

## **RAFAYAL AHMED**

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Kellogg School of Management  
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### **RESEARCH FIELDS**

Microeconomic Theory, Strategy

### **DOCTORAL STUDIES**

Ph.D., Managerial Economics & Strategy, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois  
Dissertation: Essays on Information Economics  
Committee Chairperson(s): Professor Michael Powell  
Date of Completion: July 2018 (expected)

### **PREDOCTORAL STUDIES**

B.A.: Economics & Mathematics, Amherst College, Amherst, MA, 2012.  
Graduated with Distinction  
Visiting Student: General Course, London School of Economics, London, UK, 2010-2011.

### **FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS**

Amherst College International Student Scholarship (Full Tuition), 2008-2012  
Amherst College Civic Engagement Scholar, 2009  
Kellogg School of Management PhD Scholarship, 2012-2017

### **TEACHING EXPERIENCE**

Teaching Assistant, Northwestern University, 2013-2017  
Business Analytics, MBA, for Prof. Peter Klibanoff (Fall 2016, 2017)  
3 hours of weekly teaching in Fall 2016, 2017  
11 quarters  
Microeconomics, MBA, 7 quarters  
Conducted review sessions in most quarters  
Business Strategy, MBA, 6 quarters  
International Business Strategy, MBA, for Prof. Dan Spulber  
3 quarters  
Pricing Strategies, MBA, for Prof. Mark Satterthwaite

Teaching Assistant, Amherst College, 2011-2012  
Undergraduate Microeconomics

### **RESEARCH EXPERIENCE**

Research Assistant to Professor Mark Satterthwaite, 2013-2014

## **JOB MARKET PAPER**

“Dynamic Screening with Differentially Informed Principals”

Abstract: This paper studies a dynamic principal-agent model of adverse selection under competition among principals. Principals are ex-ante identical, but receive information about the agent independently which creates a setting of imperfect competition. We study how the agent's payoffs in this setting differ compared to the regular monopoly principal-agent case, and how that affects the agent's incentives to reveal/hide information. When the game is played in a repeated setting with only short-term commitment, the familiar Ratchet effect kicks in and makes it difficult for principals to incentivize the agent. Finally, we show that allowing voluntary information sharing among principals can benefit principals and improve welfare in general.

## **OTHER PAPERS AND WORK IN PROGRESS**

“Price Competition with Asymmetric Information”, with Colin Shopp [in progress]

Abstract: We study competition between two firms who are differentially informed about demand characteristics of the market. In particular, we analyze and contrast the cases when both of them receive information with the same accuracy, with the one with different accuracies. Intensity of competition, and welfare is increasing in the accuracy of information in the symmetric case; however, when accuracy is asymmetric, welfare implications are ambiguous.

## **CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS**

Transatlantic Doctoral Conference, at London Business School  
London, UK  
Kellogg Strategy Seminar

May 2017  
2014-2017

## **PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE**

International Visiting Scholars' Program, Grameen Bank  
Dhaka, Bangladesh

August 2010

## **PERSONAL INFORMATION**

Marital Status: Single

Citizenship: Bangladesh

**REFERENCES**

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