

Concentration and self-censorship in commercial media  
By Fabrizio Germano<sup>+</sup> and Martin Meier<sup>++</sup>  
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## **ABSTRACT**

Within a model of Hotelling-type product differentiation that allows for non-localized competition among arbitrary numbers of media outlets, we characterize quality and content of profit-maximizing media under different ownership structures. Concentrated media markets in equilibrium can exhibit self-censorship by all outlets present in the market. The number of owners rather than the number of overall outlets emerges as the relevant variable determining the degree of self-censorship. Affected is content that has the potential to reduce future revenues from advertising or other forms of sponsorship.

+ Universitat Pompeu Fabra, [fabrizio.germano@upf.edu](mailto:fabrizio.germano@upf.edu)

++ Institute for Advances Studies, Vienna, [martin.meier@ihs.ac.at](mailto:martin.meier@ihs.ac.at)