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COMPETITIVE EFFICIENCY IN AN OVERLAPPING-GENERATION MODEL
WITH ENDOGENOUS POPULATION

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INTRODUCTION
A puzzling result regarding market failure was obtained by Samuelson [6] in his exact consumption-loan model. He showed that under the conventional assumptions on the economic environment, the fact that "each and every today is followed by a tomorrow" ([6], p. 682) may lead competitive markets to fail in achieving the standard Pareto-efficiency objective. As the standard sources for market failure (externalities and sonconveities) are absent from Samuelson's model, it was natural to "blame" the infinity of the time horizon as such for the resulting inefficiency. ²/²

Our purpose in this paper is to show that if certain exogenous features of the Samuelsonian model are treated as being endogenously determined by economic factors, the above mentioned inefficiency, with its associated puzzles, does not arise.

More specifically, in the model presented below, population is an endogenous variable with parental preferences determining the number and "quality", (in a utility sense) of children. Importantly, endowments of children are viewed to be bequeathed to them by parents. Under the assumptions of perfect capital markets and perfect foresight, it is shown that every competitive equilibrium is Pareto-efficient (under any appropriate definition of Pareto-efficiency). ²/² While the pathological behavior of competitive markets in the Samuelsonian model must indeed be attributed to the infinity of the economy's time horizon (in the sense that in finite horizon economies
the efficiency of competition is guaranteed even under Samuelson's formulation of exogenous population evolution), the fact that in our model each representative individual has an infinite time horizon (even though he himself is finitely lived) is shown to be sufficient to restore the efficiency properties of competitive markets. To the best of our knowledge, this paper presents one of the first attempts to analyze formally the properties of competitive markets insofar as the efficiency production of population is concerned.

II GALE’S FORMULATION OF SAMUELSON’S MODEL

In this section we briefly review the essence of Samuelson’s inefficiency result as presented in Gale [2].

Consider a Samuelsonian overlapping-generations model in which each individual lives for two periods and the population grows geometrically at a rate γ. Each individual is endowed with a vector \( e = (e_0, e_1) \) where \( e_i (i = 0, 1) \) represents the (fixed) endowment of an individual in the \( i \)th period of his life. All people of all generations are assumed to be identical in endowments and preferences. As in Samuelson, goods do not keep and production is ruled out.

Let \( c(t) = (c_0(t), c_1(t+1)) \) be the consumption vector of an individual born in period \( t \), where \( c_i(s) \) is the consumption of an individual of age \( i \) in time-period \( s \).

On the assumption that nothing gets thrown away the economy’s resource constraint in period \( t \) is given by

\[
\gamma (e_0 - c_0(t)) + (e_1 - c_1(t)) = 0
\]

since there are \( \gamma \) young individuals per an old one.
We assume that the representative person has a preference ordering on his lifetime consumption vector which can be represented by a continuous, monotone increasing and quasiconcave utility function. The utility function of an individual born in period $t$ is denoted by $u(c_{0}(t), c_{1}(t+1))$. As usual, a perfect foresight competitive equilibrium is an infinite sequence of interest factors $(r_{t})_{t=0}^{\infty}$ and a feasible consumption program such that each individual maximizes utility subject to the budget constraint defined parametrically by the interest-factors.

Restricting our attention in this section to steady-state equilibria it is easy to see that these must satisfy

\[(2.2) \quad (\rho - \gamma)(c_{0} - c_{0}^*) = 0\]

where $\rho$ is the (time-independent) interest factor associated with an equilibrium steady-state. Thus, steady-state equilibria are of two types: (1) that for which $\rho = \gamma$, the golden-rule program, and (2) that for which $c_{0} = c_{0}^*$, i.e. autarkic (no-trade) equilibrium.

Denoting by $\mathcal{E}$ the golden-rule program, Figure 1 summarizes the possibilities for steady-state equilibrium.

The figure demonstrates the possibility of steady-state competitive
inefficiency. This obtains at the no-trade equilibrium represented by point $\delta^s$ (and $p < \gamma$). The inefficiency is illustrated by the fact that in this situation the economy could instantaneously move to $\bar{c}$ making both the existing old and everybody else up to the indefinite future better off.

III INFINITE INDIVIDUAL HORIZON AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF COMPETITIVE INEFFICIENCY

One possible objection to the Samuelsonian model is that while new generations are continually being produced by the older ones, there is nothing in the model that rationalizes this reproductive behavior. This difficulty can be resolved by appealing to the reproductive instincts of parents which implies that parents have preferences for children. Under such an interpretation, there will now be a utility link between any two successive generations. If the link is via parents having the utility function of their children as an argument in their own utility function then, recursively, the utility functions of all the (infinitely many) future generations become arguments in each representative individual's utility function. \[5\] We will show now that under this specification of intergenerational preferences perfect foresight competitive equilibria are always efficient.

For each individual born in period $t$, ($t = 0, 1, \ldots$) the utility function is now assumed to be: \[5\]

\[(3.1) \quad u(c_o(t), c_i(t+1), \gamma(t), u(c_o(t+1), c_i(t+2), \gamma(t+1), u(\ldots, \ldots)))\]

where $\gamma(s)$ is the number of children of the representative individual of generation $s$, $s = t, t + 1, \ldots$. The utility function $\nu$ is assumed to be monotone increasing and continuous. The dependence of $u$ on $\gamma(t)$ stems
from the fact that $\gamma(t)$ is an important endogenous variable of our model. But, even if $\gamma(t)$ were exogenous to the model, it should appear as an argument in $u$ whenever it is desired to give a strictly positive utility weight to each (present and) future member of the family.

In order to define the representative individual's maximization problem in a competitive economy we must first define the budget set with which he is confronted. On the assumption that there exist perfect capital markets $S^f$ in which each individual of generation $t (t = 0, 1, 2, \ldots)$ can borrow and lend at the same (parametrically given) interest rates, we can lump up all the individual budget constraints with which each member of a given family $f (f = 1, \ldots, F, \text{ where } F \text{ is the number of families, assumed to be fixed})$ will eventually be confronted with into a single family budget constraint given by:

$$
\sum_{s=t}^{t + 1} \prod_{i \in S} \frac{g_0(s)}{g(s)} (c_1^f(i) + \gamma^f(1)c_0^f(i) - e_1^f(1) - \gamma^f(1)e_0^f(i)) - B_1^f(t) \leq 0,
$$

where

$$
B_1^f(t) = \sum_{s=0}^{t} \prod_{i \in S} \rho(s)[\gamma^f(1)c_0^f(i) - c_0^f(i) - \gamma^f(1)e_0^f(i)],
$$

$t = 0, 1, \ldots; f = 1, \ldots, F$.

The meaning of $B_1^f(t)$ is the value, per individual of age $1$ belonging to family $f$, at time $t$ of the cumulative net intergenerational transfers of wealth between period $0$ and period $t$.

In any period of time $t$, the economy-wide resource availability constraint is given by:

$$
\sum_{f=1}^{F} \prod_{s=0}^{t} \gamma^f(s) [\gamma^f(t)(e_0^f(t) - c_0^f(t)) + e_1^f(t) - c_1^f(t)] \geq 0
$$

for every $t = 0, 1, \ldots$. 
Note that $\sum_{s=0}^{t} c_f(s)$ is the number, at time $t$, of age 1 individuals belonging to family $f$. From (3.3) it is clear that for any $t$ the aggregate cumulative net intergenerational transfers of wealth is non-negative, namely:

$$(3.4) \sum_{f=1}^{F} \sum_{s=0}^{t} c_f(s) \gamma_f(s) f(t) \geq 0$$

A perfect foresight competitive equilibrium is defined by non-negative sequences $(c_f(s), \gamma_f(s))_{s=0}^{\infty}$ such that $(c_f(s), \gamma_f(s))_{s=t}^{\infty}$ maximize

$$(3.1) \text{ s.t. } (3.2) \text{ for each } f \text{ and which satisfy } (3.3).$$

Such an equilibrium is referred to in the sequel as an infinite-horizon equilibrium. We are now ready to state the following:

**Theorem:** An infinite-horizon equilibrium is Pareto-efficient.

**Proof:** The proof is standard. Suppose not, and let $(c_f'(s), \gamma_f'(s))_{s=t}^{\infty}$ for some $f_o$ and some $t(t=0,1,\ldots)$ be strictly preferred to the competitive sequence $(c_f(s), \gamma_f(s))_{s=t}^{\infty}$.

By the individual maximization property, it must then be true that:

$$(2.5) \sum_{i=t}^{\infty} \frac{1}{\beta^i} (c_f^{o}(i) - c_f'(i)) = c_f^{o}(0) - c_f'(0) > 0$$

Aggregating (2.5) over population at time $t$, and using (3.4) it is then seen that a contradiction to (3.3) is obtained.

Q.E.D.

We will explain now why the no-trade (steady-state) allocation can never be an infinite-horizon equilibrium in the Samuelsonian case where the endowment vector $e^s$ is to the right of the golden rule allocation in
Figure 1. As noted by Samuelson [6], and further elaborated upon by Gale [2], the interest rate associated with the no-trade situation in such a case must be lower than the rate of population growth. In our model, however, such an equilibrium relationship between the rate of interest and the rate of population growth can never obtain since it would imply that the budget constraint (3.2) becomes unbounded which is inconsistent with the proper individual maximizations that underlie any competitive equilibrium. Sufficient conditions for the existence of individual maxima and of competitive equilibria are left for future research.

IV THE NATURE OF INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERS IN THE MODEL

Suppose that $B_f^s(o) = 0$, i.e. that the "first" individual of age 1 in the economy has no net-claims on the present originating in the past, since there is no past. If it is also assumed that all individuals are identical in preferences and endowments, it follows that in equilibrium $B_f^s(t) = 0$, for all $f$ and $t$. To see this, observe that $B_f^s(t) > 0$ for some $t$ implies that every family in period $t$ will consume less than the value of its initial endowments. Since goods are desirable and do not keep the resulting excess supply in period $t$ is inconsistent with equilibrium. Likewise $B_f^s(t) < 0$ is impossible since it violates the feasibility condition (there can be no accumulation of goods from the past or decumulation from the future since goods are assumed to be nontransferable across time).

However, in the more general case where families differ, this will no longer be generally true. While for the economy as a whole the aggregate value in (3.4) is identically equal to zero at all $t$ (the value of aggregate consumption during any time period equals the value of endowments
in the same period) it is generally to be expected that some families overconsume in some periods (implying that some other families choose to underconsume in an offsetting way). From (7.2), it is then seen that the existence of overconsuming families until time \( (t-1) \) implies that in time period \( t \) the budget constraint includes a negative \( b^e(c) \) term.

We wish now to indicate how an institutional setting in which bequests might seemingly be "negative" is enforceable in a competitive market economy.\(^{22} \) Bequests from generation \( t \) to generation \( t+1 \) (intergenerational net-transfers of wealth) in our model are effectively always nonnegative in the following sense. If we consider the endowments \( o_0 \) and \( e_1 \) (say, productive abilities \( b^g \)) in each of the periods during which any individual lives to be inherited (i.e. bequeathed by the previous generation), then the possibility that some generations might face a present value of consumption possibilities constraint smaller than the present value of endowments is not to be understood as involving a negative bequest. As long as each generation is able at all to consume (possibly by shifting debt to future generations), this is to be regarded as it having obtained a positive bequest from the previous generation.

Property rights in this model are in this sense assigned to parents. Since every individual in the model is a potential parent this assignment of property rights treats each generation symmetrically in a sense. The importance of this remark stems from the consideration that if each pair of \( e_0 \) and \( e_1 \) were assumed to belong to the corresponding generation, then without outside legislative fiat requiring children to pay for their parents' "debts" (i.e. without symmetric inheritance laws that treat debts and gifts in the way way) the above competitive program could not be sustained (unless parents' utility functions enter as arguments into those of their children).

Note that the enforcement of this system of property rights does not
involves any more contrivance than the standard one implicitly assumed in finite horizon intertemporal economies where each individual is always required to pay his own debts even though this may be contrary to his self-interest (as is the case for instance when repayment of debt is due in the individual's last period of life). Finally, if the utility links are such that parents' welfare also enter children's utility function then there is an added incentive for children to comply with repayments of their parents' debts.

V CONCLUDING REMARKS

It has been shown that competition results in an efficient pattern of population production. While children were treated here exclusively as consumption goods by parents, if parents also view them as investment goods to an extent, the efficiency result will still hold. The apparent externality in consumption associated with the fact that children's consumption enter parents' utility function as well as their own is not relevant from the Pareto viewpoint since parents create children while fully taking children's utility of consumption (as viewed by the latter) into account.

The analysis presented here should not be understood as implying that under no conditions of interference, on efficiency grounds, with the workings of free markets in the population area is called for. In the present model, the standard reasons for interference, such as non-convexities and genuine externalities, are ruled out by assumption.

However, when we think of possible deviations from classical environments in the population area these usually are of a form which is detrimental to competitive efficiency for reasons related to the "quality" of population.
For instance, the fact that people are "intermediate goods" capable of improving in quality through schooling, say, and the likelihood that schooling production processes may exhibit increasing returns, and the possibility that somebody's child (an Einstein or a Jack-the-Ripper) may enter other families' preferences as a public good or bad, certainly are possible grounds for regulating free markets. Note, however, that the first of the abovementioned reasons might in fact be more pertinent to a fixed population, as some of the standard non-convexities might endogenously be smoothed out with utility maximizing increases in population. A detailed analysis of these issues, however, is left for future research.
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1/ See [2], [7], [8], and [10].
Particularly noteworthy for present purposes is Thompson's [10] analysis
of the source of inefficiency in Samuelson's model.

2/ In a model with changing population, the definition of Pareto-efficiency
warrants some discussion. Whose utility, current generation alone or
current and all future (yet unborn) generations, does one wish to include
in the efficiency calculus? In our model, in which there is a direct
utility link between each generation and the one immediately following
it (and thus an indirect utility link extending into the infinite future)
the welfare of all generations as perceived by them is taken into account
by the efficiency criterion in a natural way. Therefore, independently
of whether or not the welfare of unborn generations is included in the
efficiency criterion the analysis below implies that competitive markets
always result in efficient allocations. In particular, the commodity
"population" is also efficiently produced under the present competitive
setting.

3/ See Phelps [4] for a related study of the welfare aspects of population
changes.

4/ See Nerlove [3] and Razin and Ben-Zion [5].

5/ The function should be thought of as a representation of the family's
ordinal (Herzson-Samuelson) social welfare function as viewed by the
current parent. We assume that each individual is consistent in his
planning in the sense of Strotz [9]. Note that consistency with respect
to plans of future generations is explicitly imbedded in the dynamic pro-
gramming formulation of the utility function (3.1). We note here that
the assumptions that utility functions are the same for all generations, and
that individuals live only two periods can be relaxed without affecting
the results.

6/ On the nature of property rights in these markets see the discussion in
Section IV below.
7/ Contrast this explanation with Barro [1] who imposed a condition equivalent to \( 1 + (r^2 \gamma) t \leq 0 \).

8/ The model presented in Section III can be looked upon as being based on an implicit production technology by means of which initial endowments are transformed on a one-to-one basis into final consumption goods. We note here that intertemporal production possibilities can also be introduced without affecting the efficiency result.
REFERENCES


