
Module 2: Monopoly & Welfare Loss

Market Organization & Public Policy (Ec 731) · George Georgiadis

- So far, we have seen that monopoly leads to higher prices (and hence lower quantities),
 and higher profits.
- But is the total social welfare higher or lower in a monopoly?
 - Total surplus = (firms' profits) + (consumer surplus); or = (total consumer utility)
 - (production costs).
 - In a monopoly, consumer surplus is always lower (relative to perfect competition).
 - But it could be that the increase in the firm's profit more than offsets the decrease in consumer surplus.
- Lower! Illustrate graphically. (Example with linear demand and marginal cost functions.)
- Under monopoly pricing:
 - The firm sets p_m , which corresponds to demand $q_m = P^{-1}(p_m)$.
 - Net consumer surplus is the area DECD.
 - Firm's profit = $p_m q_m$ (integral of the marginal cost) = area CEFAC.
 - Total surplus = area DEFAD.
- Under marginal-cost pricing:
 - The firm sets p_c , which corresponds to demand $q_c = P^{-1}(p_c)$.
 - Net consumer surplus is the area DGBD. (Explain)
 - Firm's profit = $p_c q_c$ cost = area BGAB.



- Total surplus = area DGAD.
- The dead-weight welfare loss is equal to the area EGFE (difference between DEFAD and DGAD).
- Can monopoly ever be welfare enhancing?
 - Yes, if there are significant economies of scale in production (i.e., c'(q) is decreasing).

Two types of monopolies:

- 1. Natural (or *inevitable*) monopolies
 - Occur when the cost structure deters entry.
 - Large entry costs or significant economies of scale.
 - If large firms are always more efficient, then it doesn't make sense to have more than one.
 - Some examples?
 - Electric utility companies

- Telephone networks
- Public transportation (in many settings)

2. Unnatural monopolies

- Price fixing (cartels) and tacit collusion
 - Firms agree explicitly or implicitly to keep prices above competitive levels.
 - Illegal in the US and most developed countries.
- Intellectual property
 - Either private trade secrets or government protection (e.g., patents).
 - We will talk about it later in the quarter.
- Lobbying and protection
 - Very harmful, both from static and dynamic perspective.
 - Try to stop by restrictions on lobbying.
 - e.g., "Anti-Tesla" dealer laws: in many states in the US, vehicles must be sold through an independent dealer.
- Temporary advantage / first-to-market
 - Resolves itself over time.
 - Transparency and low bureaucracy helps aid entry.

References

Whinston M.D., (2008), Lectures on Antitrust Economics (Cairoli Lectures), MIT Press.