DISCUSSION OF "GOVERNMENT GUARANTEES AND BANK LIQUIDITY CREATION," BY BERGER, LI AND SAHERUDDIN

Nicolas Crouzet

Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University

SUMMARY

This paper:

- constructs index of liquidity creation by banks $l_{i,j,t}$
 - Berger and Bouwman (2009), more countries
- constructs index of government guarantees $g_{j,t}$
- shows that $corr(l_{i,j,t}, g_{j,t}|x_{i,j,t}) < 0$

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Why do we care?

- theory: DI supports "liquidity creation" by banks, but might lead to excessive risk-taking
- case studies, but no systematic evidence

Comments

- 1. Measuring liquidity creation
- 2. Regression results
- 3. Interpretation

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- mortage loans vs. C&I loans: is relative liquidity stable?
- correlation w/ $\frac{D}{A}$?

$$LC = \frac{D}{A^{tot}}$$
 for a bank holding only cash
$$LC = \frac{D}{A^{tot}} - 1$$
 for a bank holding only C&I loans

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liquidity/maturity transformation?

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- how to think of a change in portfolio composition from, e.g., mortgages to C&I loans?

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 - time-varying?
 - "exclusion restriction": banking sector concentration?

Regression results (1/1)

- OLS: 1 unit increase in $g_{j,t} \implies l_{i,j,t}$ falls by 7% relative to its mean
- IV: tendency of national culture toward individualism; disease prevalence
 - time-varying?
 - "exclusion restriction": banking sector concentration?
- Directionally interesting, but difficult to interpret
 - distribution of $g_{j,t}$ across countries? (use just an indicator for DI instead?)
 - which guarantees? what liquidity?

- Decomposition by type of gov't guarantee
 - "government guarantees on deposits": negative effect
 - "explicit insurance scheme": positive effect
 - examples/mechanisms?

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- By component of liquidity creation
 - assets: "less liquid" (less MBS, more C&I loans?)
 - liabilities: "more liquid" (less sub. debt, more deposits?)
 - fewer loan commitments

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Dependent Variables:	LC(total)/TA	LC(total)/TA
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- Focus on non-crisis countries?

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Does leverage change? How does the asset mix change? etc.

- More descriptive stats! And delineate relationship btw. liquidity creation and risk-taking more precisely