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Research Details

Antitrust Enforcement Under Asymmetric Information, Economic Journal

Abstract

This paper considers the optimal design of antitrust policy when collusive behaviour is unobservable and production costs are private information.1 The analysis shows that asymmetric information can be a significant factor in the decision to tolerate some degree of collusion even though price fixing is illegal per se.

Type

Article

Author(s)

David Besanko, Daniel Spulber

Date Published

1989

Citations

Besanko, David, and Daniel Spulber. 1989. Antitrust Enforcement Under Asymmetric Information. Economic Journal. 99(396): 408-425.

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