Fault Tolerance in Large Games, Proceedings of the 2008 ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
A Nash equilibrium is an optimal strategy for each player under the assumption that others play according to their respective Nash strategies. In the presence of irrational players or coalitions of colluding players, however, it provides no guarantees. Some recent literature has focused on measuring the potential damage caused by the presence of faulty behavior, as well as designing mechanisms that are resilient against such faults. In this paper we show that large games are naturally fault tolerant. We first quantify the ways in which two subclasses of large games -- ?-continuous games and anonymous games -- are resilient against Byzantine faults (i.e. irrational behavior), coalitions, and asynchronous play. We then show that general large games also have some non-trivial resilience against faults.
Ronen Gradwohl, Omer Reingold
Gradwohl, Ronen, and Omer Reingold. 2008. Fault Tolerance in Large Games. Proceedings of the 2008 ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. 9: 274-283.