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False Reputation in a Society of Players

by

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Abstract

A folk theorem of game theory illustrates that strategic use of reputation can drastically alter the equilibrium play of an isolated group of n-players engaged in a finitely repeated game. We show that this folk theorem may fail in social settings where many groups of n-players play the game, as the ability to strategically use reputation dies out over time due to players' opportunity to observe the play of earlier groups. This phenomenon is demonstrated in a model of Bayesian recurring games by using old and new techniques from the rational learning literature combined with a notion of purification.

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1 Introduction

The role of reputation in strategic interaction is a topic of major concern to economists, and has received considerable attention in the literature. Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1982) (KMRW for short) show that even the famous paradox of the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma game disappears when reputation phenomena are brought into the analysis. A small uncertainty about a player’s preferences can be used by the player to create a favorable false reputation in a long game. Such a false reputation can lead to long periods of cooperation in equilibrium.

Generalizing this result, Fudenberg and Maskin (1986) establish a reputation “folk” theorem. They study an $n$-person normal form game $G$ played repeatedly $m$ times with perfect monitoring ($m \times G$, for short) and show that if there is a small uncertainty about players’ payoffs, but the number of repetitions $m$ is large, then any vector of individually rational payoffs of the stage game $G$ is obtainable as the average payoff of a Bayesian equilibrium of a Bayesian version of $m \times G$.

While the above papers show that false reputations can be sustained in long finitely repeated games played by an isolated group of $n$-players, it is not clear that the same phenomenon can be sustained by an entire society. If many different groups of players play $m \times G$ recurrently, and later groups of players observe the play of earlier groups, does the ability to maintain false reputation disappear?

We study this question in the context of a Bayesian recurring game where the stage game is itself a finitely repeated ($m \times G$) game. (To avoid confusion with a double use of the term stage game, the $m$ iterations within a stage game are called rounds.) A recurring game is one where the stage game is played in periods $t = 1, 2, ...$ as follows. In period 1 a group of $n$-players play $m \times G$ and the resulting play path becomes public knowledge available to all future players. In period 2 a new group of $n$-players plays $m \times G$ and the resulting play path becomes publicly known. This iteration continues indefinitely so that after every social history of play paths a new group of $n$-players plays the stage game and adds one play path to the cumulative social history.\footnote{See Jackson and Kalai (1997) for more on recurring games.}

Each of the infinitely many players in the recurring game has preferences
over the play paths of his or her own stage game. To allow for uncertainty about opponents’ preferences, an essential ingredient for the reputation question, the recurring game is augmented to be a Bayesian recurring game. In a preliminary stage, according to a commonly known prior probability distribution, an infinite vector of Harsanyi (1967) types is drawn and each player in the infinite horizon is informed of his or her own realized preferences. With this private information they proceed to play the infinite recurring game described above.

Since the first stage of the Bayesian recurring game is the Fudenberg and Maskin game, initial uncertainty can lead to a large variety of reputations and possible play paths. For example, if the underlying normal form game \( G \) is a prisoners’ dilemma game and all the players in the Bayesian recurring game were selected to have standard prisoners’ dilemma preferences, but the prior distribution assigns positive probability to player types that prefer to use a tit-for-tat strategy, then (following the results of KMRW) the first play path will be mostly cooperative. It is not clear, however, what late play paths are likely to be. There seem to be two competing arguments.

One argument, combining learning and backwards induction, builds on the fact that in this example all of the realized types hold standard prisoners’ dilemma preferences and so they will certainly fink in the last round of their stage games. After learning to predict this, later players will fink in second to last round. As later players learn to predict this, they will fink in the third to last round, and so on.

Another argument leads to an opposite view. After the above learning has led things to unravel to the point where agents are finking even in the first round, a cooperative first round action by a late player is likely to be interpreted by his opponent as a signal that the player is not a standard prisoners’ dilemma type. In turn, this could help this player build a favorable reputation for the remaining \( m - 1 \) rounds of his stage game. So, is it possible to construct a cyclical equilibrium of the recurring game where the play in different stages alternates between long periods of cooperation and long periods of finking? The answer to this question would seem to be yes, especially if the set of possible types is rich enough to allow for preferences of later players potentially to be unrelated to those of earlier players.

This paper illustrates the strength of the learning argument by showing that even when the prior probability distribution over types is uncountably rich, the false reputation phenomenon dies out with time and in equilibrium
late players play near the equilibrium of the stage game. For example, in the Bayesian recurring repeated prisoners' dilemma game, for a large set of initial beliefs, if the realized players are close to the standard prisoners’ dilemma types, then the probability of a finking play path approaches one over time. In more general terms, while for the first period of the Bayesian recurring repeated game one obtains a general folk theorem, in later periods one obtains what may be thought of as an anti-folk theorem.

To demonstrate this conclusion, this paper combines the purification ideas of Harsanyi (1973) with results from the recent literature on rational learning (relating to the merging of measures as shown by Blackwell and Dubins (1962) and Kalai and Lehrer (1993a)). Recent criticisms of the Kalai and Lehrer (1993a) approach center on the assumption that the prior assigns positive probability\(^2\) to single vectors of types (see Jordan (1993), Nachbar (1997ab), Foster and Young (1996)). For instance, if the set of types is sufficiently rich, then it is impossible to have players' predictions eventually become accurate, and to have the players best respond to those beliefs. One intuition, following Jordan (1993), is that with a rich enough type space best responses generically are pure strategies, yet equilibrium convergence may require mixed strategies. The requirement of predicting an opponent's behavior cannot be met as it implies prediction of the actual pure strategy played, contradicting the best response requirement for a game with a mixed strategy equilibrium.

We overcome this difficulty in the face of a rich type space by studying the play of \(\varepsilon\)-neighborhoods of a given player. We refer to the players in the neighborhood as \(\varepsilon\)-variants of the given player. Even though the prior probability of a given type may be zero, the prior probability on the player being some \(\varepsilon\)-variant may be positive. Our results rest on the fact that, although any single player will always be choosing pure strategies, any set of \(\varepsilon\)-variants of the player eventually will choose actions that average to the correct mixed strategy. Thus, Harsanyi's (1973) purification idea arises naturally and plays an important role in our recurring context.

The indirect contributions of this paper to rational learning are similar to, yet different from, some existing papers. First, like Jordan (1991), Nyarko (1994), Jackson and Kalai (1997), and Lehrer and Smorodinsky (1997), this paper is restricted to learning Nash equilibrium within the play of Bayesian

\(^2\)Similar criticisms apply to the weaker assumption of absolute continuity.
equilibrium. However, those papers study the repeated play of a one shot

  game and assume that the stage game actions are observed. Given that

  our stage games are themselves repeated games, it is unreasonable to as-

  sume that the actions chosen in the stage game are observed, since those

  actions include prescriptions for play at potentially unreached nodes of the

  corresponding extensive form. Thus, we assume that only play paths are

  observed in the stage games, which means that the results mentioned above

  cannot be applied.

  In addition to the weakening of the requirement of observability of stage

  game play, our assumptions concerning the prior probability differ from previ-

  ous papers that have obtained results concerning convergence of equilibrium

  play. Lehrer and Smorodinsky (1997) and Sandroni (1997) assume a positive

  prior probability of all neighborhoods of the true type to draw conclusions

  about eventual equilibrium play. However, while the assumption in those

  papers relate to players’ behaviors, the assumptions in our paper are on the

  primitive of preferences.

  The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the model, Section

  3 presents the general theorem, Section 4 presents the proof of the theo-

  rem, Section 5 examines the repeated prisoners’ dilemma and shows that a

  strengthening of the theorem is possible, and Section 6 concludes.

2 The Model

The Stage Game

There are \( n \) player roles.

The stage game consists of \( m \geq 1 \) rounds of a finite normal form game

played repeatedly by a fixed group of \( n \) players. We refer to iterations inside

a stage as rounds, to distinguish them from stages.

\( A_i \), with generic element \( a_{i,j} \), is a finite set of possible actions that player

\( i \) has available in the normal form game. Let \( A = \times_i A_i \).

\(^3\)Jackson and Kalai (1997) allow for more general stage games. However, they assume

  countable sets of types and some relationship between payoffs and observability.

\(^4\)Jordan (1991) and Nyarko (1994) also have measures over preferences as the primitive, but they obtain results concerning convergence of players’ expectations, rather than play, and for the case where the stage game is a normal form game. The reader is referred to Marimon (1995) for a survey of the learning literature.
A result of the stage game is a play path, i.e., a vector \( p = (a^1, a^2, \ldots, a^n) \) with \( a^k \in A \) denoting the vector of actions taken at round \( k \). \( A^n \) denotes the set of all possible play paths.

\( S_i \), with generic element \( s_i \), is a set of possible strategies that player \( i \) can use for playing the stage game. Following Kuhn's (1953) theorem, we consider mixed strategies of the extensive form stage game.

\( g_s \) denotes the probability distribution over play paths induced by a given vector of strategies \( s = (s_1, \ldots, s_n) \). Let \( g_{s_{-i}, \cdot} \) denote the distribution over play paths obtained when players other than \( i \) play according to \( s \) and \( i \) plays the strategy \( r_i \).

**The Recurring Game**

The stage game is played sequentially but each time by a new group of \( n \) players. After each stage the play path resulting in the stage becomes publicly known to all future players.

For each time \( t \in \{1, 2, 3, \ldots\} \) \( h^t \) denotes the history of play paths that resulted in stages preceding stage \( t \). Thus, \( h^t \) is a vector \( (p^1, \ldots, p^{t-1}) \). We follow the convention that \( h^1 = \emptyset \). For each \( t \) the set of histories \( h^t \) is denoted \( H^t \). and the set of all finite histories is \( H = \bigcup H^t \).

After every history a new group of \( n \) players is selected to play the stage game. The pair \((i, h^t)\) denotes the player who plays in role \( i \) at stage \( t \) if the history through \( t \) is \( h^t \).

**Types**

The set denoting the possible types for players in role \( i \) is \( V_i \), with generic element \( v_i : A^n \rightarrow [0, 1] \). A type \( v_i \) specifies the payoff to the player in role \( i \) as a function of the play path played in his stage. It is assumed that players' objectives are to maximize their expected payoffs. The type of player \((i, h^t)\) is denoted \( u_{i, h^t} \), where \( u_{i, h^t} \in V_i \). \( \hat{V} \equiv \times_i V_i \) denotes the set of vectors of stage game types.

This formulation of types is more general than the standard one. Usually different types are described by different payoff matrices for the underlying normal form game, with each player type assessing his payoff for a given play path by adding up (and perhaps discounting) the payoffs from each round.

\[^5\text{The bound on utility is not important to our results. It allows us to easily define a metric on the space and avoid using topological arguments.}\]
Assigning payoffs directly to play paths allows us to easily incorporate a rich variety of types, including boundedly rational ones like 'tit-for-tat' types (see Remark 1, below).

A type profile for players in role $i$ ($i$-type profile, for short), is an infinite vector $u_i = (u_{i,h})_{h \in H}$ which specifies a type for player $(i, h)$ for each $h \in H$. Note that a player's type may be history dependent.

A social type profile is a vector $u = (u_i)$ specifying an $i$-type profiles for every $i$. The set of $i$-type profiles is denoted $U_i$, and the set of social type profiles is denoted $U$.

**The Bayesian Recurring Game**

A Bayesian recurring game allows for uncertainty over the types of opponents as follows.

**The Prior Distribution**

Given two $i$-type profiles $u_i \in U_i$ and $u'_i \in U_i$, define the metric

$$|u_i - u'_i| = \sup_{h, h', p} |u_{i,h}(p) - u'_{i,h}(p')|.$$  

Given social type profiles $u \in U$ and $u' \in U$, define the metric

$$|u - u'| = \max_i |u_i - u'_i|.$$  

For $\varepsilon > 0$ let $u^\varepsilon$ denote the neighborhood

$$u^\varepsilon = \{u' : |u - u'| \leq \varepsilon\}.$$  

$D_i$ is a type-generating measure over $i$-type profiles, i.e., a Borel probability measure over the set $U_i$. The support of $D_i$ may be uncountable. $D$ is the product measure, $D = \times_i D_i$, over the set of social type profiles $U$.

This formulation does not assume independence of $i$-types across time, but does assume that the type of opponents a player faces is independent of his own type. This assumption drastically simplifies the mathematics of computing best-responses in a model with uncountably many types.

The social type profile $u$ is non-isolated if $D(u^\varepsilon) > 0$ for all $\varepsilon > 0$.

**Strategies**
A strategy for player \((i, h^t)\) is a Borel measurable function \(\sigma_{i,h^t} : V_i \rightarrow S_i\), which specifies a stage game (mixed) strategy for \((i, h^t)\) as a function of \((i, h^t)\)'s type \(u_{i,h^t}\).

A social strategy profile \(\sigma\) is an infinite vector of strategies \(\sigma = (\sigma_{i,h^t})_{i,h^t}\), which specifies a strategy \(\sigma_{i,h^t}\) for each player \((i, h^t)\).

The Bayesian recurring game is played as follows:

In an initial stage a social type profile \(u\) is chosen according to the prior \(D\) and each player \((i, h^t)\) is informed of his or her own realized \(u_{i,h^t}\).

Stage 1: Players \((1, h^1), \ldots, (n, h^1)\) select strategies as a function of their types, i.e., \(s_i = \sigma_{i,h^1}(u_{i,h^1})\), to play the stage game. A play path \(p^1\) is determined by the distribution \(g_s\) and the social history at the beginning of stage 2. \(h^2 \equiv (p^1)\) is publicly revealed.

The infinite recurring game is defined inductively for \(t = 2, 3, \ldots\).

Stage \(t\): The new players \((i, h^t)\) select stage-game strategies \((s_i)\) as a function of their types, i.e., \(s_i = \sigma_{i,h^t}(u_{i,h^t})\). A play path \(p^t\) is randomly selected by the distribution \(g_s\) and the social history of length \(t\), \(h^{t+1} \equiv (p^1, p^2, \ldots, p^t)\), becomes publicly known.

**Outcomes and Probability**

A fully specified outcome of the Bayesian recurring game is an infinite sequence

\[ o = (u, p^1, p^2, \ldots). \]

A social strategy profile \(\sigma\), together with \(D\), determines a probability measure \(P_\sigma\) as follows. For any \(o = (u, p^1, p^2, \ldots)\), let \(o^1 = (u)\) and \(o^t = (u, p^1, p^2, \ldots, p^{t-1})\). The Borel field over social type profiles induces a \(\sigma\)-algebra, \(F^1\), over the space of all outcomes. Similarly, given the finite set of play paths at each time, we have an obvious \(\sigma\)-algebra, \(F^t\), over outcomes based on the social type profile and the information observable through the beginning of stage \(t\), for each \(t > 1\). The \(\sigma\)-algebra on the space of all outcomes, \(F^\infty\), is the one generated by the sequence \(F^t\). To define the probability measure \(P_\sigma\) over the space of all outcomes, we define \(P^t_\sigma\) for events in \(F^t\) for each \(t\) inductively. For any \(A \in F^1\) let

\[ P^1_\sigma(A) = D\{u : u = o^1, o \in A\} \]
and, inductively, for any $A \in F^t$ let

$$P^t_{\sigma}(A) = \int_{o \in A} g_\sigma(o^t)(p^t_o) \, dP^{t-1}_{\sigma}(o).$$

where $p^t_o$ is the play path at stage $t$ under outcome $o$, and $\sigma(o^t)$ is profile of behavioral strategies $(\sigma_{(i,h^t)}(u_{i,h^t}), \ldots, \sigma_{(n,h^t)}(u_{n,h^t}))$, where $h^t$ and $u_{i,h^t}$ correspond to the outcome $o^t$.

$P_{\sigma}$ is the unique extension of the sequence $P^t_{\sigma}$ to the field $F^\infty$.

**Equilibrium in the Bayesian Recurring Game**

An equilibrium of the Bayesian recurring game is a profile of social strategies $\sigma$ such that $\sigma_{i,h^t}(u_{i,h^t})$ maximizes the expected utility $u_{i,h^t}$ conditional on $h^t$ for each $u_{i,h^t}$. That is, for each $(i,h^t)$

$$\int_{u_{i,h^t}} \left[ \sum_{p^t} g_{\sigma_{i,h^t}(u_{i,h^t}),\sigma_{i,h^t}(u_{i,h^t})}(p^t)u_{i,h^t}(p^t) \right] \, dP_{\sigma}(u_{i,h^t}|h^t)$$

$$\geq \int_{u_{i,h^t}} \left[ \sum_{p^t} g_{\sigma_{i,h^t}(u_{i,h^t}),\sigma_{i,h^t}(u_{i,h^t})}(p^t)u_{i,h^t}(p^t) \right] \, dP_{\sigma'}(u_{i,h^t}|h^t)$$

for all $s_i \in S_i$. Given the independence of types across roles, there is no need to condition on $(i,h_t)'s$ type in addition to conditioning on $h_t$.

**3 Convergence to Equilibrium: A Purification Theorem**

Harsanyi (1973) introduced the idea of a purification of a mixed strategy equilibrium, where a player may be any one of an infinite number of variants whose privately known preferences are close to some publicly known preferences. In an equilibrium of this Bayesian game, the average play of the variant types, who each play pure strategies, is close to the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the complete information game relative to the publicly known preferences. The following definitions are analogous concepts for recurring games.

$\varepsilon$-**Variants**

Fix $\varepsilon > 0$. For a type $v_i$, a vector of types $v$, an $i$-type profile $u_i$, and a social type profile $u$, let $v^t_i, v^\varepsilon_i, u^t_i$, and $u^\varepsilon$ denote the corresponding sets of
\( \varepsilon \)-variants, i.e., \( v_i^\varepsilon = \{ v_i' : |v_i' - v_i| \leq \varepsilon \} \), \( u = \{ u' : |v' - v| \leq \varepsilon \} \), \( u_i^\varepsilon = \{ u_i' : |u_i' - u_i| \leq \varepsilon \} \) and \( u = \{ u' : |u' - u| \leq \varepsilon \} \).

Given \( v \in V \), a vector of stage game types, let \( G_v \) denote the complete information stage game defined by these types. Also, let \( \bar{v} \) denote the constant social type profile defined by \( v \) (i.e., \( \bar{v}_{ih} \equiv v_i \) for every \( i \) and \( h \)) and \( \sigma \) be a fixed social strategy profile. Thus, \( \bar{v} \) is a set of societies where the players in every stage game are \( \varepsilon \)-variants of the constant vector of types \( v \).

**Playing Like**

Given \( \bar{v} \), let \( P_{\sigma|v} \) \( (A) = P_v(A|u \in \bar{v}) \) for every event \( A \), and for any \( h \) \( h \) \( \equiv P_{\sigma|v} \) \( (p) \equiv P_{\sigma|v} \) \( (p|h) \) for any stage game play path \( p \). \( P_{\sigma|v} \) may be thought of as the distribution over social outcomes when the society consists of \( \varepsilon \)-variants of the constant vector of types \( v \) and \( P_{\sigma|v} \) \( (h) \) is the corresponding distribution over play paths of the stage game following \( h \).

Fix \( \gamma > 0 \) and two distributions over stage game play paths \( \hat{g} \) and \( g \). We say that \( \hat{g} \) plays \( \gamma \)-like \( g \) if \( \max_p |\hat{g}(p) - g(p)| \leq \gamma \).

Given \( \gamma > 0 \), \( P_{\sigma|v} \) eventually plays \( \gamma \)-like a Nash equilibrium of \( G_v \) if for \( P_{\sigma|v} \) \( -a.e. \) outcome there exists \( T \) such that for each \( t \geq T \) \( P_{\sigma|v} \) \( h \) plays \( \gamma \)-like \( g_s \) for some Nash equilibrium \( s \) of \( G_v \).

**Theorem 1.** Consider an equilibrium of the Bayesian recurring game, \( \sigma \), and a vector of stage game types \( v \) such that \( \bar{v} \) is non-isolated. For every \( \gamma > 0 \) there exists \( \varepsilon^* > 0 \), such that if \( 0 < \varepsilon \leq \varepsilon^* \), then \( P_{\sigma|v} \) eventually plays \( \gamma \)-like a Nash equilibrium of \( G_v \).

Theorem 1 states that for a non-isolated vector of stage game types \( v \), if the society consists of \( \varepsilon \)-variants of \( v \), then in equilibrium late stage games will play arbitrarily close to a Nash equilibrium of the stage game with the known types. In other words, the difference between the Bayesian equilibrium with uncertainty about opponents’ types and equilibrium of the game with the known types disappears in late stage games. In particular, the strategic use of reputation due to uncertainty about opponents’ types must die out with time. Before proceeding with the proof of the theorem, we remark on some aspects of the model and their role in Theorem 1.

**Remark 1: On the permissible types.** Describing a player type by payoffs over play paths rather than over a matrix for round payoffs, enriches the
analysis and strengthens the above result. Any type that can be described by a payoff matrix can be described through this more general formulation. His path payoff is simply the sum of the round payoffs computed using his type payoff matrix. In addition, however, a new large variety of types, describing rational and boundedly rational players, can be accommodated. For example, a player 1 type who always plays the tit-for-tat (tft) strategy in the prisoners’ dilemma game has payoff over play paths described as follows. Play paths which are compatible with a tft strategy of player 1 are assigned a payoff of 1, and play paths which are incompatible with play of tft by player 1 are assigned a 0 payoff. Even if the original motivation for this player is not ‘rational’, in the type formulation just described it is a (strictly) dominant strategy for him to follow the tft strategy. In other words, any fixed rule of behavior in the repeated game can be described by the behavior of a rational player with appropriately chosen preferences over play paths. For example we can have types who always (like to) cooperate, types who always fink, and tricky types who play tft in the first $m - 1$ rounds but fink in the last round. Since the prior distribution over types is defined over this abstract set, going into his stage game a player may not a priori rule out any of this rich set of types.

Remark 2: On the prior distribution. While each player knows his own realized type, he forms beliefs about the types of his opponents by updating the prior distribution $D$ based on the observed social history. Since the distributions $D$, operate directly on profiles of types, they can describe a rich family of beliefs about the generation of types. For example, the prior might be a totally random distribution where after every history and for every play path player $i$ is assigned a random payoff between 0 and 1 according to a uniform distribution, independently of all past assignments. Thus, the opponents that player 1 faces in any given period are new and, moreover, have preferences believed to be independent of all the observed earlier players. Clearly such beliefs make learning difficult, and violate the non-isolated types condition. Another example, that clearly does lend itself to learning and satisfy the non-isolated types condition (for each possible realized type), is one where a payoff matrix is randomly chosen for each $i$ and used to compute payoffs in each round of every stage. That is, any player $i$’s payoff for any play path is computed by summing his round payoffs according to the matrix which was randomly selected, once and for all, prior
to the first stage. Despite the fact that a continuum of social profiles can be selected, learning is possible since the preferences of future player i's are identical to the preferences of past player i's.

The description of the prior distribution also allows the inclusion of uncertainty on which prior is used to generate types (by the usual phenomenon that a prior over priors can be replaced by a single prior). For example, player 1 may believe that player 2’s types are generated by one of the processes described above, but not sure of which one. Representing $D$ as the convex combination of these two distributions, captures the idea that player 1 assigns probability to each of these models of type generation.

**Remark 3: On the assumption of non-isolated profile.** As discussed in Remark 2 above, the beliefs held by players about the types of their opponents may be quite general and in some cases may preclude learning. The condition that a social profile $\vec{v}$ is non-isolated is sufficiently strong to make learning possible, conditional on having a social profile realized in neighborhood of $\vec{v}$. When priors are mixed it is sufficient to assign a positive probability to a prior satisfying the non-isolation condition. in order to have the mixed prior satisfy this property.

**Remark 4: On learning and purification:** Considering play of the $\varepsilon$-variants of $\vec{v}$ rather than the play of $\vec{v}$ is critical to the validity of Theorem 1. Jordan (1993) makes it clear that it will be impossible to have players learn to play mixed strategy equilibria, since they generally will have pure best responses to their beliefs at any stage. Here, we do not require that players make correct predictions about the actual player that they face or that the particular paired players play close to a Nash equilibrium. Instead, we find that actual play averaged over types in any arbitrarily small neighborhood of a given profile of types converges to Nash equilibrium play, which provides a true purification of the Nash equilibrium.\(^6\)

**Remark 5: On Other Impossibilities in Learning.** In two recent papers on repeated games, Nachbar (1997a,b) presents conditions on the richness of types under which rational learning is impossible.\(^7\) Nachbar’s results show

\(^6\)See Nyarko (1994) for a different approach where beliefs are not necessarily correct in any single period, but match the empirical distribution of play over time.

\(^7\)Although his setting is repeated, his assumption of myopic behavior by agents allows his setting to be translated into a recurring setup and so it appears that his results would
the incompatibility of three things: a specific condition of richness of types, consistency of each type's beliefs with respect to the actual set of types, and best response behavior by all types. An implication of his results is that there is a fundamental incompatibility between just having a Bayesian equilibrium in a recurring (or even repeated) game and having a rich set of types in his sense. Given that our equilibrium admits a very rich set of types and beliefs, this suggests that one needs to better understand his richness conditions and explore the degree of irrationality required in order to satisfy them.

Remark 6: A Corollary on Expectations: Since $P_\sigma$ merges$^8$ with $P_{\sigma|\omega}$, we can modify the statement of Theorem 1 to conclude that for $P_{\sigma|\omega}-a.e.$ outcome there exists $T$ such that for each $t \geq T$, $P_{\sigma|\omega}$ plays $\gamma$-like $g_s$ for some Nash equilibrium $s$ of $G_v$. Then, in the case where almost every social profile is non-isolated, we can conclude that $P_\sigma$ eventually plays $\gamma$-like a Nash equilibrium of $G_v$ (where $v$ is the realized stage utility profile). This provides a result similar to that of Jordan (1991), but for the case where the stage game is itself an extensive form game and only its play path is publicly observed.

4 Proof of Theorem 1.

A direct proof of Theorem 1 is possible but complicated. It involves combining a delicate backward induction argument (within the stage games) with repeated use of Bayes' formula and the law of total probability, taking limits as $\varepsilon$ goes to zero and $T$ goes to infinity. However, the purification idea, combined with the concept of $\delta-\varepsilon$-subjective equilibrium, and a result on the merging of measures provides a "simple" proof.

Fix $v$ to be a vector of types for the stage game $G_v$. Given two strategy profiles $s$ and $r$ for $G(v)$, we say that $s$ plays $\gamma$-like $r$ if $g_s$ plays $\gamma$-like $g_r$.

For each player role $i$ consider a profile $s^i = (s^i_1, \ldots, s^i_n)$ of strategies for the stage game and let $s = (s^1_1, s^2_2, \ldots, s^n_n)$. $s^i_j$ is interpreted as the strategy that player $i$ believes player role $j$ plays, and $s$, under the assumption that

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$^8$For $P_{\sigma|\omega}-a.e.$ outcome and any $\gamma > 0$ there exists $T$ such that for $t \geq T$, $P_{\sigma|\omega}$ plays $\gamma$-like $P_{\sigma|\omega^*,\omega^*}$. 

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players know their own strategies. is the vector of strategies actually used. The following concept is defined by Kalai and Lehrer (1993b): 9

A profile \((s^i_j)_{i,j}\) forms a \(\delta - \varepsilon\)-subjective equilibrium of the stage game, \(G_v\), if for each \(i\)

(i) \(s^i\) plays \(\delta\)-like \(s_i\), and

(ii) \(s^i_j\) is an \(\varepsilon\)-best response to \(s^i_{-i}j\).

The following Lemma strengthens a claim (Remark 2) of Kalai and Lehrer (1993b) and is useful in the proof of Theorem 1.

**Lemma 1.** Consider a stage game and a utility vector \(v\). For every \(\gamma > 0\) there exists \(\delta^* > 0\) and \(\varepsilon^* > 0\) such that each \(\delta - \varepsilon\)-subjective equilibrium with \(\delta \leq \delta^*\) and \(\varepsilon \leq \varepsilon^*\) plays \(\gamma\)-like some Nash equilibrium of the stage game \(G_v\).

**Proof:** Pick any \(\gamma > 0\). By Proposition 2 in Kalai and Lehrer (1993b) there exists \(\delta^* > 0\) such that each \(\delta - 0\)-subjective equilibrium with \(\delta \leq \delta^*\) plays \(\gamma\)-like some Nash equilibrium of the stage game \(G_v\). Suppose that Lemma 1 is false. Then, there exist sequences \(\delta^k \to 0\), \(\varepsilon^k \to 0\), and a corresponding sequence \(\{(s^i_j)^k\}_{i,j}\) of \(\delta^k - \varepsilon^k\)-subjective equilibria that do not play \(\gamma\)-like any Nash equilibrium of \(G_v\). Given the finiteness of the stage game, find a convergent subsequence of \(\{(s^i_j)^k\}_{i,j}\) and let its limit be \((s^i_j)_{i,j}\). It follows that \((s^i_j)_{i,j}\) does not play \(\gamma\)-like any Nash equilibrium of \(G_v\). It also follows that \((s^i_j)_{i,j}\) is a \(\delta^* - 0\)-subjective equilibrium (since payoffs are continuous in mixed strategies). This contradicts the fact that any \(\delta^* - 0\)-subjective equilibrium plays \(\gamma\)-like some Nash equilibrium of the stage game \(G_v\). 

The proof of Theorem 1 is then based on the following construction. Consider the (non-Bayesian) recurring game, \(R_\varepsilon\), with stage games \(G_v\). For each player role \(i\) consider the \(\varepsilon^*\)-variants of \(v_i\). Construct an \(i\)-player mixed strategy profile \(\eta_i\) in \(R_\varepsilon\) which corresponds to the average play of the \(\varepsilon^*\)-variants of \(v_i\) in the Bayesian recurring equilibrium. The play generated by the constructed profile of strategies \(\eta\) induces the same distribution over the play paths of all stage games as does the Bayesian recurring game equilibrium.

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9 Also, see Battigali (1987) and Fudenberg and Levine (1993) for the related concepts of conjectural and self-conforming equilibria.
when restricted to the $\varepsilon$-variants of $v$. Thus, it suffices to show that these constructed strategies $\eta$ play $\gamma$-like a Nash equilibrium of $R_\varepsilon$ in all late stage
games, which is the use of the purification idea. Relying upon Lemma 1, this
is accomplished by starting with a small enough $\varepsilon$, and then showing that in
late subgames the constructed strategies $\eta$ are a $\delta$-$\varepsilon$-subjective equilibrium
for small enough $\delta$. The $\delta$-convergence of beliefs follows from results on
merging.

Formally, for every measurable set of $i$-type profiles $B_i$ define the $B_i$
average strategy (induced by $\sigma$) $\eta_{i, h^i | B_i}$ by

$$\eta_{i, h^i | B_i} = \int_{u_i, h^i} \sigma_{i, h^i}(u_i, h^i) dP_\sigma(u_i, h^i | h^i, u_i \in B_i).$$

**Lemma 2:** Fix $\varepsilon > 0$, $\delta > 0$, and a vector of non-isolated types $\bar{c}$. For
almost every history generated by the strategies $(\eta_{i, h^i | c_i^j})_i$ there is a time $T$
such that for all $t \geq T$ the matrix defined below is a $\delta$-$\varepsilon$-subjective equilibrium
of $G_v$:

$$s^t_j = \eta_{i, h^i | c_i^j} \text{ if } j \neq i \text{ and } s^t_i = \eta_{i, h^i | c_i^i}.$$  

The probability distribution over play paths induced by the strategies
$s^t_i = \eta_{i, h^i | c_i^i}$, is the distribution generated by the $\varepsilon$-variants of $\bar{c}$ under the
Bayesian equilibrium. The distribution generated by the strategies $s^t_j = \eta_{i, h^i | c_i^j}$, is the distribution generated on (conditionally weighted) average by
all types of $j$ under the Bayesian equilibrium, and corresponds to the beliefs
of $i$ about the other players.

**Proof of Lemma 2:** Part (ii) in the definition of $\delta$-$\varepsilon$-subjective equilibrium
is satisfied by $(s^t_j)_{j \neq i}$ by the definition of $\eta_{i, h^i | c_i^j}$. (Each action in the support
of $\eta_{i, h^i | c_i^j}$ is a best response to $(s^t_r)_r$ for some $\varepsilon$-variant of $v_r$, and is thus
an $\varepsilon$-best response relative to $v_r$.) To see part (i) of the definition of $\delta$-$\varepsilon$-
subjective equilibrium, notice that each strategy $\eta_{i, h^i | c_i^j}$ is a mixed strategy
composed of $\eta_{i, h^i | c_i^j}$ and a second strategy $(\eta_{i, C}^\varepsilon$ with $C$ being the complement
of $v_r^\varepsilon$) which assigns strictly positive probability to $\eta_{i, h^i | c_i^j}$ under the
non-isolation condition. A result about merging (e.g., Theorem 3 in Kalai and
Lehrer (1993a)) is then sufficient to guarantee that Part (i) of the definition
of $\delta$-$\varepsilon$-subjective equilibrium is satisfied after a sufficiently long random time
$T$.  \[\]
Proof of Theorem 1: Fix $\gamma > 0$ and $v$ such that $D(\vec{v}) > 0$ for all $\sigma > 0$.

By Lemma 1, find $\delta^*$ and $\epsilon^*$ such that for any $\delta \leq \delta^*$ and $\epsilon \leq \epsilon^*$ any $\delta - \epsilon$-subjective equilibrium relative to $v$ plays $\gamma$-like some Nash equilibrium of $G_v$. It follows from Lemma 2 applied to $\delta \leq \delta^*$ and $\epsilon \leq \epsilon^*$ that for $P_{\sigma|\sigma^*}$ almost every outcome there exists $T$ such that $P_r(P^t | h^t, u \in \vec{v})$ plays $\gamma$-like some Nash equilibrium of $G_r$ for each $t \geq T$.

5 Noncooperation in the Prisoners' Dilemma

Consider the situation where the stage game is a finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma. Following well-known terminology, in each of the $m$-rounds each of the two players chooses one of two actions: C (cooperate) or F (fink).

Of special interest are the types whose utility is computed to be the sum of the payoffs of the $m$-rounds of their own stage game obtained from a standard prisoners' dilemma table. The following table describes such single round payoffs for player 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>C</th>
<th>F</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

and the symmetrically opposed table describes the single round payoffs of a standard player-two type. Let $r_i, i = 1, 2$, denote such standard types and, as before, let $\vec{r}$ denote the corresponding social profile.

The noncooperative play path is one where both players play action $F$ in each round of the prisoners' dilemma.

Theorem 2. Consider $D$ such that $\vec{r}$ is non-isolated, and an equilibrium $\sigma$ of the Bayesian recurring $m$-times repeated prisoners' dilemma. There exists $\epsilon^* > 0$ such that for every $0 < \epsilon \leq \epsilon^*$

$$\lim_{t \to \infty} P_{\sigma|\sigma^*} \text{ (a noncooperative path at time } t) = 1.$$
Theorem 2 states that if player roles are really being filled with players who are close to having standard prisoners' dilemma payoffs, then play will converge to that of the Nash equilibrium in the sense that it will become arbitrarily likely that players will play noncooperatively. The stronger conclusion, that players will play noncooperatively with certainty after some time is not necessarily true. Consider, for instance a version of the KMRW world, where there are social types who are sometimes tit-for-tat and sometimes rational players. In equilibrium rational players could mix on C (in the early rounds relative to m) with positive probability in every stage following every history. This follows along the KMRW reasoning. Players can never completely rule out tit-for-tat types after any finite history. If rational players did not mix on C, then a rational player who did play C would be believed with certainty to be a tit-for-tat player and could gain, contradicting equilibrium.

Notice that the conclusion of Theorem 2 is stronger than the conclusion of Theorem 1. In Theorem 1, \( \varepsilon^* \) depends on how close one would like to be to the Nash equilibrium play; i.e., \( \varepsilon^* \) depends on \( \gamma \). In Theorem 2, we can fix a single \( \varepsilon^* \) and eventually play as close as one likes to the (unique) Nash equilibrium play path. This stronger conclusion is derived from the particular structure of the prisoners' dilemma. To prove Theorem 2, we introduce a new concept which is a strengthening of the concept of \( \delta - \varepsilon \)-subjective equilibrium.

**Tight \( \delta - \varepsilon \)-Subjective Equilibrium**

A profile \( (s^i)_{i,j} \) forms a **tight \( \delta - \varepsilon \)-subjective equilibrium** of the stage game, \( G_v \), if for each \( i \)

(i) \( s^i \) plays \( \delta \)-like \( s^i \) and

(ii) each pure strategy in the support of \( s^i \) is an \( \varepsilon \)-best response to \( s^j_{-i} \).

The concept of **tight \( \delta - \varepsilon \)-subjective equilibrium**\(^{10}\) places a restriction on the nature of the \( \varepsilon \)-best response: each strategy in the support of a player’s strategy must be a best response relative to some \( \varepsilon \)-variant of \( v \). The usual definition of \( \varepsilon \)-best response allows for mixtures that place small probability on strategies that are far from being best responses. Such mixtures are ruled out under the tight definition. This stronger definition and the structure of

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\(^{10}\) The notion of “tightness” is useful in other contexts as well. See Jackson and Kalai (1997) for the related notion of a tight \( \varepsilon \)-Bayesian equilibrium and its usefulness.
the prisoners' dilemma allows us to strengthen Lemma 1 to find a uniform ε across γ.

**Lemma 3.** Consider the prisoners' dilemma stage game with utility vector r. There exists ε* > 0 such that for every γ > 0 there exists δ* > 0 such that each tight δ - ε-subjective equilibrium with δ ≤ δ* and ε ≤ ε* plays γ-like the Nash equilibrium of the stage game Gr.

**Proof of Lemma 3:** Suppose the contrary. Then there exists a sequence of εk → 0, and a corresponding sequence of γk > 0, such that for every 11 δ > 0 there exists a tight δ - εk-subjective equilibrium that does not play γk-like the Nash equilibrium of Gr. Consider any k. Since the above statement holds for all δ > 0, it follows that there exists a tight 0 - εk-subjective equilibrium that does not play γk-like the Nash equilibrium of Gr. (Take the limit of a convergent subsequence of tight δ - εk-subjective equilibria as δ → 0.)

Next, given the structure of the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma, Gr, we can find ε* such that if |v - r| ≤ ε*, then the following holds: If in a given round a player i expects finkng with probability 1 in all subsequent rounds, then any best response to the player's beliefs relative to v; results in the player finking in that round. (Finking in that round results in a higher payoff than cooperating in that round, and can do no worse in the continuation since the current continuation has finking with probability 1 in any remaining rounds.)

Finally, combining the two ideas above, choose k such that εk < ε* and consider a tight 0 - εk-subjective equilibrium that does not play γk-like the Nash equilibrium of Gr. There exists a last round in which some player finks with probability less than 1 on the play path. Consider that round and some such player i. Given that i must expect finking with probability 1 in all subsequent rounds and that εk < ε*, a best response for i to any v; where |v - r| ≤ ε* must be to fink in that round, which is a contradiction.

To prove Theorem 2, we need to restate Lemma 2 for the concept of tight δ - ε-subjective equilibrium.

**Lemma 4:** Fix ε > 0, δ > 0 and a vector of non-isolated types v. For almost every history generated by the strategies (ηk, b|v|k), there is a time T

11 Note that any tight δ' - ε-subjective equilibrium is a tight δ - ε-subjective equilibrium, whenever δ' ≤ δ.
 such that for all $t \geq T$ the matrix defined below is a tight $\delta - \varepsilon$-subjective equilibrium of $G_v$:

$$s^i_j = \eta_{j,t}'(u'_j) \text{ if } j \neq i \text{ and } s^i_i = \eta_{i,t}'(u'_i).$$

Proof of Lemma 4: This follows the proof of Lemma 2, substituting the words "tight $\delta - \varepsilon$-subjective equilibrium" instead of "$\delta - \varepsilon$-subjective equilibrium."  

Proof of Theorem 2: Theorem 2 is proven by combining Lemma 3 with Lemma 4 in the same way that Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 are used to prove Theorem 1, except that Lemma 3 allows for a uniform choice of $\varepsilon^*$ across $\gamma \rightarrow 0$.

6 Concluding Remarks

Extensive form stage games present specific off-equilibrium path learning problems (see Fudenberg and Kreps (1988)). Here the recurring play of $m \times G$ leads to convergence to Nash equilibrium even though the off-the-equilibrium play is never observed. However, in order to obtain results concerning convergence to subgame perfect equilibrium play, stronger assumptions are needed since there are additional requirements on off-equilibrium-path play. Explicit trembling is used by Jackson and Kalai (1995) to consider learning in Selten’s chain store game. However, that analysis assumes a limited set of types, but it suggests that a similar approach may be possible in the context studied here.

The analysis in this paper, as well as that in much of the Bayesian learning literature, assumes that agents can observe the play in all previous periods. An interesting issue for future consideration is how results such as those presented here extend when agents’ historical horizons are limited.\footnote{This question was raised by Bob Aumann in a seminar presentation of this paper.} For instance, if players can only observe the last $n$ play paths - but realize that earlier players were reacting to earlier observations and use this additional information - will similar results hold?
Finally, one might also consider the following question. Consider again, the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma and suppose that the realized world is the one that actually (randomly) has some types playing tit-for-tat, and other types with standard payoffs. (In other words, types are in fact generated according to the prior of KMRW rather than just being variants of standard players whose beliefs allow for such generation.) If players start with beliefs that put very high probability on all standard payoffs so that they begin by finking, under what conditions would they learn to play the KMRW equilibrium where standard types would enjoy a false reputation? This would be a case where specific beliefs about non-rational types are actually justified. Our results do not answer this question since the stage game equilibrium in that context is a Bayesian equilibrium where very different types are playing across time, and so the non-isolation condition does not apply. However, the techniques we have used here seem to extend (e.g., Lemmas 1 and 2 have analogs for Bayesian subjective equilibrium), and so the answer should be "yes" given an appropriate analog of the non-isolation condition.
References


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