

## MECS 466: Social Choice and Voting Models

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Mondays, Leverone 561, 2pm-5pm

Although applications are considered where appropriate, this course focuses on the general theory of collective decision-making and strategic political behaviour. The first three sessions (3/29, 4/04, 4/11) in the course survey the main results from the general (cooperative game-theoretic) theory of preference aggregation and social choice. The remainder of the course considers (noncooperative game-theoretic) theories of committee voting and agenda-selection (4/18, 4/25), legislative bargaining (5/02, 5/09) and parties (5/16, 5/23).

Teaching is by lecture and student presentations of particular papers from the literature. Assessment is by class participation and a research paper.

### Course Outline

#### 1. Social choice over finite sets

Arrow, K. 1963. *Social Choice and Individual Values (2ed)* New Haven:Yale UP.

Sen, A.K. 1986. Social choice theory. In: K.J. Arrow and M. Intriligator (eds.), *Handbook of Mathematical Economics vol. III*. Amsterdam: North Holland.

Nakamura, K. 1979. The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences. *International Journal of Game Theory*, 5:55-61.

Austen-Smith, D. and J.S. Banks. 1999. *Positive Political Theory I: Collective Preference* [Chapters 2, 3]. Ann Arbor: U. Michigan Press.

#### 2. Social choice in the spatial model

Plott, C. 1967. A notion of equilibrium and its possibility under majority rule *AER*, 57: 787-806

McKelvey, R. 1979. General conditions for global intransitivities in formal voting models. *Econometrica*, 47: 1086-1112.

McKelvey, R and N. Schofield 1987. Generalized symmetry conditions at a core point. *Econometrica*, 55: 923-34.

Banks, J.S., J. Duggan and M. LeBreton 2003. Social choice and electoral competition in the general spatial model. *Journal of Economic Theory* (Forthcoming)

Gans, J. and M. Smart. 1996. Majority voting with single-crossing preferences. *Journal of Public Economics*, 59:219-237.

Grandmont, J-M. 1978. Intermediate preferences and majority rule. *Econometrica*, 46: 317-330.

Austen-Smith, D. and J.S. Banks. 1999. *Positive Political Theory I: Collective Preference* [Chapters 5, 6]. Ann Arbor: U. Michigan Press.

### **3. Committee voting and agendas**

Moulin, H. 1979. Dominance solvable voting schemes. *Econometrica*, 47: 1337-1351.

Banks, J. 1985. Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control. *Social Choice and Welfare*, 1: 295-306.

Shepsle, K and B. Weingast 1984. Uncovered sets and sophisticated voting outcomes with implications for agenda institutions. *American Journal of Political Science*, 28: 49-74.

Kramer, G. 1972. Sophisticated voting over multidimensional choice spaces. *Journal of Mathematical Sociology*, 2:165-180.

Duggan, J. 2003. Endogenous amendment agendas. *Working paper, University of Rochester*.

Penn, E.M. 2003. A distributive N-amendment game with endogenous agenda formation. *Working paper, CMU*.

Austen-Smith, D. and J.S. Banks. 2005. *Positive Political Theory II: Strategy and Structure* [Chapters 4, 5]. Ann Arbor: U. Michigan Press.

### **4. Legislative bargaining theory**

Baron, D. and J. Ferejohn. 1989: Bargaining in Legislatures. *American Political Science Review*, 83: 1181-206.

Baron, D. 1991. Majoritarian incentives, pork barrel programs and procedural control. *American Journal of Political Science*, 34: 57-90.

Banks, J.S. and J. Duggan 2000. A bargaining model of collective choice. *American Political Science Review*, 94: 73-89.

Banks, J.S. and J. Duggan 2003. A bargaining model of policy making. *Working paper, CalTech*.

Banks, J.S. 1999. Committee proposals and restrictive rules. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Science*, 96: 8295-8300

Eraslan, H. 2002. Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 103: 11-31.

Morelli, M. 1999. Demand competition and policy compromise in legislative bargaining. *American Political Science Review*, 93: 809-820.

Diermeier, D. and R. Myerson. 1999. Bicameralism and its consequences for the internal organization of legislatures. *American Economic Review*, 89: 1182-1196.

Austen-Smith, D. and J.S. Banks. 2005. *Positive Political Theory II: Strategy and Structure* [Chapter 6]. Ann Arbor: U. Michigan Press.

## 5. Parties

Jackson, M. and B. Moselle. 2002. Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 103: 49-87.

Baron, D. 1989. A noncooperative theory of legislative coalitions. *American Journal of Political Science*, 33: 1048-84.

Levy, G. 2004. A model of parties. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 115: 250-277.

Dhillon, A. 2003. Political parties and coalition formation. *Working paper*, University of Warwick.

Morelli, M. 2003. Party formation and electoral outcomes under different electoral systems. *Review of Economic Studies*, forthcoming.

Osborne, M.J. and R. Tourky. 2004. Party formation in single-issue politics. *Working paper*, University of Toronto.

Snyder, J. and M. Ting. 2002. An informational rationale for political parties. *American Journal of Political Science*, 46: 90-110.

Roemer, J. 2001. *Political Competition: Theory and Applications* [Chapter 8]. Cambridge MA: Harvard.

Caillaud, B. and J. Tirole. 1999. Party governance and ideological bias. *European Economic Review*, 43: 779-789.

Caillaud, B. and J. Tirole. 2002. Parties as political intermediaries. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Nov.: 1453-89.