GOALS AND MOTIVATION

The Unique Role of Anger among Negative Emotions in Goal-Directed Decision Making

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ABSTRACT While much of consumer choice is goal driven, consumers often fail to prioritize their goals when making decisions. Despite this relevance of goal pursuit to consumer behavior, relatively little work has examined the factors that facilitate it. The current research examines when and how different negative emotions influence such goal-directed decision making. Six studies show that anger leads to greater goal-directed decision making and more goal-consistent choices compared to sadness and fear. Consequently, anger results in both less susceptibility to contextual choice biases and greater post-choice satisfaction. We argue that the results arise because anger is characterized by appraisals of both high certainty and high control, which increase the likelihood that consumers will use goals as decision criteria. With anger becoming more common in the consumer space, thanks to contemporary social media and political polarization, we provide a framework for marketers and managers to put this negative emotion to good use.

Much of consumer choice is seen as being driven by goals (Markman and Brendl 2000); although consumers’ choices are often an important means to achieving their goals, extant research suggests that when consumers actually make decisions, they may fail to prioritize their goals because of intervening contextual and/or situational factors (Fishbach and Dhar 2007; Fujita 2011). Prior research shows that consumers make more goal-consistent choices when they are simply reminded of their goals (e.g., Locke et al. 1989), which supports the notion that goal pursuit does not always guide consumers’ decisions. While consumers’ ability to make goal-consistent choices is central to both their overall goal pursuit as well as their decision satisfaction (Markman and Brendl 2000), relatively little work has examined factors that facilitate goal-directed decision making. In the present article, we inquire whether different emotions may serve to make consumers’ decision making more goal-directed and therefore result in more goal-consistent choices.

Our investigation focuses on negative emotions, which have traditionally been thought to inhibit goal pursuit (e.g., Bagozzi, Baumgartner, and Pieters 1998). Contrary to this view, we propose that negative emotions may promote goal-directed decision making depending on the specific appraisal tendencies that these emotions evoke (e.g., Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001). We illustrate this idea by examining three negative emotions: anger, fear, and sadness. We predict that anger’s appraisals of high certainty and high control (Tiedens and Linton 2001; Lerner and Tiedens 2006) will lead to greater goal-directed decision making, but the same will not be true of fear and sadness, both of which are characterized by appraisals of low certainty and low control.

We start with a brief overview of relevant literature to build a theoretical framework explaining when and how negative emotional states may lead to more goal-directed decision making and goal-consistent choice. Next, six studies highlight the unique role and consequences of anger in increasing goal-directed decision making and contrast it with fear and sadness. We conclude with a discussion of the theoretical and practical importance of the findings and directions for future research.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
An optimal way for consumers to navigate the decisions they encounter in their day-to-day lives is to choose the outcomes that best satisfy their goals. However, this is not how consumers always make their decisions. Something as fundamental as being confronted with a multi-attribute choice can lead consumers to get bogged down in making attribute-level trade-offs, ultimately leading them to systematically fail at
emphasizing their important goals (Fishbach and Dhar 2007). This sort of bottom-up processing, wherein decision criteria are based largely on attribute-level information provided within a choice context, often leads consumers to make goal-irrelevant choices that resolve the trade-offs presented in the choice set. In such cases, consumers’ choice outcomes reflect biases arising from the decision context or task (e.g., Simonson 1989; Bettman, Luce, and Payne 1998) rather than reflecting their goals (Fujita and Trope 2014).

Conversely, consumers may engage in more top-down processing in which their decision criteria are guided by goals that they bring to the choice context (Park and Smith 1989). In this top-down approach, consumers are less likely to get caught up in trade-offs, leading them to make more goal-consistent choices that are also likely to be more satisfying (e.g., Markman and Brendl 2000). In keeping with this notion, research shows that having a clear sense of which attributes are more important in a choice can reduce decision biases that arise from contextual and situational factors (e.g., Evangelidis, Levav, and Simonson 2018). Given the benefits of goal-consistent choices, it is important to identify factors that may facilitate more goal-directed decision making. In the current article, we explore how certain emotions may result in greater goal-directed decision making and hence more goal-consistent choices.

Role of Emotions in Goal-Directed Decision Making

A growing body of research indicates that emotions, even when incidental to the decision at hand, can systematically affect judgment and decision making (e.g., Schwarz and Clore 1983; Lerner and Keltner 2000). A main conclusion from this research is that emotions not only impact decision making through their valence but also through the specific cognitive and motivational associations and processes they evoke, referred to as appraisals. Using this approach, Smith and Ellsworth (1985) distinguished 15 different emotions and proposed that each varied on and could be defined by six core appraisals including pleasantness, certainty, control, attentional activity, anticipated effort, and agency. Lerner and Keltner (2000, 2001) further proposed the appraisal-tendency framework to predict and explain the carryover effects of past or incidental emotions in future judgments and choices. They proposed that cognitive predispositions or appraisal tendencies unique to each emotion can lead the experiencer to evaluate future events in a way that is consistent with the core appraisals of that emotion (e.g., Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001; Han, Lerner, and Keltner 2007). Consequently, subsequent behaviors and judgments differ depending on the specific underlying appraisals of the experienced emotion.

We use the appraisal-tendency framework to explore how negative emotions under particular contexts may facilitate goal-directed decision making and choice. Specifically, we posit that two key appraisal tendencies relevant to goal-directed decision making are certainty and control. Certainty is the subjective sense of understanding and feeling sure of a situation, while control refers to attributing events to oneself rather than to situational factors (Smith and Ellsworth 1985). These two appraisals, especially when co-occurring, have important implications for consumer decision making and goal pursuit. Feeling highly certain and in control can promote goal pursuit by increasing confidence and self-efficacy (Bagozzi and Dholakia 1999); by bringing behaviors in line with attitudes, preferences, or goals (Locke et al. 1989; Glasman and Albarracín 2006; Tormala and Rucker 2007); and by facilitating goal planning (Maglio, Gollwitzer, and Oettingen 2014). By applying this research to decision making, we predict that consumers with greater certainty and control should be less likely to focus on goal-irrelevant information and attribute-level trade-offs presented in a choice context and instead should be more likely to use their goals as decision criteria. This goal-directed processing should consequently result in more goal-consistent choices.

It further follows that consumers high in certainty and control should be less susceptible to decision biases that can arise from too much focus on attribute-level trade-offs. For example, the compromise effect (Simonson 1989) and choice deferral (Dhar 1996; Dhar and Nowlis 1999) both arise because consumers find it hard to justify resolving the trade-offs between the multiple attributes present in choice options (Dhar and Simonson 2003; Fishbach and Dhar 2007). In such cases, consumers often choose a middle-of-the-road option or choose to defer the decision rather than choose something based on their goals or preferences. We posit that because consumers high in certainty and control rely more on their goals and less on attribute-level trade-offs, they should be more likely to choose goal-consistent options and thus less likely either to choose a compromise option or to defer their choices. Furthermore, we predict that appraisals of certainty and control can increase post-choice satisfaction because consumers are likely to be more satisfied when their choices are more consistent with their goals (Markman and Brendl 2000).

We test our predictions by examining negative emotions that differ in appraisals of certainty and control. Specifically,
we look at anger, sadness, and fear. Anger is characterized by high certainty and high control, while sadness and fear are both characterized by low certainty and low control (Lerner and Keltner 2000, 2001; Tiedens and Linton 2001; Han et al. 2007). Because of anger’s appraisal tendencies, we posit that it should reduce emphasis on attribute-level trade-offs presented in a choice. This notion is consistent with prior research showing that high certainty and control can reduce processing depth (Tiedens and Linton 2001), which would likewise predict reduced engagement with trade-offs. We posit that, in multi-attribute choice contexts, such a lack of emphasis on trade-offs can be advantageous because it can increase goal directedness and result in more goal-consistent choice. Furthermore, as elaborated earlier, such increased goal directedness should also reduce susceptibility to contextual choice biases and to increase post-choice satisfaction. On the other hand, as sadness and fear are characterized by low certainty and control, we do not expect such a pattern of results from either of these emotions. Note that we focus on negative emotions because they are generally believed to inhibit goal pursuit (e.g., Bagozzi et al. 1998). Thus, demonstrating that some negative emotions, such as anger, can facilitate goal-consistent choices thus makes a stronger point about the importance of appraisal tendencies when examining the effect of emotions on goal-directed decision making.

HYPOTHESES AND OVERVIEW OF STUDIES

This article aims to test the central hypothesis that angry consumers are more likely to make goal-consistent choices. We predict that this outcome is a product of consumers engaging in fewer attribute-level trade-offs. As a consequence of increasing goal-consistent choice, we posit that anger will also make consumers less susceptible to contextual choice biases and will lead to greater satisfaction with the chosen options. In testing these hypotheses, we also rule out several alternative explanations relating to heuristic decision making, cognitive load, arousal, and valence.

We provide evidence for our theorizing and predictions in six studies. We start with an initial demonstration that consumers experiencing anger make more goal-consistent choices (study 1). We then replicate this effect of anger and distinguish it from the effect of fear to provide support for the importance of certainty and control appraisals to goal-directed decision making and to rule out arousal and valence as competing explanations (study 2). Next, we examine how anger may lead to more goal-consistent decisions in cases where choice goals are not explicitly provided. Consistent with the notion that anger leads to more goal-consistent choices, we show that angry individuals engage in fewer trade-offs when making choices between options with multiple competing attributes and consequently are less susceptible to both the compromise effect (study 3A) and choice deferral (study 3B). Finally, we demonstrate that because of this greater goal directedness, angry participants experience greater post-choice satisfaction in multi-attribute choices (studies 4A and 4B). We additionally distinguish anger from fear (study 2) and from sadness (studies 3B and 4A) to provide a fuller picture of how negative emotions affect goal-directed decision making.

STUDY 1

To provide an initial test of whether anger facilitates goal-directed decision making, we primed participants with the goal to choose either a high-speed or a high-capacity laptop. We predicted that angry (vs. neutral) participants would make choices that were more consistent with their primed goal.

Method

Participants from an online pool ($N = 271, M_{age} = 35$) completed a series of tasks presented as unrelated studies to win a $25 gift certificate. The study had a 3 (goal primed: speed, capacity, or none) $\times$ 2 (emotion: anger or neutral) between-subjects design. The first task primed the different goals: participants in the speed goal (vs. capacity goal) condition read a customer review of a car commenting on the speed (capacity) of the vehicle (stimuli of all studies are in app. A; apps. A–C are available online). Participants were then asked to identify as many speed-related (capacity-related) words as possible in the review. Next, they imagined test-driving a fast (spacious) car and were asked to write their own review about what they thought their experience would be like in such a way that someone reading it could get a sense of the car’s speed (capacity) without knowing the make and model of the vehicle. Participants in the no-goal condition completed a sentence unscrambling task in which none of the words were related to either speed or capacity.

Next, participants completed a twofold emotion induction task. In the anger condition, participants were first presented with three pairs of faces and indicated whether the faces depicted the same or different emotions. Five of the six faces presented an angry expression, thus priming anger (adapted from Winkielman, Berriage, and Wilbarger 2005). Participants then completed an autobiographical emotion induction task in which they listed three times when they had felt really angry and then elaborated on one of these events in a way that someone reading their description...
would also feel angry (Lerner and Keltner 2001). In the neutral condition, participants were first presented with three pairs of products and indicated whether the products belonged to the same category or not. Next, they completed an autobiographical task in which they listed three things that happened to them yesterday and described one event in detail. The autobiographical task was pretested (N = 91; M<sub>ang</sub> = 34) to lead to greater anger than the neutral emotion condition (7-point scale: M<sub>ang</sub> = 5.33, SE = 0.36; M<sub>neutral</sub> = 1.54, SE = 0.05; F(1, 89) = 37.06, p < .001).

Finally, participants made a choice between two laptops that were similar on several dimensions (brand, price, screen size, and weight) but differed on speed and capacity such that laptop A had faster processor speed but lower hard-drive capacity while laptop B had slower speed but higher capacity. Participants indicated their preference between the laptops on three 7-point scales (1 = laptop A to 7 = laptop B): “Which laptop do you like more?”; “Which laptop is more attractive?”; and “Which laptop you think is better for you?” They then made a choice between the two laptops.

Results and Discussion

Preference Ratings. The three preference measures were aggregated (Cronbach’s alpha = .97) such that lower numbers indicate preference for speed (laptop A) and higher numbers indicate preference for capacity (laptop B). An ANOVA revealed a main effect of goal prime on preference (F(2, 265) = 5.1, p < .005), moderated by the anger × goal interaction (F(2, 265) = 7.45, p < .005). Angry participants primed with the speed goal rated the faster laptop as more attractive (M = 2.01, SD = 1.36) compared to neutral participants primed with the speed goal (M = 3.37, SD = 1.88; t(269) = -2.94, p < .01). Similarly, angry participants primed with a capacity goal showed a greater preference for the higher capacity laptop (M = 4.18, SD = 2.35) compared to neutral participants primed with the capacity goal (M = 3.23, SD = 1.99; t(269) = 1.95, p = .05). We next looked at the emotion conditions individually. Within the anger condition, participants primed with speed tended to prefer the faster option relative to both the no-goal prime (t(265) = 2.24, p < .05) and the capacity prime (t(265) = 4.86, p < .001), while participants primed with capacity (vs. no-goal) preferred the higher-capacity laptop (t(265) = -2.73, p < .01). However, none of these contrasts were significant within the neutral emotion condition (all p > .37; see fig. 1).

Choice. The choice results mirrored the preference data. A logistic regression found a significant interaction between the emotion and goal manipulations (Wald χ² = 6.44, p < .05). Angry participants primed with a speed goal were marginally more likely to choose a faster laptop (M = 88.1%, SE = 5.1%) than were neutral participants with the same speed prime (M = 69.2%, SE = 6.5%; z(269) = 1.65, p = .098). Similarly, angry participants primed with a capacity goal chose the higher capacity laptop (M = 51.3%, SE = 8.1%) more often than neutral participants with the same goal (M = 36.4%, SE = 7.3%; z(269) = -2.05, p < .05).

Moreover, examining the choice share within each emotion condition shows that only in the anger condition did the speed prime lead to a greater choice share of the faster option relative to control (88.1% vs. 66.7%; Wald χ² = 5.23, p < .05) and the capacity prime led to a marginally greater choice share of the high capacity option relative to control (51.3% vs. 33.3%; Wald χ² = 2.73, p = .098; see fig. 2). These same contrasts were not significant among the neutral group (all p > .29). This pattern suggests that angry participants made more goal-consistent choices than did participants in neutral emotion.

Posttest. We predicted that anger is unique in its effect due to its appraisal tendencies of certainty and control. Although these appraisal tendencies of anger are well documented in prior research, we wanted to ensure that our manipulation...
of anger was indeed inducing these tendencies. To do so, we directly measured appraisals of certainty and control in a posttest (N = 61). After completing the same emotion inductions used in study 1, participants identified an important goal they currently held. We then asked them to indicate how certain they thought it was to achieve the goal (all ratings from 1 = not at all to 9 = very much), and how difficult they thought it was to achieve the goal (all ratings from 1 = not at all to 9 = very much). Consistent with the appraisal-tendency framework, angry participants reported significantly greater certainty (M_{anger} = 7.33, SE = 0.30; M_{neutral} = 6.42, SE = 0.30; t(60) = 2.18, p < .04) and control (M_{anger} = 8.10, SE = 0.23; M_{neutral} = 6.65, SE = 0.32; t(60) = 3.71, p < .001). There was no perceived difference in the level of goal difficulty across the conditions (M_{anger} = 6.80, SE = 0.37; M_{neutral} = 6.10, SE = 0.25; t(60) = 1.59, p > .11), suggesting that anger affects consumers’ appraisals as opposed to leading them to systematically pursue goals of different difficulty level.

**STUDY 2**

We argue that the pattern in study 1 suggesting greater goal-consistent choice is the result of the high certainty and control appraisals that characterize anger. The first goal of study 2 is to provide support for this mechanism. Another goal is to address high arousal associated with anger as a possible reason for the observed effects. We address both of these goals by comparing anger to fear. Like anger, fear is characterized by both high arousal and negative valence. But unlike anger, fear is strongly associated with appraisals of low certainty and low control. We thus predict that while anger will lead to more goal-consistent choices, fear will not. A third goal of study 2 is to rule out cognitive load as a possible mechanism. Specifically, it is possible that anger increases cognitive load and thereby reduces consumers’ ability to make trade-offs. Since there is no theoretical or conceptual reason to expect fear and anger to affect cognitive load differently, we should expect them to have the same effect on trade-off making and choice. However, if anger and fear have a different effect on choice, cognitive load is unlikely to be the key mechanism behind the proposed effects.

**Method**

Students at the University of Miami (N = 141; M_{age} = 20.7) completed a single factor (emotion: anger, fear, or neutral) between-subjects study for course credit. All conditions used the autobiography task from study 1; the anger and neutral manipulations were the same, while the fear condition asked for experiences in which participants have been afraid. All participants then completed four scale measures of emotional arousal and valence (Russell, Weiss, and Mendelsohn 1989). The items asked them how stressed (high arousal, negative), excited (high arousal, positive), bored (low arousal, negative), and relaxed (low arousal, positive) they felt (1 = not at all to 7 = very much). Participants were then presented with three choice tasks. Before viewing the options, they were given a goal for each choice (e.g., “you are looking for lightweight flashlight”). Participants then viewed two options in each of three choice categories: laptops, flashlights, and restaurants. One option in each choice was more aligned with the given goal than the other.

**Results and Discussion**

**Choice.** Validating our prediction, a mixed-model logistic regression controlling for within-subject replication found that angry participants were significantly more likely to make goal-consistent choices than neutral (M_{anger} = 66.0%, SE = 4.0%; M_{neutral} = 49.3%, SE = 4.3%; Wald $\chi^2 = 7.76$, p < .01). Choice share of the goal-consistent options was no different between neutral and fearful participants as predicted (M_{fear} = 52.5%, SE = 4.2%; Wald $\chi^2 = 0.97$, p > .32), and a planned comparison confirmed that angry participants chose goal-directed options more than fearful participants (Wald $\chi^2 = 4.69$, p < .04). It is important to note that despite having a clear goal only half of the participants in the control condition made a goal-consistent choice. This sup-

![Figure 2. Study 1 choice shares. Priming participants with the goal of choosing a laptop with greater speed vs. the goal of choosing a laptop with greater capacity led to a greater choice share of the goal-consistent option only among angry participants.](image-url)
ports the notion that consumers often get distracted by the trade-offs presented in a multi-attribute choice and that anger due to its appraisal tendencies of certainty and control can prevent consumers from engaging in excessive trade-offs and hence keep them focused on their goals. As anger and fear did not have the same effect on choice, it is unlikely that anger leads to more goal-consistent choices due to increased cognitive load.

**Arousal and Valence.** Using all four arousal/valence items, we constructed measures of both arousal (Cronbach’s alpha = .63) and valence (Cronbach’s alpha = .53). The anger and fear conditions elicited greater arousal than the neutral condition (M_{anger} = 4.30, SE = 0.12; M_{fear} = 4.07, SE = 0.16; M_{neutral} = 3.59, SE = 0.15; F(2, 138) = 6.12, p < .01) but were no different from each other (F(2, 138) = 1.25, p > .26). These conditions also elicited greater negativity than neutral (M_{anger} = 4.55, SE = 0.09; M_{fear} = 4.32, SE = 0.11; M_{neutral} = 4.18, SE = 0.13; F(2, 138) = 5.55, p < .02) but did not differ from each other (F(2, 138) = 0.09, p > .75). Valence and arousal did not predict choice, nor did their interaction (Wald χ²_{arousal} = 1.17, p > .27; Wald χ²_{negativity} = 0.01, p > .92; Wald χ²_{valence × arousal} = 1.92, p > .16), and the effect of anger on choice remained significant when controlling for these measures (Wald χ² = 7.91, p < .01). These results suggest that the impact of anger on goal-directed decision making cannot be explained by arousal or valence.

**STUDIES 3A AND 3B**

The purpose of these next two studies is threefold. First, we generalize our findings to nonexplicit goals, that is, idiosyncratic goals that participants may bring to the decision. Second, we rule out an alternate explanation of the results observed so far, namely that angry participants may not be responding to goal-consistent cues, but simply to any salient or primed cue. To test this, we examine two context effects that result from excessive reliance on trade-offs between competing goals and attributes: the compromise effect (study 3A) and choice deferral (study 3B). We argue that a greater reliance on consumers’ idiosyncratic goals should mean that they will be less sensitive to goal-irrelevant or conflicting information provided in the decision context, and as a result should be less susceptible to context effects arising from trade-offs between competing attributes. We posit that angry participants should thus show a reduced compromise effect as well as less decision deferral. Third, beyond showing an attenuation of these context biases, the studies also demonstrate that the effect is indeed driven by angry consumers making fewer trade-offs between competing attributes. To this end, we examine whether participants indicate consideration of trade-offs when explaining their choices (study 3A), as well as the extent of the trade-off comparisons they perform when making their choices (study 3B).

**STUDY 3A**

In this study, we test the effect of anger on the compromise effect (e.g., Simonson 1989), the tendency for consumers to choose a middle-of-the-road option that represents a compromise between conflicting attributes. The compromise effect is a common decision bias that can arise due to excessive reliance on trade-offs between multiple attributes rather than focusing on a specific goal or criterion (Dhar and Simonson 2003). We predict that angry participants will be more likely to focus on their idiosyncratic goals (i.e., “I need a fast computer” vs. “I need a high capacity computer”) and will be less sensitive to contextual trade-offs and thus will be less likely to choose a compromise option. In support of this process, we predict that angry participants will be less likely to indicate consideration of a trade-off between attributes relating to conflicting goals when asked to explain their choices.

**Method**

Participants from a national online pool (N = 97; M_{age} = 36) completed a series of short questionnaires to win a $25 Amazon gift-certificate. After the autobiographical emotion induction manipulation (Emotion: angry or neutral) used in study 1, participants completed a choice study in which they imagined that they were shopping for a laptop. They were presented with three laptop options that differed in quality (RAM, CPU, and portability, i.e., how light-weight the option was) and price, reflecting a trade-off between quality and price goals through different levels of attributes. Importantly, one option offered a middle amount of both quality and price, making it a compromise option within the choice set. Participants indicated which laptop they would buy and explained their choice.

**Results and Discussion**

**Choice.** We measured the compromise effect by comparing the share of the middle option across the two experimental conditions (Neuman, Böckenholt, and Sinha 2015). As predicted, angry participants were less likely to choose the compromise option (18.8%) compared to the neutral participants (36.7%; Wald χ² = 3.79, p = .05).
Trade-offs. Four independent judges coded participants’ explanations as either reflecting a trade-off or not based on the methodology used in prior research (Drolet, Luce, and Simonson 2009; Khan, Zhu, and Kalra 2011; coding details in app. B). As expected, 61.2% of participants in the neutral condition gave trade-off related explanations, while only 31.2% did so when induced with anger (χ²(1) = 8.76, p < .005). A logistic regression confirmed that participants who did not report making trade-offs were less likely to choose the compromise option (Wald χ² = 16.23, p < .001). Furthermore, level of trade-offs mediated the relationship between anger and choice (bootstrapped bias corrected 95% confidence interval [CI] [−0.293, −0.058] with 1,000 iterations; mediation details in app. B).

These results provide converging evidence that angry individuals rely more on goal-relevant information, which leads them to make more goal-consistent choices. To supplement this claim, we ran an additional study in which we confirmed that angry participants placed more importance on goal-relevant attributes than neutral participants (study details in app. C).

STUDY 3B
We posit that the tendency to defer a choice, another decision bias that arises as a means to avoid difficult trade-offs, should be reduced when consumers have a singular or clearer goal (Fishbach and Dhar 2007). If angry participants are more likely to rely on their goals, we argue that they should be less likely to get caught up in trade-offs and hence less likely to defer their choice. As in study 2, we contrasted the effect of anger with another negatively valenced but low certainty and low control emotion, namely sadness. Because it lacks these key appraisal tendencies, we do not expect sadness to have any effect on either deferral or trade-offs. Also, as with study 2, contrasting anger and another negative emotion helps to further rule out valence and cognitive load as possible mechanisms for the effect of anger on choice. Finally, this study uses a different manipulation of emotion induction to further generalize our results.

Method
Participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk (N = 428, M_{age} = 35) completed the study in exchange for $0.50. The study had a single factor (emotion: angry, sad, or neutral) between-subjects design. Participants in the emotion induction conditions were first presented with a survey on “news and media,” in which they were asked to “briefly identify a current political topic, event, or person that has made you feel very angry (sad).” Next, participants elaborated on their feelings so that someone reading their statements could understand how they felt. Those in the control condition simply wrote about how and from what sources they got their news and provided specific details.

Next all participants chose between two round-trip airline tickets varying on a number of attributes. Participants were instructed that they could either choose a ticket or choose to wait and look again later. During the choice task itself, participants could only view one ticket at a time and had to click between them. These clicks served as an explicit measure of trade-offs as participants switched back-and-forth between the options. Participants then either chose a ticket or chose to defer, and their response times were recorded. At the end of the study, participants completed a manipulation check which confirmed that the emotion inductions worked as intended (manipulation check and detailed results in app. B).

Results and Discussion
Choice. Results revealed that only 24.2% in the angry condition chose to defer, compared to 37.6% of participants in the neutral condition and 38.5% in the sad condition (Wald χ² = 8.67, p = .01). Planned comparisons show that deferral was significantly different between angry and both neutral (z(423) = 2.52, p < .02) and sad (z(423) = 2.54, p < .02), but neutral and sad did not differ (z(423) = 0.52, p > .95). This is consistent with our predictions both that anger reduces choice deferral and that sadness does not. Of the participants who chose to select a ticket, there were no differences in the chosen option between conditions (Wald χ² = 2.34, p > .31).

Trade-offs. We found significant differences in the number of trade-offs between conditions as measured by clicks. Participants in the anger condition switched between the options an average of 4.0 times, compared to participants in the control condition who switched an average of 5.0 times and participants in the sadness condition who switched an average of 4.8 times. A negative binomial regression confirmed that angry participants switched fewer times than either neutral (b = 0.17, z(423) = 3.13, p < .002) or sad participants (b = 0.14, z(423) = 2.38, p < .02); a planned comparison found no difference between neutral and sad participants (b = −0.02, z(423) = −0.81, p > .41). A bootstrapped mediation analysis with 1000 iterations found that trade-offs drove the effect of anger (vs. neutral) on the decision to defer (bias corrected 95% CI [−0.925, −0.007]),
while no such effect was found for sadness (bias corrected 90% CI [-0.326, 0.071]; mediation details in app. B). Response time (in seconds) followed the same pattern as trade-offs and further confirmed that anger reduces the depth of information processing ($F(2, 423) = 2.84, p < .06$), such that angry participants took less time ($M = 32.12, SE = 1.44$) than control participants ($M = 38.12, SE = 2.52$; $t(422) = 2.28, p < .03$) and sad participants ($M = 37.91, SE = 1.89$; $t(422) = 1.96, p = .05$), while control and sad participants did not differ ($t(422) = -0.25, p > .80$).

**STUDIES 4A AND 4B**

We proposed that because anger leads to more goal-consistent choices, one consequence could be greater post-choice satisfaction. We test this implication in the next two studies. We provided participants with real choices and measured their choice satisfaction after a week’s delay (study 4A), as well as immediately after the choice (study 4B). We predicted that angry participants would report greater satisfaction with their choices.

**STUDY 4A**

Study 4A examines post-choice satisfaction in a choice sets that presents trade-offs without the traditional structure of the compromise set. While we do not make any predictions about the specific options that angry participants will choose from such a choice set, we expect that if angry individuals rely more on their goals rather than on trade-offs, they should be happier with their choices. The study measures the effect of anger after a one week delay to examine whether the effect persists when the emotional state of anger is over.

**Method**

Student volunteers at Stanford University ($N = 81; M_{age} = 22.5$) completed a single factor (Emotion: angry, sad, or neutral) between-subjects design using the emotion induction used in study 3B (manipulation check details in app. B). Next, all participants were offered a choice between two different packs of cookies and a cash prize of $3 as a token of thanks. The packs of cookies varied on several dimensions, such as brand, number of cookies, and variety of cookies. One week later, participants were contacted again and asked to indicate how satisfied they were with their choice (1 = highly dissatisfied to 9 = highly satisfied). This longitudinal design speaks to whether the effects of anger on choice satisfaction persist when the emotional state of anger is over.

**Results and Discussion**

**Satisfaction.** Two participants failed to respond to the satisfaction survey (one from the sad condition and one from the neutral condition). We found a significant difference across the emotion conditions ($F(2, 76) = 3.93, p < .05$): angry participants were more satisfied with their choice ($M = 6.93, SD = 0.31$) compared to both sad ($M = 5.88, SD = 0.34$) and neutral participants ($M = 5.65, SD = 0.37$). Planned comparisons revealed a significant difference between angry and neutral ($t(77) = 2.64, p < .05$) and between angry and sad participants ($t(77) = 2.14, p < .05$) but not between sad and the neutral participants ($t(77) = 0.45, p > .65$). The emotion condition did not predict participants’ choices ($\chi^2(4) = 0.08, p > .99$; see the figure in app. B).

We argue that the long-lasting effect of anger on satisfaction lends support to the notion that anger affects satisfaction by promoting goal-consistent choices rather than through heuristic based or impulsive decision making (e.g., Shaw and Oppenheimer 2008). However, the results are open to the possibility that appraisals of certainty and control lead participants to perceive any choice more positively. Next study addresses this limitation.

**STUDY 4B**

The current study aims to replicate the effect of anger on post-choice satisfaction and to show that this increased satisfaction is indeed a product of greater goal directedness rather than due to greater reliance on heuristics. Moreover, the study also rules out an alternative explanation for the effects which suggests that consumers’ certainty and control appraisals directly lead them to perceive their choices more positively. We do this by demonstrating that consumers’ choices mediate the effect of anger on satisfaction, suggesting that anger leads to the selection of more goal-consistent (and thus more satisfying) options. We again examine the context of a compromise choice where it is reasonable to assume that participants who choose one of the extreme options are more likely to have an idiosyncratic goal that directs their choices, whereas those who choose the compromise option are less likely to have a clear idiosyncratic goal and may engage in attribute trade-offs. As goal-consistent choices tend to be more satisfying (Markman and Brendl 2000), we predict that angry participants should be more satisfied with their choices as a consequence of being more likely to choose an extreme option consistent with their idiosyncratic goals. On the other hand, if reliance on heuristics or appraisals of certainty and control directly lead angry con-
consumers to be more satisfied with their choices, we should expect angry participants to be more satisfied regardless of their choice.

Methods
Students at the University of Miami (N = 118) completed the study for a chance to win a $25 gift card of their choice. They completed an emotion induction (emotion: angry or neutral), using the same prompts as study 3A, before making a choice from a compromise choice set. They chose between gift cards to three restaurants near campus: Five Guys, Shake Shack, and Yard House. The restaurants were selected to reflect a price-quality trade-off based on a pretest (Five Guys was low quality/low price, Yard House was high quality/high price, and Shake Shack was moderate on both quality and price). Participants were informed that they would be entered into a raffle to win the gift card they chose. Following the choice, participants rated their satisfaction with their chosen gift card (1 = highly dissatisfied to 9 = highly satisfied).

Results and Discussion
Choice. Replicating study 3A, anger attenuated the share of the compromise option: only 37.7% of participants in the angry condition chose the compromise option, while 58.3% did so in the neutral condition (Wald x² = 4.85, p < .03).

Satisfaction. As predicted, anger led to greater post-choice satisfaction (Manger = 7.90, SE = 0.19; Mneutral = 6.77, SE = 0.26; F(1, 116) = 12.13, p < .001). Choice of an extreme option also predicted greater satisfaction (Mcompromise = 6.82, SE = 0.28; Mextreme = 7.79, SE = 0.19; F(1, 116) = 8.54, p < .005), in keeping with our assertion that such choices tend to be reflective of pursuit of an idiosyncratic goal over a reliance on trade-offs (see fig. 3). A bootstrapped mediation analysis with 1,000 iterations confirmed that anger led to increased satisfaction by first reducing the choice of the compromise option (bias corrected 95% CI [0.064, 1.686]; details in app. B). The finding that anger leads to greater satisfaction only among those who select an extreme (vs. compromise) option lends support to a goal-based process over the possibility that appraisals of certainty and control directly increase satisfaction with any choice.

General Discussion
Based on the appraisal tendencies of emotions, we proposed a framework to predict when and how negative emotions may facilitate goal-directed decision making in consumer choice. We suggested that emotions marked with appraisals of high certainty and high control would lead to more goal-consistent choices relative to emotions with appraisals of low certainty and low control. We propose that this occurs because greater certainty and control reduce the level of trade-offs consumers make when making a decision which can distract them from their goals. In support of our theorizing, we looked at three emotions: anger, which is associated with high certainty and control, as well as sadness and fear, which are associated with low certainty and control. We predicted that angry consumers, in contrast to neutral, fearful, or sad consumers, would be more likely to make choices consistent with their goals, and would be less susceptible to decision biases arising from excessive reliance on attribute level trade-offs.

Six studies provide evidence for our proposition. We found that angry consumers were more likely to make more goal-consistent choices when a goal was explicitly provided (studies 1 and 2) as well as when no goal was explicitly made salient (studies 3A, 3B, 4A, and 4B). Moreover, angry consumers showed greater reliance on goal-relevant attributes in their decision making instead of relying on goal-irrelevant trade-offs, leaving them less susceptible to settling on a compromise option (study 3A), less likely to defer their choices (study 3B), and ultimately more satisfied with their choices (studies 4A and 4B). Results on post-choice satisfaction...
provide strong evidence that anger increased satisfaction through its promotion of goal-consistent choice. This further excludes the alternative explanation that anger leads to the observed effect because of reliance on heuristics or from appraisals of certainty and control directly increasing evaluations (study 4B). Finally, contrasting anger with fear (study 2) and sadness (studies 3B and 4A) provided further support for the role of certainty and control appraisals in goal-consistent decision making by allowing us to rule out valence, arousal, and cognitive load as possible explanations for the observed effects.

These results have both theoretical and practical importance, and we hope they will motivate further research in the under-studied intersection of emotion and goal-directed decision making. While most prior research exploring the influence of emotion in goal pursuit suggests that positively valenced emotion promotes goal-directed behavior while negatively valenced emotion inhibits it (e.g., Bagozzi et al. 1998), our work highlights the importance of incorporating the more nuanced view afforded by the appraisal-tendency framework when studying the impact of emotional states in goal-pursuit. Our research further proposes that emotional inputs can lead consumers to form their decision criteria in a more goal-driven, top-down fashion rather than in a bottom-up approach (Huffman and DePaoli 2012). This calls for further research into whether specific emotional (and even cognitive or motivational) states make consumers more open to priming effects than others.

While we focused on the appraisals of certainty and control to generate our predictions, there may also be other ways in which emotions may influence goal-directed decision making. Future research could examine the role of other emotions or appraisals in similar decision contexts. For instance, disgust and happiness are associated with both high certainty and high control appraisals (Smith and Ellsworth 1985; Tiedens and Linton 2001; Han et al. 2007) and thus could have similar effects on consumer choice as anger. In contrast, boredom is associated with a high sense of certainty but a low sense of control, while surprise is associated with a high sense of control but a low sense of certainty (Smith and Ellsworth 1985). Understanding how these emotions influence goal-directed decision making will help to disentangle the potentially unique roles of certainty and control appraisals in goal pursuit.

Additionally, more research is needed to understand how emotions may interact with the number of salient goals (single vs. multiple), the nature of those goals (e.g., promotion vs. prevention goals), and the stages of goal pursuit. Our predictions focused on single, promotion related goals. However, when consumers pursue multiple goals and/or prevention goals, the same appraisals may generate different results. For example, certainty and control tend to reduce sensitivity to losses (Lerner and Keltner 2001), which may put them at odds with prevention goals that tend to emphasize avoidance of losses (Higgins 1997).

Finally, our research provides important insights for marketers. Typically, anger is thought of as something a company needs to control, as can be witnessed by the significant resources firms spend to mitigate consumer anger. However, our results show that anger can be leveraged toward positive outcomes. We suggest that anger can be an effective way to motivate consumers to pursue goals made salient by a firm’s messaging, and could perhaps increase satisfaction with their actions. For example, in the space of political advertising, a campaign might be more successful in motivating people to vote if they employ anger appeals rather than fear appeals or neutral appeals. Similarly, nonprofit marketers may be able to generate greater contributions by using anger appeals (e.g., highlighting cruelty or injustice) rather than sadness appeals (e.g., highlighting a lack of resources or eliciting pity). Indeed, we already see a great deal of appeals based in anger on social media, such as polarizing calls to action encouraging consumers to pursue goals ranging from low-commitment behaviors (e.g., “clicktivism”) to high-involvement choices (e.g., boycotts). Product advertising might employ similar strategies to better increase sales, such as by stoking anger against a competing brand or by highlighting a common complaint with the competition.
The findings also have implications for consumers’ information search behavior. If angry consumers are indeed more goal-directed, their information search may also be more goal-consistent. Hence, inbound (vs. outbound) marketing tools may be more effective with angry consumers, but not with fearful or sad consumers. Moreover, angry consumers may reach a decision sooner and terminate their information search faster. This has implications for designing the length of communications and advertisements, as well as for the structure of persuasive messages (e.g., how soon to identify diagnostic information or a key argument).

Our findings also have managerial implications for motivating goal-pursuit outside of marketing. For example, organizations often go through times when anger among employees may be high, such as during layoffs or salary freezes. Our research suggests that such difficult times might present an opportunity to highlight corporate goals to the employees. In fact, organizations might even want to highlight anger to refocus employees to generate greater productivity. For example, leveraging anger is common in competitive sports, where it is viewed as facilitative of better player performance (Robazza and Bortoli 2006). Our work shows that anger has a broader positive role to play in goal-directed behavior than previously understood.

Although our results suggest that anger can be indeed a fruitful way to motivate consumers toward goal-consistent behaviors, there is an important caveat: while angry consumers may pursue their goal(s) more effectively, they will also be less susceptible to marketing efforts that rely on contextual cues to steer their behavior. We also note that because we have emphasized incidental anger in this article, further research is needed to shed light on the effect that will manifest in cases where consumers are pursuing goals related to the source of their anger.

In closing, our research provides preliminary evidence on the role of negative emotions in creating goal-directed decision making. In this regard, our work contributes to prior findings on the positive effects of negative emotions in decision making (e.g., Young et al. 2011; Jung and Young 2012). However, it is important to note that we are not making a general claim that anger will always improve decision making and increase satisfaction. We have identified choice contexts where consumers are likely to engage in trade-offs that distract from their goals and lead to decision biases, but clearly there are situations where careful consideration of trade-offs can improve decision making such as interpersonal relationships and negotiation contexts. We hope that our research will serve to stimulate further inquiry on the role of emotions in goal-directed decision making, helping us to better understand when and which emotions help versus hurt.

REFERENCES


Unique Role of Anger among Negative Emotions


