

RAFAYAL AHMED

Managerial Economics & Strategy
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RESEARCH FIELDS

Microeconomic Theory, Strategy

DOCTORAL STUDIES

Ph.D., Managerial Economics & Strategy, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois
Dissertation: Essays on Information Economics
Committee Chairperson(s): Professor Michael Powell
Date of Completion: July 2018 (expected)

PREDOCTORAL STUDIES

B.A.: Economics & Mathematics, Amherst College, Amherst, MA, 2012.
Graduated with Distinction
Visiting Student: General Course, London School of Economics, London, UK, 2010-2011.

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Amherst College International Student Scholarship (Full Tuition), 2008-2012
Amherst College Civic Engagement Scholar, 2009
Kellogg School of Management PhD Scholarship, 2012-2017

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Teaching Assistant, Northwestern University, 2013-2017
Business Analytics, MBA, for Prof. Peter Klibanoff (Fall 2016, 2017)
3 hours of weekly teaching in Fall 2016, 2017
11 quarters
Microeconomics, MBA, 7 quarters
Conducted review sessions in most quarters
Business Strategy, MBA, 6 quarters
International Business Strategy, MBA, for Prof. Dan Spulber
3 quarters
Pricing Strategies, MBA, for Prof. Mark Satterthwaite

Teaching Assistant, Amherst College, 2011-2012
Undergraduate Microeconomics

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant to Professor Mark Satterthwaite, 2013-2014

JOB MARKET PAPER

“Dynamic Screening with Differentially Informed Principals”

Abstract: This paper studies a dynamic principal-agent model of adverse selection under competition among principals. Principals are ex-ante identical, but receive information about the agent independently which creates a setting of imperfect competition. We study how the agent's payoffs in this setting differ compared to the regular monopoly principal-agent case, and how that affects the agent's incentives to reveal/hide information. When the game is played in a repeated setting with only short-term commitment, the familiar Ratchet effect kicks in and makes it difficult for principals to incentivize the agent. Finally, we show that allowing voluntary information sharing among principals can benefit principals and improve welfare in general.

OTHER PAPERS AND WORK IN PROGRESS

“Price Competition with Asymmetric Information”, with Colin Shopp [in progress]

Abstract: We study competition between two firms who are differentially informed about demand characteristics of the market. In particular, we analyze and contrast the cases when both of them receive information with the same accuracy, with the one with different accuracies. Intensity of competition, and welfare is increasing in the accuracy of information in the symmetric case; however, when accuracy is asymmetric, welfare implications are ambiguous.

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

Transatlantic Doctoral Conference, at London Business School
London, UK
Kellogg Strategy Seminar

May 2017
2014-2017

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

International Visiting Scholars' Program, Grameen Bank
Dhaka, Bangladesh

August 2010

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Marital Status: Single

Citizenship: Bangladesh

REFERENCES

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