Curriculum Vitae
ROGER B. MYERSON

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Personal Information:
Date of Birth: March 29, 1951, in Boston, Massachusetts. Citizenship: U.S.A.
Married to Regina Weber Myerson, with two children, born 1983 and 1985.
Home address: 1219 Elmwood Avenue, Wilmette, Illinois 60091-1646

Education:
Ph.D. in Applied Mathematics, Harvard University, 1976 (dissertation title: "A Theory of Cooperative Games").
A.B. summa cum laude, and S.M. in Applied Mathematics, Harvard University, 1973.

Professional Experience:
Harold L. Stuart Professor of Decision Sciences (since 1986), Professor of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences (since 1982), Professor of Economics (by courtesy since 1987) and Political Science (by courtesy since 1993), Northwestern University.
Associate Professor (1979-1982), Assistant Professor (1976-1979) of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Northwestern University.
Visiting Professor of Economics, University of Chicago (1985-1986, and 2000-2001).
Guest Researcher, Center for Interdisciplinary Studies, U. of Bielefeld, Germany (1978-1979).

Professional Honors and Responsibilities:
Fellow of the Econometric Society, elected 1983.
Member of the Council of the Econometric Society (since 1996).
Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, elected 1993.
Member of the Midwest Council of American Academy of Arts and Sciences (since 1995).
Director of the Midwest Center and Vice President of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (1999-2002)
Editorial board member, Games and Economic Behavior (1989-1997).
Editorial Board member, International Journal of Game Theory (1982-1992).
Associate Editor, Journal of Economic Theory (1983-1993).
Guggenheim Fellow (1983-1984). Sloan Foundation Fellow (1984-1986).

Book:

      <u>Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict</u>, Harvard University Press (1991).

Published software:

      Formlist.xla (for auditing formulas in Microsoft Excel) v1.5, 22 kb, updated 12/1999.
      Simtools.xla (for simulation and decision analysis in Excel) v3.31, 97 kb, updated 3/2000.
      Available at http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/myerson/ftp/addins.htm

Papers:

1.   "Values of Games in Partition Function Form," <u>International Journal of Game Theory</u> <u>6</u> (1977), 23-31.

2.   "Graphs and Cooperation in Games," <u>Mathematics of Operations Research</u> <u>2</u> (1977), 225-229.

3.   "Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility," <u>Econometrica</u> <u>45</u> (1977), 1631-1637.

4.   "Discussion (of Harsanyi's 'Bayesian Decision Theory and Utilitarian Ethics')," <u>American Economic Review</u> <u>68</u> (1978), 231.

5.   "Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept," <u>International Journal of Game Theory</u> <u>7</u> (1978), 73-80.

6.   "Threat Equilibria and Fair Settlements in Cooperative Games," <u>Mathematics of Operations Research</u> <u>3</u> (1978), 265-274.

7.   "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," <u>Econometrica</u> <u>47</u> (1979), 61-73.

8.   "An Axiomatic Derivation of Subjective Probability, Utility, and Evaluation Functions," <u>Theory and Decision</u> <u>11</u> (1979), 339-352.

9.   With W. Thomson, "Monotonicity and Independence Axioms," <u>International Journal of Game Theory</u> <u>9</u> (1980), 37-49.

10.   "Conference Structures and Fair Allocation Rules," <u>International Journal of Game Theory</u> <u>9</u> (1980), 169-182.

11.   "An Algorithm for Computing Equilibria in a Linear Monetary Economy," <u>Mathematical Programming</u> <u>21</u> (1981), 182-189.

12.   "Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems," <u>Econometrica</u> <u>49</u> (1981), 883-897.

13.   "Prices and Market Imbalance Indexes in a General Equilibrium Model," CMSEMS DP No. 339 (August, 1978), French translation in <u>Les Cahiers du Seminaire d'Econometrie #22</u> (1980), Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris.

14. "Optimal Auction Design," <u>Mathematics of Operations Research</u> <u>6</u> (1981), 58-73.

15. With D. P. Baron, "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs," <u>Econometrica</u> <u>50</u> (1982), 911-930.

16. "Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Generalized Principal-Agent Problems," <u>Journal of Mathematical Economics</u> <u>10</u> (1982), 67-81.

17. "The Basic Theory of Optimal Auctions," in <u>Auctions, Bidding and Contracts</u>, edited by R. Engelbrecht-Wiggans, M. Shubik, and R. Stark, New York University Press (1983), 149-163.

18. With M. A. Satterthwaite, "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," <u>Journal of Economic Theory</u> <u>29</u> (1983), 265-281.

19. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal," <u>Econometrica</u> <u>51</u> (1983), 1767-1797.

20. With B. Holmstrom, "Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information," <u>Econometrica</u> <u>51</u> (1983), 1799-1819.

21. "A Dynamic Microeconomic Model with Durable Goods and Adaptive Expectation," <u>Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization</u> <u>4</u> (1983), 309-351.

22. "Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information," <u>Econometrica</u> <u>52</u> (1984), 461-487.

23. "Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information," <u>International Journal of Game Theory</u> <u>13</u> (1984), 69-86.

24. "Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive Compatibility," in <u>Social Goals and Social Organization</u>, edited by L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler, and H. Sonnenschein, Cambridge University Press (1985), 229-259.

25. "Analysis of Two Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information," in <u>Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining</u>, edited by A. Roth, Cambridge University Press (1985), 59-69.

26. With R. Radner and E. Maskin, "An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria," <u>Review of Economic Studies</u> <u>53</u> (1986), 59-69.

27. "Multistage Games with Communication," <u>Econometrica</u> <u>54</u> (1986), 323-358.

28. "Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria," <u>International Journal of Game Theory</u> <u>15</u> (1986), 133-154.

29. "An Introduction to Game Theory," in <u>Studies in Mathematical Economics</u>, edited by S. Reiter, Mathematical Association of America (1986), 1-61.

30. "Negotiation in Games: A Theoretical Overview," in <u>Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow</u> <u>3</u>, edited by W. Heller, R. Starr, and D. Starrett, Cambridge U. Press (1986), 3-24.

31.   "Incentive Constraints and Optimal Communication Systems," in <u>Procedings of the Second Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge</u>, edited by M. Y. Vardi, Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann (1988), 179-193.

32.   With R. J. Aumann, "Endogenous Formation of Links Between Players and of Coalitions: an Application of the Shapley Value," in <u>The Shapley Value</u>, edited by A. E. Roth, Cambridge University Press (1988), 175-191.

33.   "Mechanism Design," in <u>The New Palgrave: Allocation, Information, and Markets</u>, edited by J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. Newman, New York: Norton, (1989), 191-206.

34.   "Credible Negotiation Statements and Coherent Plans," <u>Journal of Economic Theory</u> <u>48</u> (1989), 264-303.

35.   "Analysis of Incentives in Bargaining and Mediation," in <u>Negotiation Analysis</u>, edited by H. P. Young, University of Michigan Press (1991), 67-85.

36.   With G. B. Pollock and J. M. Swinkels, "Viscous Population Equilibria," <u>Games and Economic Behavior</u> <u>3</u> (1991), 101-109.

37.   "On the Value of Game Theory in Social Science," <u>Rationality and Society</u> <u>4</u> (1992), 62-73.

38.   "Fictitious-Transfer Solutions in Cooperative Game Theory," in <u>Rational Interaction</u>, edited by R. Selten, Springer-Verlag (1992), 13-33.

39.   "Mechanism Design and Incentive Constraints" and "Revelation Principle," in <u>New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance</u>, edited by J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. Newman, New York: Stockton Press (1992).

40.   With R. J. Weber, "A Theory of Voting Equilibria," <u>American Political Science Review</u> <u>87</u> (1993), 102-114.

41.   "Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game Theoretic Analysis," <u>Games and Economic Behavior</u> <u>5</u> (1993), 118-132.

42.   "Review of 'Advances in the Spatial Theory of Voting' and 'Models of Multiparty Electoral Competition'," <u>Journal of Economic Literature</u> <u>31(1)</u> (March 1993), 237-240.

43.   "Proportional Representation, Approval Voting, and Coalitionally Straightforward Elections," in <u>Political Economy: Institutions, Competition, and Representation</u>, edited by W. A. Barnett, M. J. Hinich, and N. J. Schofield, Cambridge University Press (1993), pp. 107-133.

44.   With R. Forsythe, T. A. Rietz, and R. J. Weber, "An Experiment on Coordination in Multicandidate Elections: the Importance of Polls and Election Histories," <u>Social Choice and Welfare</u> <u>10</u> (1993), 223-247.

45.   "Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities under Alternative Electoral Systems," <u>American Political Science Review</u> <u>87</u> (1993) 856-869.

46. "Communication, Correlated Equilibria, and Incentive Compatibility," chapter 24 in <u>Handbook of Game Theory, vol. 2</u>, edited by R. J. Aumann and S. Hart, Elsevier Science (1994), pages 827-847.

47. "Sustainable Matching Plans with Adverse Selection," <u>Games and Economic Behavior</u> <u>9</u> (1995), 35-65.

48. "Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct, and Perfomance," <u>Journal of Economic Perspectives</u> <u>9:1</u> (1995), 77-89.

49. "Axiomatic Derivation of Scoring Rules without the Ordering Assumption," <u>Social Choice and Welfare</u> <u>12</u> (1995), 59-74.

50. "An Early Paper on the Refinement of Nash Equilibrium," <u>Duke Mathematical Journal</u> <u>81</u> (1996), 67-75.

51. "John Nash's Contribution to Economics" <u>Games and Economic Behavior 14</u> (1996), 287-295.

52. "Analisis economico de las instituciones politicas: una introduccion" (translated into Spanish by J. Ignacio Conde Ruiz), <u>Cuadernos Economicos 62</u> (1996),7-28.

53. "Sustainable Equilibria in Culturally Familiar Games," in <u>Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten</u>, edited by W. Albers, W. Gueth, P. Hammerstein, B. Moldovanu, and E. van Damme (Springer-Verlag, 1997), pages 111-121.

54. "Economic Analysis of Political Institutions: An Introduction,"in <u>Advances in Economic Theory and Econometrics: Theory and Applications</u>, volume 1, edited by D. Kreps and K. Wallis (Cambridge University Press, 1997), pages 46-65.

55. "Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining: An Introduction for Economists Studying the Transnational Commons," in P. Dasgupta, K.-G. Maler, and A. Vercelli, eds, <u>The Economics of Transnational Commons</u> (Oxford U. Press, 1997), 17-34.

56. "Dual Reduction and Elementary Games," <u>Games and Economic Behavior</u> <u>21</u> (1997), 183-202.

57. "Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games," <u>International Journal of Game Theory 27</u> (1998), 375-392.

58. "Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," <u>Games and Economic Behavior</u> <u>25</u> (1998), 111-131.

59. "Working in Game Theory: A Personal Perspective" in <u>Passion and Craft: How Economists Work</u>, edited by M. Szenberg, University of Michigan Press (1998), pages 227-233.

60. With Thomas Rietz and Robert Weber, "Campaign Finance Levels as Coordinating Signals in Three-Way, Experimental Elections." <u>Economics and Politics 10</u> (1998) 185-217.

61. "Large Poisson Games," <u>Journal of Economic Theory 94</u> (2000), 7-45.

62. With Daniel Diermeier, "Bicameralism and its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures" <u>American Economic Review 89</u> (1999), 1182-1196.

63. With Rebecca B. Morton, "Decisiveness of Contributors' Perceptions in Elections," Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science DP No. 1023 (December 1992). Available at web site.[*]

64. "Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory," CMSEMS DP No. 1162 (September 1996). Available at web site.[*]

65. "Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games," CMSEMS DP No. 1214 (1998, revised July 200). To appear in <u>Journal of Economic Theory</u>. Available at web site.[*]

66. "Political Economics and the Weimar Disaster," CMSEMS DP No. 1216 (July 1998). Available at web site.[*]

67. "Theoretical Comparisons of Electoral Systems," <u>European Economic Review 43</u> (1999), 671-697.

68. "Informational Origins of Political Bias Towards Critical Groups of Voters," <u>European Economic Review 43</u> (1999), 767-778.

69. "Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory," <u>Journal of Economic Literature 37</u> (1999), 1067-1082.

70. "Economic Analysis of Constitutions," <u>Chicago Law Review 67</u> (2000), 925-940.

71. "Learning Game Theory from John Harsanyi" (August 2000). Written for a memorial symposium, to appear in <u>Games and Economic Behavior</u>. Available at web site.[*]

[*]Unpublished research papers are available on the web at:
   http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/myerson/research/