Take Action
Home | Faculty & Research Overview | Research
Research Details
Antitrust Enforcement Under Asymmetric Information, Economic Journal
Abstract
This paper considers the optimal design of antitrust policy when collusive behaviour is unobservable and production costs are private information.1 The analysis shows that asymmetric information can be a significant factor in the decision to tolerate some degree of collusion even though price fixing is illegal per se.
Type
Article
Author(s)
Date Published
1989
Citations
Besanko, David, and Daniel Spulber. 1989. Antitrust Enforcement Under Asymmetric Information. Economic Journal.(396): 408-425.
KELLOGG INSIGHT
Explore leading research and ideas
Find articles, podcast episodes, and videos that spark ideas in lifelong learners, and inspire those looking to advance in their careers.
learn more
COURSE CATALOG
Review Courses & Schedules
Access information about specific courses and their schedules by viewing the interactive course scheduler tool.
LEARN MORE
DEGREE PROGRAMS
Discover the path to your goals
Whether you choose our Full-Time, Part-Time or Executive MBA program, you’ll enjoy the same unparalleled education, exceptional faculty and distinctive culture.
learn more