Statistical Inference in Games *

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Abstract

We consider statistical inference in games. Each player obtains a small random sample of other players’ actions, uses statistical inference to estimate their actions, and chooses an optimal action based on the estimate. In a Sampling Equilibrium with Statistical Inference (SESI), the sample is drawn from the distribution of players’ actions based on this process. We characterize the set of SESIs in large two-action games, and compare their predictions to those of Nash Equilibrium, and for different sample sizes and statistical inference procedures. We then study applications to competitive markets, markets with network effects, monopoly pricing, and search and matching markets.

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1 Introduction

Real-life decision making often involves deciding whether to take a particular action or not in situations in which the action’s value depends on how many people take the action. For example, deciding whether to drive to work may depend on road congestion; when contemplating whether to search for a new job, market thickness is a relevant factor; and deciding whether to adopt a new network product may depend on other people’s adoption decisions. In such settings, an individual has to determine how many people take the action in order to figure out the action’s value.

The individual may act as a statistician when estimating how many people take the action. He may first obtain some data on other people’s actions. For example, he may ask a few co-workers whether they drive to work. The individual may then use some form of statistical inference to estimate how many people take the action. For example, he may combine the data collected with some prior perception he has about road congestion, or perhaps estimate the most likely road congestion parameter to have generated the data. The individual can then use the estimate to decide whether to take the action.

This paper considers such statistical decision making in games. Each player obtains a small sample of other players’ actions. To describe how players make inferences from the sample, we introduce the notion of an inference procedure, which is the analogue of an estimator in the statistics literature. An inference procedure assigns to every possible sample a player may obtain an estimate, which is a distribution over possible proportions of players taking the action. Estimates are assumed to relate to one another monotonically: fixing the sample size, a player puts a larger weight on more players taking the action as the number of observations in which people take the action increases. Examples of inference procedures include Bayesian updating from a non-degenerate prior, maximum likelihood estimation, and Beta estimation, among others. Inference procedures can also be used to describe various heuristics in information processing such as the tendency to underestimate sample variability (Tversky and Kahneman (1971)). Each player uses the estimate to choose an action that maximizes his payoff.

A sampling equilibrium with statistical inference (SESI) incorporates this statistical decision making procedure into Osborne and Rubinstein (2003)’s sampling equilibrium. A SESI is a distribution of actions with the property that sampling from this distribution and using statistical inference to arrive at an optimal action results in the same distribution of actions. A SESI
depends on players’ sample sizes and inference procedures.

In a SESI, players have access to the equilibrium distribution of actions. Osborne and Rubinstein (1998) interpret this assumption as reflecting a steady state of a dynamic process in which new players sample the actions of past players. We formalize this interpretation in Section 8. Another interpretation is that of noisy retrieval of information from memory. A player may have been involved in the same or a similar interaction in the past and encoded in memory the distribution of actions. However, because of memory decay and forgetting, the player can only retrieve from memory a few imperfect signals about his past experience. Put differently, instead of sampling other players’ actions, a player retrieves information from his own memory. In this interpretation, Nash equilibrium (NE) reflects an ability to perfectly retrieve information from memory in contrast to the imperfect retrieval in a SESI.

Section 3 studies SESIs in large games in which the action players consider taking has an idiosyncratic benefit and a cost that is increasing and convex in the number of players taking the action. We establish three main results, which serve as building blocks for studying applications in later sections. First, there is a unique SESI for any inference procedure and any sample size. Second, the proportion of players who take the action in this SESI, which we call the SESI proportion, is smaller than the unique NE proportion for any sample size and for any unbiased inference procedure, i.e., an inference procedure with the property that the expected value of the estimate is the sample mean. The SESI proportion could be as small as half of the NE proportion for natural cost specifications. Third, the SESI proportion increases in the sample size under additional assumptions on the inference procedure. The three main results extend, under certain assumptions, to cost specifications that are non-monotone in the number of players taking the action.

Section 4 studies two simple applications. The main one is to competitive markets. A unit mass of producers face a known demand function for their product. Each producer has to decide whether to produce a unit of the product at an idiosyncratic cost to be sold at the market price. The market price depends on the production decisions of all producers, and so each producer

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1Sethi (2000) is an earlier contribution that formalizes this interpretation in a different context.

2A classic contribution to the study of memory decay and forgetting is Ebbinghaus (1885) (See Ebbinghaus (2003) for the English version.) A more recent contribution is Schacter (1999, 2002).

3A possible difficulty with the information retrieval interpretation is that sample observations are assumed to be independent. Vul and Pashler (2008) provide partial support for this independence assumption.
obtains data on the production decisions of other producers, and uses statistical inference to estimate the market supply.

Because there is a unit mass of producers, their data — when aggregated over all producers — reflects the market supply accurately. But because each producer only obtains a small sample, some producers will underestimate and some will overestimate the market supply. This is in contrast to a standard competitive equilibrium in which each producer estimates the market supply accurately. We show that there is a unique SESI in this environment, and that the market supply in this SESI depends on the curvature of the inverse demand function. In particular, when the inverse market demand is convex, there is over-production and a lower market price in the unique SESI than in the standard competitive equilibrium.

Section 5 considers an application to markets with positive network effects. Each consumer needs to decide whether to adopt a new product at an idiosyncratic cost. Adoption benefits are positive and increasing in the number of adopters. Marginal adoption benefits initially increase and then decrease in the number of adopters resulting in an S-shaped benefit function. An S-shaped benefit function can support up to three NEs. We identify conditions under which there is a unique SESI in this environment, and show that when these conditions do not hold, there are at most three SESIs. We also show that all SESI proportions are between the smallest and largest NE proportions.

Section 6 considers an application to monopoly pricing in a market in which consumers have a preference for uniqueness, i.e., the more consumers who buy the product the less valuable it is to others. A leading example is status goods. We ask how the monopolist’s optimal profit changes as consumers obtain more information on other consumers’ purchase decisions. We establish that the monopolist’s profit decreases in the amount of information consumers obtain, suggesting the monopolist wishes to reduce consumers’ access to information about other consumers’ demand.

Section 7 considers an application to search and matching markets. Workers in this market have to decide whether to engage in costly search for jobs, and firms have to decide whether to engage in costly search for workers. Following Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), we postulate that a Cobb-Douglas matching function determines the likelihood of a worker-firm match as a function of the matching friction and market thickness on the workers side and the firms side.4

4Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) write: “the stylized fact that emerges from the empirical literature is that there is a stable aggregate matching function of a few variables that satisfies the Cobb-Douglas restrictions with constant returns to scale in vacancies and unemployment.”
We depart from the rational expectations modeling assumption by assuming that workers (and similarly firms) do not know the thickness on the other side of the market and use statistical inference to estimate it. A SESI in this environment is a steady state in which workers obtain data from the distribution of firms’ actions based on the firms’ statistical inference, and firms obtain data from the distribution of workers’ actions based on workers’ statistical inference.

We establish that market thickness and employment are smaller in the unique SESI with positive employment than in the unique rational expectations equilibrium with positive employment. The gap in market thickness and employment can be proportional to the matching friction itself. This implies that statistical inference amplifies the effect of shifts in the matching friction on employment relative to the predictions of the standard rational expectations equilibrium.

Section 8 concludes with two comments. The first is about the steady state interpretation of SESIs. We consider a dynamic process based on the primitives of Section 2, and establish that its unique steady state is the unique SESI. The second comment is about heterogeneity in players’ sample sizes and inference procedures. Such heterogeneity may arise due to differences in players’ ability to obtain or process information, different time constraints, or different preferences over statistical inference methods. We establish that our uniqueness and comparison to NE results extend to environments with heterogeneous players. We also identify simple conditions on the profile of players’ sample sizes and inference procedures under which our comparative statics results continue to hold.

This paper is related to the literature on belief formation in games that relaxes the NE assumption that players have correct beliefs about the equilibrium distribution of actions. Most relevant to the current paper is Osborne and Rubinstein (2003)’s sampling equilibrium in which players obtain a sample of other players’ actions and best-respond to the sample average. Osborne and Rubinstein (2003) analyze the sampling equilibria of a voting model with two or three samples. Osborne and Rubinstein (1998)’s $S(k)$-equilibrium is an earlier contribution in which players do not know the mapping from actions to payoffs, sample the payoff of each action $k$ times, and choose the action with the highest payoff. Sethi (2000) studies the dynamic stability of $S(1)$-equilibria, and Mantilla, Sethi, and Cárdenas (2018) analyze the efficiency and stability of $S(1)$-equilibria in public goods games. Spiegler (2006a,b) studies competition between firms that face consumers who sample their prices or another payoff-relevant parameter once.

There are other prominent approaches to belief formation in games. In a self-confirming equilibrium (Fudenberg and Levine (1993), Battigalli and Guaitoli (1997), Battigalli et al. (2015)),
players’ beliefs cannot contradict the (possibly partial) feedback they obtain about payoffs and other players’ behavior on the equilibrium path. In a cursed equilibrium (Eyster and Rabin (2005)), players may not account for the correlation between players’ behavior and private information, and in a behavioral equilibrium (Esponda (2008)), players may also not account for the correlation between behavior and other payoff-relevant parameters. In an analogy-based equilibrium (Jehiel (2005)), players form coarse beliefs about the average behavior in analogy classes, which are a partition of other players’ strategy sets. In a Berk–Nash equilibrium (Esponda and Pouzo (2016)), players entertain a collection of possible beliefs and use the one that best-fits (according to a relative entropy criterion) the feedback they obtain. In Spiegler (2019), players use the maximum entropy criterion to form beliefs about payoff-relevant parameters after obtaining partial feedback on the correlations between them.

We make three contributions to this literature. First, we consider players who use statistical inference to form beliefs. Statistical inference is captured by the notion of an inference procedure, which is flexible enough to model a rich class of possible statistical inferences from data. A related contribution is Liang (2018) who studies whether players with different statistical learning rules converge to NE after observing the same long sequence of data on payoff-relevant parameters. In contrast, our emphasis is on statistical inference from small heterogeneous samples that leads to different predictions than NE. Another related contribution is Al-Najjar (2009) who studies statistical decision making in a single-person environment.

Our second contribution is to provide a comprehensive characterization of SESIs in large two-action games. Our ability to do so relies on the connection between SESIs and Bernstein polynomials that we discuss in detail in Section 3.1. Nöldeke and Peña (2016) and Peña, Lehmann, and Nöldeke (2014) use Bernstein polynomials in other game-theoretic settings to study NEs of voter participation games and evolutionary dynamics in two-action N-player games.

Our third contribution is to develop applications to competitive and network markets, monopoly pricing, and search and matching markets.

2 Model

This section presents the model. After describing the model primitives in Section 2.1, Section 2.2 discusses players’ statistical decision making. Section 2.3 discusses the data generating process and the solution concept. Section 2.4 provides an example.
2.1 Primitives

There is a unit mass of players, and each of them has to decide whether to take action $A$ or action $B$. The utility from action $B$ is 0. The utility from action $A$ is $u(\theta, \alpha) = \theta - f(\alpha)$ where $\theta$ is a player’s idiosyncratic benefit from $A$, and $f(\alpha)$ is the cost incurred by a player taking action $A$ if a proportion $\alpha$ of players take action $A$. The benefit $\theta$ is distributed uniformly on $[0, 1]$, and the function $f$ is continuous, convex and increasing with $0 \leq f(0)$ (i.e., $f$ is a cost) and $f(1) \leq 1$ (i.e., the cost is weakly smaller than the maximal benefit of action $A$.) Alternative cost specifications are considered in Section 3.6. A model with more than two actions is considered in Appendix A.

2.2 Statistical decision making

In order to decide which action to take, each player estimates the proportion $\alpha$ of players taking action $A$. The player obtains $k$ observations of other players’ actions, which are $k$ independent draws from a Bernoulli distribution with probability of success $\alpha$. Observing a success is interpreted as observing a player who takes action $A$, and a failure as observing a player who takes action $B$. The resulting sample is denoted by $(k, z)$ where the integer $k \geq 1$ is the sample size and $z \in [0, 1]$ is the sample mean, i.e., the proportion of successes in the sample.\(^5\)

An inference procedure, which is the analogue of an estimator in the statistics literature, describes how a player makes inferences from the sample. It requires that the player puts more weight on more players taking action $A$ as the sample mean increases.

Definition. An inference procedure $G = \{G_{k,z}\}$ assigns a cumulative distribution function $G_{k,z}$ called an estimate to every sample $(k, z)$ such that the estimate $G_{k,\hat{z}}$ strictly first-order stochastically dominates the estimate $G_{k,z}$ when $\hat{z} > z$.

Following are a few examples of inference procedures.

Example 2.1 (Bayesian Updating). A player has a non-degenerate prior over the parameter $\alpha$, and he uses Bayes rule to update this prior based on the sample. By Proposition 1 in Milgrom (1981), the family of posteriors is an inference procedure.

\(^5\)The proportion $z$ can take any value in $[0, 1]$ even though players only observe proportions of the form of $j/k$ for $j = 0, 1, ..., k$. This is useful for comparative statics.
Example 2.2 (Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE)). A player uses the maximum likelihood method to estimate the most likely parameter to generate the sample, i.e., the player solves for the $\alpha$ that maximizes $\alpha^k (1 - \alpha)^{(1-z)}$. It is easy to verify that this $\alpha$ is $z$. The player treats this number as the proportion of players taking action $A$. Thus, the inference procedure is

$$G_{k,z}(\alpha) = 1_{\alpha \geq z} = \begin{cases} 
0 & \alpha < z \\
1 & \alpha \geq z 
\end{cases}$$

Example 2.3 (Beta Estimation). A player has “complete ignorance” about the proportion $\alpha$. Such ignorance is often captured in the statistics literature by “Haldane’s prior” (Haldane, 1932; Zhu and Lu, 2004), which is the limit of the Beta($\epsilon, \epsilon$) distribution as $\epsilon \to 0$.

When the player’s sample includes only failures ($z = 0$) or successes ($z = 1$), the player concentrates his estimate on the sample mean similarly to MLE. When the sample includes both successes and failures, the player’s estimate is the Beta($zk, (1-z)k$) distribution. The mean of this estimate is $z$ and its variance is $\frac{zk(1-z)}{k+1}$.

To understand why a player with “complete ignorance” who observes the sample $(k, z)$ may arrive at the estimate Beta($zk, (1-z)k$), recall that the Beta distribution is a conjugate prior for Binomial distributions. That is, given a Beta($a, b$) prior on $\alpha$, the posterior following the realization of a Binomial random variable with parameters $k$ (sample size) and $\alpha$ (probability of success) is a Beta($a+s, b+k-s$) distribution, where $s$ is the number of successes in the sample. That is, the first parameter of the Beta is incremented by the number of successes, and the second by the number of failures. For example, the uniform distribution is a Beta(1, 1) distribution, and so a player with a uniform prior who observes the sample $(k, z)$ and uses Bayesian updating would have the posterior Beta($1 + zk, 1 + (1-z)k$).

The sum $a + b + k$ of the two Beta parameters is often interpreted as the number of pseudo-observations, a way of measuring the weight placed on the prior ($a + b$) relative to that put on the sample $k$. Thus, a uniform prior corresponds to putting a weight of 2 on the prior and the rest on the sample, whereas in the current example, players are ignorant in the sense that they put no weight on a prior and base their estimate solely on the sample.$^6$

$^6$Beta estimation is not included in Example 2.1 because there does not exist a proper prior that together with Bayesian updating based on the sample $(k, z)$ generates a Beta($zk, (1-z)k$) posterior.
Example 2.4 (Truncated Normal). A player believes that $\alpha$ is distributed according to a normal distribution truncated symmetrically around the mean. He estimates its mean to be $z$ and its variance to be $\frac{z(1-z)}{k}$.

After obtaining the sample $(k, z)$ and deriving the estimate $G_{k,z}$, a player best-responds to the estimate. That is, he takes the action $A$ if and only if

$$\theta \geq F_{k,z}$$

where $F_{k,z}$ is the expected value of $f$ under $G_{k,z}$:

$$F_{k,z} = \int_{0}^{1} f(\alpha) dG_{k,z}(\alpha).$$

2.3 Equilibrium

Players obtain their sample from the distribution of actions based on players’ statistical decision making. That is, players obtain data from a source that is representative of the parameter they wish to estimate. A sampling equilibrium with statistical inference describes the resulting solution concept.

Definition. A sampling equilibrium with statistical inference (SESI) is a number $\alpha_{k,G} \in [0,1]$ such that an $\alpha_{k,G}$ proportion of players take action $A$ when each player draws $k$ independent observations from a Bernoulli distribution with probability of success $\alpha_{k,G}$, forms an estimate according to the inference procedure $G$, and best-responds to this estimate in choosing an action. We refer to $\alpha_{k,G}$ as the SESI proportion of degree $k$ with respect to the inference procedure $G$.

A SESI embodies two procedural constraints on players’ decision making. The first is informational: Players obtain data on the behavior of a small subset of players, e.g. because of time or other constraints. If players had obtained data on the actions of all players, they would fully learn the equilibrium action profile, and the predictions of the model would coincide with those of NE in which players are assumed to know this profile. The second constraint is cognitive: Players use only their data and statistical inference to estimate the distribution of actions. If each player had investigated how other players make decisions, the player would arrive at the “correct” distribution of actions and best-respond to it, so the predictions of the model would again be identical to those of NE. The combination of the informational and cognitive constraints, however, implies different predictions than those of NE as we will see below.
2.4 Example

Suppose that the utility of action $A$ is $u(\theta, \alpha) = \theta - \alpha^4$ and that players use MLE. To solve for the SESI proportion $\alpha_{1,MLE}$ of degree 1 with respect to MLE, suppose that players draw one observation from a Bernoulli distribution with success probability $\alpha$. Then:

- With probability $1 - \alpha$, a player draws a failure. He estimates that no one takes action $A$, and hence takes this action if $\theta \geq f(0)$.
- With probability $\alpha$, a player draws a success. He estimates that everybody takes action $A$, and hence takes this action if $\theta \geq f(1)$.

Thus, the proportion $\alpha_{1,MLE}$ has to satisfy $\alpha = (1 - \alpha) \cdot (1 - f(0)) + \alpha \cdot (1 - f(1))$. Rearranging, we obtain the equilibrium equation:

$$1 - \alpha = (1 - \alpha) \cdot f(0) + \alpha \cdot f(1).$$

This linear equation has a unique solution at $\alpha_{1,MLE} = 1/2$.

To solve for $\alpha_{2,MLE}$, suppose that players draw two observations. Then,

- With probability $(1 - \alpha)^2$, a player draws two failures. He estimates that no one takes action $A$, and hence takes this action if $\theta \geq f(0)$.
- With probability $2\alpha(1 - \alpha)$, a player draws one success and one failure. He believes that half of the population takes action $A$, and hence takes this action if $\theta \geq f(1/2)$.
- With probability $\alpha^2$, a player draws two failures. He estimates that everybody takes action $A$, and hence takes this action if $\theta \geq f(1)$.

Thus, the proportion $\alpha_{2,MLE}$ has to solve the equilibrium equation

$$1 - \alpha = (1 - \alpha)^2 f(0) + 2\alpha(1 - \alpha)f(1/2) + \alpha^2 f(1)$$

which is quadratic in $\alpha$ and has a unique solution in $[0, 1]$ at $\alpha_{2,MLE} \approx 0.60 > \alpha_{1,MLE}$.

Similarly, for sample size 3, the proportion $\alpha_{3,MLE}$ has to solve the equilibrium equation

$$1 - \alpha = (1 - \alpha)^3 f(0) + 3\alpha(1 - \alpha)^2 f(1/3) + 3\alpha^2 (1 - \alpha) f(2/3) + \alpha^3 f(1)$$

which is cubic in $\alpha$ and has a unique solution in $[0, 1]$ at $\alpha_{3,MLE} \approx 0.64 > \alpha_{2,MLE}$.
If players use Beta estimation as in Example 2.3 instead of MLE, then the SESI proportion changes for samples with two or more observations. For example, when the sample size is 2, a player who observes one success and one failure estimates that $\alpha$ is distributed according to the $\text{Beta}(1, 1)$ distribution, and so the expected cost is $F_{2,1/2} = \int_0^1 f(z)\,dz$. The equilibrium equation in this case is similar to the one that characterizes $\alpha_{2,\text{MLE}}$ except for $F_{2,1/2}$ replacing $f(1/2)$:

$$1 - \alpha = (1 - \alpha)^2 f(0) + 2\alpha(1 - \alpha)F_{2,1/2} + \alpha^2 f(1).$$

This equation also has a unique solution in $[0, 1]$ at $\alpha_{2,\text{Beta}} \approx 0.57 < \alpha_{2,\text{MLE}}$.

Figure 1 provides a graphical intuition. It plots in solid black the function $(1 - \alpha)$ that appears on the left-hand side of all equilibrium equations. It plots in dashed colors the functions $B_{k,G}$ where $k \in \{1, 2, 3\}$ denotes sample size and $G \in \{\text{MLE, Beta}\}$ denotes the inference procedure. The functions $B_{k,G}$ correspond to the right-hand side of the various equilibrium equations. As can be seen from the figure, all the $B_{k,G}$ functions lie above $f$, which is plotted in solid black. The $B_{k,G}$ functions are ranked and their ranking implies the ranking of the corresponding SESIs.

3 Equilibrium characterization

This section establishes several properties of SESIs, which will serve as building blocks for solving applications in later sections. These properties include existence and uniqueness (Section 3.2),
how SESIs relate to NEs (Section 3.3), and how they change as the sample size or the inference procedure changes (Sections 3.4 and 3.5 respectively). Corresponding properties for alternative cost specifications are established in Section 3.6. The analysis relies on the theory of Bernstein polynomials presented in Section 3.1.

### 3.1 SESIs and Bernstein polynomials

The main tool that we use in equilibrium analysis is the theory of Bernstein polynomials.

**Definition.** For a function \( v \) defined on the closed interval \([0, 1]\), the \(k\)-th order **Bernstein polynomial** of \( v \) is a function on \([0, 1]\) defined by

\[
\text{Bern}_k(x; v) \equiv \sum_{j=0}^{k} \binom{k}{j} x^j (1 - x)^{k-j} v(j/k).
\]

That is, \( \text{Bern}_k(x; v) \) is a polynomial of degree \( k \) in \( x \). It is the weighted average of the values of \( v \) at the \( k+1 \) points \( \{0, \frac{1}{k}, \ldots, \frac{k-1}{k}, 1\} \) where the weight assigned to \( v(j/k) \) is the probability of obtaining \( j \) successes in \( k \) independent draws from a Bernoulli distribution with success probability \( x \). By definition \( \text{Bern}_k(0; v) = v(0) \) and \( \text{Bern}_k(1; v) = v(1) \).

**Observation 1.** A number \( \alpha_{k,G} \) is a SESI proportion if and only if it solves the equation

\[
1 - \alpha = \text{Bern}_k(\alpha; F_k)
\]

where \( F_k \) is a function that assigns to every \( z \in [0, 1] \) the value \( F_{k,z} \), i.e., \( F_k(z) = F_{k,z} \).

**Proof.** Suppose players obtain \( k \) independent draws from a Bernoulli distribution with success probability \( \alpha \) and use the inference procedure \( G \). The probability of observing \( j \) successes is \( \binom{k}{j} \alpha^j (1 - \alpha)^{k-j} \). Conditional on observing \( j \) successes, all players with \( \theta \leq F_{k,j/k} \) take the action \( B \) where \( 0 \leq F_{k,j/k} \leq 1 \) because \( 0 \leq f(\alpha) \leq 1 \). Thus, the fraction of players who observe \( j \) successes and take the action \( B \) is

\[
\binom{k}{j} \alpha^j (1 - \alpha)^{k-j} F_{k,j/k}.
\]

Summing over \( j \) yields the total measure of players taking the action \( B \), which is

\[
\sum_{j=0}^{k} \binom{k}{j} \alpha^j (1 - \alpha)^{k-j} F_{k,j/k} = \text{Bern}_k(\alpha; F_k).
\]

In equilibrium, this measure is equal to \( 1 - \alpha \). ∎
Observation 1 indicates that analyzing properties of SESIs is related to studying the behavior of Bernstein polynomials. The following properties of these polynomials, which they inherit from the function on which they operate, will be relevant in the analysis.

**Property 1.** If \( v \) increases in \( x \) then \( \text{Bern}_k(x; v) \) increases in \( x \).

**Property 2.** If \( v \) is convex then \( \text{Bern}_k(x; v) \) is convex, and \( \text{Bern}_k(x; v) \geq \text{Bern}_{k+1}(x; v) \geq v(x) \) for any \( x \) with strict inequality for \( 0 < x < 1 \) if \( v \) is not linear.

Proofs of Properties 1 and 2 can be found in Phillips (2003). Another useful property that we prove directly is:

**Property 3.** Consider two inference procedures \( G \) and \( \hat{G} \) such that \( G_{k,z} \) is a mean preserving spread of \( \hat{G}_{k,z} \) for any sample \((k, z)\). Then \( \text{Bern}_k(\cdot; F_k) \geq \text{Bern}_k(\cdot; \hat{F}_k) \).

Proof. Jensen’s inequality and the convexity of \( f \) imply that \( F_{k,j/k} \geq \hat{F}_{k,j/k} \) for any \( 0 \leq j \leq k \), which in turn implies the ranking of the corresponding Bernstein polynomials.

### 3.2 Equilibrium existence and uniqueness

Our first result is about existence and uniqueness of SESIs.

**Theorem 1.** There exists a unique SESI for any inference procedure and any sample size.

**Proof.** Fix an inference procedure \( G \) and sample size \( k \), and consider Equation (1). The expression \( 1 - \alpha \) on the left-hand side is strictly decreasing and continuous in \( \alpha \), it takes the value 1 at \( \alpha = 0 \), and it takes the value 0 at \( \alpha = 1 \).

The Bernstein polynomial \( \text{Bern}_k(\alpha; F_k) \) on the right-hand side of Equation (1) has the following properties. First, it is a continuous function in \( \alpha \) on \([0, 1]\). Second, it increases in \( \alpha \). This is because the first-order stochastic dominance of \( G \) implies that \( F_k \) is an increasing function, and so \( \text{Bern}_k(\alpha; F_k) \) is an increasing function (Property 1). Third, \( 0 \leq \text{Bern}_k(0; F_k) < 1 \) because \( 0 \leq F_k(0) < F_k(1) \leq 1 \) and \( F_k(0) = \text{Bern}_k(0; F_k) \). Similarly, \( 0 < \text{Bern}_k(1; F_k) \leq 1 \).

Thus, \( 1 - \alpha \) and \( \text{Bern}_k(\alpha; F_k) \) cross exactly once on \([0, 1]\) implying existence and uniqueness.

Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration. The Bernstein polynomials corresponding to the right-hand side of Equation 1 are plotted in dashed colors and are increasing in \( \alpha \). Each of them
crosses the decreasing function $1 - \alpha$ (plotted in solid black), which corresponds to the left-hand side of Equation 1, exactly once.

The proof of Theorem 1 does not rely on $f$ being convex and thus extends to any continuous and increasing cost function. Section 3.6 identifies conditions on the inference procedure such that uniqueness also holds for any non-monotone and convex $f$ with $0 < f(0), f(1) < 1$.

### 3.3 Relationship to Nash equilibrium

There is a unique NE proportion of players taking action $A$. To see this, consider a NE distribution of actions and let $\alpha_{NE}$ denote the proportion of players taking action $A$ in this NE. All players with $\theta$ above (below) $f(\alpha_{NE})$ strictly prefer to take action $A$ ($B$) and thus the proportion $\alpha_{NE}$ has to satisfy $\alpha = 1 - f(\alpha)$ or

$$1 - \alpha = f(\alpha).$$

Because $f$ is increasing — and $1 - \alpha$ is decreasing — in $\alpha$, this equation has a unique solution on $[0, 1]$.

To compare SESI proportions, which depend on the inference procedure and the sample size, to the NE proportion, we restrict attention to unbiased inference procedures.

**Assumption 1.** An inference procedure $G$ is unbiased if for any sample $(k, z)$ the expected value of the estimate $G_{k,z}$ is equal to the sample mean, i.e.,

$$\int_0^1 \alpha \ dG_{k,z}(\alpha) = z \quad \text{for any sample } (k, z).$$

In the statistics literature, estimates are often concentrated on a single point, and an estimator is unbiased if its expected value is equal to the underlying parameter. Assumption 1 implies a similar property. Fixing the sample size $k$ and the underlying success probability $\alpha$ of the Bernoulli distribution, the expected value of $G_{k,j/k}$ is $j/k$. This expected value is distributed according to a $k$-trial binomial distribution with success probability $\alpha$, and so its expected value is $\alpha$.

Assumption 1 is satisfied by the inference procedures in Examples 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4. However, the Bayesian Updating procedure in Example 2.1 does not satisfy this assumption. This is because whenever a player has a proper prior on $\alpha$, and he updates using Bayes rule, the posterior mean of $\alpha$ depends on both the prior mean and the sample mean. In particular, the posterior mean cannot coincide with the sample mean for all samples.
Theorem 2. The SESI proportion is strictly smaller than the NE proportion for any unbiased inference procedure $G$ and any sample size $k$ when the cost $f$ is not linear.

Proof. Fix a cost $f$, an unbiased inference procedure $G$, and a sample size $k$. The unique NE proportion solves Equation (2) and the unique SESI proportion solves Equation (1). Because the left-hand side of the equations is identical, it suffices to prove — in order to establish the result — that the continuous and increasing functions on the right-hand side of both equations are ranked such that $f(\alpha) \leq Bern_k(\alpha; F_k)$ with strict inequality for $0 < \alpha < 1$ when $f$ is not linear. This follows immediately from the equalities:

(i) $Bern_k(\alpha; F_k) \geq Bern_k(\alpha; f)$ for every $\alpha \in [0, 1]$

(ii) $Bern_k(\alpha; f) \geq f(\alpha)$ for every $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ with strict inequality between 0 and 1 if $f$ is not linear.

Inequality (ii) holds by Property 2. To verify inequality (i), recall that $F_k = f$ for the maximum likelihood procedure and that any unbiased inference procedure $G$ is a mean preserving spread of the maximum likelihood procedure. Inequality (i) now follows from Property 3.

Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration. The Bernstein polynomials corresponding to the right-hand side of Equation 1 lie above the function $f$, which corresponds to the right-hand side of Equation 2. The ranking of the SESI and NE proportions follows because these proportions are the intersection points of the Bernstein polynomials and $f$, respectively, with $1 - \alpha$.

When the cost $f$ is linear, the NE proportion and the SESI proportion coincide. This is because the linearity of $f$ implies that $F_k = f$ and so $Bern_k(\alpha; F_k) = Bern_k(\alpha; f)$, and because the Bernstein polynomial of a linear function coincides with the function. This case is useful for highlighting another important difference between the two solution concepts, which relates to the selection of players who take each action.

In a NE, all players hold the same “correct” belief about the proportion of players taking each action. Therefore, there is a positive sorting of players to actions in the sense that if a player takes action $A$ then players with higher types also take action $A$. In a SESI, players’ estimates differ from one another based on their sample. Players with a larger sample mean tend to take action $A$ less than players with a smaller sample mean leading to a weaker positive sorting than in NE. It is even possible that there is no positive sorting of types to actions in a SESI. This happens, for example, in the SESI with sample size 1 in Section 2.4, in which players’ actions depend only on their sample and not on their type.
How different are the predictions of the unique SESI and the unique NE? We return to the example of Section 2.4 to demonstrate that the gap between the SESI and the NE proportions can be large. Recall that $\alpha_{1,MLE}$ is $1/2$ in this example. The NE proportion is the solution to $1 - \alpha = \alpha^4$ which is about 0.72. Consider now the function $f(\alpha) = \alpha^n$. As $n$ increases, $\alpha_{1,MLE}$ does not change. However, $\alpha_{NE}$ increases and converges to 1 as $n \to \infty$.

### 3.4 Comparative statics: sample size

To evaluate how the SESI proportion changes as the sample size $k$ changes, we make two additional assumptions on the inference procedure. The first is that players become more confident in their estimate as the sample size increases.

**Assumption 2.** An inference procedure $G$ satisfies **noise reduction** if for any two samples $(k, z)$ and $(\hat{k}, \hat{z})$ such that $\hat{k} > k$, the estimate $G_{k,z}$ is a mean preserving spread of $G_{\hat{k},\hat{z}}$.

Assumption 2 is satisfied by all the unbiased inference procedures in Section 2.2.

The second assumption is that fixing the sample size $k$, the inference procedure preserves the shape of the function $f$ in the sense that the expected value of $f$ as a function of the proportion of successes in the sample $z$ is convex when $f$ is convex.

**Assumption 3.** An inference procedure $G$ **preserves shape** if the expected cost function $F_k$ is convex when the cost function $f$ is convex.

The maximum likelihood procedure trivially satisfies Assumption 3 because $F_k = f$. A sufficient condition for Assumption 3 to hold is that, fixing $k$, the densities of the unbiased inference procedure $G_{k,z}(\alpha)$ are totally positive of degree 3 in $(z, \alpha)$ (cf. Jewitt (1988)). The inference procedures in Examples 2.3 and 2.4 satisfy Assumption 3 because they belong to the exponential family, and exponential family densities are totally positive of every degree.

**Theorem 3.** If the inference procedure is unbiased, satisfies noise reduction, and preserves shape, then the SESI proportion of degree $k$ is strictly smaller than the SESI proportion of degree $k + 1$ when $f$ is not linear.

---

7A function $h(x,y)$ is totally positive of degree 3 if for any $x_1 < x_2 < x_3$ and $y_1 < y_2 < y_3$ the matrix $(h(x_i,y_j))$ has a non-negative determinant for every minor of size $\leq 3$. Total positivity of degree 2 is the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property and is implied by Total positivity of degree 3. Intuitively, total positivity of degree 3 ensures that the likelihood ratios increase sufficiently quickly to preserve convexity under integration.
Proof. Fix an inference procedure $G$. By Observation 1, it suffices to prove that for all $\alpha \in [0, 1]$

$$\text{Bern}_k(\alpha; F_k) \geq \text{Bern}_{k+1}(\alpha; F_{k+1})$$

with strict inequality for $0 < \alpha < 1$. We establish this inequality in two steps.

**Step 1.** $\text{Bern}_k(\alpha; F_k) \geq \text{Bern}_k(\alpha; F_{k+1})$. The convexity of $f$ together with noise reduction imply by Jensen’s inequality that $F_k(z) \geq F_{k+1}(z)$ for any $z \in [0, 1]$. The inequality follows. ✷

**Step 2.** $\text{Bern}_k(\alpha; F_{k+1}) \geq \text{Bern}_{k+1}(\alpha; F_{k+1})$ with strict inequality for $0 < \alpha < 1$. Because the inference procedure is shape preserving, $F_{k+1}$ is convex. The inequality now follows from Property 2. ✷

Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration. Fixing the inference procedure, the Bernstein polynomials are ranked according to the sample size, and this ranking implies the ranking of the corresponding SESI proportions.

By Theorem 3, as the sample size grows the SESI proportion gets closer to the NE proportion. To obtain convergence to the NE proportion, we consider consistent inference procedures.

**Assumption 4.** An inference procedure $G$ is **consistent** if for any $z$, the sequence of estimates $\{G_{k,z}\}_{k=1}^{\infty}$ converges in probability to the distribution $1_{\alpha \geq z}$ that puts a unit mass on $z$.

All the inference procedures discussed in Section 2 are consistent.

**Observation 2.** The SESI proportion converges to the NE proportion for any consistent inference procedure.

*Proof.* Fix a consistent inference procedure $G$. For any proportion of successes $z$, $F_{k,z} \xrightarrow{k \to \infty} f(z)$ because $G_{k,z} \xrightarrow{k \to \infty} 1_{\alpha \geq z}$. Moreover, the $k$’th order Bernstein polynomial of any continuous function converges to function as $k$ tends to infinity (see e.g. Phillips (2003) for a proof). Thus, the right-hand side of Equation 1 converges to the right-hand side of Equation 2 implying that the SESI proportion converges to the NE proportion. ✷

Intuitively, consistency implies that fixing the sample mean, players’ estimates converge to the sample mean as the sample size $k$ tends to infinity. Moreover, as $k$ tends to infinity, the sample mean converges in probability to the underlying parameter $\alpha$. Thus, players become fully informed about the proportion of players taking action $A$ as $k$ tend to infinity and best respond to it, similarly to NE.
3.5 Comparative statics: inference procedure

The predictions of all unbiased inference procedures coincide when players draw a single observation. This is because unbiasedness implies that a player who draws a success must concentrate his estimate on $\alpha = 1$, and a player who draws a failure must concentrate his estimate on $\alpha = 0$. However, two unbiased inference procedures may differ in how they estimate $\alpha$ when players draw two or more observations.

Assumption 5. The inference procedure $G$ is more dispersed than the inference procedure $\hat{G}$ if $G_{k,z}$ is a mean-preserving spread of $\hat{G}_{k,z}$ for any sample $(k, z)$.

Fix a sample size $k$. If $G$ is more dispersed than $\hat{G}$ then $\text{Bern}_k(\alpha; F_k) \geq \text{Bern}_k(\alpha; \hat{F}_k)$ by Property 3, and hence by Observation 1 the SESI proportion with respect to $G$ is smaller than the SESI proportion with respect to $\hat{G}$. Thus, more dispersed inference implies a smaller proportion of players taking action $A$.

MLE is the least dispersed procedure among all unbiased procedures. Thus, for any given sample size, MLE provides the closest prediction to NE among all unbiased inference procedures. This is because by Theorem 2 the SESI proportions of all unbiased inference procedures are smaller than the NE proportions.

3.6 Alternative cost specifications

The results of Sections 3.2–3.5 extend to additional cost specifications. We consider two extensions. The first extension is to cost functions that are increasing and concave. Theorem 1 continues to hold in this case as it relies only on the cost being increasing. The comparison between the SESI proportion and the NE proportion in Theorem 2 is reversed, i.e. the SESI proportion is larger than the NE proportion, because the direction of the two relevant inequalities is reversed. As the sample size increases, the SESI proportion decreases because the relevant inequalities in Theorem 3 are also reversed. Finally, the SESI proportion is larger for a more dispersed inference procedure because the direction of the relevant Jensen inequality in Property 3 is reversed.

The second extension is to cost functions that are convex but not monotone. (Establishing analogous results for concave non-monotone functions follows the discussion in the previous paragraph.)
Theorem 4. Fix a strictly convex cost function \( f \) with \( 0 < f(0), f(1) < 1 \) and an unbiased inference procedure \( G \) that preserves shape and satisfies noise reduction. Then, there exists a unique SESI for any sample size. The SESI proportion is smaller than the NE proportion and it increases in the sample size \( k \).

The proof of Theorem 4 is analogous to the proofs of Theorems 1-3. It appears in Appendix B, which contains all proofs that do not appear in the main text.

4 Two examples

This section incorporates statistical inference and the analysis of Section 3 into the theory of competitive markets (Section 4.1) and environments with a coordination dilemma (Section 4.2).

4.1 Statistical inference in a competitive market

A unit mass of producers face a known inverse demand function \( P(Q) \) for a good.\(^8\) Each producer has to decide whether to produce a unit of the good at an idiosyncratic cost \( \theta \) to be sold at the market price. The market price depends on the market supply \( Q \), and so each producer needs to estimate \( Q \) in order to decide whether to produce.

In a NE, producers best-respond to the same correct belief about the market supply \( Q_{NE} \). Producers may arrive at this belief using the following thought process: The market supply has to be equal to the proportion of producers who decide to produce given this market supply, i.e., all producers with \( \theta \) below the market price. Hence, \( Q_{NE} \) solves \( Q = P(Q) \).

On the other hand, when producers act as statisticians, each of them obtains data on the production decisions of other producers, uses statistical inference to estimate the market supply and the market price, and makes a decision based on the estimate. In a SESI, producers obtain their data from a Bernoulli distribution with success probability governed by the market supply. Hence, the market supply \( Q_{SESI} \) solves

\[
Q = \sum_{j=0}^{k} \binom{k}{j} Q^j (1-Q)^{k-j} P_{k,j/k}
\]

\(^8\)The function \( P(Q) \) summarizes a demand model with a unit mass of consumers whose valuations are distributed on the interval \([0,1]\) with a positive density function. Because consumers’ valuations are between 0 and 1, we can assume without loss of generality that \( P(Q) \) is between 0 and 1.
where $P_{k,j/k}$ is the estimated market price of producers who obtain the sample $(k,j/k)$ and use the estimate $G_{k,j/k}$ of the market supply $Q$.

To apply the results of Section 3, we label the action “don’t produce” as action $A$. Its benefit is $\theta$ and its cost is the foregone revenue from producing. Letting $N = 1 - Q$ denote the proportion of producers who do not produce, this cost is $f(N) = P(1 - N)$. Thus, the utility of not producing becomes $\theta - f(N)$ and the utility of producing becomes 0. Because $P$ decreases in $Q$, $f$ increases in $N$. And by definition, the functions $f$ and $P$ have the same convexity properties. The following result is a corollary of Theorem 1.

**Corollary 1.** There exists a unique SESI market supply $Q_{SESI}$ for every inference procedure and every sample size.

Because there is also a unique NE market supply, we can apply Theorem 2 and the market clearing condition to obtain the following result.

**Corollary 2.** Fix an unbiased inference procedure. If the inverse demand function is convex in volume then there is over-supply of the good and a lower market price in the SESI than in the NE. On the other hand, if the inverse demand function is concave in volume then there is under-supply of the good and a higher market price in the SESI than in the NE.

### 4.2 Statistical inference and the dilemma of limited coordination

This example is a variant of the El Farol Bar Problem (Arthur (1994)).

There is unit mass of individuals and each of them needs to decide whether to go to a bar that offers entertainment on a Thursday night. The idiosyncratic travel cost to the bar is $\theta$. The benefit of going to the bar is positive. The marginal benefit decreases in the proportion of individuals going to the bar: it is positive up to a certain level $\bar{\alpha} < 1$ after which it is negative because of overcrowding. Thus, this is a coordination problem in which coordination benefits $f$ are positive, non-monotone and concave.

A NE coordination level $\alpha_{NE}$ has the property that all individuals with $\theta \leq f(\alpha_{NE})$ go to the bar, so $\alpha_{NE}$ has to satisfy $\alpha = f(\alpha)$. Despite the non-monotonicity of $f$, there a unique NE because the function $f(\alpha)$ crosses the linear function $\alpha$ exactly once.

In a SESI, an individual who obtains the sample $(k,z)$ goes to the bar if $\theta \leq F_{k,z}$ where $F_{k,z}$ is the expected value of $f$ according to the estimate $G_{k,z}$. Thus, the coordination level in a SESI solves $\alpha = \sum_{j=0}^{k} \binom{k}{j} \alpha^j (1 - \alpha)^{k-j} F_{k,j/k}$. 


Similarly to the analysis of Section 4.1, we need to label the action “don’t go to the bar” as action A in order to apply Theorem 4 and obtain the following result.

**Corollary 3.** Fix an unbiased inference procedure that preserves shape and satisfies noise reduction. Then, there exists a unique SESI for any sample size. Coordination level in this SESI is smaller than in the unique NE, and it increases in the sample size.

5 Statistical inference in network markets

Comparing the SESI and NE proportions in Sections 3 and 4 relied on $f$ being convex or concave. There are settings in which neither holds. For example, in the context of costly product adoption in a market with positive network effects, adoption benefits may be $S$-shaped: they may have increasing returns up to a certain level of users after which the returns are decreasing. This section considers such a setting.

There is a unit mass of consumers and each of them needs to decide whether to adopt a new product at an idiosyncratic cost $\theta$. The adoption benefit $f$ is $S$-shaped: it is positive and increasing in the number of adopters, convex up to an inflection point $i \in (0, 1)$, and then concave. Suppose that $f$ crosses the $45^\circ$ line three times, $f(0) > 0$, and $f(1) < 1$. And for tractability, suppose consumers use MLE to estimate the proportion of adopters.

Similarly to the analysis of Section 4, a SESI proportion has to solve $\alpha = \text{Bern}_k(\alpha; f)$ where $\text{Bern}_k$ operates on $f$ because consumers use MLE. Because $\text{Bern}_k(0; f) = f(0) > 0$ and $\text{Bern}_k(1; f) = f(1) < 1$, $\text{Bern}_k(\alpha; f)$ crosses the $45^\circ$ line at least once and thus there is at least one SESI. There are three NEs because an NE proportion has to solve $\alpha = f(\alpha)$ and $f$ crosses the $45^\circ$ line three times.

The exact number of SESIs depends on the sample size and the variation in $f$ close to 0 and 1. For sample size 1, there is a unique SESI because the SESI proportion is the intersection of the line $\alpha f(1) + (1 - \alpha) f(0)$ with the $45^\circ$ line and $f(0) > 0$.

For larger sample sizes, the variation in $f$ at the point $j/k$ is $\delta_j^k = \Delta_j^{k+1} - \Delta_j^k$ where $\Delta_m^k = f(\frac{m}{k}) - f(\frac{m-1}{k})$. Thus, $\delta_j^k$ is positive (negative) if the line connecting $f(\frac{i-1}{k})$ and $f(\frac{j+1}{k})$ is above (below) $f(\frac{i}{k})$.

9This assumption guarantees that there are three NEs and that the NE proportions are in the interior of $[0, 1]$. 

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**Theorem 5.** There is a unique SESI of degree $k \geq 2$ if $\delta_1^k \leq 0$ or $\delta_{k-1}^k \geq 0$. Otherwise, there are at most three SESIs. If there is a unique SESI proportion of degree $k$ then there is a unique SESI proportion of degree $k - 1$.

The intuition for the result is that $\delta_{k-1}^k \geq 0$ guarantees that the concave part of $f$ does not affect the curvature of its Bernstein polynomial, which is convex and therefore intersects the 45° line once. Similarly, $\delta_1^k \leq 0$ guarantees that the convex part of $f$ does not affect the curvature of its Bernstein polynomial, which is concave and therefore intersects the 45° line once. When $\delta_1^k > 0$ and $\delta_{k-1}^k < 0$, the Bernstein polynomial is $S$-shaped and may therefore cross the 45° line up to three times. Because $\delta_1^k \leq 0$ implies $\delta_{k-1}^{k-1} \leq 0$ and $\delta_{k-1}^k \geq 0$ implies $\delta_{k-2}^{k-1} \geq 0$, similar conclusions hold for smaller sample sizes.

Figure 2A provides a graphical illustration. There are three NEs because $f$ (in solid black) crosses the 45° line (also in solid black) 3 times. There is a unique SESI of degree 1 because the curve $B_1$ (in dashed blue), which denotes the first order Bernstein polynomial of $f$, is linear. There is also a unique SESI of degree 2 because $\delta_1^2 > 0$ and hence $B_2$ (in dashed red) is convex. For sample sizes $k \geq 3$, $\delta_1^k > 0$ and $\delta_{k-1}^k < 0$ and hence the corresponding Bernstein polynomial is $S$-shaped. For $k = 3, 4$, the Bernstein polynomials (not depicted in the figure) cross the 45° line once despite being $S$-shaped and so there is a unique SESI. For larger sample sizes, the $S$-shaped Bernstein polynomial is closer to $f$ and hence crosses the 45° three times implying there are three SESIs. This is depicted in the figure for the curve $B_5$ (in dotted green). Note that the SESI proportions are between the smallest and largest NE proportions.

To characterize the location of the SESI proportions relative to the NE proportions more generally, consider the convex hull $co(f)$ of $f$ depicted in Figure 2B. The lower envelope of $co(f)$
is \( f \) itself from 0 up to the point \( m_0 \) and is then the line segment connecting \( f(m_0) \) and \( f(1) \).\(^{10}\) Because \( f(m_0) < m_0 \), the smallest NE proportion is smaller than \( m_0 \). Similarly, the upper envelope of \( \text{co}(f) \) is the line segment connecting \( f(0) \) and \( f(m_1) \) up to the point \( m_1 \) and is then \( f \) itself.\(^{11}\) Because \( f(m_1) > m_1 \), the largest NE proportion is larger than \( m_1 \). Because \( \text{Bern}_k(\alpha; f) \) is the convex combination of the values of \( f \), its graph lies inside \( \text{co}(f) \). It is above \( f \) between 0 and \( m_0 \) and below \( f \) between \( m_1 \) and 1. Thus,

**Observation 3.** If \( f(m_0) < m_0 \) and \( f(m_1) > m_1 \) then any SESI proportion is larger than the smallest NE proportion and is smaller than the largest NE proportion.

### 6 Statistical inference and monopoly theory

This section demonstrates how statistical inference can be incorporated into monopoly theory when consumers have a preference for uniqueness, and discusses how the predictions of statistical inference differ from those of rational expectations in this context.

Consumers have a preference for uniqueness when their consumption utility from a good decreases in the number of individuals consuming the good. Such a preference may arise when the good conveys social status (e.g. jewelry) or when its consumption reflects freedom or independence (e.g. a designer clothing item).

To model preference for uniqueness, suppose an individual has consumption value \( \theta \) for the good, and a disutility of -1 if he meets one or more other individuals who also consume the good in \( t \) random encounters. Thus, if an \( \alpha \) proportion of the population consumes the good, the expected disutility is \( 1 - (1 - \alpha)^t \). For tractability, we will replace \( (1 - \alpha)^t \) with \( e^{-\alpha t} \) and use the consumption utility \( u(\theta, \alpha) = \theta - (1 - e^{-\alpha t}) \) in the analysis.

A monopolist produces the good at zero marginal cost and sets a price \( p \) to maximize profit. Consumers observe the price and estimate the expected consumer demand for the good at this price. They then decide whether to purchase the good. The monopolist knows consumers are statisticians and takes this knowledge into account when pricing.

We are interested in comparing the monopolist’s profit when consumers use statistical inference and when they use rational expectations. This comparison may be informative about

\(^{10}\)Formally, \( m_0 = \arg \max_{\alpha \in [0,1]} \frac{f(1) - f(\alpha)}{1 - \alpha} \).

\(^{11}\)Formally, \( m_1 = \arg \max_{\alpha \in [0,1]} \frac{f(\alpha) - f(0)}{\alpha} \).
the monopolist’s incentives when deciding how much information to release about the expected demand for the good. We first solve an example and then provide a general characterization.

**Example 6.1.** Suppose that \( t = 4 \) and that the monopolist sets a price \( p \) for the good. An individual who purchases the good obtains a utility of \( \theta - p - (1 - e^{-4\alpha}) \). Otherwise, his utility is 0.

Rational expectations require that \( \alpha \) is equal to the proportion of consumers with \( \theta \geq p + (1 - e^{-4\alpha}) \), so \( \alpha \) has to satisfy \( \alpha = 1 - p - (1 - e^{-4\alpha}) \). The monopolist’s inverse demand is therefore \( p = e^{-4\alpha} - \alpha \). Solving the monopolist’s profit maximization problem, we obtain that the monopolist’s profit under rational expectations is 0.060 with an optimal quantity of 0.135 and an optimal price of 0.448.

Unbiased statistical inference from a single observation implies that when a consumer observes a success, he estimates \( \alpha \) to be 1 and hence his utility to be \( \theta - p - (1 - e^{-4}) \). For \( p \geq 0.02 \), this utility is negative for any \( \theta \leq 1 \), and thus no one will purchase the good in this case. When the consumer observes a failure, he estimates \( \alpha \) to be 0 and hence his utility to be \( \theta - p \). The proportion of individuals who purchase the good in this case is \( 1 - p \). Thus, at a price \( p \geq 0.02 \), the SESI demand has to satisfy \( \alpha = \alpha \cdot 0 + (1 - \alpha)(1 - p) \) and the inverse demand is \( p = 1 - \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \). Solving the monopolist’s profit maximization problem, we obtain that the monopolist’s profit is 0.17 with an optimal quantity of 0.29 and an optimal price of 0.59. The monopolist’s profit is almost three times larger than with rational expectations.

Unbiased statistical inference from two observations depends on how consumers estimate demand after observing one success and one failure. Suppose that consumers use Beta estimation and so have the estimate \( \text{Beta}(1, 1) \) in this case. The estimated disutility is then the expected value of \( 1 - e^{-4\alpha} \) with respect to \( \text{Beta}(1, 1) \), which is about 0.75. The proportion of individuals who purchase the good conditional on this sample is \( \max\{0.25 - p, 0\} \). It is easy to verify that \( p \leq 0.25 \) is not optimal for the monopolist and thus the monopolist will cater only to consumers who observe two failures. The optimal profit is smaller than with one observation at 0.14, the optimal quantity is also smaller at 0.23 but the optimal price is higher at 0.62.

More generally, we have the following comparative static result.

**Theorem 6.** Fix an unbiased inference procedure that preserves shape and satisfies noise reduction. The monopolist’s profit when consumers use statistical inference is larger than when consumers have rational expectations, and it decreases in the sample size.
Proof. Suppose the monopolist sets a price $p$ for the good. Fix an inference procedure $G$ and a sample size $k$. A consumer who observes $j$ successes purchases the good if his type $\theta$ is larger than $p + 1 - F_{k,j/k}$ where $F_{k,j/k}$ is the expected value of $e^{-\alpha t}$ according to $G_{k,j/k}$. Thus, conditional on observing $j$ successes, the proportion of consumers who purchase the good is $\max\{F_{k,j/k} - p, 0\}$. Demand at price $p$, $\alpha_{k,G}(p)$, is therefore determined by the solution to the equation

$$\alpha = \sum_{j=0}^{k} \binom{k}{j} \alpha^j (1 - \alpha)^{k-j} \max\{F_{k,j/k} - p, 0\}$$

which can be rewritten as

$$1 - \alpha = \sum_{j=0}^{k} \binom{k}{j} \alpha^j (1 - \alpha)^{k-j} \min\{1 + p - F_{k,j/k}, 1\}.$$

Because the function $e^{-\alpha t}$ is convex and decreasing, the function $F_k$ is convex and decreasing, and the function $1 + p - F_k$ is concave and increasing in $\alpha$. The function $\min\{1 + p - F_k, 1\}$ is therefore concave and increasing. We thus have an equation which is similar to equation 1 and the results of Section 3 continue to hold. That is, for every price $p$, the demand $\alpha_{k,G}(p)$ decreases in $k$ and is above the rational expectations demand, which is the $\alpha(p)$ that solves the equation $\alpha = 1 - e^{-\alpha t} - p$. We thus obtain a ranking of the demand functions the monopolist faces, and this ranking implies the ranking of the monopolist’s profit. \qed

Thus, the monopolist has no incentive to inform consumers about the demand for the good.

7 Statistical inference in two-sided markets

This section incorporates statistical inference to two-sided markets in which workers and firms need to decide whether to engage in costly search in order to create jobs.

There is a unit mass of workers, and each of them needs to decide whether to search for a job at an idiosyncratic cost $\theta$. Workers’ costs are distributed uniformly on $[0, 1]$. There is also a unit mass of firms, and each of them needs to decide whether to post a vacancy at an idiosyncratic cost $\omega$. Firms’ costs are also distributed uniformly on $[0, 1]$. If $\alpha$ workers search for jobs and $\beta$ firms search for workers, the number of jobs created is given by the matching function

$$m(\alpha, \beta) \equiv \mu \alpha^x \beta^{1-x}$$
where $0 < \mu < 1$ is the matching friction that prevents full employment even if all workers and all firms participate in the market. As noted by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001), “the matching function summarizes a trading technology between agents who place advertisements, read newspapers and magazines, go to employment agencies, and mobilize local networks that eventually bring them together into productive matches. The key idea is that this complicated exchange process is summarized by a well-behaved function that gives the number of jobs formed at any moment in time in terms of the number of workers looking for jobs, the number of firms looking for workers, and a small number of other variables. ... The stylized fact that emerges from the empirical literature is that there is a stable aggregate matching function of a few variables that satisfies the Cobb-Douglas restrictions with constant returns to scale in vacancies and unemployment.”

A worker who searches for a job finds one with probability $m(\alpha, \beta)$ when $\alpha$ workers and $\beta$ firms participate in the market. Assuming that each match creates a surplus of 2 to be split equally between the worker and the firm, the expected utility of a worker who searches for a job is $m(\alpha, \beta) - \theta$. Similarly, the expected utility of a firm that posts a vacancy is $m(\alpha, \beta) - \omega$. Firms and workers who do not participate in the market obtain a utility of 0.

In a NE, all workers and firms form the same belief about the market thickness $(\alpha_{NE}, \beta_{NE})$. This belief satisfies the rational expectations assumption whereby if workers and firms best-respond to the belief, actual market thickness is $(\alpha_{NE}, \beta_{NE})$. Thus, market thickness on the workers’ side $\alpha_{NE}$ has to satisfy that all workers with cost $\theta \leq m(\alpha_{NE}, \beta_{NE})_{\alpha_{NE}} = \mu \alpha_{NE}^{-1} \beta_{NE}^{-x}$ search for jobs. Applying the same reasoning for firms, we obtain that the two equations that characterize the NE participation are $\alpha = \mu \alpha^{-1} \beta^{1-x}$ and $\beta = \mu \alpha^{x} \beta^{-x}$. Rearranging, we obtain the following equilibrium equations:

$$\alpha_{NE}(\beta) \equiv (\mu \beta^{1-x})^{\frac{1}{1+x}} \quad (3)$$

$$\beta_{NE}(\alpha) \equiv (\mu \alpha^{x})^{\frac{1}{1+x}}. \quad (4)$$

We prove below that there is a unique NE with positive participation.

We relax the rational expectations assumption. We postulate that while each worker estimates market thickness on the workers’ side accurately, he uses statistical inference to estimate firms’ participation. This difference between workers’ reasoning ability regarding workers’ participation and firms’ participation aims to capture situations in which each worker has a good understanding of his side of the market, e.g. because he observes the decisions of many workers,
but he struggles to understand firms’ decision making, e.g. because his access to information
on firms’ decision making is limited. In order to get a better understanding of firms’ decision
making, he obtains data on a few firms and uses statistical inference to estimate the market
thickness on the firms’ side. We make an analogous assumption on firms’ reasoning abilities:
each firm estimates the market thickness of the firms’ side accurately and obtains data on a few
workers in order to estimate workers’ participation. Formally,

**Definition.** A **SESI in a two-sided markets** is a pair \((\alpha_k, \beta_m) \in [0, 1] \times [0, 1]\) that
satisfies the following:

- An \(\alpha_k\) proportion of workers searches for jobs when each worker obtains \(k\) draws about
  firms’ behavior from a Bernoulli distribution with probability of success \(\beta_m\), and best-
  responds to the estimate he forms according to the inference procedure \(G^w\) and \(\alpha_k\).

- An \(\beta_m\) proportion of firms searches for workers when each firm obtains \(m\) draws about
  workers’ behavior from a Bernoulli distribution with probability of success \(\alpha_k\), and best-
  responds to the estimate it forms according to the inference procedure \(G^f\) and \(\beta_m\).

To develop the equations that characterize SESIs in this setting, fix a pair of unbiased
inference procedures \((G^w, G^f)\) that preserve shape and satisfy noise reduction. Let \(M(\alpha, (k, z))\)
denote the expected matching probability of a worker who estimates that \(\alpha\) workers are in the
market, obtains the sample \((k, z)\) regarding firms’ behavior, and uses the inference procedure \(G^w\).
Let \(M((m, z'), \beta)\) denote the analogous expected matching probability of a firm that observes
the sample \((m, z')\) of workers’ behavior. Then, the proportion of workers who participate in the
market conditional on observing the sample \((k, z)\) is equal to the expected matching probability
\(M(\alpha, (k, z))\) and similarly the proportion of firms is \(M((m, z'), \beta)\). The probability that a worker
observes the sample \((k, z)\) with \(z = j/k\) is \(\binom{k}{j} \beta^j (1-\beta)^{k-j}\) and the probability that a firm observes
the sample \((m, z')\) with \(z' = i/m\) is \(\binom{m}{i} \alpha^i (1-\alpha)^{m-i}\). The equations that characterize SESIs are therefor:

\[
\alpha = \sum_{j=0}^{k} \binom{k}{j} \beta^j (1-\beta)^{k-j} M(\alpha, (k, j/k))
\]

\[
\beta = \sum_{i=0}^{m} \binom{m}{i} \alpha^i (1-\alpha)^{m-i} M((m, i/m), \beta).
\]

The expected matching probability of workers \(M(\alpha, (k, z))\) satisfies \(M(\alpha, (k, z)) = \mu \alpha^{x-1} M^w(k, z)\)
where \(M^w(k, z)\) is the expected value of \(\beta^{1-x}\) with respect to the estimate \(G^w_{k, z}\). Rewriting the
expected matching probability of firms similarly, we obtain the equilibrium equations:

\[
\alpha_k(\beta) \equiv \left( \mu \sum_{j=0}^{k} \binom{k}{j} \beta^j (1 - \beta)^{k-j} M^w(k, j/k) \right)^{\frac{1}{2-x}}, \quad (5) 
\]

\[
\beta_m(\alpha) \equiv \left( \mu \sum_{i=0}^{m} \binom{m}{i} \alpha^i (1 - \alpha)^{m-i} M^f(m, i/m) \right)^{\frac{1}{1+x}}. \quad (6) 
\]

While the environment and the equations characterizing SESIs in two-sided markets are different from those of Sections 2 and 3, we can still use the theory of Bernstein polynomials to characterize SESIs in two-sided markets.

**Theorem 7.** Fix a pair of unbiased inference procedures \(G^w\) and \(G^f\) that preserve shape and satisfy noise reduction, and sample sizes \(k\) for workers and \(m\) for firms. Then, there exists a unique SESI with positive employment. In this positive SESI, market thickness on the workers’ and the firms’ sides, and hence employment, are smaller than in the unique NE with positive employment. Moreover, as \(k\) or \(m\) increase, market thickness on both sides of the market and employment in the positive SESI increase.

**Proof.** The function \(\alpha_k(\beta)\) is strictly concave and strictly increasing in \(\beta\). This is because (1) \(\beta^{1-x}\) is concave and strictly increasing in \(\beta\), hence (2) \(M^w(k, z)\) is concave and strictly increasing in \(z\) because \(G^w\) is an inference procedure that preserves shape, hence (3) the Bernstein polynomial of \(M^w(k, z)\), which is the expression in parenthesis in equation 5, is concave and strictly increasing, hence (4) this expression raised to the power of \(\frac{1}{2-x} < 1\) is strictly concave and strictly increasing in \(\beta\). A similar argument establishes that \(\beta_m(\alpha)\) is strictly concave and strictly increasing in \(\alpha\), which implies that its inverse function \(\hat{\alpha}_m(\beta)\) is strictly convex and strictly increasing in \(\beta\). Now, \(\beta\) is part of a SESI if and only if it is a point in which the functions \(\alpha_k(\beta)\) and \(\hat{\alpha}_m(\beta)\) intersect. Because \(\alpha_k(\beta)\) is strictly concave and \(\hat{\alpha}_m(\beta)\) is strictly convex and both are increasing, they intersect in at most one positive point. Since the value of both functions at \(\beta = 0\) is zero, and at \(\beta = 1\), \(\alpha_k(\beta) < \hat{\alpha}_m(\beta)\), we obtain that such a point exists. A similar argument can be used to establish that there is a unique NE with positive employment.

Arguments similar to the ones used in Theorems 2 and 3 can be used to show that the function \(\alpha_k(\beta)\) lies below the function \(\alpha_{NE}(\beta)\) and that the function \(\alpha_{k+1}(\beta)\) lies between these two functions for any \(0 < \beta < 1\). Similarly, the function \(\hat{\alpha}_m(\beta)\) lies above the function \(\hat{\alpha}_{NE}(\beta)\) and the function \(\hat{\alpha}_{m+1}(\beta)\) lies between these two functions. This yields the ranking of the equilibria. \(\Box\)
The magnitude of under-employment in a SESI can be substantial. The following example illustrates.

**Example 7.1.** Suppose $x = 1/2$. Then, the unique positive NE has to solve $\alpha = \mu(\beta/\alpha)^{1/2}$ and $\beta = \mu(\alpha/\beta)^{1/2}$. Participation in this NE is $\alpha = \beta = \mu$ and employment is $\mu^2$. The unique positive SESI with unbiased inference procedures and $k = m = 1$ has to solve $\alpha = \beta \mu(1/\alpha)^{1/2}$ and $\beta = \alpha \mu(1/\beta)^{1/2}$. Participation in the SESI is smaller than in the NE by a factor of $\mu$ at $\alpha = \beta = \mu^2$ and employment is smaller by the same factor and is $\mu^3$.

8 Concluding comments

This paper made modest progress in incorporating statistical inference into games. We postulated that players act as statisticians. They obtain data on the actions of a few other players and use statistical inference procedures such as MLE or Beta estimation to estimate other players’ actions. In particular, they do not “think strategically” about how other players make inferences or choose actions. In order to “close” the model, we postulated that the data generating process from which players obtain data is representative of the distribution of players’ actions. A solution to this model, which depends on players’ sample size and inference procedure, is called a SESI. We developed tools for the analysis of SESIs, and used these tools to study the predictions of SESIs in several settings including competitive and network markets, monopoly pricing, and two-sided markets.

We conclude with three comments. The first is about the interpretation of SESI as the steady state of a dynamic process, the second is about the robustness of the analysis and the results to heterogeneous sample sizes, and the third is about robustness to heterogeneous inference procedures. For simplicity, all comments focus on the setting of Sections 2 and 3 in which the function $f$ is convex, the inference procedures is unbiased, preserves shape, and satisfies noise reduction, and the SESI is unique.

8.1 The steady state interpretation of SESI

A SESI is interpreted as the steady state of a dynamic process in which the entry of new statisticians to an existing population does not alter the distribution of actions in the population.

To formalize this interpretation, consider a population of measure 1, and let $0 \leq \alpha_0 \leq 1$
denote the proportion of players in the population who take action \( A \) in period 0. In every subsequent period \( t = 1, 2, \ldots \), a proportion \( 1 - \epsilon \) of the population is randomly selected to survive. These players continue to take the same action as in the previous period. The remaining \( \epsilon \)-proportion leaves the population and is replaced by an \( \epsilon \)-proportion of new statisticians. The new players obtain data on the previous period’s actions, use statistical inference to estimate the proportion of players taking the action, and best-respond to the resulting estimate. Thus, the proportion of players who take action \( A \) evolves according to the process:

\[
\alpha_t = (1 - \epsilon)\alpha_{t-1} + \epsilon(1 - \text{Bern}_k(\alpha_{t-1}; F_k)) \equiv h(\alpha_{t-1})
\]

A steady state of this process is a proportion \( \alpha^* \) that satisfies

\[
\alpha^* = 1 - \text{Bern}_k(\alpha^*; F_k),
\]

i.e., it is a SESI proportion of degree \( k \) with respect to the corresponding inference procedure. By the results of Section 3, there is a unique SESI and so there is a unique candidate steady state.

The following result establishes convergence of the dynamic process to the steady state.

**Theorem 8.** Let \( \epsilon < \frac{1}{1 + f'(1)} \). Then, for any initial proportion \( \alpha_0 \), the proportion \( \alpha_t \) of players who take action \( A \) converges to the unique SESI proportion as \( t \) tends to infinity.

Theorem 8 continues to hold for a concave function \( f \) when \( \epsilon < \frac{1}{1 + f'(0)} \).\(^{12}\)

### 8.2 Heterogeneous samples sizes

Heterogeneous sample sizes may arise due to differences in individuals’ access to information or due to differences in the ability to recall or process information. To model such heterogeneity, let \( \gamma_i \) denote the proportion of individuals who obtain a sample of size \( i \) with \( 1 \leq i \leq K \) and \( \sum_{i=1}^K \gamma_i = 1 \) and let \( \gamma = (\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_K) \).

A SESI of degree \( \gamma = (\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_K) \) with respect to the inference procedure \( G \) is a number \( \alpha_{\gamma, G} \in [0, 1] \) such that an \( \alpha_{\gamma, G} \) proportion of players take action \( A \) when, for every \( 1 \leq i \leq K \) a proportion \( \gamma_i \) of players draws \( i \) independent observations from a Bernoulli distribution with probability of success \( \alpha_{\gamma, G} \), and each player best-responds to the estimate he forms using the inference procedure \( G \).

\(^{12}\)The upper bound on \( \epsilon \) changes because the concavity of \( f \) implies that the corresponding Bernstein polynomial of \( F_k \) lies below \( f \) and its derivative decreases in \( \alpha \).
Similarly to Observation 1, any SESI proportion $\alpha_{\gamma,G}$ solves

$$1 - \alpha = \sum_{i=1}^{K} \gamma_i \text{Bern}_i(\alpha; F_i)$$  \hspace{1cm} (7)

where $F_i$ is a function that assigns the value $F_{i,z}$ to every $z \in [0,1]$.

The left-hand side of Equation 7 is identical to the left-hand side of Equation 1. The function on the right-hand side of Equation 7 is a finite convex combination of the functions on the right-hand side of Equation 1. This convex combination inherits the properties of the functions on which it operates that we used in the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2. It therefore follows that (i) there exists a unique SESI proportion for any $\gamma$ and any $G$, and that (ii) this SESI proportion is smaller than the NE proportion.

In order to rank two SESI proportions, $\alpha_{\gamma,G}$ and $\alpha_{\hat{\gamma},G}$, we treat $\gamma$ and $\hat{\gamma}$ as discrete distributions over the values $1, \ldots, K$. Then, the proportion $\alpha_{\gamma,G}$ is strictly smaller than $\alpha_{\hat{\gamma},G}$ if $\gamma$ is first-order stochastically dominated by $\hat{\gamma}$.

To see why, recall that we established in Theorem 3 that $\text{Bern}_i(\alpha; F_i) \geq \text{Bern}_{i+1}(\alpha; F_{i+1})$ with strict inequality for $0 < \alpha < 1$. This implies that for every $0 < \alpha < 1$ the right-hand side of Equation 7 with respect to $\gamma$ is larger than with respect to $\hat{\gamma}$ by the first-order stochastic dominance. Therefore, the SESI proportion $\alpha_{\gamma,G}$ is smaller.

## 8.3 Heterogeneous inference procedures

Heterogeneous inference procedures may arise for various reasons such as a preference for a particular estimation procedure or different levels of confidence in the estimation. To model such heterogeneity, let $G^1, \ldots, G^M$ denote the $M$ inference procedures used by players and let $\gamma_i$ denote the proportion of individuals who use the inference procedure $G^i$.

A SESI of degree $k$ with respect to the distribution $\gamma = (\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_M)$ of inference procedures $G = (G^1, \ldots, G^M)$ is a number $\alpha_{k,\gamma} \in [0,1]$ such that an $\alpha_{k,\gamma}$ proportion of players take action $A$ when each player draws $k$ independent observations from a Bernoulli distribution with probability of success $\alpha_{k,\gamma}$, for every $1 \leq i \leq M$ a proportion $\gamma_i$ of players form an estimate according to the inference procedure $G^i$, and each player best-responds to his estimate in choosing an action.

Assume that every $G^i$ is unbiased, preserves shape, and satisfies noise reduction. Fix a convex cost function $f$ and a sample size $k$, and let $F^i_k$ denote the function that assigns to any $z \in [0,1]$ the expected value of $f$ with respect to $G^i$ conditional on the sample $(k,z)$. 

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Similarly to Observation 1, any SESI proportion $\alpha_{k,\gamma}$ has to solve

$$1 - \alpha = \sum_{i=1}^{M} \gamma_i \text{Bern}_k(\alpha; F^i_k).$$  \hspace{1cm} (8)

Arguments similar to the ones used above and in Section 3 can now be used to establish that (i) there exists a unique SESI proportion for every sample size and every collection of inference procedures, (ii) this SESI proportion is smaller than the NE proportion, and (iii) the SESI proportion $\alpha_{k,\gamma}$ increases in $k$.

Thus, the results of Section 3 extend to heterogeneous samples and heterogeneous inference procedures. A challenge for future research is to study settings with dynamic or correlated sampling.
A Games with more than two actions

This section extends the definitions of Section 2 to games with more than two actions, provides an equilibrium existence result, and solves an example.

Primitives. There is a unit mass of players, and each of them has to decide whether to take one of \( N + 1 \) actions. The utility from action 0 is 0. The utility from action \( n \in \{1, 2, \ldots, N\} \) is \( u_n(\theta_n, \alpha_n) = \theta_n - f_n(\alpha_n) \), where \( \theta_n \) is a player’s idiosyncratic benefit of taking action \( n \) and \( f_n(\alpha_n) \) is the cost incurred by a player taking action \( n \) when a proportion \( \alpha_n \) of players take action \( n \). Each cost function \( f_n \) is continuous with \( 0 \leq f_n(0) \) and \( f_n(1) \leq 1 \).

Statistical decision making. In order to decide which action to take, each player estimates the vector \( \alpha = (\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_N) \in \Delta^N \). The player obtains \( k \) independent draws from a Categorical distribution with the parameter \( \alpha \). The resulting sample is \((k, z) = (k, (z_0, z_1, z_2, \ldots, z_N))\) where the integer \( k \geq 1 \) is the sample size, \( z \in \Delta^N \), and \( z_n \in [0,1] \) is the proportion of “successes” for action \( n \) in the sample. The player then forms an estimate according to an inference procedure and best-responds to this estimate in taking an action.

Definition. An inference procedure \( G = \{G_{k,z}\} \) assigns to every sample \((k, z)\) a cumulative distribution function \( G_{k,z} \) defined over \([0,1]^{N+1}\) called an estimate such that:

For any action \( n \) and any two vectors \( z \) and \( \hat{z} \) with \( z_n > \hat{z}_n \), the marginal estimate of action \( n \) under \( G_{k,z} \) strictly first order stochastically dominates the marginal estimate of \( n \) under \( G_{k,\hat{z}} \).

Following are a few examples of inference procedures.

Example A.1 (Bayesian Updating). A player has a non-degenerate prior over \( \alpha \) and uses Bayes rule to update this prior based on the sample.

Example A.2 (Maximum Likelihood Estimation). A player uses the maximum likelihood method to estimate the most likely vector \( \alpha \) to generate the sample, i.e.

\[
\alpha_{k,MLE} = \arg \max_{\alpha} \frac{k!}{\prod (kz_n)!} \prod \alpha_n^{kz_n}.
\]

It is easy to verify that \( \alpha_{k,MLE} = (z_0, z_1, \ldots, z_N) \).

Example A.3 (Dirichlet estimation). This inference procedure is a generalization of Example 2.3 to the current setting. A player has “complete ignorance” about the vector \( \alpha \). Formally,
the player’s “prior” is the limit of the Dirichlet distribution with parameter \( \epsilon = (\epsilon, \epsilon, \ldots, \epsilon) \) as \( \epsilon \to 0 \). After observing \( j_n \) “successes” for action \( n \) in a sample of size \( k \), the player “updates” his estimate to the Dirichlet distribution with the parameter vector \( (j_0, j_1, \ldots, j_N) \).

**Equilibrium.** In a SESI, players obtain their sample from the distribution of actions based on players’ statistical decision making.

**Definition.** A SESI is a vector \( \alpha_{k,G} = (\alpha_{0,(k,G)}, \alpha_{1,(k,G)}, \ldots, \alpha_{N,(k,G)}) \in \Delta^N \) such that for any \( 0 \leq n \leq N \) an \( \alpha_n,(k,G) \) proportion of players take action \( n \) when each player draws \( k \) independent observations from a Categorical distribution with parameter \( \alpha_{k,G} \), forms an estimate according to the inference procedure \( G \), and best-responds to this estimate in choosing an action.

**Observation A1.** A SESI exists for every inference procedure and every sample size.

**Proof.** Fix the inference procedure \( G \) and the sample size \( k \). Consider the best-response function \( h \) that assigns to any \( \alpha \in \Delta^N \) the \( N + 1 \) proportions \( h(\alpha) \) of players taking each of the \( N + 1 \) actions after obtaining \( k \) observations from a categorical distribution with the parameter \( \alpha \) and best-responding to \( G \).

Every player observes one of finitely many samples with a probability that is continuous in \( \alpha \). Conditional on the sample and players’ tie breaking rule, players’ probability distribution over actions is constant. Thus, the best-response function \( h \) is the sum of finitely many components, each continuous in \( \alpha \), and is therefore continuous in \( \alpha \). Hence, by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, \( h \) has a fixed point.

**Example: Choosing which product variety to produce in a competitive market.** This example is a modification of the competitive market example in Section 4.1.

There is a unit mass of producers and each of them has to decide which of \( N \) product varieties to produce, if any. The inverse demand \( P(Q_n) \) for variety \( n \) is independent of \( n \), it decreases in \( Q_n \) and is between 0 and 1. Production cost \( \theta \) is also independent of \( n \), and is distributed uniformly on \([0, 1]\) among producers.

Because production cost is independent of \( n \), each producer wishes to produce the variety with the highest market price. Because inverse demand decreases in quantity and is identical for different varieties, the variety with the highest price is the variety with the lowest aggregate...
production. Thus, each producer needs to estimate \( Q = (Q_1, \ldots, Q_N) \) in order to decide which variety to produce if any.

Fix a sample size \( k \leq N - 1 \) and suppose producers use MLE to estimate \( Q \). Suppose also that if a producer is indifferent between producing one of several varieties, he mixes uniformly between them. Then:

**Observation A2.** There is a unique SESI. In this SESI, all varieties are produced by the same proportion of producers. There is also a unique NE. In this NE, all varieties are produced the same proportion of producers, which is strictly smaller than in the unique SESI.

To solve for a SESI and show it is unique, we observe that \( k \leq N - 1 \) implies that any sample involves one or more varieties that no one produces. In a SESI, a producer will produce one of these varieties if \( \theta \leq P(0) \). Otherwise, he will not produce. Thus, \( \alpha_{0,(k,MLE)} = 1 - P(0) \).

If the remaining mass \( P(0) \) of producers is not divided equally among varieties in a SESI then the variety with the largest mass of producers will appear in samples more frequently than the variety with the smallest mass. This implies in turn that more producers will choose to produce the variety with the smallest mass. Thus, the only candidate for a SESI is a distribution in which the mass \( P(0) \) is divided equally among varieties. It is easy to verify that this candidate is indeed an equilibrium.

In a NE, total production mass should also be divided equally among varieties. Denoting the production mass of each variety by \( Q_{NE} \), the total production mass \( NQ_{NE} \) has to satisfy \( NQ = P(Q) \) because producers with \( \theta \geq P(Q) \) choose not to produce. Because \( P \) decreases in \( Q \) with \( P(0) > 0 \) and \( P(1) < 1 \) while \( NQ \) increases in \( Q \), there is a unique NE. Because \( Q_{NE} > 0 \), \( P(Q_{NE}) < P(0) \) and hence the mass producing each variety \( \frac{P(Q_{NE})}{N} \) is smaller than in the unique SESI independently of the exact shape of \( P \).

**B Proofs**

*Proof of Theorem 4.* By Jensen’s inequality and the convexity of \( f \), the function \( F_k \) is larger than the function \( f \). Because \( G \) preserves shape and \( f \) is strictly convex, the function \( F_k \) is strictly convex, so Property 2 implies \( Bern_k(\alpha; F_k) \) is convex and larger than \( F_k \). In fact, \( Bern_k(\alpha; F_k) \)
is strictly convex for \( k \geq 2 \). Similarly to the proof of Theorem 2, one can also show that \( \text{Bern}_k(\alpha; F_k) \geq \text{Bern}_{k+1}(\alpha; F_{k+1}) \) with strict inequality for \( 0 < \alpha < 1 \) as the relevant arguments rely only on \( f \) being convex. Thus, we have the ranking:

\[
f(\alpha) \leq F_k(\alpha) \leq \text{Bern}_k(\alpha; F_k) \leq \text{Bern}_{k+1}(\alpha; F_{k+1})
\]

where the second and third inequalities are strict for \( 0 < \alpha < 1 \).

Equation 2 implies that the number of NEs is equal to the number of times \( f(\alpha) \) intersects the function \( 1 - \alpha \). Observation 1 implies that the number of SESIs of degree \( k \) is equal to the number of times \( \text{Bern}_k(\alpha; F_k) \) intersects \( 1 - \alpha \).

Because \( f(0) = F_k(0) = \text{Bern}_k(0; F_k) < 1 \) and \( f(1) = F_k(1) = \text{Bern}_k(1; F_k) > 1 \), the functions \( f(\alpha) \) and \( \text{Bern}_k(\alpha; F_k) \) intersect \( 1 - \alpha \) at least once. And because \( f(\alpha) \) and \( \text{Bern}_k(\alpha; F_k) \) for \( k \geq 2 \) are strictly convex, they intersect \( 1 - \alpha \) exactly once. For \( k = 1 \), \( \text{Bern}_k(\alpha; F_k) \) is a linear function with a larger slope than that of \( 1 - \alpha \), so they intersect exactly once. This establishes there is a unique NE and a unique SESI for any sample size.

The ranking of the NE and the SESI proportions of different degrees now follows from the ranking of the functions \( f, \text{Bern}_k, \) and \( \text{Bern}_{k+1} \).

**Proof of Theorem 5.** By the discussion following the statement of Theorem 5, it suffices to prove the following:

**Proposition B1.** For \( k \geq 2 \), the \( k \)-th order Bernstein polynomial of an S-shaped function \( f \) is convex if \( \delta_{k-1} \geq 0 \), is concave if \( \delta_1 \leq 0 \), and is otherwise S-shaped. Moreover, if the \( k \)-th order Bernstein polynomial of \( f \) is convex (concave) then so is the \( (k-1) \)-th order polynomial of \( f \).

We first state and prove four observations and then use them to prove the proposition.

Let \( i \) be the inflection point of \( f \). For any \( \beta > i \) and any \( \gamma < \beta \), let \( s_\beta(\gamma) = \frac{f(\beta)-f(\gamma)}{\beta-\gamma} \) denote the slope of the line segment \( L_f(\gamma, \beta) \) connecting \( f(\gamma) \) and \( f(\beta) \) on the graph of \( f \). Because \( f \) is S-shaped, \( s_\beta \) initially increases and then decreases in \( \gamma \) implying that \( m_\beta = \arg \max_{\gamma < \beta} s_\beta(\gamma) \) is unique. The point \( m_\beta \) is weakly smaller than the inflection point because \( s_\beta \) strictly decreases to the right of the inflection point. If \( m_\beta > 0 \) then \( L_f(m_\beta, \beta) \) is tangent to \( f \) at \( m_\beta \).

**Observation B1.** For any \( \zeta \in (m_\beta, \beta) \), the line segment \( L_f(\zeta, \beta) \) is strictly below \( f(\alpha) \) for \( \alpha \in (\zeta, \beta) \).

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13 Strict convexity follows because the second derivative of any \( \text{Bern}_k(\alpha; v) \) for \( k \geq 2 \) is a convex combination of expressions of the form \( v(j_k^k) + v(j_{k+2}^k) - 2v(j_{k+1}^k) \) for \( 0 \leq j \leq k - 2 \).
Proof. The line segment $L_f(\zeta, \beta)$ is strictly below the line segment $L_f(\alpha, \beta)$ between $\alpha$ and $\beta$ because $m_\beta < \zeta < \alpha$. The result follows because $L_f(\alpha, \beta)$ intersects the graph of $f$ at $\alpha$. □

Observation B2. If $\beta_2 > \beta_1 > i$ then $m_{\beta_2} \leq m_{\beta_1}$.

Proof. By the definition of $m_{\beta_1}$, $f'(m_{\beta_1}) \geq g_{\beta_1}(m_{\beta_1})$ with equality if $m_{\beta_1} > 0$. Because $\beta_2 > \beta_1$, $g_{\beta_2}(m_{\beta_1}) < g_{\beta_1}(m_{\beta_1})$ (the slope of $L_f(m_{\beta_1}, \beta_1)$ decreases when it is rotated to $L_f(m_{\beta_1}, \beta_2)$ because $\beta_1 > i$). Thus $f'(m_{\beta_1}) > g_{\beta_2}(m_{\beta_1})$ implying that $m_{\beta_2} \leq m_{\beta_1}$. □

Observation B3. If $\delta^k_j \geq 0$ then $\delta^k_h \geq 0$ for $h < j$ with strict inequality for $h < j - 1$. If $\delta^k_j > 0$ then $\delta^k_{j-1} > 0$.

Proof. If $\frac{j}{k} \leq i$ then the convexity of $f$ to the left of the inflection point implies the result.

Suppose $\frac{i}{k} > i$. Then, $\frac{i-1}{k} < i$ (otherwise $\delta^k_j < 0$ by the strict concavity of $f$ to the right of $i$). The strict convexity of $f$ to the left of the inflection point implies the result for $h < j - 1$.

To show that $\delta^k_j \geq 0$ implies $\delta^k_{j-1} \geq 0$, assume to the contrary that $\delta^k_{j-1} < 0$. This implies that $\frac{j}{k} > i$ and that $f(\frac{i-1}{k})$ is above the line segment $L_f(\frac{i-2}{k}, \frac{i}{k})$. The line segment $L_f(\frac{i-2}{k}, \frac{i}{k})$ has up to two intersection points with $f$ to the left of $\frac{i}{k}$. Let $\eta$ denote the larger one if more than one exists. Then, $\frac{i-1}{k} > \eta$ (the line segment $L_f(\frac{i-2}{k}, \eta)$ lies above $f$ to the left of $\eta$ if $\eta > \frac{i-2}{k}$.) By construction, $m_{\frac{j}{k}} < \eta$ and thus $m_{\frac{i+1}{k}} < \eta$ by Observation B2. This implies $\delta^k_j < 0$ by Observation 1, which is a contradiction. A similar argument establishes that $\delta^k_j > 0$ implies $\delta^k_{j-1} > 0$. □

Observation B4. If $\delta^k_{k-1} \geq 0$ then $\delta^k_{k-2} \geq 0$. Similarly, if $\delta^k_k \leq 0$ then $\delta^k_{k-1} \leq 0$.

Proof. Suppose $\delta^k_{k-1} \geq 0$. Then, $\frac{k-2}{k} < m_1$ (otherwise, by Observation B1, $\delta^k_{k-1} < 0$) and the line segment $L_f(\frac{k-2}{k}, \frac{k}{k})$ intersects the graph of $f$ at an intermediate point $\eta \geq \frac{k-1}{k}$ (otherwise, if $\eta < \frac{k-1}{k}$ then $\delta^k_{k-1} < 0$). Because $\frac{k-2}{k} < m_1 < i$ and $\frac{k-3}{k-1} < \frac{k-2}{k}$, the line segment $L_f(\frac{k-3}{k-1}, \frac{k}{k})$ is above $L_f(\frac{k-2}{k}, \frac{k}{k})$ and is therefore above the graph of $f$ to the left of $\eta$. Since $\frac{k-2}{k-1} < \frac{k-1}{k} < \eta$, we obtain that $L_f(\frac{k-3}{k-1}, \frac{k}{k})$ is above $f(\frac{k-2}{k-1})$ and the result follows. □

Proof of Proposition B1. Fix $k \geq 2$. The second derivative of the $k$-th order Bernstein polyno-
The second derivative is:

\[ \text{Bern}''_k(\alpha; f) = k(k-1) \sum_{j=0}^{k-2} \binom{k-2}{j} \alpha^j (1-\alpha)^{k-2-j} \left( f\left(\frac{j+2}{k}\right) - 2f\left(\frac{j+1}{k}\right) + f\left(\frac{j}{k}\right) \right) \]

i.e., it is proportional to a convex combination of \( \{\delta_j^{k-1}\}_{j=1}^{k-1} \).

If \( \delta_{k-1}^k \geq 0 \) then all the other \( \delta \)'s are non-negative by Lemma B3. The second derivative is therefore non-negative and \( \text{Bern}_k(\alpha; f) \) is convex. Similarly, if \( \delta_1^k \leq 0 \) then so are all the other \( \delta \)'s and \( \text{Bern}_k(\alpha; f) \) is concave.

Suppose \( \delta_1^k > 0 \) and \( \delta_{k-1}^k < 0 \). Let \( l \) be the largest integer such that \( \delta_l^k \geq 0 \). By Lemma B3, all the \( \delta \)'s to the left of \( l \) are non-negative (and at least \( \delta_1^k \) is positive) and all the \( \delta \)'s to the right of \( l \) are negative.

Let \( t = \sum_{j=l}^{k-2} \binom{k-2}{j} \alpha^j (1-\alpha)^{k-2-j} \). Then \( t \) increases in \( \alpha \), and we can write the second derivative as follows:

\[ \text{Bern}''_k(\alpha; f) = k(k-1) \left[ \frac{P}{1-t}(1-t) + \frac{N}{t} t \right] \]

where \( P = \sum_{j=0}^{l} \binom{k-2}{j} \alpha^j (1-\alpha)^{k-2-j} \delta_{j+1}^k \) is positive and \( N = \sum_{j=l+1}^{k-2} \binom{k-2}{j} \alpha^j (1-\alpha)^{k-2-j} \delta_j^k \) is negative. The second derivative is therefore a convex combination of a positive number and a negative one. At \( \alpha = 0 \), \( \text{Bern}''_k(\alpha; f) \) is positive, at \( \alpha = 1 \) it is negative, and it decreases in \( \alpha \). Hence, \( \text{Bern}''_k(\alpha; f) \) has a unique root on \([0, 1]\), it is positive to the left of this root and negative to its right implying \( \text{Bern}_k(\alpha; f) \) is S-shaped.

If \( \text{Bern}_k(\alpha; f) \) is convex then \( \delta_{k-1}^k \geq 0 \) by the above arguments (otherwise if \( \delta_{k-1}^k < 0 \) then \( \text{Bern}_k(\alpha; f) \) is either concave or S-shaped). By Lemma B4, this implies that \( \delta_{k-2}^k \geq 0 \) and thus by the above arguments, \( \text{Bern}_{k-1}(\alpha; f) \) is convex. The proof for a concave Bernstein polynomial is analogous.

Proof of Theorem 8. By the Monotone Convergence Theorem and the uniqueness of the steady state, it suffices to prove that one of the following two conditions holds for any \( t \geq 1 \):

(i) \( \alpha_{t-1} < \alpha_t < \alpha^* \) or
(ii) \( \alpha_{t-1} > \alpha_t > \alpha^* \).

Suppose \( \alpha_{t-1} < \alpha^* \). The following four steps establish that condition (i) holds.
Step 1. $\alpha_{t-1} < \alpha_t$.
This follows from the fact that $1 - \text{Bern}_k(\alpha; F_k) > \alpha$ for any $\alpha < \alpha^*$ and the definition of the dynamic process. \hfill \checkmark

Step 2. $\text{Bern}'_k(\alpha; F_k) \leq f'(1)$ for any $\alpha \in [0, 1]$ where $\text{Bern}'_k$ denotes the derivative of the corresponding Bernstein polynomial.
Because $f$ is convex and the inference procedure is unbiased and preserves shape, the function $F_k$ is convex and lies above $f$. The Bernstein polynomial of $F_k$ is also convex and lies above $F_k$. The derivative of the Bernstein polynomial increases in $\alpha$ because of convexity, and its value at 1 is smaller than $f'(1)$ because $\text{Bern}_k(\alpha; F_k) \geq f(\alpha)$ for any $\alpha$ with equality at 1 and both functions are convex. \hfill \checkmark

Step 3. $h'(\alpha) > 0$ for any $\alpha \in [0, 1]$.
By definition,
$$h'(\alpha) = 1 - \epsilon - \epsilon \text{Bern}'_k(\alpha; F_k) \geq 1 - \epsilon - \epsilon f'(1) > 0$$
where the second inequality is by Step 2 and the third inequality is by the choice of $\epsilon$. \hfill \checkmark

Step 4. $\alpha_t < \alpha^*$.
By the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus,
$$h(\alpha^*) - h(\alpha_{t-1}) = \int_{\alpha_{t-1}}^{\alpha^*} h'(\alpha) \, d\alpha > 0$$
where the last inequality is by Step 3. Since $h(\alpha_{t-1}) = \alpha_t$ and $h(\alpha^*) = \alpha^*$, the result follows. \hfill \checkmark

Proving that $\alpha_{t-1} > \alpha^*$ implies condition (ii) is analogous. \hfill \Box

References


