0 - k_1] k_1 p}{[1 + k_1]^2 + [k_0 - k_1] k_1}. \]

The equations (10), (14), and (15) imply the support of the only equilibrium candidate is non-degenerate and lies below \( p \). Therefore, profit is positive for every offer on the support.

To complete the proof that equations (10), (12), (14), and (15) characterize the unique equilibrium, we need only show that no wage off the support of the candidate \( F \) yields higher profit. Profit from offers less than \( \hat{w} \) on the support attract no workers by virtue of (6b) because (10) implies that the lower support is the reservation wage. A wage offer greater than \( \hat{w} \), the upper support, attracts no more workers than the upper support by virtue of (6d) because every employer has zero measure in the distribution of offers. The claim is established.\[ \]

Note that the constructed equilibrium is expressed in closed form by equations (10), (12), (14), and (15). Of particular interest is the equilibrium reservation wage function defined by (15). It is linear in both the opportunity cost of employment, \( b \), and the productivity, \( p \). Although always increasing in the worker opportunity cost of employment, the
reservation wage can decreases with productivity when the offer arrival rate when employed exceeds that when unemployed, i.e., $k_1 > k_0$. This result is explained by the fact that the returns to search while employed increase by more that the returns to search while unemployed when offers increase in response to a productivity increase if, and only if, offers arrive more frequently while employed.

Both competitive equilibrium and Diamond's (1971) solution to the wage posting game are special cases of our equilibrium solution. The competitive market clearing wage, labor productivity $p$, represents the equilibrium solution when offers arrive instantaneously when employed or unemployed, i.e., $k_0 = k_1 = \infty$. While Diamond's equilibrium obtains when workers receive no offers while employed, i.e., $k_1 = 0$. The competitive equilibrium contrasts sharply with the Diamond's solution to the wage-search and wage-posting game. As workers either do not receive or respond to offers while employed in his formulation of the problem, the only equilibrium offer is $b$. Specifically, as $k_1$ tends to zero, (14) implies that the highest wage in the market goes to $r$, whereas (15) implies an unemployed worker's reservation wage, $r$, converges to the opportunity cost of employment, $b$.

Although admitting the possibility that employed workers receive alternative offers and move from lower to higher paying jobs in response resolves the paradoxical nature of Diamond's solution, the equilibrium offer distribution still does not limit to a mass point at $p$, the competitive solution, as frictions vanish in the sense that both $k_0$ and $k_1$ both tend to infinity. The highest offer, $\hat{v}$, does converge to $p$ as offer arrival rates tend to infinity from (14) but equation (15) implies that the lowest equilibrium offer, the reservation wage, limits to less than $p$ for every
finite ratio of the two offer arrival rates equal to \( k_0/k_1 = \lambda_0/\lambda_1 \). Still, competitive equilibrium does obtain in the limit in the sense that the distribution of wages earned, \( G \), converges to \( w = p \) with probability one as \( k_1 \) tends to infinity by virtue of equation (5). The economic reason behind this result is that employees paid less than the highest wage offer instantly leave for better paying jobs in the limiting equilibrium.

The critical feature of the model is the positive relationship between the wage offered and labor force size that it implies. This simple inference is a consequence of three assumptions: hires from unemployment are independent of the labor force size, exogenous turnover is proportional to the numbers employed, and employed workers move from lower to higher paid jobs as random opportunities arise. As a corollary of the last assumption, voluntary quits and labor force size are negatively related.

It is now well known that both search and matching models provide an explanation for the observed positive relationship between wage earned and both experience and job tenure. These complement the more traditional human capital argument that the observed relationships represent returns to investments in general and firm specific human capital. To see that earnings and job tenure are positively related in the model studied here, simply note that the higher the wage a worker earns the less likely he or she is to receive a better offer. Hence, a worker is less likely to leave a firm paying a higher wage which implies a positive wage-tenure association. A positive relationship between experience and earnings obtains simply as a consequence of the fact that workers move only from lower to higher paying jobs through time.
The tabulations presented in Table 1.1, based on data for the non-union worker sample drawn from the 1973-77 Quality of Employment Survey reported in Idson [1986], are strongly consistent with the empirical implications reviewed above. Both the hourly wage and hourly earnings (hourly wage augmented by overtime, bonuses and commissions) increase monotonically with establishment size as measured by the number of employees. Indeed, the reported standard deviations of the mean estimates suggest that the hypothesis of independence of establishment size can be rejected in either case. In addition, quit rates fall and tenure increases with establishment size as the theory predicts. Finally, the predicted positive association between worker experience and labor force size implied by the movement of workers from lower to higher paying jobs is also observed, although in this case it is not quite monotonic.

That none of the predicted associations hold in the case of unionized workers is obvious from the tabulations reported in Table 1.2 for the sample of workers under union contract. This fact provides additional support for the following reason. The assumptions that firms post wage offers and workers move freely among employers in response to permanent wage differentials are intended to characterize only the non-unionized sector of the labor market. They obviously need not hold for the unionized sector, where wages are determined by a bargaining process. Consequently, if observations for the unionized sector of the labor market were similar to those for the non-unionized sector, one might surmise that some other explanation obtains.
III Productivity and Compensating Differentials

Generalization of the basic model provide both original contributions to the theory of wage differentials and a richer menu of empirical implications. Forms of employer heterogeneity are studied in this section using two related extensions of the basic model. In the first, employers differ with respect to productivity; costs of job attribute provision vary across employers in the second. As these models are similar in structure to the pure dispersion special case, derivations are only sketched.

Suppose there are two types of firms, one group more productive than the other. In particular, let \( p_1 \) denote the flow of the value of output from employing any worker to a type 1 firm, \( i = 0,1 \), and assume \( p_1 > p_0 \). The fraction of employers that are high productivity is indicated by \( \gamma \). Given all other aspects of the model as presented above, an equilibrium in this case can be described by \( (F_0, F_1, r, \pi_0, \pi_1) \) where \( r \), the reservation wage satisfies equation (1), and where \( F_1 \), the wage offer distribution over type 1 employers, and \( \pi_1 \), profit for each type 1 employer, satisfy

\[
(16a) \quad (p_1 - w)T(w; r, F) = \pi_1, \quad w \text{ on the support of } F_1
\]

\[
(16b) \quad (p_1 - w)I(w; r, F) \leq \pi_1, \quad \text{otherwise.}
\]

where the market distribution, \( F \), is the following mixture:

\[
(16c) \quad F(w) = \gamma F_1(w) + (1 - \gamma) F_0(w).
\]

Existence of such an equilibrium can be established using an argument similar to that applied in Section II.5

That more productive employers offer higher wages is a critical empirical characteristic of equilibrium in this case. Formally, we claim that
\( \omega_i \geq \omega_0 \) if \( \omega_i \) is on the support of \( F_i \), \( i = 0, 1 \). This assertion follows because

\[
(17a) \quad \pi_1 = (p_1 - \omega_i) f(\omega_i) \geq (p_1 - \omega_0) f(\omega_0) \quad > (p_0 - \omega_0) f(\omega_0) - \pi_0 \geq (p_0 - \omega_1) f(\omega_1).
\]

Comparing the difference between the first and last terms of (17) with the difference between the middle two yields the inequality \( (p_1 - p_0) f(\omega_1; r, \theta) \geq (p_1 - p_0) f(\omega_0; r, \theta) \). This inequality and the fact that \( f(\omega; r, \theta) \) is increasing in \( \omega \) imply

\[
(17b) \quad \omega_1 \geq \omega_0
\]
as claimed.

There are several relatively obvious implications of the above result. As the more productive employers offer higher wages, they have larger work forces, make more profit, and keep workers longer than less productive firms. Thus, the existence of productivity differences and matching frictions together provide an explanation for the persistence in cross-firm and inter-industry wage and profit differentials that has recently been highlighted in the empirical literature.

A closely related extension of the model admits the provision of non-wage job attributes. As before, assume workers are the same in that all face the same opportunity cost of employment and are equally productive in the usual sense. Let \( z \) represent the quantity or quality of a job characteristic valued by all workers. Each employer offers a wage-attribute pair \((v, z)\). For the sake of illustration, assume each worker values a wage-attribute pair \((v, z)\) according to the linear hedonic relation

\[
(18) \quad v = w + \beta z
\]
where $\beta > 0$ represents the forgone wage equivalent per unit of the attribute a worker would be willing to pay for its presence. (Note that a 'bad' job attributes can simply be regarded as a negative $z$.)

Suppose there are two types of firms and that one type can provide the attribute more cheaply. Formally let $c_j(z)$ represent the cost flow per worker of supplying attribute $z$, $j = 0, 1$ and assume $c_j(z)$ is increasing and strictly convex with $c_j(0) = 0$. Further, type 1 firms can supply the attribute at a cheaper cost in the sense that $c_1'(z) < c_0'(z)$ for all $z$.

As workers only care about the value of a job offered, $v$, employers choose a wage-attribute pair to maximize profit flow given $F(v)$, which is reinterpreted as the fraction of employers offering a job of value no greater than $v$. Let $r$ denote the reservation value satisfying (1) for a given $F$. Each firm maximizes its steady-state profit flow, i.e.,

$$(19) \quad \pi_j = \max_{(w,z)} \left\{ [p \cdot c_j(z) \cdot w] \lambda(w; r, F) \right\}.$$ 

An equilibrium here can be described by $(F^0_1, r, \pi_0, \pi_1)$, where $F^0_1$ is the distribution of values offered by type 1 employers, $r$ is the reservation wage of unemployed workers satisfying (1), and $(p_1 \cdot w) \lambda(w; r, F) = \pi_1$ on the support of $F^0_1$, and $(p_1 \cdot w) \lambda(w; r, F) \leq \pi_1$ otherwise, $i = 0, 1$. Although not attempted here, a straightforward extension of the arguments used in Section II establishes the existence of an equilibrium in this case. At such an equilibrium, an employer of type $j$ chooses the attribute level, $z_j$, to satisfy

$$(20) \quad c_j'(z_j) = \beta.$$
Hence, employers who find it cheaper at the margin to provide the attribute supply more of it, i.e., \( \pi_1 > \pi_0 \). Net productivity per worker for a type \( j \) employer, \( p_j \), equals the productivity flow of the employed worker plus the value of the attribute to the worker minus the cost of providing it, i.e.,

\[
p_j = p + \beta z_j - c_j(z_j) - p + \max(\beta z - c_j(z)) = p + \beta z - c_j(z).
\]

It follows from (20), (21), and the convexity of the cost function that employees of type 1 firms have greater net productivity, i.e., \( P_1 > \pi_0 \). Furthermore, by reasons of arguments previously made, those underlying (17), the equilibrium job values offered are disperse for both types of employers, but type 1 employers offer jobs of no lesser value that type 0 employers.

Thus, the highest value of the job offered by a type 0 employer is no greater than that offered by the type 1 employer offering the lowest value, i.e., the support of the random variable \( v_1 \) exceeds the support of \( v_0 \). This, of course, implies that type 1 employers have at least as many workers as type 0 employers and job to job movements are never to lower net productivity jobs from higher ones.6

In sum, the two extensions allowing for employer heterogeneity has several new empirical implications. Given differentials in productivity across employers, the more productive employers are more profitable, pay higher wages, and employ larger labor forces in equilibrium. All three of these implications seem to be consistent with observation on cross-firm and inter-industry differentials as well as the fact that wage paid and establishment size are monotonically associated as already noted. For essentially the same reasons, differentials in the cost of supplying job attributes in the model imply that employers with lower costs offer jobs of both greater value and
with more of the valued attribute. Hence, the model predicts a positive association between labor force size and both the value of the job and the presence of desirable job characteristics.

Table 2 provides evidence on the relation between one type of desirable job attribute, fringe benefits, and establishment size, again from the Quality of Employment Survey, for both nonunion and union workers. The first variable, EASY, might be interpreted as reflecting a worker's views about the total value of his or her job relative to attainable alternatives. (See the variable definitions at the bottom of Table 2.) Given this interpretation, worker's in larger establishments assign a smaller probability to the likelihood of finding a job of greater value, as our model predicts. The second variable, FB, asks for the worker's perception of the extent of fringe benefits. Its strong monotonic positive relationship to establishment size is also in the predicted direction. The remaining four variables independently measure the presence and/or extent of particular fringe benefits. All are consistent with the model's implication of positive association with labor force size.

Unlike Table 1, which relates wage, earnings, and quits to establishment size, the relationship of both perceived value and perceived presence of fringe benefits to establishment size are also generally monotone for workers under union contracts. Still, the relationships are not nearly as pronounced in the case of worker response variables and are not even monotone in the case of measures reflecting the actual presence of specific fringes. It is also possible that union contracts eliminate only wage competition. Maybe, fringe benefits still reflect a form of non-price competition among union employers as well as the non-union.
IV Equilibrium Unemployment

For the models analyzed so far, equilibrium unemployment is efficient in the sense that "gains from trade" are exploited whenever an opportunity to form a job-worker match arises. Unemployment is only frictional, an inevitable consequence of the time consuming nature of the matching process. When workers have different opportunity costs of employment this conclusion no longer holds. To establish that inefficient unemployment exists when workers differ with respect to the opportunity cost of employment, the following straightforward generalization of the pure wage dispersion case is introduced.

Let $H(b)$ denote the proportion of workers whose opportunity cost of employment is no greater than $b$ and assume $H(.)$ has a bounded support with an associated density, $h(.)$. Thus, $h(b)$ denotes the measure of workers with an opportunity cost of employment no greater than $b$. The reservation wage for each type of worker must still satisfy (1). Hence the distribution function $H(.)$ and (1), which of course depends on the distribution of wage offers, $F$, generate together a distribution of reservation wages used by workers when unemployed. Let $m(r,F)$ represent the measure of workers whose reservation wage when unemployed is no greater than $r$ when $F$ is the offer distribution. Formally,

$$m(r,F) = m(b(r,F))$$

where $b(.,F)$ is the worker type whose reservation wage is $r$, i.e.

$$b(r,F) = r + (k_1 + k_2) \int_r^\infty \frac{1 - F(x)}{1 + k_1 [1 - F(x)]} \, dx$$

by virtue of (1). As one can easily verify, $b(.,F)$ is strictly increasing in $r$. 

Let $u(r,F)$ denote the steady-state number of unemployed workers with a reservation wage no greater than $r$. In a steady-state the flow from unemployment to employment of those workers with a reservation wage no greater than $r$ must equal the flow out of jobs of the same type of workers, i.e.,

$$
\lambda_0 \int_{r_0}^{r} \{1-F(x)\}u(dr,F) = \lambda_0 [m(r,F) - u(r,F)],
$$

where $r_0$ is the reservation wage of workers with the lowest opportunity cost of employment. Similarly, the flow of workers from unemployment to employment at a wage no greater than $w$ must equal the flow of such workers from these jobs, i.e.,

$$
\lambda_0 \int_{r_0}^{w} \{F(w)-F(r)\}u(dr,F) = \left[6 + \beta_1[1-F(w)]\right]G(w)(m-u)
$$

where $G(w)(m-u)$ is the steady-state numbers employed at a wage no greater than $w$. Obviously,

$$
G(w)(m-u) = \frac{k_0 \int_{r_0}^{w} \{F(w)-F(r)\}u(dr,F)}{1 + k_1[1-F(w)]}
$$

and

$$
\left[1+k_0[1-F(r)]\right]u(dr,F) = m(dr,F).
$$

Consequently, the steady-state number of workers available to an employer offering wage $w$, given the offer distribution $F$, can be written as

$$
I(w,b(\cdot),F) = \frac{(m-u)G(w)}{dF(w)} = \frac{k_0 \int_{r_0}^{w} \{1+k_1[1-F(r)]\} \frac{m(dr,F)}{1+k_0[1-F(r)]}}{(1+k_1[1-F(w)])^2}
$$
at least when $F$ is continuous. Finally, as (22) and (23) imply

$$m(dr;F) = \frac{m(d\theta)}{dr} = \frac{k_0[1-F(r)]}{k_1[1-F(r)]} m(d\theta)$$

Substitution into (27) yields

$$I(w,F) = \frac{k_m \eta(b(w,F))}{[1 + k_1[1-F(w)]]^2}$$

In this case an equilibrium can be described by $(\eta(.,F),F,\pi)$, where $\eta(.,F)$ is a distribution of reservation wages across workers via (22) and (23) and $F$ is a wage offer distribution such that all offers are profit maximizing, i.e.,

$$(29a) \quad (p-w)\eta(w,F) = \pi, \text{ if } w \text{ on the support of } F$$

$$(29b) \quad (p-w)\eta(w,F) \leq \pi, \text{ otherwise.}$$

It follows immediately that the lowest equilibrium wage offer is the monopoly wage, $w$, i.e.,

$$(30) \quad w = \arg\max_{x} \left\{ (p-x)\eta(b(x,F)) \right\} \frac{x}{w}$$

which may well be in the interior of the support of $H(.)$. Once the lowest wage is specified, (28) yields

$$(31) \quad \pi = (p-w)k_m \eta(b(w,F))/[1+k_1]^2 = (p-w)k_m \eta(b(w,F))/[1+k_1[1-F(w)]^2]$$

for any equilibrium offer distribution. Thus, $F$ must satisfy

$$F(w) = \left\{ \frac{1+k_1}{k} \right\}^{1/2} \left[ \frac{(p-x)H(b(x,F))}{(p-y)H(b(y,F))} \right]^{1/2}$$
for all \( w \) in the support of \( F \). Of course, in the case where workers have the same opportunity cost of employment, (30) and (32) reduces to (10) and (12).

We next show (31) and (32) describe the unique equilibrium to the wage search and posting game as formulated. First, note that by differentiating (32) with respect to \( w \) and substituting from (23) for the derivative of \( b(w,t) \) with respect to \( w \), any solution to (32) is the solution to an ordinary first order differential equation, which is unique up to a constant of integration. As \( w \) is uniquely specified by (30), the constant of integration is determined by the requirement \( F(\bar{w}) = 0 \). Further, as the right side of (32) is bounded above by \( (1+k_1)/k_1 > 1 \) at \( w = p \), an upper bound on the support, \( \bar{w} \), exists and it is strictly less than \( p \). It is the smallest number that sets the right side of (32) equal to one. Finally, as the solution to (32) is increasing in \( w \) if and only if \( (p-w)H(b(w,F)) \) is decreasing in \( w \) everywhere, offering a wage in a region where \( (p-w)H(b(w,F)) \) is increasing is clearly not profit maximizing. Thus, any sub-interval on which the solution to (32) is decreasing is not in the equilibrium support. Formally, these facts imply that the unique equilibrium distribution function solves

\[
(32a) \quad F(\bar{w}) - \min_{w < \bar{w}} \left\{ \frac{1+k_1}{k_1} \right\} \left[ 1 - \frac{(p-x)H(b(x,F))}{(p-w)H(b(w,F))} \right]^{1/2} \quad \forall w \leq [\underline{w}, \bar{w}]
\]

where \( \bar{w} \) is the smallest solution to

\[
(32b) \quad F(\bar{w}) = 1
\]

and \( \underline{w} \) is defined by (30).

Given worker heterogeneity with respect to the opportunity cost of employment, dispersion in the wages offered implies that some efficient matches will not form. In particular, a efficient worker-employer pair will
fail to form when the employer's wage offer is less than a worker's reservation wage even though the revenue generated from employing that worker exceeds his or her opportunity cost of employment. For the sake of the argument, let frictional unemployment be defined as the level that would prevail if every employer and worker pair with opportunity cost of employment less than marginal productivity were to form a match when the opportunity arose. Total unemployment minus frictional unemployment is then a measure of inefficient unemployment in the sense that it reflects failures to capture all gains from trade.

For workers with a reservation wage in any small interval \([r,r+dr]\), (26) can be used to show that total unemployment of this group in equilibrium is \(m(dr;F)/(1+k_0(1-F(r)))\), whereas frictional unemployment is \(m(dr;F)/(1+k_0)\). As efficiency requires that only those workers with an opportunity cost of employment less than \(p\) participate, total equilibrium inefficient unemployment, given offer distribution \(F\), is appropriately defined as

\[
(33) \quad \mu = \int_r^{r(F)} \left[ \frac{1}{1+k_0(1-F(r))} - \frac{1}{1+k_0} \right] m(dr)
\]

\[
= \int_r^{r(F)} \left[ \frac{k_0 F(r)}{(1+k_0)[1+k_1(1-F(r))]} \right] m(dr)
\]

where \(r(p,F)\) is the optimal reservation wage for a worker whose opportunity cost of employment \(b\) equals \(p\), given \(F\).

Using (22) and (23) to change the variable of integration from \(r\) to \(b\), yields total inefficient unemployment as the following integral over the set of workers with opportunity cost of employment less than \(b\) equal to productivity \(p\).
V The Effects of A Minimum Wage on Equilibrium Wages and Employment

An important but unappreciated implication of labor market models with matching frictions is that labor market policies, such as a mandated minimum wage, have quite different effects on wages and employment than those predicted by perfect competition, even though equilibrium converges to the competitive solution as frictions vanish. To illustrate this claim here, consider the simplest case analyzed -- a unit continuum of identical employers with constant labor productivity $p$ and a continuum of identical workers of measure $m$ with opportunity cost of employment $b$. The competitive equilibrium wage is $p$ and employment per firm is $m$ if and only if $p > b$. Hence, a minimum wage below $p$ has no effect while one above $p$ prevents all trade.

When matching frictions are present, the lowest wage offered in equilibrium is the common reservation wage whereas the highest wage is strictly less than $p$ (as shown in Section I). As all wage offers are acceptable in equilibrium, unemployment $u = u = m/(1+k_0)$ by virtue of equation (3). In this case, a minimum wage less than the equilibrium reservation wage has no effect. If the minimum wage is larger than the reservation wage, however, it acts as an exogenously imposed lower bound on the support of the equilibrium offer distribution. The offer distribution still satisfies (12) but in this case the lowest wage offered, $w_0$, is the minimum wage. Further, the highest wage offered, still determined by (14), increases with the minimum.
Suppose the mandated minimum wage \( w \) is in the interval \([r, p]\), where \( r \) is the solution to (15). Any increase in the minimum wage within this interval increases the equilibrium wage offer distribution in the sense that the new one stochastically dominates the old one. The claim follows from inspection of (12) and (14). There is, however, no change in the equilibrium level of unemployment as all offers are still acceptable. An increase in a minimum wage in this case only redistributes the rents \((p-b)\) from employers to workers by off-setting the monopsony power endowed on employers by the matching frictions. Of course, a minimum wage in excess of the value of productivity will again eliminate trade.

Consider now the situation in which workers have different opportunity costs of employment, that analyzed in the previous section. Although the improvement in wage offers caused by an increase in a minimum wage induces an increase in the reservation wage of all worker types, it does not necessarily imply an increase in the equilibrium level of unemployment. Indeed, an increase in a minimum wage induces an increase in the wage offers but a decrease in the level of inefficient unemployment in two empirically relevant cases: when the two offer arrival rates (those faced when employed and when unemployed) are equal, and when both offer arrival rates are sufficiently large relative to the exogenous job-worker separation rate.

Suppose first \( k_0 = k_1 \). Inspection of (23) establishes that the reservation wage of each worker equals his or her opportunity cost of employment, i.e., \( r = b \) for all \( b \). Thus, there is no feedback from demand conditions to the reservation wage when the offer arrival are the same when employed or unemployed. An increase in a mandated minimum wage will increase the wage offer distribution in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance.
but the distribution of reservation wages will not change. The claimed result now follows directly from (32).

The proof of the second claim, equilibrium wages increase and unemployment decreases in response to an increase in the minimum wage even when the offer arrival rates are not equal provided that both are sufficiently large, is a consequence of the following observation. By virtue of equations (23) and (32) respectively, the opportunity cost of employment associated with the reservation wage and the largest offer limit to

\[
(35) \quad b(r,F) = \frac{r_0}{k_1} r + (1 - \frac{r_0}{k_1}) \bar{w}
\]

and

\[
(36) \quad \bar{w} = p
\]

as both \( k_0 \) and \( k_1 \) tend to infinity. In other words, only the largest wage offer matters in the determination of reservation wage rates when offer arrival rates are sufficiently large and the largest offer is close to the given value of labor productivity. Because the largest offer and consequently the reservation wage are approximately independent of the minimum wage so long as the minimum wage is less than productivity, \( p \), when offer arrival rates are large relative to the rate of exogenous job turnover, the same argument used to establish the first claim applies in the proof of the second as well.

VI SUMMARY

The presence of matching frictions in the form of lags in the arrival of information about the availability and terms of job offers unifies the labor market models analyzed in this study. Each model presented is related to a perfectly competitive counterpart in a natural way in the sense that its
solution converges to the competitive equilibrium as frictions vanish. However, the characteristics of equilibrium when frictions are significant suggest novel theoretical insights and new empirical predictions:

First, important phenomena that cannot be explained by traditional equilibrium market analysis, such as unemployment and wage dispersion, naturally arise as characteristics of equilibrium in these models. Second, monotone cross-employer associations of the wage offered, the provision of non-wage job attributes, and turnover with size of labor force are predicted. Furthermore, these novel empirical implications appear to be consistent with the available empirical evidence. Third, the framework's implications for policy intervention, specifically the imposition of a minimum wage, are strikingly different from those of traditional competitive market analysis. In sum, further research, both empirical and theoretical, that delves more deeply into the conceptual structure sketched here promises both novel and practical innovations.
FOOTNOTES

1 Other authors who have offered related matching arguments include Montgomery [1988] and Lang [1987].

2 For a formal derivation of equation (1), which is not trivial, see Mortensen and Neumann [1988]. Intuitively, the equation requires that an acceptable wage plus the expected return to search while employed compensate for the forgone unemployment benefit plus the expected return attributable to continued search while unemployed. Note that the reservation wage exceeds the opportunity cost of employment, b, if and only if offers arrive more frequently while unemployed because employment offers a relative return to search benefit as well as a wage when \( k_1 > k_0 \).

3 The unique equilibrium can be interpreted as a mixed strategy solution to a formal specification of a one-shot wage posting game played by the employers. That there is no single equilibrium market wage is simply a reflection of the fact that there is no symmetric pure strategy solution to the game.

4 The standard deviation of the mean estimate for each size category is the standard deviation of the sample (reported in parentheses) divided by the square root of the sample size (reported as the number of observations in the last row of each table) minus 1.

5 Mortensen (1988) establishes existence of equilibrium for any number of different employer types.

6 Note that in equilibrium the wage offered is given by \( w = v - \beta z \) where both \( z \) and \( v \) vary across employer types. Because \( v \) and \( z \) are positively correlated across employers, the OLS estimate of the compensating differential will be inconsistent and biased upward as an estimate of the value workers place on the characteristic, \( \beta \). Gronberg and Reed [1989] provide evidence that supports this implication.

7 Of course, non-continuous distributions can also be ruled out in this case using an argument analogous to that applied in Section II.
REFERENCES


Table 1-1: Means and Standard Deviations by Establishment Size -- Non-union

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>1-9</th>
<th>10-99</th>
<th>100-999</th>
<th>1000+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WAGE</td>
<td>5.204</td>
<td>5.664</td>
<td>7.097</td>
<td>8.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.87)</td>
<td>(2.83)</td>
<td>(3.45)</td>
<td>(3.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HREARN</td>
<td>5.561</td>
<td>7.593</td>
<td>8.251</td>
<td>9.382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.33)</td>
<td>(8.68)</td>
<td>(3.92)</td>
<td>(4.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUIT</td>
<td>0.380</td>
<td>0.359</td>
<td>0.244</td>
<td>0.183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.49)</td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TENURE</td>
<td>4.897</td>
<td>5.571</td>
<td>8.015</td>
<td>10.164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.35)</td>
<td>(6.58)</td>
<td>(7.94)</td>
<td>(8.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPERIENCE</td>
<td>19.09</td>
<td>18.31</td>
<td>19.99</td>
<td>22.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13.2)</td>
<td>(12.4)</td>
<td>(12.0)</td>
<td>(10.7)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No. Observed: 111, 193, 107, 67

Table 1-2: Means and Standard Deviations by Establishment Size -- Union

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>1-9</th>
<th>10-99</th>
<th>100-999</th>
<th>1000+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WAGE</td>
<td>7.836</td>
<td>7.504</td>
<td>6.804</td>
<td>7.299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.94)</td>
<td>(2.84)</td>
<td>(3.45)</td>
<td>(2.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HREARN</td>
<td>8.171</td>
<td>8.739</td>
<td>7.917</td>
<td>8.270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.07)</td>
<td>(3.57)</td>
<td>(3.07)</td>
<td>(2.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUIT</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.172</td>
<td>0.128</td>
<td>0.209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TENURE</td>
<td>10.20</td>
<td>10.04</td>
<td>9.173</td>
<td>9.648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8.57)</td>
<td>(8.24)</td>
<td>(7.35)</td>
<td>(8.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPERIENCE</td>
<td>26.36</td>
<td>22.098</td>
<td>20.06</td>
<td>19.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(13.2)</td>
<td>(12.0)</td>
<td>(12.2)</td>
<td>(12.4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

No. Observed: 23, 91, 110, 71

Variable Definitions:

- **WAGE**: The hourly straight time wage.
- **HREARN**: Average hourly earnings, including overtime pay, bonuses, and commissions.
- **QUIT**: A dummy equal to unity if the employee quit between 1973-1977.
- **TENURE**: Years of employment with current employer.
- **EXPERIENCE**: Years of labor force experience.

| Table 2-1: Means and Standard Deviations by Establishment Size -- Non-union. |
|-----------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| NAME        | 1-9   | 10-99 | 100-999 | 1000+ |
| EASY        | 0.249 (0.47) | 0.226 (0.40) | 0.187 (0.38) | 0.106 (0.33) |
| FB          | 0.162 (0.37) | 0.259 (0.44) | 0.366 (0.48) | 0.476 (0.50) |
| MED         | 0.622 (0.49) | 0.805 (0.46) | 0.935 (0.25) | 0.985 (0.12) |
| RET         | 0.333 (0.47) | 0.497 (0.50) | 0.822 (0.38) | 0.940 (0.24) |
| DAYVAC      | 11.55 (7.17) | 12.56 (7.30) | 15.21 (11.55) | 16.41 (6.91) |
| STCPAY      | 0.566 (0.50) | 0.502 (0.49) | 0.844 (0.36) | 0.863 (0.35) |
| No. Observed | 111   | 193   | 107   | 57   |

| Table 2-2: Means and Standard Deviations by Establishment Size -- Union |
|-----------------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| NAME        | 1-9   | 10-99 | 100-999 | 1000+ |
| EASY        | 0.217 (0.42) | 0.157 (0.37) | 0.157 (0.37) | 0.145 (0.35) |
| FB          | 0.304 (0.47) | 0.341 (0.48) | 0.366 (0.48) | 0.521 (0.50) |
| MED         | 0.913 (0.29) | 9.965 (0.23) | 0.964 (0.19) | 1.060 (0.06) |
| RET         | 0.870 (0.36) | 0.812 (0.28) | 0.836 (0.37) | 0.972 (0.17) |
| DAYVAC      | 15.67 (8.50) | 13.02 (6.51) | 14.04 (7.57) | 14.13 (8.24) |
| STCPAY      | 0.543 (0.51) | 0.630 (0.49) | 0.406 (0.49) | 0.557 (0.48) |
| No. Observed | 23    | 91    | 110   | 71   |

**Variable Definitions:**

EASY: A dummy equal to unity if respondent feels that it would be easy to find another job with the same income and benefits.

FB: A dummy equal to unity if respondent feels fringe benefits are good.

MED: A dummy equal to unity if medical, dental, and/or life insurance are available.

RET: A dummy equal to unity if respondent if retirement program is available.

DAYVAC: Number of paid vacation days per year.

STCPAY: A dummy equal to unity if given paid sick days.